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儒释道耶与中国文化：汉英对照／汤一介著．--北京：外语教学与研究出版社，2016.9

ISBN 978-7-5135-8160-8

Ⅰ．①儒…　Ⅱ．①汤…　Ⅲ．①宗教文化－文集－汉、英②中华文化－文集－汉、英　Ⅳ．①B920-53　②K203-53

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字（2016）第246916号

出版人　　蔡剑峰

系列策划　吴　浩

责任编辑　易　璐

出版发行　外语教学与研究出版社

社　　址　北京市西三环北路19号（100089）

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书　　号　ISBN 978-7-5135-8160-8

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汤一介（1927-2014），中国当代哲学家、哲学史家，原籍湖北黄梅。主要研究魏晋玄学、早期道教、儒家哲学、中西哲学比较等，著述宏富。曾任教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“《儒藏》编纂与研究”首席专家、北京大学儒学研究院院长、中国文化书院创院院长、中华孔子学会会长等职。

“博雅双语名家名作”出版说明

1840年鸦片战争以降，在深重的民族危机面前，中华民族精英“放眼看世界”，向世界寻求古老中国走向现代、走向世界的灵丹妙药，涌现出一大批中国主题的经典著述。我们今天阅读这些中文著述的时候，仍然深为字里行间所蕴藏的缜密的考据、深刻的学理、世界的视野和济世的情怀所感动，但往往会忽略：这些著述最初是用英文写就，我们耳熟能详的中文文本是原初英文文本的译本，这些英文作品在海外学术界和文化界同样享有崇高的声誉。

比如，林语堂的My Country and My People（《吾国与吾民》）以幽默风趣的笔调和睿智流畅的语言，将中国人的道德精神、生活情趣和中国社会文化的方方面面娓娓道来，在美国引起巨大反响——林语堂也以其中国主题系列作品赢得世界文坛的尊重，并获得诺贝尔文学奖的提名。再比如，梁思成在抗战的烽火中写就的英文版《图像中国建筑史》文稿（A Pictorial History of Chinese Architecture），经其挚友费慰梅女士（Wilma C. Fairbank）等人多年的奔走和努力，于1984年由麻省理工学院出版社（MIT Press）出版，并获得美国出版联合会颁发的“专业暨学术书籍金奖”。又比如，1939年，费孝通在伦敦政治经济学院的博士论文以Peasant Life in China—A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley为名在英国劳特利奇书局（Routledge）出版，后以《江村经济》作为中译本书名——《江村经济》使得靠桑蚕为生的“开弦弓村”获得了世界性的声誉，成为国际社会学界研究中国农村的首选之地。

此外，一些中国主题的经典人文社科作品经海外汉学家和中国学者的如椽译笔，在英语世界也深受读者喜爱。比如，艾恺（Guy S. Alitto）将他1980年用中文访问梁漱溟的《这个世界会好吗——梁漱溟晚年口述》一书译成英文（Has Man a Future?—Dialogues with the Last Confucian），备受海内外读者关注；此类作品还有徐中约英译的梁启超著作《清代学术概论》（Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period）、狄百瑞（W. T. de Bary）英译的黄宗羲著作《明夷待访录》（Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince），等等。

有鉴于此，外语教学与研究出版社推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列。

博雅，乃是该系列的出版立意。博雅教育（Liberal Education）早在古希腊时代就得以提倡，旨在培养具有广博知识和优雅气质的人，提高人文素质，培养健康人格，中国儒家六艺“礼、乐、射、御、书、数”亦有此功用。

双语，乃是该系列的出版形式。英汉双语对照的形式，既同时满足了英语学习者和汉语学习者通过阅读中国主题博雅读物提高英语和汉语能力的需求，又以中英双语思维、构架和写作的形式予后世学人以启迪——维特根斯坦有云：“语言的边界，乃是世界的边界”，诚哉斯言。

名家，乃是该系列的作者群体。涵盖文学、史学、哲学、政治学、经济学、考古学、人类学、建筑学等领域，皆海内外名家一时之选。

名作，乃是该系列的入选标准。系列中的各部作品都是经过时间的积淀、市场的检验和读者的鉴别而呈现的经典，正如卡尔维诺对“经典”的定义：经典并非你正在读的书，而是你正在重读的书。

胡适在《新思潮的意义》（1919年12月1日，《新青年》第7卷第1号）一文中提出了“研究问题、输入学理、整理国故、再造文明”的范式。秉着“记载人类文明、沟通世界文化”的出版理念，我们推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列，既希望能够在中国人创作的和以中国为主题的博雅英文文献领域“整理国故”，亦希望在和平发展、改革开放的新时代为“再造文明”、为“向世界说明中国”略尽绵薄之力。

外语教学与研究出版社
人文社科出版分社

I．AN INQUIRY INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD-PHASE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFUCIANISM

Is there the possibility for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? In saying this we mean to regard the school of thought advocated by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States as the first-phase development of Confucianism. After the Han Dynasty Buddhism spread to China. Under the impact of Buddhist ideas, a Confucian school of idealist philosophy emerged during the Song and Ming dynasties. It greatly pushed forward the Confucian doctrines and constituted the second-phase development of Confucianism. Over the last century, Western civilization has found its way into China. Especially around the time of the May Fourth (1919) Movement, Marxism was also disseminated into our country. That gave an even bigger and more serious impact on China's traditional thought and culture. Under such circumstances, is it possible for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? Can it be brought back to life? Can it still have a role to play in China in particular and the world at large? In my opinion, it is perhaps too early to conduct an all-round discussion of this issue. However, to raise questions and opinions from certain angles in an attempt to push the inquiry forward may prove helpful.

In discussing whether it is possible for Confucianism to have a third-phase development, we must, first of all, acquire a clear understanding about the basic spirit of Confucianism. Regarding this basic spirit, there have been in the past, and may be in the future, a variety of different views. The existence of different views is not necessarily a bad thing; it may help deepen the study of this issue. In clarifying the basic spirit, I think attention should be paid to two parts: the part of thoughts that have been constantly effective in the entire course of development of Confucianism, and the part of thoughts that still have vitality today. To combine the two for consideration, we may perhaps find out whether a third-phase development of Confucianism is possible from a certain aspect.

Running through the entire course of development of Confucianism, I believe, are two basic elements that still bear a major significance to us today: one is idealism, the other humanism; and the two are connected.

Confucianism is a kind of idealism. Starting from Confucius, this school of thought has cherished the ideal of having a society in which "right principles prevail" and has made every effort to materialize the ideal in the real world. Despite its acknowledgment of the unattainability of such a goal, it still insists that one should foster the ideal and dedicate oneself to realize it in the spirit of "doing the impossible." Therefore when Zigong asked Confucius: "What if one can generously give to the people and provide relief to them? Can that be called benevolence?" Confucius answered: "One who behaves with benevolence must be a saint! Even Yao and Shun fell short of that." Evidently Confucius did not regard the society of Yao and Shun's time as a society of man's highest ideal. Thus it involves the problem of what we should see as an ideal society. According to the Confucians, an ideal society is an ideal, which has the possibility, and not the necessity, of being realized. Despite the fact that an ideal society has never been realized before, it is a matter of fundamental importance, a problem of one's attitude toward life, whether or not one should seek to realize it. It is the Confucians' belief that one should ceaselessly seek after it. This is why, as I see it, people at that time criticized Confucians as "being ignorant of world affairs." Though it is not necessary that an ideal society be realized in the real world, it can be, as far as the Confucian philosophers are concerned, realized in their minds. Why is it that West Inscription by Zhang Zai was so highly respected by later Confucians? It was that, as I see it, West Inscription embodied the Confucian spirit of seeking to realize an ideal society, plus that Zhang Zai had already built in his mind the ideal society. True, whether the ideal society in which "the people are my brothers and I share my things with them," as Zhang Zai conceived, could be realized in the real world was important to him, but more important was whether one could have a world outlook of pursuing an ideal society. Therefore the last sentence of West Inscription says: "I carry on my pursuit when alive, and rest at ease when I die." While one lives, one has a duty to fulfill. The duty is to exert oneself for the realization of the ideal "world of commonweal." It can be said that this is an attitude of "concerning oneself only about the cultivation instead of the gains." Whoever holds such an attitude toward life has a clear conscience. Don't we today need to have an attitude like this more than ever?

Confucianism is a kind of idealism that has humanism as its prerequisite. Why is it that man must have an ideal and seek to build an ideal society? According to the Confucians, man is the most important factor in the world, because he can "formulate ethics for the universe, provide sustenance for the people, carry forward consummate learnings into posterity, and win peace for thousands of generations to come." Confucius said: "Man can enhance the Way and not the reverse." The "Way" or the "Way of Nature" is an objective existence. But it needs to be enhanced and carried forward by man; it has to be effected by man through practice. How can man embody the "Way of Nature"? If, as the Confucians envisaged, man can understand how "Heaven is integrated with man," "knowledge is integrated with practice," and "feeling is integrated with scenery," man can then attain the loftiest realm of being a man. In other words, man can congeal in his heart the ideal of the true, the good, and the beautiful.

The integration of Heaven with man, knowledge with practice, and feeling with scenery are the three basic propositions the Chinese traditional philosophy made about the true, the good, and the beautiful; they are the ideal realms the Confucian school has been trying to attain. Why is it that Confucianism is in pursuit of the three integrations? In my opinion, Confucianism is nothing more than a teaching that teaches one how to behave oneself; namely, one should set a demand on oneself and hold oneself responsible to the world and the nation. This is a very common question, but involves a task extremely difficult to fulfill. Whoever has attained such an ideal realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful is a saint.

Although the proposition of integrating Heaven with man is designed to illustrate the relations between man and the entire universe, it begins with man as the center of the universe. Zhongyong (The Golden Mean) stated: "Being honest is the Way of Heaven. Striving to be honest is the Way of man. An honest man hits the right Way without difficulty and understands it without deliberation. One who conforms oneself to the Way of Heaven without qualm is a saint." Therefore a saint not only behaves himself in conformity with the requirements of the Way of Heaven but also assumes as his responsibility the fulfillment of such requirements. In living a life in this world, one should not behave oneself with a passive attitude; rather, one should "make unremitting efforts to improve oneself" in order to embody the ceaseless flow and evolution of nature. In this way, man will set a demand on himself; he will find a reason for his existence and foster a lofty ideal. Since one has set a demand on oneself and found a reason for one's existence, the most important thing is for one to "integrate one's understanding with one's behavior" so that one can have a unified viewpoint on understanding and behavior in terms of morality and self-cultivation. The three programs and eight articles outlined in Daxue (The Great Learning) tell us exactly what this is about. It is said in Daxue:

The Way of the great learning lies in shedding light on the bright principles, being close to the people, and stopping at nothing but the utmost good. Those in ancient times who wanted to shed light on the bright principles for the world had to first bring order to their own kingdoms. To bring order to their kingdoms they had to first bring their own houses to order. To bring their houses to order they had to first cultivate their own moral character. To cultivate their own moral character they had to first set their minds straight. To set their minds straight they had to first foster a sincere desire. To foster a sincere desire they had to first carry knowledge to the utmost degree. To carry knowledge to the utmost degree they had to first inquire into the properties of things. Having inquired into the properties of things, they were able to carry knowledge to the utmost degree. Having carried knowledge to the utmost degree, they were able to foster a sincere desire. Having fostered a sincere desire, they were able to set their minds straight. Having set their minds straight, they were able to cultivate their own moral character. Having cultivated their own moral character, they were able to bring their houses to order. Having brought their houses to order, they were able to bring order to their kingdoms. Having brought order to their kingdoms, the whole world would be at peace.

This is a process of cognizance, still more a process of moral practice. Man must have an ideal, and the highest ideal is to "achieve peace" so that human society can attain a realm of "Great Harmony." And the world of "Great Harmony" requires that everyone should set for himself a demand for being a man, a reason for being a man, and "not do to others what one does not wish done to oneself." Noted Confucius: "To implement my principle is nothing more than being honest and just." Whether the ideal society of "Great Harmony" can be attained or not remains a question, of course. But a Confucian must have such a goal and find pleasure in pursuing it. To lead an existence in the world and be a man, one must find pleasure in doing it and appreciate the creation of the universe. And to have a true appreciation of Nature one must be able to display creativity and man's spiritual realm in reproducing the "creation of the universe." One must be able to show why man should be a man, to create poetry and prose "masterpieces," paintings of "superb work," and music like "sounds of nature." This is why art requires that "feeling be integrated with scenery." Wang Fuzhi observed: "In name feeling and scenery are two things, but in reality they are inseparable. Those gifted in writing poetry are capable of unlimited wit. A witty line naturally has feeling in the midst of scenery and scenery in the midst of feeling." "Once feeling is integrated with scenery, a witty remark is ready at hand." When one enters the realm of creation, it will be a realm in which the true, the good, and the beautiful are integrated with one another. This is precisely where the meaning of life and the highest ideal of mankind lie. Confucius described himself as "doing things at will without violating rules at the age of seventy." Probably it was the ideal realm as mentioned above. Indeed, it must be the realm of a saint when whatever one says and does is in harmony with the entire universe, society, and one's own frame of mind.

That Confucianism still has a value for its continued existence is perhaps due to the sole fact that it provides us a reason for being a man. It is most difficult for one to be a man, still more to maintain a harmony between oneself and nature, society and others, or between one's inside and outside in body and soul. Is such a requirement unnecessary in today's world? As Confucianism only tells us the reason for being a man, we should not set demands on it in other aspects. And it should come as no surprise that it suffers from some inadequacies.

壹　关于儒家思想第三期发展可能性的探讨*

儒家思想有没有第三期发展的可能性，这是把春秋战国时期孔孟荀等看成儒家发展的第一期；汉朝以后佛教传入中国，在经过佛教思想的冲击之后，到宋明产生了理学，儒家思想有了很大发展，成为儒家思想发展的第二个时期；近百年来，西方文明的传入，五四运动前后马克思主义又传入中国，这一冲击比佛教对中国传统思想文化的冲击更大、更严重，在这样的情况下，儒家思想有没有第三期发展的可能性？它会不会“死而复生”？它还能不能在中国、在世界上起作用？我想，全面地讨论这个问题或者为时过早，但试图从某些方面提出一些问题和看法，也许对于推动这一问题的探讨是有益的。

讨论儒家思想第三期发展的可能性，首先应弄清儒家思想的基本精神。对于儒家思想的基本精神过去有各种各样不同的看法，今后仍然会有各种各样不同的看法。有不同的看法并不一定是坏事，它会推动对儒家思想的基本精神的研究。弄清儒家思想的基本精神，我觉得可以注意两点：一点是要注意贯穿儒家思想整个发展过程中经常起作用的某些思想；另一点是它到目前为止仍然有活力的那一部分。把这两个方面统一起来考虑，也许可以从某一侧面看到儒家思想有没有第三期发展的可能性。

我认为贯穿整个儒家思想发展过程中有两个基本精神对我们今天仍有很大意义，一是理想主义，二是人本主义，而这两者又是结合在一起的。

在中国传统思想中有一种理想主义，从孔子起就向往着“天下有道”的社会，并且极力想把它实现于现实社会之中，甚至并不认为它完全能够实现，但却认为人们应有这种理想，应有“知不可而为之”的精神而致力于此。所以当子贡问孔子“如有博施于民而能济众，何如？可谓仁乎？”的时候，孔子回答说：“何事于仁，必也圣乎！尧舜其犹病诸。”可见孔子并没有认为尧舜时期的社会就是人类最高的理想社会。因此，就有一个对于理想社会应如何看的问题。照儒家看，理想社会就是一种理想，它只有实现的可能性，但并不一定能把这种可能性变成现实性。尽管理想社会从来没有实现过，但要不要追求它却是一个根本性问题，是一个人生态度问题。孔孟认为，对于它应去不断地追求，所以当时人批评儒家“迂阔”。我看问题就在于此。理想社会虽然不一定能在现实中实现，但对于古代的哲人来说，却可以在他们的心中实现。为什么张载的《西铭》那么受后来宋明理学的重视？我想就在于《西铭》体现了古代思想家追求理想社会的精神，而且在他的心中已经建立了这个理想社会。张载理想中的“民，吾同胞；物，吾与也”的社会是否能实现，这对他来说固然很重要；但更重要的是人能不能有一种追求理想社会的人生态度，所以《西铭》的最后一句是“存，吾顺事；没，吾宁也。”人生在世必须去尽自己的责任，这个责任就是如何为实现理想的“大同世界”而奋斗，为这个理想可以说是“只问耕耘，不问收获”，这样的人生态度是问心无愧的。今天难道我们不是更加需要这种人生态度吗？

儒家思想是一种理想主义，这种理想主义又是以它的人本主义为前提的。人为什么要有一个理想，要追求建立一理想社会？照儒家看，人在天地中是最重要的，他能“为天地立心，为生民立命，为往圣继绝学，为万世开太平”，所以孔子说：“人能弘道，非道弘人。”“道”（或“天道”）是客观存在的，但“道”要人来发扬光大它，要人在实践中体现它。人怎样体现“天道”？儒家认为，如果能了解“天人合一”“知行合一”“情景合一”，那么人就有了一种做人的最高境界，也就可以把其美好的理想凝聚于心中。

“天人合一”“知行合一”“情景合一”是中国传统哲学关于真、善、美的三个基本命题，也是儒家所要追求的理想境界。儒家思想为什么要追求这三个“合一”呢？我认为，儒家思想无非是教人如何做人，对自己应有一个要求，对天下国家应有一个责任感，这是一个很普通的问题，但也是一个极难做到的问题。达到了这个“天人合一”“知行合一”“情景合一”的真、善、美的理想境界的人是圣人。

“天人合一”的问题虽然是说明人和整个宇宙的关系，但它是把人作为宇宙中心来考虑的，《中庸》中说：“诚者，天之道也；诚之者，人之道也。诚者，不勉而中，不思而得，从容中道，圣人也。”因此，圣人的行为不仅应符合“天道”的要求，而且是以实现“天道”的要求为己任。人生活在天地之中，不应取消极态度，而应“自强不息”，体现宇宙大化的流行，这样人就会对自己有个要求，有个做人的道理，有个高尚的境界。既对自己有个要求，要有个做人的道理，最重要的是要做到“知行合一”，有个道德修养上的知行统一观。《大学》的三纲领八条目就是告诉我们这个道理，它说：“大学之道，在明明德，在亲民，在止于至善”；“古之欲明明德于天下者，先治其国。欲治其国者，先齐其家。欲齐其家者，先修其身，欲修其身者，先正其心。欲正其心者，先诚其意。欲诚其意者，先致其知。致知在格物。物格而后知至，知至而后意诚，意诚而后心正，心正而后身修，身修而后家齐，家齐而后国治，国治而后天下平。”这是一个认识过程，更是一个道德实践的过程。人应该有理想，最高的理想是“致太平”，使人类社会达到一个“大同”的境地。而“大同”世界的基本要求就是每个人对自己有个做人的要求，要有个做人的道理，要能“己所不欲，勿施于人”，孔子说：“吾道一以贯之”，“忠恕而已矣。”理想的“大同”世界能否达到自然是个问题，但儒者应有这个要求，并从中得到做人的乐趣。盖人生活在天地之中，要做人，也要有做人的乐趣，要能领略天地造化之功；而真正能领略天地造化之功的，就必须能于再现“天地造化之功”中表现人的创造力，表现人的精神境界，表现人之所以为人者，使诗文成为“至文”，使绘画成为“神品”，使音乐成为“天籁”。所以艺术的要求是“情景合一”的，王夫之说：“情景名为二，而实不可离。神于诗者，妙合无垠。巧者则有情中景，景中情”；“情景一合，自得妙语。”当人进入这一创造的境界，这将是真、善、美合一的境界；人生的意义、人类的最高理想正在于此。孔子说他“七十而从心所欲不逾矩”，大概就是这样一种境界，自己的一切言行和整个宇宙、社会、自己的身心都和谐了，这种境界是真、善、美合一的境界，自然也就是圣人的境界了。

儒家思想之所以仍有存在的价值，也许就仅仅在于它告诉我们一个做人的道理。做人是最不容易的，做到和自然、社会、他人以及自己的身心内外的和谐更是不容易的，难道今天的世界不应有这样的要求吗？正因为儒家思想只是告诉我们一个做人的道理，就不应从其他方面要求它。它有不足的方面，也不应该奇怪。

II．CONFUCIANISM & CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERNISM

I．What Kind of Age Are We in Now?

From a world perspective, our current age can possibly be seen as the transition from modern capitalist society beginning with the first, 18th-century, Enlightenment toward a postmodern society of a "second enlightenment." From a China perspective, our age will be seen as a crucial moment for realizing great national revival in the context of globalization. All in all, for human society, this age represents a precious opportunity to enter a totally new era.

Since the 18th-century Age of Enlightenment, Western capitalism has a history of almost 300 years, during which period the Western world achieved dazzling "modernization." But now, "modernized society" is suffering from more and more intractable problems. Immanuel Kant(1724-1804) proposed that reason should be the watchword of the Enlightenment, but these days "reason" faces its own problems. Originally, "reason" contained two related aspects: "instrumental reason" and "value reason," both aspects with an extremely important role in advancing human progress, but the present-day reality is that "scientifically omnipotent" "instrumental reason" outshines humanistic "value reason," and the latter has become marginalized. As a result, everything becomes an "instrument": people become instruments for others and the natural world has become an instrument to be used by human beings as they see fit.

The normal and harmonious relation between man and nature has been severely harmed by man's unrestrained exploitation, destruction and waste of natural resources. In turn, man's own survival is threatened by deteriorating natural conditions such as depletion of the ozone layer, poisoned oceans, polluted environment and unbalanced ecoenvironment. Although the Kyoto Protocol for limiting air pollution was signed in Kyoto, Japan, in as early as December 1997, certain developed countries in the capitalist world set various obstacles on its path. One example is Canada's recent announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Protocol. This illustrates that the "reason" advocated by the Enlightenment is being changed by some Western leaders into a "non-rational" and utilitarian "tool."

With the growth of industrialization, "free market economy" has promoted the huge increase of human wealth and people have won great material benefit from it. But there is no denying that it has also caused serious polarization between the rich and the poor (including country-to-country, ethnic group-to-ethnic group, class-to-class within a country). If "free market economy" continues to grow like a rapacious monster, without effective supervision, control or restraint, sooner or later it will cause economic crisis and social disturbance. The global financial crisis that first appeared in the USA in 2008 was still ongoing when the debt crisis began to sweep Europe in 2011. According to Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale University, liberalism freed people from the shackles of the pre-market-economy age, but it has also put people in danger of financial crisis and social disasters.¹

Another Enlightenment watchword, "liberation of the individual," originally targeted religious superstition and vulgar ignorance, encouraging people to be fully aware of their own strength so as to fully deploy their "free" creativity. Today, however, this notion has become an instrument for the domination of others, a tool that imperialist countries in particular use to support their own hegemony and impose their own value systems on other countries and people, pushing a universalist doctrine.² The distorted development of today's capitalist society has resulted in people no longer in pursuit of "reason," but indulging themselves in the lust for power and worship of money. Consequently, all groups of people live in pain and mental conflict: ordinary people struggle to survive harsh conditions; intellectuals experience constant guilt because of their inability to settle social chaos; unable to win people's trust, politicians exist in a state of self-deception; entrepreneurs wrestle to figure their way around mutually contradictory rules and systems. Regardless of rank or identity it seems the happy life to which all aspire is out of reach and happiness eludes all. But this is not a problem caused by any individual: rather, it is an unavoidable pain for a society in the throes of a major transitional period. Therefore, it is incumbent on each and every one of us to work hard for the coming of a new age.

II．The Rise of Two Trends of Thought in China in the 1990s

In the 1990s, there emerged in China's ideological and cultural circles two ideological trends opposing the concept of "monism." One trend is "postmodernism," an idea originating in the West and aiming to deconstruct "modernity." In the early 1980s, "postmodernism" had already come to China, but it made little impact at the time; by the 1990s, however, Chinese scholars were suddenly showing it great interest. Another trend is the " Guoxue tide"—the ardent pursuit of revitalizing traditional Chinese culture. In truth, in the 1980s, China's thinkers had advocated greater emphasis on traditional Chinese culture, but it did not coalesce into a surge tide until in the 1990s when Guoxue rose quietly in Peking University. What does the rise of these two trends mean for us?

In the 1960s, to save human society and cancel out modernity's concomitant negative impact, the trend of "postmodernism" first emerged in the West. In its early period, postmodernism was "deconstructive postmodernism," posited as a way of dealing with problems produced in the course of modern society's development. The aim was to deconstruct modernity, to oppose monism and advocate pluralism, to shatter all authority and to cast the "authoritativeness" and "dominant nature" of modernity into the shade. But, postmodernism of the deconstructive kind produced neither positive standpoints, nor any designs for a new age.

At the turn of the 21st century, "constructive postmodernism," a concept based on process philosophy, proposed integrating the positive elements of the first Enlightenment with postmodernism and thus called for a "second enlightenment." For instance, according to Whitehead's process philosophy, "man" should not be taken as the center of everything. Rather, "Man and nature should be regarded as a closely related living community."³ According to John B. Cobber, a major founder of process philosophy, "Constructive postmodernism takes a critical attitude towards deconstructive postmodernism. . . we have introduced ecologicalism into postmodernism. In a postmodern age, man and man will co-exist harmoniously, as will man and nature. It is an age which will retain something positive of modernity while transcending dualism, anthropocentrism and male chauvinism, an age that aims to build a postmodern society for the common good." According to process philosophy, if the rallying cry of the first Enlightenment was "to free the self," then the second enlightenment's watchword should be "to care about others" and "to respect differences" (in a postmodern society). In their opinion, when people use their personal "freedom" in ways that diminish the community, they are bound to weaken their own "freedom." Therefore, it is necessary to reject an abstract concept of freedom in favor of a profound and responsible freedom by bringing in the notions of responsibility and duty and by revealing the inner relation between freedom and duty. In the West, constructive postmodernism is a tiny branch stream with very little influence, but in China it has attracted the attention of a group of scholars who are passionate for national revival.

Karl Theodor Jaspers wrote in The Origin and Goal of History: "Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Period, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Ever since then it has been the case that recollections and re-awakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period—renaissances—afford a spiritual impetus. Return to this beginning is the ever-recurrent event in China, India and the West."⁴ This is exemplified in the " Guoxue tide" in the late 1990s, when China was experiencing a process of national rejuvenation, and for this the support of a revitalized national culture was essential.

In my opinion, it is precisely because traditional Chinese culture (Guoxue) has had over a century of impact from Western culture that Chinese scholars have had the chance for reflecting on our own traditional culture. We have gradually come to realize what of our culture should be promoted, what abandoned and what absorbed. For over one hundred years, Chinese scholars have been trying to absorb and digest "Western learning," and this most certainly laid the foundation for the transformation of Guoxue in the traditional sense to its modern counterpart. The new or modern Guoxue must be a spiritually significant power for China's revival as well as for the "peace and development" of human society. It will help China to realize "modernization" in an all-round way, and also to avoid the predicament that Western society currently experiences.

In other words, the new Guoxue should stick to the principle of Fanben Kaixin. Only through Fanben (return to the source) are we able to Kaixin (open up new territory). Fanben requires of us a deep understanding of Guoxue's essence and insists on the mainstay nature of our own culture, whereas Kaixin requires of us a systematic understanding of the new problems facing China and human society, problems in need of urgent resolution. The two aspects are inseparable: Only by digging deeper into the true essence of Guoxue can we open up new territory at the appropriate time. Only by squarely addressing the problems of human society can we better promote and update the essence of Guoxue, so that in the 21st century, the flame of Guoxue will once more be ignited by the Fanben Kaixin principle and contribute to human society.

What are the prospects of these two trends of thought in China? Will they exert a positive impact on Chinese society and on human society as a whole? To answer these questions, we must fully investigate the possibility of integrating the two.

III．In the New Historical Period of Chinese Revival and in the Context of Globalization, Traditional Chinese Culture May Well Make an Epochal Contribution to Human Society.

China is in the process of national revival, and this must have the support of revitalized national culture. However, in this globalized age, the revitalization of our traditional culture requires us not only to address our own social problems, but world problems also. It follows that while developing our traditional culture we must keep in mind that it belongs to both China and the world at large. It requires us not only to pay close attention to the actual development of our own culture, but also to incipient tendencies in Western culture. Here the author would like to offer a possible trend for discussion, namely: Could a combination of Guoxue and constructive postmodernism—the former traditional Chinese learning and the latter of Western origin and still in the bud—have something to offer to the healthy and rational development of China and the rest of the world?

i．"Man and Nature as a Closely Related Living Community" and "Unity of Man and Heaven"

According to John B. Cobber, "Today we recognize that man is a part of nature and that we live an ecological community." This idea, although coming directly from Whitehead, is very similar to a traditional Chinese notion—the unity of Man and Heaven, Heaven implying the laws of nature. As a core traditional Chinese value, it is a mode of thinking that differs from the "man-nature dichotomy" idea that long prevailed in the West.

In 1992, 1,575 scientists from around the world signed and published a document named "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity." Its first line reads: "Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course." Why has nature been so devastated? There is no getting away from the fact that the long prevalence of the "man-nature dichotomy" mindset has made nature a victim.⁵ Fortunately, the "unity of Man and Heaven" way of thinking offers us a feasible way towards tackling the destruction of the natural world.

As early as 2,500 years ago, Confucius was exhorting people to both "know Heaven" and "fear Heaven." The first admonition requires us to learn more about nature and thus consciously use it to improve the welfare of human beings. The second requires us to hold nature in awe and fulfill our duty of protecting it. According to Zhu Xi, another great thinker of ancient China, "Heaven is inseparable from man and man from Heaven." What he is telling us is that, after Heaven gives birth to man, man and Heaven have formed an inseparable relation, one that requires man to embody the laws of Heaven and to be responsible for it.

As we have seen, in dealing with the relation between man and nature, traditional Chinese philosophy takes a road similar to that of constructive postmodernism. As Léon Vandermeersch put it, "Western humanism that brought the world such a perfect thought as the concept of human rights now faces many challenges from modern society that as yet it has been unable to answer. Why, then, not give some consideration as to whether Confucian thinking might indicate a way forward for the world, for example: respect for nature as proposed in the 'unity of Man and Heaven' concept; and the philanthropic spirit that 'all men are brothers'? We can and should bring to bear the essence of Confucian teaching on current world problems, to examine them afresh from a new perspective."⁶

Why does Vandermeersch put Western thought on human rights together with the three concepts from Chinese thinking as mentioned above? As we know, human rights are very important to us, because man should not be deprived of the right of freedom, and social progress can only be realized with "freedom of thought," "freedom of speech," "freedom of belief," "freedom of movement," etc. However, the question of how to protect human rights is often subject to interference by external forces, to removal even. This has been the case in China and overseas. Some Western thinkers and politicians widen the concept of human rights to the extent that there are no limits and that man can destroy nature at will. Hence Vandermeersch asserted that there should be some constraints on man's rights over nature, and to do that we should use the significant philosophical asset of the concept of their unity.

According to Christian belief, God created the world in its complete form and man can do nothing further to it. However, in Vandermeersch's opinion, once God created a complete world, the rest was man's problem and for man to address. Just as André Gide, the French writer, said, "God proposes and man disposes." The Confucian view that "all men are brothers" is linked to another traditional Chinese idea, namely "world outlook." This considers that man's loftiest ideal is "the world being One"(or the world is in Great Harmony). As written in The Great Learning, it is important to cultivate one's moral character, to take good care of one's family, to run the State well and thence make the whole world peaceful and harmonious. For any country or nation, it is important to consider not just its own interests, but "peace in the world" (i.e. common interests of mankind), which, in my opinion, should be an intrinsic meaning of "human rights." In other words, Western thinking on human rights would do well to look into the traditional thought and culture of other nations(such as China) for valuable elements that could supplement and enrich its own approach, and thereby set human society on a more reasonable path.

ii．Constructive Postmodernism, a Second Enlightenment and Confucian "Renxue" (Learning of Goodness)

According to constructive postmodernism, if the watchword of the first Enlightenment was "liberty of the individual," then those of the second should be "care about others" and "respect for differences."⁷ The former can be described as ren (goodness), a core value of the Confucian school. The starting point and basis of ren is "love of family," but according to Confucius we should not only extend ren to family members but beyond the family, too. Similarly, as taught by Mencius, an important successor of Confucius, "Apart from taking good care of the elderly and children of one's own kin, one should extend concern for the elderly and children of other families." He also asserted that love for family was a prerequisite for loving others, and loving others a prerequisite for loving all creatures.

Mencius' thought is also in line with the "care about others" line proposed by constructive postmodernism. According to constructive postmodernism scholars, their philosophy is to try to "construct a postmodern world where all living communities get due attention and concern" on the basis of "retaining some positive factors of modernity"(mainly valuable concepts such as "freedom," "democracy," "human rights," etc., as proposed by Western thinkers on the basis of reason).⁸ This can be regarded as a more comprehensive description of "care about others." In the development of human society, culture always undergoes a process of accumulation, inheritance and creation. A postmodern society must retain the positive factors of modernity such as "freedom," "democracy," "human rights," etc., before the significance of "constructing a postmodern world in which all living communities get due attention and concern" can be fully displayed. "Respect for differences" can be taken as a different way of expressing the Confucian proposition "the Ways move in parallel and do not interfere with each other."

Different ideological and cultural traditions often have different features. Fortunately, such differences can be meaningful to human society to an extent and are by no means necessarily at odds.⁹ For example, to allow that the concept of "democracy" proposed by the West as having positive meaning in specific social conditions, is not to deny traditional Chinese thinking such as Minben (people as the root) as also having positive meaning in specific social conditions too; nor do we deny the "universal value" of our traditional thoughts such as "Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself." Only by acknowledging that every ideological and cultural tradition has its positive effect on human society can different countries and nations co-exist and co-prosper. Absorbing and digesting the strong points of different cultural systems as a means of achieving real comprehension of them is an essential path for the development of culture. Just as Russell said, "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress."¹⁰ We should remember that as human beings, we face common problems. We may adopt different ways to tackle those problems but we often come to the same end via different routes. Therefore, "respect others" and "the Ways move in parallel and do not interfere with each other" have equivalent value to us.

iii．Defining "Human" and Examining "Human Rights" from the Standpoint of "Li"—a Traditional Chinese Concept

The human rights concept is a very important one for modern society. But each ideological and cultural tradition should discuss deeply how to have the concept play a positive role in building a healthy and rational society. As written in Thinking Through Confucius, co-authored by Hall and Ames, two well-known American philosophers, "What we need to do is not only to study Chinese traditions but also to use them as a cultural resource to enrich and restructure our own. The Confucian school defined 'man' from a societal perspective. Can we use it to modify and strengthen the Western mode of liberalism? Can we find some useful resource from a society built on li [rites, courtesy, ceremony, etc.] to help us better understand our insufficiently rooted but indeed valuable outlook on human rights?"¹¹

This paragraph discusses three issues: One, that the West should not stop at studying China's thinking and culture, but go on to apply those things so as to "enrich and restructure" its own; Two, the necessity of understanding the significance of "man" as defined from a societal perspective in traditional Chinese culture; Three, that China's li contains elements that could well be valuable if brought into the Western concept of human rights.

In my opinion, the three issues raised by Hall and Ames are for treating the condition of some of Western philosophical concepts being "insufficiently rooted." It is precisely because of the great importance attached to man's right of liberty in modern society (since the first Enlightenment) that human society has developed by leaps and bounds. The right of liberty is a great creative force. That said, the misuse of right of liberty by an individual, a country or a nation can, in certain circumstances, constitute a threat to, suppression or violation of the rights of other individuals, countries or nations. To define "human" from a societal perspective as traditional Chinese culture does means "not defining it from the isolated angle of 'the individual'" because "humans" have to live and grow up in various relations since the moment of birth. It is much like what Karl Marx said in Theses on Feuerbach, "The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of social relations."¹²

How then are we to handle the complex "social relations of man"? In ancient China, great emphasis was placed on li in dealing with these relations. Although li was a conceptual thing, it did have a restricting power on man's behavior. As written in The Analects of Confucius, "In practicing the rules of li, harmony is to be prized." The most important role of li is to promote social harmony as a normalizing power over society. As written in the Book of Rites, ". . . rulers use li to protect morality and laws to prevent people from committing crimes." Rulers created li for preventing moral norms being ruined and made laws for keeping social order. As written in "Explaining Government" by Jia Yi of the Former Han Dynasty, " Li is put into practice before people do something wrong whereas law is executed after people do bad things. The role of law is visible whereas the role of li is invisible and hard to perceive." Another reason that li is greatly valued in our tradition is, as advocated by the Confucian school, the importance of reciprocal relationships among people. As written in the Books of Rites, "What is human righteousness? It involves ten (or five pairs of) person-to-person relations: A father is kind to children and children show filial obedience to parents; brothers are kind to each other; a husband is responsible to wife and wife obedient to husband; the older children are kind to younger siblings and the younger respect the older; a ruler is benevolent and his subjects are loyal." That is to say, according to the Confucian school, the moral relation between people should be a relation of rights and corresponding obligations rather than one-sided enjoyment of rights without fulfilling obligations. China's li was created precisely in order to balance the rights and obligations of those social relations. Therefore, in my opinion, is it possible to call premodern China a society under "rule of li and law"? This, of course, is an ideal of the Confucian school.

From this one could envisage, in establishing a "convention on human rights" also establishing a "convention on obligations" at the same time, so as to keep a balance between rights and obligations. This would accord with what Hall and Ames believed a possible role for li— "enriching and restructuring" the Western concept of human rights. One might envisage a "convention of obligations" to protect and strengthen a "convention on human rights."

According to John B. Cobber, "Traditional Chinese ideology is very attractive to constructive postmodernism, but we should not just return to it. Instead, our postmodernism should renew itself by serious scientific means and by adjusting itself to the changing society. The pre-modern tradition should absorb the positive factors of the Enlightenment such as concern for and respect of individual rights before it can contribute something to the postmodern society."¹³ This paragraph has great significance for study of our ideology and culture. Traditional or pre-modern Chinese culture needed to absorb rather than exclude all valuable fruits achieved by modern society since the Enlightenment, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, etc., concepts that embody "concern and respect for individual rights." In addition, we must work hard to put into practice those positive concepts before we can successfully align traditional or pre-modern Chinese culture with postmodernism and promote the transformation from modern to postmodern society.

It is good to note that some Chinese scholars have had extensive contact and satisfactory cooperation with Western scholars of constructive postmodernism. The representative figures of constructive postmodernism have also realized the value of traditional Chinese culture to their research and are absorbing nutrition from it. Similarly, some Chinese scholars have noticed the practical significance of constructive postmodernism in helping human society out of predicament and are paying close attention to the development of this thought. If an organic synthesis between the widely influential " Guoxue tide" and constructive postmodernism can be achieved, then pioneered deeply in Chinese society and developed further, China could perhaps proceed smoothly to complete the mission of its own "first enlightenment," realize modernization, and then rather rapidly enter a postmodern society marked by a "second enlightenment." If this does come to pass, the fruits achieved in China's current cultural revival will be of great significance to human history.

In this paper, the author explores the possibility of communication and integration of Western and Chinese cultures. Whether this possibility can become reality hinges mainly on how China's Guoxue can adapt to healthy social development and whether constructive postmodernism, currently a minor branch of thinking in the West, can become more mainstream and win widespread acceptance. The author stresses that this paper is simply a theoretical foray—a try-out—and would welcome any comments.

贰　儒学与建构性后现代主义*

一、当前我们处在一个什么样的时代？

从全世界来说，将可能是自18世纪以来第一次“启蒙运动”开始的资本主义现代社会向第二次“启蒙”的后现代社会转型。从我们中国说，将是处在全球化背景下实现伟大的民族复兴的关键时刻。这个时代对人类社会来说将是走向新时代的一次难得的机遇。

我们知道，西方资本主义自18世纪“启蒙运动”到现在已有近三百年的历史，这三百年的历史也是西方取得辉煌的“现代化”的历史。但到现在，“现代化社会”的矛盾日益显露，出现了许多深层的难以克服的问题。康德（1724—1804）提出“要敢于用理性”作为“启蒙运动”的口号，但是“理性”现在发生了问题。本来“理性”包含着两个相互联系的方面：“工具理性”和“价值理性”，它们对人类社会的发展有着极大的推动作用，然而现在的情况是“科学万能”的“工具理性”一枝独秀，而具有人文精神的“价值理性”被边缘化了。这样使一切都变成了“工具”，不仅“人”对“人”是一种“工具”，而且“人”把“自然界”也变成了可以任意利用的“工具”。

当前对“自然界”的无量开发和破坏，自然资源的浪费，臭氧层变薄，海洋毒化，环境污染，生态平衡失调，严重地损害了“人”和“自然界”的正常和谐关系，威胁着人类自身生存的条件。1997年12月在日本京都通过了一份限制大气污染的《京都议定书》，但一些发达的资本主义国家对此设置了种种障碍，近日加拿大又宣布退出《京都议定书》。这说明，“启蒙运动”提出的“理性”已被西方国家的某些主政者变成“非理性”的功利化“工具”。

“自由经济”（自由的市场经济）曾使工业化以来人类社会的财富极大增长，人们在物质生活上受益巨大。但不可讳言，“自由经济”发展到现在却使贫富两极（包括国家与国家、民族与民族以及同一国家内部的各阶层）分化日益严重。如果“自由经济”不受到一定程度的有效监督和控制，将会像贪婪的猛兽一样不受约束地发展，定会引起经济危机和社会混乱。2008年首先发生在美国的金融危机还没有走出，2011年接着在欧洲又发生了“欧债危机”，真是在劫难逃。美国耶鲁大学教授保罗·肯尼迪说：“自由主义使人们免于市场经济之前时代的束缚，也使人们承受着金融和社会灾难的危机。”¹

“启蒙运动”的另一口号“个性解放”，这本来是针对宗教的迷信和世俗的蒙昧，使人认识到自我的力量，以便使“自由”的创造力得到充分发挥，但是“个性解放”发展到今天也异化成对他人宰制的工具，特别是帝国主义依仗他们的霸权，强行把他们的“价值观”加给其他国家和民族，推动“普遍主义”。²资本主义现代社会的畸形发展，导致人们追求的不再是“理性”，而是权力欲望的放纵和对金钱的崇拜。因而使各个人群都生活在矛盾与痛苦之中，老百姓在艰难的生活条件下为谋生而苦苦挣扎，知识分子面对社会种种乱象而无能为力，日夜受到良心的谴责，政治家（政客）为得不到人们的信任而自我欺骗，企业家因各种相互矛盾的制度与规则而千方百计地想对策。各阶层、各人群希望得到幸福生活的到来似乎遥遥无期，大家都不快活。这不是哪个人的问题，而是人类社会一次重大转型时期的不可避免的阵痛。为此，我们每个人都应义不容辞地担当起促进新社会早日到来的责任。

二、上个世纪90年代两种思潮在中国的兴起

上个世纪90年代在中国思想文化界出现了两股反对“一元化”的思潮。一股是来自西方消解“现代性”的“后现代主义”。“后现代主义”在上个世纪80年代初已经进入中国，但在那时没有什么影响，而到90年代突然被中国学术界关注了。另一股是追求复兴中国传统文化的“国学热”思潮。其实，在80年代中国学术思想界已经提出应重视中国的传统文化，但并未形成热潮，90年代“国学在燕园悄然兴起”而渐渐形成热潮。这两股思潮的兴起，说明什么问题？

为了挽救人类社会，消除“现代化”带来的负面影响，因而在上个世纪60年代在西方有以消解“现代性”的“后现代主义”思潮的出现。初期的“后现代主义”是“解构性的后现代主义”，它是针对现代社会发展过程中所产生的缺陷提出的，他们所做的是对“现代性”的解构，反对一元化，主张多元化，要求粉碎一切权威，使“现代性”的权威性和宰制性都黯然失色，但是解构性的“后现代主义”却并未提出新的建设性主张，也没有策划一个新时代。

在20世纪末，将进入21世纪之初，以“过程哲学”为基础的“建构性的后现代主义”提出将第一次“启蒙”（即18世纪的“启蒙运动”）的积极因素与“后现代主义”整合起来，召唤第二次“启蒙”。例如，怀德海的过程哲学认为，不应把“人”看成一切的中心，而应把“人和自然视为密切联系的生命共同体”。³过程哲学中心创始人小约翰·柯布说：“建构性后现代主义对解构性后现代主义的立场持批判态度，……我们明确地把生态主义引入后现代主义中，后现代是人与人、人与自然和谐共处的时代。这个时代将保留现代性中某些积极性的东西，超越其二元论、人类中心主义、男权主义，以建构一个所有生命共同福祉都得到重视和关心的后现代社会。”他们还提出，如果说第一次“启蒙”的口号是“解放自我”，那么第二次“启蒙”的口号是“关心他者”、“尊重差异”（指进入后现代社会）。他们认为，当用自身的“自由”专权削弱共同体的时候，其结果一定会削弱其自身的“自由”。因此，必须拒绝抽象自由观，走向有责任的深度自由，要把责任和义务观念引入自由中，揭示出“自由”与义务的内在联系。目前建构性的后现代主义在西方仅仅是一股涓涓细流，影响很小，但却被中国的一批祈望民族复兴的学者所关注。

卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯在《历史的起源与目标》中说：“人类一直靠轴心期所产生、思考和创造的一切而生存。每一次新的飞跃都回顾这一时期，并被它重燃火焰。自那以后，情况就是这样。轴心期潜力的苏醒和对轴心期潜力的回忆，或曰复兴，总是提供了精神力量。对这一开端的复归是中国、印度和西方不断发生的事情。”⁴在上个世纪90年代，即将进入21世纪之际，由于中华民族正处在伟大的民族复兴的过程之中，民族的复兴必须由民族文化的复兴来支撑，因此，“国学热”的出现是必然的。

我认为正是中国的传统文化（国学）经过了一百多年西方文化的冲击，使我国学术界得到一个对自身传统文化自我反省的机会。我们逐渐知道，在我们的传统文化中应该发扬什么和应该抛弃什么以及应该吸收什么。因此，在长达一百多年中，我们中国学术界一直在努力吸收和消化“西学”，这为“国学”从传统走向现代奠定了基础。新的“国学”必须是能为中华民族在当代得以复兴、能为当今人类社会“和平与发展”的前景提供有意义的精神力量的“国学”。它将是使我国全面实现“现代化”，而又可以避免陷入当前西方社会的困境的“国学”。

也就是说，新的“国学”应该是“反本开新”的“国学”。“反本”才能“开新”，“反本”更重要的是为了“开新”。“反本”要求我们对“国学”的真精神有深刻的领悟，坚持自身文化的主体性。“开新”要求我们全面系统地了解当前中国社会和人类社会所面临的亟待解决的新问题。“反本”和“开新”是不可分割的，只有深入发掘“国学”的真精神，我们才可能适时地开拓“国学”发展的新局面；只有敢于面对当前人类社会存在的新问题，我们才能使“国学”的真精神得以发扬和更新，使“国学”在21世纪的“反本开新”中“重新燃起火焰”，以贡献于人类社会。

这两股新的思潮在中国的兴起，它们的发展前景如何，对中国社会和人类社会能否起决定性的积极作用？为此，我们必须全面考察这两股思潮能否有结合的可能性。

三、中国传统文化在中华民族伟大复兴的历史新时期，它面对全球化的态势下很可能对人类社会作出划时代的新贡献。

中华民族正处在伟大民族复兴的过程之中，民族的复兴必须由民族文化传统的复兴来支撑。但是在全球化的时代，中华民族的传统文化复兴不仅要面对自身社会的问题，而且要面对当前世界存在的问题，这样就要求我们在发展中华民族传统文化的同时，必须注意到它既是民族的，又是世界的。因此，我们不仅要关注中国社会文化自身发展的现实，同时我们必须关注在当前西方社会文化中发现的苗头。在这里我们提出一种可供讨论的可能的趋势，即中国传统的国学与西方刚刚萌芽的建构性的后现代主义思潮的结合，是否能对当今中国和世界的健康、合理发展有所贡献。

1．“人与自然是一生命共同体”与“天人合一”理论

建构性后现代主义的代表人物柯布说：“今天我们认识到人是自然界的一部分，我们生活在生态共同体中”，这个思想是从哪里来的呢？虽然直接来自怀德海，但它无疑是和中国的“天人合一”理念有着密切的关系。“天人合一”是中国传统思想的核心价值理念之一。它和在西方长期流行的“天人二分”理论是两种不同的思维模式。

1992年世界1575名科学家发表了一份《世界科学家对人类的警告》，在开头有这样一句话：“人类和自然正走上一条相互抵触的道路”。自然界为什么惨遭破坏，这不能不说它与在西方长期有着影响的“天人二分”的思维模式有着密切的关系。⁵与西方这种思维定式不同的“天人合一”思维方式可以说正是为解决自然界惨遭破坏提供了可行的思路。

我们可以看到，早在2500多年前的孔子提出既要“知天”，又要“畏天”的思想。“知天”是要求人们认识自然界，以便使人们可以自觉地利用自然界为人类社会谋福祉；“畏天”是要求人们对自然界有所敬畏，认识“天”的神圣性，要自觉地尽到保护自然的责任。朱熹对“天人合一”思想的解释说：“天即人，人即天。人之始生，得之于天；既生此人，则天又在人矣。”意思是说，在“天”把“人”产生之后，“天”和“人”就存在着一种相即不离的内在关系，因而“天”的道理就要由“人”来彰显，“人”对“天”就有了不可推卸的责任。

我们可以看到，在解决“人”与“天”（自然界）的关系上，中国传统哲学和建构性的后现代主义走着相同的道路。所以正如法国大儒汪德迈说：“曾经给世界完美的人权思想的西方人文主义面对近代社会以降的挑战，迄今无法给出一个正确答案。那么，为什么不思考一下儒家思想可能指引世界的道路，例如‘天人合一’提出的尊重自然的思想、‘远神近人’所倡导的拒绝宗教的完整主义以及‘四海之内皆兄弟’的博爱精神呢？可能还应该使儒教精神在当今世界诸多问题的清晰追问中重新认识。”⁶

为什么汪德迈把西方的“人权”思想和中国的“天人合一”“远神近人”“四海之内皆兄弟”联系起来考虑？我们知道，“人权”对人类来说无疑非常重要，这是由于“人”的自由权力是不应被剥夺的，社会发展只能靠“思想自由”“言论自由”“信仰自由”“迁徙自由”等等来实现。但是如何保障“人权”，往往受到外在的力量干扰，甚至剥夺，无论中外都有这种情况。西方某些思想家或政客把“人”的权力无限扩大，以至于把“人”的权力扩大至可以去无序地破坏自然界。因此，汪德迈认为“人”对自然界的权力应该受到限制，这样就应该从中国的“天人合一”思想中取得有意义的思想资源。

在西方由于基督教认为上帝已经把世界完整地创造了，似乎“人”再无能为力了。汪德迈则认为虽然上帝把世界完整地创造好了，剩下的事就是“人”的问题，要“人”来做主了。正如法国文学家安德烈·纪德所说：“神出主意，人做主意”。在中国儒家所说的“四海之内皆兄弟”是和中国传统思想的“天下观”相联系的，它认为，人类最高的理想是“天下大同”（协和万邦），《大学》说“修身、齐家、治国、平天下”，因此任何民族和国家要考虑的不仅是自己的国家（治国），而且最终要考虑“天下太平”（即全人类的共同利益），这应是“人权”中的应有之义。这就是说，西方的“人权”思想应可以在其他民族思想文化传统（如中国的文化传统）中找到某些补充和丰富其原有价值的思想因素，以便人类社会走向更加合理之路。

2．建构性后现代主义的第二次“启蒙”与儒家的“仁学”理论

建构性的后现代主义提出，如果说第一次“启蒙”的口号是“解放个人”，那么第二次“启蒙”的口号则是“关心他者”“尊重差异”。⁷“关心他者”的思想如果用中国儒家思想来表述，那就是“仁者爱人”。“仁爱”是孔子儒家学说的核心价值。儒家提倡的“仁爱”虽是从“亲亲”（爱自己的亲人）出发，如孔子所说：“仁者，人也，亲亲为大”，仁爱之心是人本身所具有的，爱自己的亲人是“仁爱”精神的出发点和基础。但是孔子认为，“仁爱”不能只停留在爱自己的亲人上面，要推己及人，“老吾老以及人之老，幼吾幼以及人之幼。”孟子也说：“亲亲而仁民，仁民而爱物。”从爱自己的亲人出发必须推广到对老百姓的“仁爱”，由爱护他人才会对一切事物都有爱心。

这样的思想又可以和建构性的后现代主义“关心他者”接轨。建构性的后现代主义认为，他们的哲学是在“保留现代性某些积极的东西”（主要是西方思想家依据理性提出的极有价值的“自由”“民主”“人权”等理想性思想）的基础上“以建构一个所有生命共同体福祉都得到重视和关心的后现代世界”，⁸这正是对“关心他者”的更为全面的表述。因为，人类社会的发展，其文化是要不断积累，总是在传承中创新。因此，后现代社会必须是在保留“现代性”社会的“自由”“民主”“人权”等等中的积极因素，这样“建构一个所有生命共同体福祉都得到重视和关心的后现代世界”的意义才得以充分显现。建构性的后现代主义提出的“尊重差异”，它正是儒家思想所主张的“道并行而不相悖”的另一种表述。

不同的思想文化传统往往是各有其特点而不相同，但这种不同可以说对人类社会都有一定的意义，并不是要相互排斥的。⁹例如肯定西方近代提出的“民主”思想在特定的社会条件下的积极意义，并不要否定中国思想文化传统中的“民本”思想在特定的社会条件下也具有某种积极意义，更不应否定中国传统文化中的“己所不欲，勿施于人”对人类社会的“普遍价值”。只有承认在不同思想文化传统中都有其对人类社会有积极贡献的部分，这样在不同国家和民族之间才可以“共存”“共荣”。吸收和消化不同文化传统中的优长，以达到“会通”是人类文化发展的必由之路，正如罗素所说：“不同文明之间的交流，过去已经多次证明是人类文明发展的里程碑。”¹⁰我们应该看到，同为人类就有着共同要解决的问题，如何解决人类所面对的共同问题，道路可能不同，方法可能有异，但往往目标是殊途同归的。所以“尊重他者”和“道并行而不相悖”有同等的价值。

3．如何定义“人”与中国传统文化中“礼”的“人权”观

“人权”观念对现代社会来说是非常重要的，但如何使“人权”观念真正对建设健康、合理的社会起积极作用是应该在不同的思想文化传统中进行深入讨论的。美国著名哲学家安乐哲、郝大维写了一本书叫作《通过孔子而思》，这本书中有以下一段话：“我们要做的不止是研究中国传统，更要设法使之成为丰富和改造我们自己的一种文化资源。儒家从社会角度来定义‘人’，这是否可用来修正和加强西方的自由主义模式？在一个以‘礼’建构的社会中，我们能否发现可以利用的资源，以帮助我们可以更好地理解我们的根基不足却富有价值的人权观念？”¹¹

这段话大体上说，讨论了以下三个问题：第一，西方不应仅仅研究中国思想文化，而且应用中国思想文化来“丰富和改造”西方的思想文化；第二，要理解中国传统文化是“从社会角度来定义‘人’”的意义；第三，在中国的“礼”文化中包含着极富有价值的“人权”观念的可资利用的因素。

我认为，安乐哲提出的三个问题正是为了对治“西方哲学的根基不足”而发的。正是近现代社会特别重视人的自由权利（第一次启蒙后的历史），才使得人类社会有了长足的发展。这是因为“人”的“自由权利”是一种巨大的创造力。但是，个人的“自由权利”和某一国家和民族“自由权利”的滥用，在一定情况下对其他人的“自由权利”或者其他国家和民族的“自由权利”将构成威胁和遏制，甚至侵犯。中国传统文化中的“从社会的角度定义‘人’”，意思是说“不是从孤立的‘个人’的角度来定义‘人’”，因为“人”一出生就是在各种关系中生活和成长，这颇有点像马克思在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中说的：“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，实际上，它是一切关系的总和。”¹²

那么，如何处理这种种复杂的“人的社会关系”呢？在中国古代社会特别注意用“礼”来处理“人”在社会中的种种关系。“礼”虽然是观念形态的东西，但它带有对“人”的行为有着约束性的意义。在《论语·学而》中说：“礼之用，和为贵。”“礼”的作用最重要之点就在于促使社会和谐，这就是说中国传统文化中的“礼”是一种带有对社会规范性的力量。在《礼记·坊记》中说：“君子礼以坊德，刑以坊淫”，君子制“礼”是为了防止败坏社会的道德规范，制刑（刑法）是为了防止祸乱社会秩序。汉贾谊《陈政事疏》中说：“夫礼者禁于将然之前，而法者禁于已然之后，是故法之所用易见，而礼之所为生难知也。”可见，在中国传统中，对“礼”是特别重视的。这是因为中国儒家认为，在人与人之间应有一种相互对应的关系，如《礼记·礼运》中说：“何谓人义？父慈子孝，兄良弟弟，夫义妇听，长惠幼顺，君仁臣忠，十者谓之人义。”这是说，什么是人与人之间的道义关系，儒家学说认为在人与人之间应有一个权利和义务（责任）相对应的关系，不应只有单方面的权利而不需对所应承担的相对应的义务负责任。中国的“礼”正是为协调社会关系的权利和义务所设。因此，我认为中国前现代社会是不是可以称为“礼法合治”的社会，这当然是一种儒家的理想。

从这里，我们可以设想，在确立“人权公约”的同时是否应有一“责任公约”，以便使得“权力”和“责任”之间得到平衡。这也就是安乐哲他们所说“礼”对西方颇有价值的“人权”观念可以起着“丰富和改造”的作用。从这里，甚至可以看到“责任公约”或许会对“人权公约”起着保护和提升的作用。

小约翰·柯布说：“中国传统思想对建构性的后现代主义非常有吸引力，但我们不能简单地回到它。它需要通过认真对待科学和已经发生的变革的社会来更新自己。前现代传统要对后现代有所裨益，就必须吸收启蒙运动的积极方面，比如对个体权利的关注和尊重。”¹³柯布的这段话对我们研究中国思想文化应说是颇有意义。作为前现代的中国传统文化是需要认真吸收启蒙运动以来现代社会的一切积极成果，如自由、民主、人权等“对个体权利的关注和尊重”的思想，我们决不能企图排斥“自由”“民主”“人权”等“极富有价值”的思想，而且必须认真实现“第一次启蒙”有积极意义的理念，这样前现代的中国传统文化才能和建构性的后现代主义结成联盟推进现代社会向后现代社会的转型。

我们已经注意到，中国一些学者和西方建构性后现代主义的学者之间不仅有了广泛的接触，而且开始了良好的合作。建构性的后现代主义的代表人物已经注意到中国传统文化对建构性后现代主义颇有吸引力，并已从中吸取营养；同样中国的一些学者也已经注意到建构性后现代主义对当前人类社会走出困境的现实意义，并认真地关注着该学说的发展。在中国已经发生广泛影响的“国学热”和建构性的后现代主义这两股思潮的有机结合如果能在中国社会中深入开展，并得到新的发展，也许中国可以比较顺利地完成“第一次启蒙”的任务，实现现代化，而且会较快地进入以“第二次启蒙”为标帜的后现代社会。如果真能如此，当前中华民族文化的复兴所取得的成果，在人类社会发展史上将是意义重大的。

本文只是对当前中西文化交流与会通可能有的一种趋势的探讨，这一可能的趋势是否能真正出现，无疑要看中国的“国学”如何适应现代社会健康的发展以及建构性的后现代主义能否在西方从涓涓细流变成滚滚大江大河，而得到广大人群的赞同，这样理想才可以成为现实。在这里我必须说明，本文只是一种理论上的尝试，请大家批评指正。

III．THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFUCIANIS

I

I have delivered speeches on the topic "The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism" several times, including in the 80s and 90s of the last century. Now, I will continue to address it in the 21st century. In addition to me, more and more scholars have started to address this topic. Why? I think there are two important reasons: One is that we are on the eve of the great revival of the Chinese nation. So now, we must review our historical and cultural tradition. Karl Jaspers presented the notion of "the Axial Age." He thought that great thinkers emerged in Ancient Greece, Israel, India, China and other countries almost simultaneously around 500 BC, and they all presented unique ideas on problems which concern all human beings. Aristotle and Plato in Ancient Greece, Prophets of Judaism in Israel, Shakyamuni in India, and Laozi and Confucius in China independently initiated and formed distinctive cultural traditions. Through 2,000 years of development, these cultural traditions have become central to human intellectual wealth, but these different cultures in different regions developed independently at the beginning, and did not originally influence each other. He says, until today mankind has lived all by what was thought and created during the Axial Age. In each new upward leap it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Even since then it has been the case that recollections and reawakening of the potentialities of the Axial Period—renaissances—always afford a spiritual impetus. The return to the root is the continuous thing in China, India, and West (see Jaspers 1989, p. 14). For instance, the Europeans in the Renaissance looked back at the origin of their culture, Ancient Greece, which revived European civilization and left its mark on global culture. Similarly, Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism in China was stimulated by Indian Buddhism; the Confucian thinkers, by "recalling" Confucius and Mencius in the pre-Qin Period, had promoted the ingenious Chinese philosophy to a new height. When we enter into the new millennium, the world's intellectual circle has started to appeal for the arrival of "a New Axial Age." Thus, it has become important to review and research ancient thoughts and wisdom, and recall the origin of our own culture in order to respond to the new, diverse world culture. Secondly, in the new century, our country has brought forward a great project to build a "harmonious society." Fei Xiaotong has raised the issue of "cultural self-consciousness." In order to build a "harmonious society," we have to know our own "culture." What is "cultural self-consciousness"? Fei Xiaotong in Reconsideration on Humanistic Value said:

Cultural self-consciousness denotes that people who live in a context of some culture have "self-knowledge" of their own culture, and can explain its origin, development, characteristics, and its trend. It does not mean that people "return to the original culture," and "return to the ancients," and it does not mean "complete Westernization" or "complete tahua 他化 (otherization)" at the same time. The request for self-knowledge intends to strengthen the ability of self-determination in the process of cultural transformation, and grasp the initiative status of cultural choice in the process of adaptation to new conditions and new era (Fei 2005, p. 248).

It means that we have to have "self-knowledge" of our culture and establish our place in our culture in the great historical era when we are building our "harmonious society." Our place in our culture does not mean "completely returning to the ancients" and "complete Westernization"; instead, it means assuring that our own culture can take deep root in society, like leaves which flourish if the roots are deep. So we have to persist in our cultural understanding in order to be able to absorb and digest the outstanding cultures of other nations to nourish our own culture.

In this situation when we study our history and the prospect of our national culture, we have to adapt to the new trend of the contemporary development of world culture, that is, the "New Axial Age." We have to have cultural self-consciousness in order to meet the goal of building a "harmonious society." In the new historical era, what problems face the world and our society? Which issues should we address in order to realize "the New Axial Age" and our "harmonious society"?

II

Entering into the 21st century, the learning of the Chinese classics becomes popular. There are various opinions and explanations on this phenomenon. The so-called "learning of the Chinese Classics" can be found in Zhouli · Chunguan · Yueshi 周礼·春官·乐师, which is the earliest record: "The duty of the official in charge of music is to administer the affairs of nation-owned school, and to teach the offspring of high-ranking officials music and dance." But, now, the "learning of the Chinese classics" seems to be the opposite of "Western learning." The reason is that as we face the influence of "Western learning," we encounter the problem of how to protect and develop our own traditional culture. The development of Chinese culture faces a dual task. One is that we must protect our culture, and maintain our cultural foundation. And the other is how we deal with Western culture. This has been the basis of the cultural dispute of "China and the West, the Ancient and the Modern" for the past hundred years. But today, in the time of globalization, we must go out of the dispute, synchronize the teachings of "China and the West, and the Ancient and the Modern," and realize the ability of different cultures to coexist and prosper.

Today, there are various points of view about the "learning of the Chinese classics," especially Confucianism, in academic and cultural circles. I will give a brief introduction in the following passages.

i．Some scholars propose the outline as "the reconstruction of Chinese Confucianism." They think that we "must revive Confucianism omni-directionally in order to fight against the omni-directional challenge of Western civilization" and "the revival of Confucianism is an urgent affair to revive Chinese culture and reconstruct Chinese civilization." Therefore, they advocate establishing Confucianism as the national religion and realizing the so-called "combination of politics and religion" of China's ancient times (Jiang 2005, pp. 3-7).

ii．There are two critiques of this point of view: One is from "the school of liberalism." The critics believe that "the theory that Confucianism can save the nation" counteracts contemporary democratic politics and is harmful to the idea of "equality." The critics assume that their purpose is to establish "Confucianism" as "the national religion," and they "attempt to ideologize Confucianism and make use of Confucianism as the instrument of dictatorship" (Chen 2006, p. 6). Another critique is from Marxist scholars. They think that "the essence of salvation in Confucianism is an exaggeration of moral function," and "to apply the ontological Dao of Heaven and ontological nature and destiny to pursue the kingliness Dao of politics, but this only leads to the trap of feudal dictatorship again." "The real savior can only be Marxism" (Ibid.).

iii．Some scholars fully affirm "Confucianism" in order to maintain and develop Confucian thoughts. For instance, modern neo-Confucians think that "the Dao of kingliness without," which can adapt to modern democratic politics, can be developed from the learning of the sageliness within. They also think that the system of epistemology can develop from the Confucian "learning of mind and nature." Others think that " san gang wu chang 三纲五常 (the Three Bonds and the Five Moral Rules) in human relationships" still have value. In the 1994 conference, Tu Weiming gave up his former belief that the Three Bonds still had value for the belief that "the Five Moral Rules in human relationships still had value." His opinion on "cultural China" is important for making Chinese culture known to the world. But he divided "cultural China" into several circles, with the core circle including Chinese mainland, Taiwan, etc. The second circle includes the overseas Chinese. And the third circle includes those countries which have been influenced by Chinese culture. The fourth circle covers foreigners who study and enjoy Chinese culture. But one of his beliefs is debatable. He said: "The category of cultural China is very broad. Some persons who have no consanguineous relationship with China, but have a great impact on China are also a part of cultural China"(Tu 2002, p. 430). This is questionable. From this logic, we can infer the categories of "cultural Europe" and "cultural America," and that Chinese thinkers like Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi had an impact on them, so they are also a part of "cultural Europe" and "cultural America," too.

iv．Of course, some scholars think that the May Fourth Movement refuted Confucianism and to once again raise Confucianism to a high status is a historical regression.

How should we look at Confucian thoughts? There are various answers. Today, the many perspectives to this issue indicate that our society is progressing, because academic and cultural questions can only be raised in an environment of free discussion and improved by rational dialogue.

Of course, I myself have my own opinion on "Confucianism," and debates will determine whether my opinion is right or not. It is just one voice. I have several opinions on academics and culture. First, there is no absolutely right way of thinking and culture in history, because each of them contains internal contradictions, including Confucianism. So, some aspects of Confucianism inevitably have historical limitations, and cannot adapt to the needs of modern society. The universal significance of Confucianism also needs to be interpreted in a modern way. Second, although thinking and culture are moving forward, the issues raised by ancient philosophers and their thoughts are the same as today because some philosophical issues last forever. For instance, the problem of "the relationship between human and nature" is still discussed in contemporary Chinese philosophy. Third, Bertrand Russell said: "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress" (Russell 1922, p. 195). Any culture that wants to have continuous historical development must absorb and digest other nations' cultures, and a culture can only keep up with other cultures through mutual exchanges, especially in the era of globalization. Looking at Chinese history, the entry of Indian Buddhism has proven this. Chinese culture has benefited from Indian Buddhism; Indian Buddhism was further developed and promoted in China. It was absorbed by Chinese culture and had a profound impact on neo-Confucianism in the time of the Song and Ming dynasties. Today, we must absorb and digest Western culture and other nations' cultures, fully and systematically in the time of globalization. Only in this way can Chinese academics and culture adapt to the demands of contemporary human society and our own nation's development. Therefore, our culture must be national and international. Fourth, cultural subjectivity should be established. Any national culture must take root in its own soil because it is necessary to understand, comprehend, protect and develop a native culture fully in order to rationally and healthily develop as well as have the capacity to absorb other nations' cultures in depth. A culture that is unable to maintain its autonomy and is unable to absorb other nations' cultures to enrich and develop its own will be wiped out or completely assimilated.

Based on the above discussions, we may analyze "Confucianism" from three different perspectives: political Confucianism, orthodox Confucianism, and academic Confucianism.

Confucianism has been intertwined with politics in past dynasties; undoubtedly, it played an important role in feudal dictatorship. Confucianism pays special attention to its function in moral cultivation, which has a positive side, but the negative side leads to absolute rule, making China a society of "the rule of man," and making it difficult for China to achieve "the rule of law." Confucians often moralized politics and glorified political rule; and they also politicized morality, making it an instrument of politics. Of course, some of the political philosophy in Confucianism limited dictatorship. For instance, "to resist high-ranking official with virtue," "people are the most valuable" and "to kill a dictator"(King Xuan of Qi asked: "Is it tolerable if a government official kills his king?" Mencius said: "He who destroys benevolence and righteousness is called a dictator. I just heard about King Wu of Zhou, the first king of Zhou Dynasty, who killed the dictator Zhou 纣, the last ruler of the Shang Dynasty, and I have never heard that he killed his king as an official.")(Mencius 1980, Liang Huiwang Xia). It was also typical of Confucians to apply " tian 天 (Heaven)" in restricting the emperor's power. Confucians proposed that humans should revere "Heaven" and fate. In some circumstances, "the interaction between Heaven and man" can also restrict the "emperor's power." For instance, when natural disasters or strange phenomena happened, officials would write to the emperor to warn him. Then the emperor would have to publish an imperial self-criticism. But speaking as a whole, the negative function of political Confucianism is more obvious because it was used by politics. In any case, the thoughts of "stupid loyalty" and "my majesty is holy and wise, and your subject commits intolerable crime and should be put to death" are not advisable. So when Confucianism is manipulated by politicians, many problems arise.

Orthodox Confucianism: the development and influence of schools with systematic traits and a successive heritage must have their own tradition whether it is in the West or in China. In China, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism all have their own traditions. Because schools with traditions continuously develop, among them, Confucianism is especially conscious of inheriting its tradition, and Confucians regard the inheritance of the cultural traditions of the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties as their responsibility. Confucius inherits "the Dao of Yao and Shun and imitates King Wen and King Wu of Zhou" (Zisi 1980, Chapter 30). Therefore, today we should consciously inherit our own cultural tradition. But if Confucianism overemphasizes its "orthodox tradition," it might exclude other schools and suppress heterodoxy. Heterodoxy is to oppose and overthrow mainstream thought, and blaze a new path for new ways of thinking. Confucianism as a whole is relatively inclusive. For instance, Confucians hold that "the myriad things grow equally without harming each other and the circulation of the four seasons, the travel of the sun and the moon go smoothly without interference" (Ibid.). But sometimes there is also a strong sense of exclusiveness in Confucianism. For instance, Mencius rejected Yang Zhu and Mozi, and he criticized Yang Zhu's lack of filial piety to his father because he advocated universal and equal benevolence and Mozi's lack of loyalty to the emperor because he insisted that individuals came first. Here, Mencius goes too far. Another example is Han Yu's exclusion of Buddhism. At that time, Buddhism had caused some problems, including a tremendous waste of national wealth. But Han Yu suggested "the government should secularize Buddhism monks and nuns, burn off sutra, and transform Buddhism temples to civilian houses" (Han 1991, p. 174). His words go too far. It is not good if factionalism is too strong.

"The academic tradition of Confucianism" is about the history of Confucian learning and its academic ideals. In this aspect, the positive value of Confucianism can be seen, and Confucianism can offer significant resources for human society. Now and in the future, Confucianism should not be ideologized. Learning is learning, and it should not depend on politics. No school of learning should be viewed as the ruling one and the "contention of a hundred schools of thought" should be put into practice. Of course, we must analyze the thoughts offered by sages and outstanding men in history, and interpret them according to contemporary circumstances in order to uncover resources which can assist in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and be universally significant for the rational and all-around development of human society. In order to achieve this goal, Confucianism should be renewed in order to make it a source of real spiritual wealth.

III

We may judge the value of learning from many perspectives, such as politics, economics, science and technology. Perhaps it is most important to make a philosophical judgment on the value of a school. Therefore, we must learn about the main problems faced by our society, nation, and mankind. These issues should be the starting point for considering philosophical questions.

What are the main issues in contemporary human society? In my opinion, there are three: one is the relationship between man and nature, a conflict which is quite serious. The second is the relationship between man and man, including relationships between man and self (man and society), nation and nation, and people and people. The third problem is the relationship between body and mind. The biggest problem facing mankind is the conflict between man and nature, man and man (man and society), and the conflict within oneself. These issues are related to building a "harmonious society" and human society's "peaceful coexistence." In my opinion, the three philosophical propositions, "the unity of nature and man," "the unity of self and others" and "the unity of body and mind," can provide some valuable approaches and important philosophical resources to resolve the three conflicts. Of course, I do not mean that these problems can only be solved by Confucianism.

As we enter the 21st century, we will see that the past century was a century of rapid development, a progressive century, but it was also a tragic century full of conflict and fighting. In one hundred years, there were two world wars, and more than a hundred million people died unnaturally due to war. Many cultural artifacts made by mankind several centuries ago were destroyed. China has experienced much suffering, but has also made great progress in the past one hundred years. In this process, we nearly completely negated our cultural tradition, and we refused to absorb some progressive Western cultures for a long time, too. It led to social problems, such as "a crisis of belief," "moral vacuum," "environmental pollution" and "money worship." How should we tackle these problems? I, and not only me, but other scholars, too, think that we can find philosophical resources from the past 5,000 years to deal with these problems. Many scholars have looked for answers to these problems. Of course, we should not think that thoughts and culture can solve all problems. If we think that thoughts and culture can tackle all problems, it will lead to "cultural determinism." Then it will be like the belief that science and technology can tackle human and social problems, leading to the trap of "the omnipotence of science," of "scientism." Therefore, when we discuss "the significance of Confucianism," we simply want to find resources and approaches which can be applied to contemporary human and social problems, and a way to deal with these problems.

IV

On the problem of "conflict between man and nature," in 1992, 1,575 scientists, including half the Nobel laureates, signed the "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity," which stated that human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. In my opinion, the warning signaled that human kind will encounter a serious crisis if the world continues as it is now. Advanced science and technology can benefit people, but as a part of nature, people not only control a lot of instruments to destroy nature, but also control weapons which can be used to destroy human beings in the process of conquering nature. The never-ending exploitation and destruction of nature results in consequences such as the waste of natural resources, the depletion of the ozone layer, the poisoning of the ocean, environmental pollution, the sudden and sharp growth in the human population, and ecological imbalance. The result is the destruction of "a harmonious nature" and "the harmonious relationship between man and nature," threatening conditions for human existence. These situations have a relationship with the subject-object dichotomy in Western philosophy. For instance, in A History of Western Philosophy, Russell said: "The philosophy of Descartes. . . it brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy. . . the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other" (Russell 1972, p. 567). It means that for a long time, spirit and matter have been regarded as independent and isolated in Western philosophy. Therefore, this kind of philosophy is established on an "external relationship" ("man" and "nature" are two unrelated factors), or it can be said that they regard "mind" and "matter" as two independent dual factors, and when Western philosophers study one, they do not involve the other (but Western philosophy has changed, for instance, Whitehead criticizes the dualism in the traditional way of thinking in his Process Philosophy). It means that Western thought involves the dualism of "subject-object" ("mind" and "matter," or "nature" and "man") from Plato in the Axial Age. But Chinese philosophy is different because it is based on "the unity of Heaven and man" (subject and object are connected and cannot be divided).

One of the origins of Chinese philosophy is Zhou Yi 周易 (The Book of Changes). There is an important passage on the Bamboo Slips unearthed in Jingmen, Hubei Province, in 1993. It states (Jingmen 1998, Yucong yi 语丛一):

The Rituals describes the manners of intercourse.

The Music is used to enjoy or educate.

The Book of History is □□□□ [sic].

The Book of Odes is a collection of poems of the past and the present.

The Book of Changes is to communicate the Dao of nature and the Dao of man.

The Spring and Autumn Annals is a collection of affairs of the past and the present.

These bamboo slips were written around 300 BC. They say that change communicates the Dao of nature and the Dao of man. It means that The Book of Changes studies the Dao of Heaven (law of Heaven or nature) and the Dao of man (order in society) and why they are connected through a comprehensive study of the subjects. That is, people in ancient times had already realized that they had to include "man" when studying "nature," and when studying "man," they had to involve "Heaven," too. This is "the unity of nature and man." In fact, this had already been revealed in Confucius' Analects. Zi Gong said: "I cannot hear Master Confucius' saying about nature and the Dao of nature" (Confucius 1980, Gongye Chang). Although Zi Gong had never heard Confucius speak about "nature and the Dao of nature," he brought forward this issue, which indicates that there was great interest in the relationship between "human nature" (man) and "the Dao of Heaven (nature)." When looking at the development of human society, people originally came across the relationship between "man" and "nature (Heaven)" because humans cannot live without "nature." Therefore, the ancient Chinese always paid attention to "the relationship between man and nature."

Of course, there are various attitudes and methods to deal with "the relationship of man and nature." Some scholars held that man should comply with nature; some scholars thought that man should make use of "nature" to serve man, "know and apply nature to serve people"; and some scholars held that "both man and nature have their own laws and advantages." But the mainstream Confucian thinkers believed in "the unity of man and nature." The so-called "unity of man and nature" means that "nature" is inseparable from "man," and "man" is inseparable from "nature," too.

Why is there such a belief? Well, it has a long history. We know that The Book of Changes was originally a fortune-telling book used to predict good or bad luck, and misfortune or good fortune. Who was asked to answer people's fortunes? " Tian" 天 (Heaven). "Man" asks "tian" about good or bad luck, and misfortune or good fortune. The Book of Changes recorded these answers, and so it became a book on the relationship between "Heaven" (tian) and "man." Subsequently, various interpretations of this book formed a new one, that is, Yizhuan 易传 (The Appendices to the Book of Changes). Among them, The Appended Remarks in particular can be regarded as a philosophical interpretation of The Book of Changes. The Book of Changes solves the problem of the relationship between "Heaven" and "man," then what is the relationship between "Heaven" and "man"? The Appended Remarks answers this. It argues that The Book of Changes includes everything, and the book not only includes "the Dao of Heaven," "the Dao of earth," but also includes "the Dao of man." Although "the Dao of Heaven" is manifested by yin and yang, "the Dao of earth" is presented as "hardness" and "softness," and "the Dao of man" is manifested as "benevolence" and "righteousness." The principle of the three is united, and the three are the manifestation of qian 乾 and kun 坤. The Confucian Zhang Zai in the Song Dynasty said: "Heaven, earth, and man all have the Dao of qian and kun. The Change penetrates in Heaven, earth, and man, and yin and yang are its substance (qi), hardness and softness are its form, and benevolence and righteousness are its nature" (Zhang 1978, p. 235). From the example in The Book of Changes that unites Heaven (earth) and man, we can see that Heaven and man are a connected entity. The reason that " qian" and " kun" are used to describe the unity of "Heaven," "earth" and "man," is that " qian" denotes vigorous movement and " kun" denotes generosity and virtue in the Appendices to the Book of Changes. Therefore, "man" has a special responsibility for "Heaven and Earth" (Heaven). "Man" should know what is demanded by Heaven and Earth in the spirit of "constantly striving for self-improvement" and "with profound generosity to contain things or complete things." Zhang Zai said, "the Dao of Heaven" and "the Dao of man" is similar in the sense of "reason or truth." If we want to know the principle of being a man, we have to know the Dao of "Heaven and Earth," and if we know the truth of "Heaven and Earth," we can know the principle or law of "man" (society).

Confucians in the Song Dynasty developed "the unity of nature and man." For instance, Cheng Yi said: "Is it allowable to know the Dao of man but do not know the Dao of nature? The Dao is one. Is it right if the Dao of man is one, and the Dao of nature is another one?" (Cheng 2004, Er Cheng Yishu, Vol. 18). According to the Confucian thinking, "nature" and "man" cannot be divided, and they cannot be regarded as an external and opposite relationship, and we cannot study only one of the two. Zhu Xi expressed this idea much clearer. He said: "Nature is man, and man is nature. At the beginning of human birth, they are produced from nature; and after the birth, nature is human, too" (Zhu 1990, Vol. 17). Zhu Xi held that "nature" cannot be independent of "man," and "man" cannot be independent of "nature." At the time of birth, humans come from nature, but when there is a human being, the Dao of "nature" (Heaven) is embodied by "man." In other words, "humans" are responsible for "nature." If there were no "humans," how would the lively atmosphere of "nature" be embodied, how would "the constantly striving to become stronger" of "nature" be embodied and how would "containing things or completing things with profound generosity" of the "earth" be embodied? So man should know that "the work to establish mind or heart for Heaven and Earth" and "the work to establish life for people" is the same and cannot be separated. Therefore, the Yucong yi of Guodian Zhujian 郭店竹简·语丛一 (Collection One of the Guodian Bamboo Slips for Writing) said: "The Dao can be mastered after knowing what Heaven (nature) does and what man does. If we know the Dao, then we know what fate is" (Jingmen 1998). If we know "the Dao of nature (Heaven)" (the law of nature), and the Dao of man (the law of human society and life), then we can know the unified principle or reason for "nature or Heaven" and "man," and the development of "nature or Heaven" (the Dao of nature or Heaven) and "man" ("the Dao of man," society). Confucius said: "It is necessary to know destiny or fate mandated by Heaven" (Confucius 1980, Weizheng). He means that "man" should know about "nature or Heaven." Confucius also said: "Man should have reverence for fate or destiny as mandated by Heaven or nature" (Ibid., Jishi), and cannot randomly destroy the law of development of "nature or Heaven." A Chinese philosopher never regards "nature or Heaven" as a dead thing. Instead, it is organic, constantly developing, growing, and united with man as an entity. It is common sense that the existence of "man" cannot be separated from "nature or Heaven," but why does "man" regard "nature or Heaven" as an opposing object, and recklessly destroy and conquer "nature" ? It is because he regards the relationship between "nature" and "man" as external, and does not know that the relationship between "nature" and "man" is close and internal. "The internal relationship" is different from "the external relationship" because "the external relationship" denotes that "nature" and "man" are independent and unrelated. But "the internal relationship" denotes that "nature" and "man" have a close relationship. Therefore, "the unity of nature and man" is an ancient philosophical proposition in Chinese philosophy, and it is the cornerstone of Chinese Confucian thought as well as a proposition which needs to be continuously re-interpreted by human society. When we consider the problems of human beings and our relationship with nature, we should bear in mind the idea of "the unity of nature and man," and we must deepen our discussion of the close relationship between "nature" and "man." Human society has neglected the close relationship between "nature" and "man" for a long time, and so are we now being punished by nature? Why have we chosen a confrontational relationship with nature?

The idea of "the unity of nature and man" (the thought, " yi 易(change) is to communicate the Dao of nature with the Dao of man"), which originated from The Book of Changes, supplies a way of thinking that resolves the current conflict between nature and man. It can inspire us in the following three aspects.

Firstly, "the unity of nature and man" as a way of thinking says that people ought not to regard "man" as the opposite of "nature" because "man" is a part of "nature" and "the birth of man is from nature." Acts to destroy "nature" are the same as destroying "man," and "man" will be punished by "nature." Therefore, "man" should "know nature" (know nature in order to reasonably make use of nature) and should "revere nature" (revere nature and regard work to protect nature as a holy obligation). Now, we emphasize only "knowing nature" and blindly use "knowledge" to exploit and conquer "nature" and even destroy "nature." But man does not know that we should revere "nature." It is definitely an extreme manifestation of "scientism" (the omnipotence of science and technology). "Scientism" denies the holiness of "nature or Heaven," and consequently denies the transcendence of "nature or Heaven." Thus, humanist spirit loses its foundation. The Chinese thought of "the unity of nature and man" holds that "knowing nature" is the same as "revering nature." If we "know nature" but do not "revere nature," we will regard "nature" as a dead thing, not knowing that it is organic, alive, and vigorous. "Revering nature" but not "knowing nature" leads man to regard "nature or Heaven" as a mystical power outside of "man," and does not help man gain the real favor of nature. "Knowing nature" is united with "revering nature," and it is an important manifestation of "the unity of nature and man," reflecting the inner obligation of "man" to "nature." The philosophical proposition, "the unity of nature and man," symbolizes the complicated relationship between "nature" and "man," which not only includes how "man" should understand "nature," but also that "man" should revere "nature" because of its holiness. This is the reason why Chinese Confucianism has not become a universal religion(like Buddhism and Christianity), but Confucianism possesses a certain "religiosity." Confucian thought has a religious function in China, that is, Confucians think that the "inner" morality of "man," which is mandated by "nature," needs moral cultivation to realize its "transcendence" as "transcendence from an ordinary person to the level of a sage." Therefore, "the unity of nature and man" is not only a recognition of "nature," but also a realm of life that "man" should pursue. The reason is that " tian"(nature, Heaven) does not just mean nature; it also means "Heaven" in the sense of holiness. "Human nature" should be asked to reach a transcendent sphere which is "equal to tian (Heaven, nature). In this sense, "man" and "nature" are not in opposition. Instead, "man" is united with "Heaven and Earth." For instance, Mencius said, "The people of the place where the superior man has visited will be influenced and educated; the impact at the place where the superior man has stayed is miraculous, and the sage acts along with Heaven and Earth" (Mencius 1980, Jinxin Shang). In this way, the superior man realizes personal transcendence. This way of thinking not only helps us get rid of the problem of "the division between Heaven and man" (the antagonism of Heaven and man), but also opens a way for human beings to attain the ideal human realm.

Secondly, we cannot regard the relationship between "Heaven(nature)" and "man" as a kind of external relationship, because "Heaven is man, and man is Heaven" and so "Heaven" and "man" are inherently connected. "Man" cannot be separated from "Heaven," and "man" cannot survive without "Heaven"; "Heaven" cannot be separated from "man," without "man," the reason of "Heaven" cannot be embodied, and so who can realize "the Dao of Heaven"? Understanding the relationship between "Heaven" and "man" is a characteristic of Chinese philosophy. On this point, Wang Fuzhi made an important observation. He reviewed ancient scholars' theories and concluded that they had merely grasped the outer phenomena of the pre-Qin Confucianism, and thought that The Book of Changes was only about "the Dao of Heaven," but did not know that The Book of Changes had been the root or foundation of "the Dao of man" since the Han Dynasty (Wang 1975, Vol. 9, Qiancheng Shang). Zhou Dunyi's doctrine of " taiji picture" is about the root (origin) of "the unity of Heaven and man," which explains that the birth of man is the result of a change in "the Dao of Heaven." While changing into "the Dao of Heaven," Heaven gives its essential part to "man" and makes "man" possess "human nature," which is different from other things. Then, man can discover that all the principles of moral human relations of "the Dao of man" (the rules of human society) are in the order of the yin-yang movement of "the Dao of Heaven" (the law of the universe). "The Dao of man" and "the Dao of Heaven" should be united. "The Dao of man" is based on "the Dao of Heaven" because "man" is a part of Heaven (nature), so a discussion of "the Dao of man" cannot be separated from "the Dao of Heaven," and discussion of "the Dao of Heaven" must also take "the Dao of man" into consideration because "the principle of daily life and things" of "the Dao of man" is in the order of the yin-yang movement of "the Dao of Heaven." Zhang Zai said that the Book of Changes "contains the principle of Heaven, and also includes the Dao of man" (Zhang 1978, p. 65).

Thirdly, why does Confucian philosophy hold that there is an "internal relationship" between "Heaven and man"? From the Western Zhou Dynasty, there is an intellectual tradition described as "the ear of Heaven is the ear of my people, and the eye of Heaven is the eye of my people" (Mencius 1980, Wanzhang Shang). The tradition can be traced from Confucius and Mencius to Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming. On this point, Zhu Xi's saying reflects Confucius' consistency on "the learning of benevolence." He said: "The man of benevolence" "should have the heart to produce abundantly in the sense of nature, in sensing the heart of tender affection for man and beneficence for things; the benevolent man's heart includes four morals(benevolence, righteousness, rituals, and wisdom) and penetration into the four beginnings of the four morals" (Zhu 1936, Vol. 13). "The Dao of Heaven" continuously produces, and regards benevolence as the heart. "Heaven" (nature) can make myriad things grow well, so "man" should follow the example of "Heaven" (nature), and show kindness to man and benefit myriad things. The reason is that "Heaven and man is united as a whole" and "man" obtains the essence of "Heaven" to become a "man," so man should realize the function of "nature" (Heaven) and "the tender affection for other man, and bring benefits to things." "The heart of Heaven" and "the heart of man" is actually the same heart. "Man" must realize "the Dao of Heaven" and sense "the Dao of Heaven." The value of life is to realize "the destiny (fate) of Heaven," so the relationship between "Heaven" and "man" is actually internal. We discuss the proposition of "the unity of Heaven and man" and understand it philosophically on the above points to see its real spirit and value. It is a kind of world view, a way of thinking that is applied to an interpretation of "the unity of Heaven and man." Its significance is that it endows "man" with an inescapable responsibility. "Man" can realize its own transcendence, and achieve the ideal "unity of Heaven and man" only in the process of "imitating Heaven(nature)" (enhancing to the sphere of "Heaven").

Of course, the Confucian idea of "unity of Heaven and man" probably cannot directly solve specific problems in human society's "conflicts between man and nature." However, as a philosophical proposition, the thought of "the unity of Heaven and man" holds that "Heaven" and "man" cannot be separated; instead, "Heaven" and "man" should be regarded as an inherent union. There is an internal communication between "Heaven" and "man," which undoubtedly provides a positive way of thinking for philosophically resolving the relationship between "Heaven" and "man."

V

"The conflict between man and man" that exists in contemporary society is more complicated than "the conflict between man and nature." Interpersonal conflict is not only related to the various conflicts between "self and others," "man and community," "nation and nation," "people and people" and "region and region." For instance, the pursuit of material needs and power, the struggle for natural resources, and the expansion of possession and ambition cause conflict and war between nations, peoples, and regions, and lead to "imperial hegemony" and "terrorism." Excessive preoccupation with the pursuit of money and the enjoyment of material goods, especially the ruling class' corruption and their oppression of ordinary people, causes tensions in the relationships between people, a negative social atmosphere, numerous factions, and factionalism. In society, children, youth, and the aged all have their own problems. Misunderstandings and hostility in daily life, the isolation of souls, then lead to the dissolution of social harmony. This trend will result in the collapse of human society. Does Confucianism provide a helpful intellectual resource for contemporary society's faults? In my opinion, the Confucian "learning of benevolence" may have much significance for the formation of harmony "between man and man," between nations, peoples, and regions, or "harmonious society."

The volume of " xing zi ming chu 性自命出 (nature coming out of fate)" in Guodian Zhujian says that " Dao originates from affection (feeling, emotion), and affection comes from nature. The beginning is close to affection, and the end is close to righteousness." It means that interpersonal relationships are initially founded on affection (feeling), and affection comes from human nature. Therefore, at the start of interpersonal relationships, affection is more important (such as the affection between a mother and child), and later on, morality and justice (Dao, or the way, and justice or righteousness) become more important than affection. Here, "the Dao" denotes "the Dao of man," which means the law of interpersonal relationships or principles of social relations. It is connected with "the Dao of Heaven," but different from "the Dao of Heaven," which means the law of nature (or the external world beyond "man"). " Dao originates from affection," meaning that interpersonal relationships are initially founded on affection. It is the starting point of Confucius' "learning of benevolence." Confucius' disciple Fan Chi asked him what "benevolence" was, and Confucius answered, "to love people." Where does the moral command "to love people" come from? Zhongyong quotes Confucius: "Benevolence is the character of man, and it is foremost to love family" (Zisi 1980, Chapter 20). The moral character of benevolence is inborn, and it is essential to love one's own family. But Confucians think that the spirit of benevolence cannot just rest on the love of one's own family. The Guodian Zhujian says, "It is affection to love family sincerely, but benevolence is understood as a broad affection for ordinary people, not only affection for one's father" (Jingmen 1998). It is natural to have much love for one's own family; love (affection) that is extended to other people can be regarded as "benevolence." There is also the saying, "filial piety should be extended to affection for ordinary people under the sky" (Ibid., Tang yu zhi dao). However, affection for one's family is the foundation of affection for others. It means that the Confucian "learning of benevolence" requires an extension of the affection for one's family to the affection of ordinary people. The principle, "put oneself in the place of another," and the practice, "treat the aged with respect in my family, and extend that respect to the aged outside of my family; treat the young in my family with tenderness and then extend that tenderness to the young outside of my family" (Mencius 1980, Liang Huiwang Shang), reflect benevolence. It is not easy to abide by the principle "put oneself in the place of another." One must take "the Dao of zhong 忠 (the full development of one's original good mind) and shu 恕 (the extension of that mind to others)," described as "you do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you"(Confucius 1980, Yanyuan), "if you wish to establish your own character, also establish the character of others, and if you wish to be prominent, also help others to be prominent" (Ibid., Yongye), to be the principle for carrying out "benevolence." (Zhu Xi's Sishu Jizhu explains: "To realize one's good to the best is zhong, and the extension of one's good is shu.") If "benevolence" is extended to society (all human society), it is like Confucius' saying, "To master oneself and return to ritual is benevolence. If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to the rites(ceremony), all under Heaven will return to benevolence. To practice benevolence depends on oneself. Does it depend on others?" (Ibid., Yanyuan). In the past, "overcome selfish desire" and "revive the ritual" had always been explained as two parallel acts, but such an understanding is not correct in my opinion. Overcoming selfish desire and reviving the ritual are benevolence means that it is "benevolence" if "reviving the ritual" is based on "overcoming selfish desire." Fei Xiaotong explains this well. He said: "Only overcoming selfish desire, the ritual can be revived. To revive the ritual is a necessary condition for entry into society and becoming a social person. To limit one's selfish desire or to raise one's selfish desire may be the key difference between Western and Eastern cultures" (Fei 2002, p. 4). This is a reasonable explanation. If one enters society, he must require something of himself. For instance, he should ask himself to abide by the principle, "you do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you," then he can follow social criterion (the ritual) and become a social person. A nation is the same; it must abide by the requirements of the world "pact" and the general rules. Then the world pact and general rules can be preserved. Fei Xiaotong thought that "the restriction of selfish desire" in Chinese culture was good for interpersonal relationships, while "the encouragement of selfish desire" in Western culture, which placed the self above other persons or other nations, surely and easily led to conflict and war. According to Zhu Xi, the saying can be understood as "conquering selfish desire and returning to the rituals, which represent the principle of Heaven" (Zhu 1983). He means that we should restrict our own selfish desire in order to conform to rituals and criterion in our behaviors and actions. "Benevolence" is man's innate characteristic ("affection is originated from nature"); in the sense of social life, "the ritual (ceremony)" is the external system which regulates people's behavior, and its function is to regulate interpersonal relationships in order to ensure harmony. It symbolizes that "the importance of the use of rites (ceremony) is harmony." Demanding that people obey the ritual (ceremony) must be based on their internal heart (mind) of "the affection for others," which conforms to "benevolence." Confucius says: "To practice benevolence depends on oneself. Does it depend on others?"(Confucius 1980, Yanyuan). On the relationship between "benevolence"and "rites (ceremony)," Confucius clearly said: "If a man is not benevolent, what has he to do with rites (ceremonies, etc.)? If he is not benevolent, what has he to do with music?" (Ibid., Bayi). Without the heart (mind) of benevolence, the system of rites (ceremony) and music is deceptive, and is for cheating. Therefore, Confucius held that society can be harmonious and peaceful if people consciously pursue "benevolence," base "the heart(mind) of benevolence" on certain criterion, and put it into practice in daily society. This is the meaning of the saying "if a man (the ruler) can for one day control himself and return to the rites (ceremony), all under Heaven will return to benevolence" (Ibid., Yanyuan). The action of pursuing benevolence in daily practice is similar to "seeking to reach the greatest height and brilliancy and follow the Dao of the Mean" in Zhongyong. "Seeking to reach the greatest height and brilliancy" (Zisi 1980, Chapter 27) means that people should pursue the highest principle, the ideal of benevolence, in life; "To follow the Dao of the Mean" asks people to realize the spirit of "benevolence" in daily life ("the doctrine of the mean, denotes the use of the mean.") "Seeking to reach the greatest height and brilliancy" and "to follow the Dao of the Mean" cannot be separated into two parts, and "the Dao of sageliness within and kingliness without" is the highest Confucian ideal. Today, we are trying to build a harmonious society, so Confucius' sayings are very important. There are many explanations of "benevolence" in the Confucius Analects, but there are no words for "benevolent governance." However, "to lead the people with virtue and regulate them by the rules of ceremonies (rites, property)," "to love people widely," "to elect the virtuous and able talents," "to extensively bring benefit to the people and bring salvation to all" etc. are all about "benevolent governance." There are many discussions of "benevolent governance" in Mencius, and the meaning of "benevolent governance" is broad. Some of the explanations are not compatible with the needs of contemporary human society, but two of them are important in helping us to build a harmonious society and achieve world peace. One is that "the practice of benevolent government" should ensure people to have fixed property. Mencius said: "The people follow the right Dao, because they have fixed property and stable hearts, and without fixed property, there cannot be stable hearts" (Mencius 1980, Teng Wengong Shang). He means that ordinary people should have some fixed property in order to ensure that they have certain moral and behavioral principles. Without fixed property, a person will not have moral ideas and behavioral guidelines. Mencius said: "Benevolent governance should start with the private ownership of land" (Ibid.). He means that a benevolent government should ensure that ordinary people have their own land first. I believe that we must ensure that ordinary people have some fixed property if we truly want to build a harmonious society. At the international level, every nation and people should possess the wealth that they deserve; powerful nations should not exploit other nations' wealth and resources or pursue power politics. The second point of Mencius' "benevolent governance" opposes unjust war. He said, "Those who carry out the kind and right Dao will gain more support; otherwise, others will find scant support who lose the kind and right Dao." Here, "the Dao" means "morality and justice." In Gongsun Chou Xia there is a passage saying that favorable weather is less important than advantageous terrain, and advantageous terrain is less important than the support of the people. It reads:

It is not needed to confine civilians by a national boundary, not necessary to protect a nation with a dangerous mountain, and to threaten the world by the weapons of destruction. Those who carry out the kind and right Dao will gain more support. Others who give up the kind and right Dao will find scant support. He who has the least support, his family and relatives will all oppose him, and all the people under the sky will come and pledge allegiance to he who has the most support. The just superior man will win if he launches a war against those who are opposed by all supporting forces, even by his family and relatives, or he need not launch the war (Mencius 1980, Gongsun Chou Xia).

The passage tells us that it is not necessary to have national boundaries to restrict civilians, to depend on advantageous terrain to protect a nation, and to rely on weapons of mass destruction to threaten the world. Confucians usually divide war into two kinds: "the just war" and "the unjust war." Mencius says, "there is no just war in the Spring and Autumn Period" (Ibid., Jinxin Xia), and "those who lose public support will lose the regime" (Ibid., Lilou Shang). This idea also applies to the ruler of a nation. In the early Han Dynasty, Jia Yi wrote an article, Guo Qin Lun 过秦论 (An analysis of the fall of the Qin Dynasty). In his article, he concluded that the Qin Dynasty fell because "the Qin government did not carry out the policy of benevolence and righteousness after it had established a united nation, so it lost sovereignty even though it had taken over national power and had many advantages" (Jia 1989, Vol. 1). He quoted the proverb, "the past events are today's lesson." Isn't that the wisdom we should absorb today? Such Confucian thoughts should have some meaning to the rulers of a nation and for the ruling group of the world's developed nations. "Manage state affairs and pacify the world" for "benevolent governance" and "the Dao of kingliness," instead of "arbitrariness" and oppression.

Since Samuel P. Huntington presented his thesis on the conflict of civilizations in 1993, it has been hotly debated by scholars from all countries. In human history, it is not uncommon to find conflicts and war caused by cultural differences (for instance, differences in philosophy, religion, values). Having entered the 21st century, there is no world war, but regional wars frequently break out between nations, peoples, and regions, with political and economical problems being important reasons, but culture is also an important reason. To resolve conflicts and even wars due to cultural differences, perhaps Confucius' notion of "harmony without sameness" might be a very important principle.

In Chinese history, there are two concepts, " he 和 (harmony)" and "tong 同 (sameness)," which are regarded as different, so there is the so-called "discrimination of harmony and sameness." According to the records on Zhaogong ershi nian of Zuozhuan 左传·昭公二十年 (the 20th year of the Duke Zhao, Zuozhuan), "Duke Zhao asked, 'Is only Liang Qiuju harmonious with me?' Yanzi (Yan Ying) answered, 'Ju is the same as you. Is it harmonious with you?' The Duke said, 'Is harmony different from sameness?' Yan answered, 'It is different. It is like cooking a thick soup, which needs water, fire, vinegar, catsup, salt, and plum to cook fish or meat, firewood to burn, and then the cook will get it seasoned to assure a fine taste. If the taste is too mild, the cook will add seasoning, and if the taste is too thick, he will add water to dilute the taste. When the superior man has the soup, he will find it delicious. The relationship between the emperor and his officials is alike. . . . Now Ju is different, because he always agrees with you no matter what decisions you make. It is like adding water to improve the flavor of water. Who would want this? If musical instruments always play the same tone, who would listen to it? This is why sameness should not be advocated'" (Zuo 1980, Zhaogong ershi nian). In Zhengyu of Guoyu 国语·郑语, "The harmonious relationship between things is helpful to produce new things, while sameness cannot. To add one with another is called harmony, so it can create something new; while if the same things are put together, all will lose their vital force. So the past kings used earth, metal, wood, water, and fire to produce the myriad things" (Zuo 1997, Vol. 16). Therefore, "harmony" and "sameness" are not the same. If different and related things can harmoniously grow, then things will develop. If the same things are put together, the result is the suppression of vital force. The highest ideal in traditional Chinese culture is "ten thousand things grow together without harming each other; their Dao move in parallel without mutual interference" (Zisi 1980, Chapter 30).("Ten thousand things growing together" with "their Dao moving in parallel" expresses a "lack of sameness"; "they do not damage" or "interfere with each other"—this is "harmony.") This can be a rich source of ideas for the coexistence of many cultures.

Different nations and countries should have cultural exchanges and dialogue in order to achieve a common understanding, that is, a process of mutual recognition from difference to a sense of commonality. This kind of mutual recognition does not mean that one side exterminates the other or that one side is completely assimilated by another. It means the search for junctures where different cultures can come together and develop. This is harmony. Therefore, we must diligently strive for harmonious coexistence among different cultures through dialogue. Now, many scholars in China and the West have recognized the importance of pursuing mutual understanding among different cultures through dialogue. For instance, Habermas puts forward the notions of "justice" and "solidarity" (Habermas 1996). I think these should be used as principles in the relationship between different nations and cultures. Habermas' "principle of justice" can be understood as that every national culture should be independent and self-determining; the "principle of solidarity" can be understood as that one nation should regard other national cultures with a sympathetic attitude and respect other cultures. Only through continuous dialogue and communication and other means can good communication between different national cultures be established. The German philosopher Gadamer pointed out that "understanding" should be extended to a "broad dialogue" (Pan 2002, pp. 65-68). It is to increase "understanding" to the level of "broad dialogue," then the subject and object can become equal. In other words, dialogue can only be truly carried out under the condition of mutual equality. It can be said that Gadamer's consciousness of subject-object equality and his theory on cultural dialogue are important and necessary ideas for our age. The idea is in inspiration for us to correctly understand Sino-foreign cultural relationships and national relationships. Habermas' principles of justice and solidarity and Gadamer's theory of broad dialogue both recognize, as their premise, the need for harmony without sameness. It is only if we recognize that nations and states with different cultural traditions can achieve harmonious coexistence will it be possible for them to have equal rights and duties; it is only under such conditions that "broad dialogue" can truly and smoothly accomplish its ends. Thus, Confucius' principle of "harmony without sameness," based on the notion that harmony is valuable, should become a basic principle for handling relations between different cultures.

VI

If we use the Confucian notion of "the unity of Heaven and man" as a philosophical resource to resolve "the contradictions between man and nature" and "the unity of self and others" to resolve "the contradictions among men," we may then use the "integration of the inner and the outer" to moderate the contradictions within ourselves. There are pressures in modern society. In particular, the unlimited pursuit of sensual pleasure results in psychological imbalance and a split in the human personality. Psychological imbalance induces spiritual disturbances, alcoholism, murder, suicide, etc. This distortion of the human body and mind has become a social disease that seriously affects social peace. The reason for this is the withering of morality; people no longer have a sense of harmony between body and mind. Many perceptive scholars have proposed theories and policies about how to cure the disease. In traditional Chinese culture, much attention has been given to this in the Confucian practice of cultivating the person and nurturing the mind. Xing Zi Ming Chu in Guodian Zhujian says: "if you intend to know the Dao, you should return to the innate goodness within yourself, it is called moral cultivation" (Jingmen 1998). Daxue 大学 (The Great Learning) stresses that people's moral practice is important to building a harmonious society. In the first chapter of the book, it says: "The Dao of learning to be great consists in manifesting the clear character, renovating the people, and abiding (staying, resting) in the highest good" (Zeng 1980, Chapter 1). Zhu Xi commented, "the word, renovate, means remove from old. And if I am clear about myself and clean, I should help others to abolish the former pollution in the similar way as mine. . . To manifest the clear character and renovate, people should stay at the highest good and not change" (Zhu 1983, Daxue). The purpose of showing a clear character and shaping the people is to reach the highest good and achieve man's highest realm. Therefore, The Great Learning holds that "From the Son of Heaven to common civilians, all must regard moral cultivation as the root or foundation. There has never been a case when the root is in disorder and the branches are all in order" (Zeng 1980, Chapter 1). It means that according to Confucianism, if everyone (from the Son of Heaven to common people) cultivated their morality well, "family" could be regulated, "state" will be in order, and there will be peace throughout the "world." Or if moral cultivation, the root or foundation, is disordered, it is definitely impossible to manage "family," "state" and the "world" well. In the Doctrine of the Mean, "Social governance depends on man, the choice should be made according to their moral cultivation, the standard of moral cultivation is the Dao (the top Dao, harmony), and the heart(mind) of benevolence and love is necessary for realizing a harmonious society" (Zisi 1980, Chapter 20). Here, the connection of an individual's moral cultivation to "benevolence" proves the consistency of Confucian thought. Confucianism's attention to "moral cultivation" is not aimless; instead, it is to regulate family, govern the nation, and unite the world, that is, to build a "harmonious society." The ideal of the commonwealth of great unity in the Records of Rites is aimed at building a harmonious society politically, economically, and culturally. Confucianism's ideal of a harmonious society is based on personal moral cultivation, so Confucians lay particular emphasis on personal cultivation of the body and mind. Confucians think that life and death, riches and honor should not be the final life goal, and people should pursue moral perfection and knowledge. Confucius said: "I am uneasy that people do not cultivate their moral character, do not learn and teach knowledge, do not behave according to righteousness, and do not correct their mistakes although they know they are wrong" (Confucius 1980, Shuer). This tells us the reason for being a man. It is not easy to cultivate our moral character unless we have great dreams and the willingness to improve the welfare of humankind. It is also not easy to study knowledge because we not only need to improve our own wisdom, but also need to show culture and education to society. People always make mistakes, but we should have the courage to correct our mistakes, benefiting social harmony. "Be apt to goodness" means that we should strive in the direction of goodness everyday, improve ourselves day to day, and then we can reach the state of being in the highest good. All of the above are reasons to be an upright person, as advocated by Confucianism, and they are necessary for maintaining harmony between the body and the mind, the inner and the outer. Mencius said: "To preserve one's mind and nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven. Not to allow any double-mindedness regardless of longevity or brevity of life, but to cultivate one's person and wait for ming 命 (destiny, fate, Heaven's decree or mandate) to take its own course is the way to fulfill one's destiny" (Mencius 1980, Jinxin Shang). If one can preserve his compassionate heart and cultivate his moral character to realize the Dao of Heaven, then the length of one's life does not matter. But he must be sure of being conform to the Dao of Heaven through individual moral cultivation. It is one's peace and calmness and the establishment of destiny.

Confucian self-cultivation has a goal. The Book of Changes says, "Make use of personal moral cultivation in order to honor virtue" (Zhouyi, Xici Xia). People's actions should benefit society, and this should be their main pursuit. An individual undergoes self-cultivation in order to elevate his spirit and "set his mind on Heaven and Earth, establish his life's destiny, and continue to study to achieve sage, so that all things in the world are at peace" (Zhang 1978, p. 320). This is to "establish the great root or foundation and so carry out the Dao." What the Confucians in the Song Dynasty pursued is that, as far as an individual is concerned, he will be at peace with himself both in his inner thoughts and emotions and in his external relations. In A Letter to Zhang Jingfu, when Zhu Xi discussed "the meaning of the mean and harmony" with Jingfu, he said: "From now on, I know I have a safe place, that is, the place for the peace and calmness of a person, the establishment of destiny, and for the domination of consciousness in the vast transformation of the universe. So the key for us to establish our big root (foundation) and carry out the great Dao is described as that substance and function have one source and there is no gap between the apparent and the hidden" (Zhu 1936, Vol. 10). Confucians hold that it is very important for a person to find peace and calmness, and to establish his destiny for the harmony of body and mind, inner thoughts and emotion, and external factors. Therefore, Zhu Xi said: "If a person can be harmoniously centered within himself, even though the world at large is in chaos, the inner world, its Heaven and Earth and the myriad things, remains peaceful and unharmed. If someone is unable to attain this, even though there is order in the world at large, within oneself one will be perturbed, even if no harm comes to him from without. It's the same for a country or a family" (Ibid.). If our internal and external beings are harmonious, the chaos of a disordered world cannot disturb our inner peace. If we are not centered and harmonious in our internal and external beings, even if there is a very well-ordered world outside, we will still be troubled, worried, or perturbed. We must work hard at cultivating our own virtue whether the world at large is in chaos or in order. In this way, we can fulfill our life's duty and when it is time to leave the world, we can go with a sense of peace and fulfillment. Thus, the last two sentences in Zhang Zai's Ximing 西铭 (Western Inscription) says: "In life I fulfill my duty as a member of society and as a member of the universe, and when death comes, I rest" (Zhang 1978, p. 63).

Confucians consistently give much attention to an individual's peace and calmness and the establishment of destiny. This comes from selfcultivation. In this way, we can bring harmony to our own hearts and minds and to our internal world and its external manifestations. Our words and actions conform to the "principle of being human." And in this way, our persons will be at peace and our destiny established. We should remove all obstacles in the way of our personal harmony. Zeng Zi says: "Everyday I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends I have not been faithful; and whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher" (Chan 1963, p. 20). As a man of honor, everyday one should be aware of himself and examine whether his behavior and actions are moral and just. If there is something immoral and unjust, he should sacrifice his life to realize humanity and defend justice. Confucius said, "A resolute scholar and a man of humanity will never seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity. He would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity" (Confucius 1980, Weiling Gong). Mencius said: "If I do not act according to humanity and justice, I choose self-abandonment"(Mencius 1980, Lilou Shang). It is not easy to carry out the Confucians' "principle of being human," but this is something people should ardently strive for. And the purpose of achieving this personal peace is to bring about social harmony.

Sima Qian says: "For one to make a record of the Dao of the ancients today is to make a mirror for ourselves; it is not that the two ages are necessarily identical in all things" (Sima 1997, Vol. 18). We have been reviewing the thoughts of Confucius and his school in order to search for resources that human society today can use. This is undoubtedly important. But the thoughts and ideas of the sages and worthies of ancient times are not fully able to solve all the problems of the present time; nor do they all accord with the demands of contemporary society. They can only show us a path for thinking, hints on how to make use of these resources, giving us a new foundation for addressing the concerns of the present time. It is in this way that they contribute to building a harmonious human society. "Though Zhou is an ancient state, its Mandate is ever-new" (Shi Jing, Daya). Our Chinese nation is an ancient nation with 5,000 years of history and culture. Our mission is to assure that our society constantly revitalizes itself and makes contributions to all mankind.

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叁　儒学的现代意义*

一

《儒学的现代意义》这个题目，我曾讲过多次，上世纪80年代讲过，90年代也讲过，现在到21世纪还讲。不仅我讲，而且越来越多的学者都在讲，为什么今天我们要讲？我想，有两个重要的原因：一是我们中华民族正处在伟大的民族复兴的前夜，在此时此刻，我们必须回顾我们的历史文化传统。雅斯贝尔斯（1883—1969）曾提出“轴心时代”的观念。他认为，在公元前500年前后，在古希腊、以色列、印度和中国等地几乎同时出现了伟大的思想家，他们都对人类关切的根本问题提出了独到的看法。古希腊有苏格拉底、柏拉图，以色列有犹太教的先知们，印度有释迦牟尼，中国有老子、孔子等等，形成了不同的文化传统。这些文化传统经过两千多年的发展，已经成为人类文明的主要精神财富，而这些地域的不同文化，原来都是独立发展出来的，最初并没有互相影响。“人类一直靠轴心期所产生、思考和创造的一切而生存。每一次新的飞跃都回顾这一时期，并被它重燃火焰。自那以后，情况就是这样。轴心期潜力的苏醒和对轴心期潜力的回忆，或曰复兴，总是提供了精神动力。对这一开端的复归是中国、印度和西方不断发生的事情。”¹例如，欧洲的文艺复兴就是把目光投向其文化的源头古希腊，使欧洲文明重新发出新的光辉，而对世界产生重大影响。中国的宋明理学（新儒学）在印度佛教文化冲击之后，再次回到孔孟而把中国文化提高到一个新的阶段。在这踏入新千年之际，世界思想界已出现对于“新的轴心时代”的呼唤，这就要求我们更加重视对古代思想智慧的温习与发掘，回顾我们文化发展的源头，以响应世界文化发展的新局面。二是在新的世纪，我们的国家提出建设“和谐社会”的要求之际，费孝通先生提出“文化自觉”的问题。也就是说，我们要建设“和谐社会”也必有个对自身“文化”上的自觉。什么是“文化自觉”？费孝通先生在《人文价值再思考》中说：

文化自觉只是指生活在一定文化中人们对其文化有“自知之明”，明白它的来历、形成过程，所具有的特色和它发展的趋向，不带任何“文化回归”的意思，不是要“复古”，同时也不主张“全盘西化”或“全盘他化”。自知之明是为了加强对文化转型的自主能力，取得决定适应新环境、新时代文化选择的自主地位。

这就是说，在我们建设“和谐社会”的伟大历史时期，我们必须有“文化自觉”，要确立“文化”上的自主地位。我们的文化上的自主地位，既不是“复古”，也不是“全盘西化”，而是要使我们自身文化的根基牢固，根深才可以叶茂，必须坚持文化自主性，并且也要充分吸收其他各民族的文化滋养我们自身。

在这种情况下，来研究我们民族文化的历史和它发展的前景，就必须适应当代世界文化发展的新形势，即“新的轴心时代”到来的文化发展的新形势；就必须适应我们国家建设“和谐社会”的目标，而必须有一个文化自觉的要求。那么在这样一个新的历史时期，全人类社会和我们自己的社会，到底遇到了什么问题，我们需要努力解决什么问题，才能促使“新的轴心时代”和我们的“和谐社会”早日到来呢？

二

进入21世纪，可以说在我们国家出现了“国学热”的情况。对这种情况存在着各种各样不同的看法和解释。所谓“国学”最早见于《周礼·春官·乐师》：“掌管国学之政，以教国子小舞。”意思是说：乐师的职责是管理国学的事务，这个国学事务是教国子的音乐舞蹈的。但是现在我们说的“国学”是对“西学”而言。这是由于，我们面对“西学”的输入，如何保护和发展我们的传统文化，也就是说：中国文化的发展面对着双重任务，一是要保护自身文化，维护我们自身文化发展的根基；二是如何对待和吸收、消化“西方”文化，这就形成了百多年来文化上的“中西古今”之争。而在这个全球化的时代，我们必须走出“中西古今”之争，会通“中西古今”之学，以实现不同文化之间的共存共荣。

对“国学”，特别是“儒学”，现在学术文化界有种种的看法，我简单作点介绍：

1．有的学者提出“重建中国儒教的构想”：他们认为“必须全方位的复兴儒教，以应对西方文明的全方位的挑战”，“复兴儒教是复兴中华文化重建中华文明的当务之急”。因此，主张把儒教立为国教，在我们国家实现所谓的自古以来的“政教合一”²。

2．对这种观点来自两个方面的批评：一是来自“自由主义派”，他们认为，“儒教救国论”是对当代民主政治的反动，是对“平等”观念的践踏。把“儒教”立为“国教”会让中国成为一个儒教的伊朗，“企图将儒教意识形态化，为专制主义服务”³。另一是来自马克思主义学者的批判，他们认为：“儒教救世的想象实质是道德作用的自我夸大”，也是“以天道性命的形上学来追求王道政治，这样只能重踏封建专制的陷阱”，“真正的救世主只能是马克思主义”⁴。

3．还有一些学者从维护和发扬儒家思想出发，对“儒学”作充分的肯定，例如现代新儒家认为内圣之学可以开发出适合现代民主政治的“外王之道”，而且认为儒家的“心性之学”（所谓“良知的坎陷”）可以发展出认识论的系统。也还有认为，“三纲五常”仍有其价值。1994年杭州会议上，杜维明放弃了认为“三纲”有价值的看法，而“五常”还有价值，这是他的一个改变。还有关于“文化中国”的问题，杜维明提出这一想法，对中国文化走向世界有其意义，但他把“文化中国”分成若干圈，核心圈为“大陆”“台湾”等；第二圈为海外华人；第三圈为受中国文化影响的各国；第四圈是研究和欣赏中国文化的外国人等等。但他有个观点是可讨论的，他说：“文化中国的范畴很广，有一批与中国没有血缘关系，但对中国人影响很大的，也是文化中国的一部分，像释迦牟尼，马克思等。”这也许很成问题。如此类推，可以有“文化欧洲”“文化美国”，而中国的思想家，如孔、孟、老、庄等等，在他们那里有影响，也就是他们的一部分。

4．当然还有一些学者认为，孔子的儒家学说在五四时期已被否定，今天再把它推崇到至高的地位，无疑是历史的倒退等等。

到底对儒家思想应如何看，这是仁者见仁，智者见智的问题，今天对它有多种看法，说明我们的社会在进步，因为学术文化问题只能在自由讨论、在贯彻“百家争鸣”的方针中实现，在不断的理性的对话中前进。

当然，我自己对“儒学”也有自己的看法，是否对，要在讨论中得到检验，它也只是众多之家的一家之言。对于学术文化，我有几点根本的看法：第一，任何历史上的思想文化没有绝对正确的，其自身往往包含着内在矛盾，儒学也是一样；因此，“儒学”必然有某些方面有其历史的局限性，不可能都适合现代社会生活的要求。即使是其中具有普适意义的精粹部分也往往要给以现代的诠释。第二，虽然思想文化是在不断发展的，但是，古代哲学家提出的哲学问题和他们的哲学思考并非都不如我们今天，有些问题很可能是万古常新的，例如中国哲学中讨论的“天人关系”（人与自然关系）的问题，仍然是我们现代中国哲学讨论的主题之一。第三，罗素说：“不同文明之间的交流，过去已经多次证明，是人类文明的发展的里程碑。”任何文化要在历史长河中不断发展，必须不断地吸收其他民族的文化，在相互交流中才能适时地发展，特别是在今天全球化时代。从我国历史上看，印度佛教的传入已经证明这一点。中国文化曾受惠于印度佛教，印度佛教又在中国得到发扬光大，后为中国文化所吸收，而深刻地影响了宋明理学。今天，在全球化的形势下，我们必须充分地系统地吸收和消化西方文化和其他各民族的文化，当然是他们的优秀文化，中国学术文化才能适应人类社会要求和我们民族自身的新发展。因此我们的文化必须是民族的又是世界的。第四，要有文化的主体性，任何一个民族文化必须扎根在自身文化的土壤中，只有对自身文化有充分理解和认识，保护和发扬，它才能适应自身社会合理、健康发展的要求，它才有深厚的吸收其他民族的文化的能力。一个没有能力坚持自身文化的自主性，也就没有能力吸收其他民族的文化以丰富和发展其自身的文化，它将或被消灭，或全盘同化。

基于以上看法，我认为，要对“儒学”进行分析，也许可以从不同角度来看待它。我们可否从三个角度来看“儒学”：一是政统的儒学，一是道统的儒学，一是学统的儒学。

儒学曾长期与中国历代政治结合在一起，无疑它对封建集权专制统治起过重要作用。在儒家思想中特别注重道德教化的作用，这虽有可取的一面，但却流于把道德的作用绝对化，而使中国一直是“人治社会”，而很难实现“法治社会”；而且很容易使政治道德化，而美化政治统治；又使道德政治化，使道德为政治服务。当然儒家思想中的某些政治哲学也对消解专制统治起限制作用，如“以德抗位”“民为贵”“诛一夫”（曰：“臣弑其君可乎？”曰：“贼仁者谓之贼，贼义者谓之残，残贼之人，谓之一夫。闻诛一夫纣矣，未闻弑君也。”⁵）往往也可以用“天”来压制君权。“畏天命”，要对“天”有所敬畏，甚至“天人感应”在一定条件下，也可以起抑制“皇权”的作用，利用天降灾异，有臣子就上书警告皇帝，于是皇帝不得不下罪己诏。但总的说来儒学在历史上被政治利用起的消极作用更明显。特别是“愚忠”“吾皇圣明，臣罪当诛”，无论如何是不可取的。所以对儒学在受政治利用的情况下，问题较多。

“道统”的儒学：任何一个成系统有历史传承的学术文化派别，其学术文化的发展和影响，必有其传统，西方如此，中国也是如此，从中国历史上看有儒释道三家，都有其传统。因为有传统的学术文化它才能不断发展，儒家是更为自觉的继承着其传统，它以继承夏、商、周三代的文化传统为自任。“祖述尧舜，宪章文武。”因此，我们今天当然也应自觉地继承我们的文化传统。但是对自身“道统”的过分强调就可能形成对其他学术文化的排斥，而形成对“异端”思想的压制，而在历史上某些异端思想的出现，恰恰是对主流思想的冲击，甚至于颠覆，这将为新的思想开辟道路。儒家从总体上说，是比较有包容性的，如他们主张“万物并育而不相害，道并行而不相悖”，但有时也存在强烈的排他性，例如孟子的“拒杨墨”，批评杨朱和墨子“无父、无君”这就过分了。如韩愈的排佛，佛教在当时确有问题，浪费国家财力过大，但韩愈提出“人其人，火其书，庐其居”（让僧尼都还俗，佛经都烧掉，佛寺都改为民居），也有点过分吧！因此，派性过强不大好。

“学统”的儒学是指其学术传统，是指它的学术理念，也许在这方面，儒学的正面价值比较多，它可以为人类社会提供比较有意义的思想资源。在当前甚至以后，都不应把它意识形态化。学术最好归学术，不应依附于政治，不能定于一尊，要贯彻“百家争鸣”的方针。当然，我们对古来圣贤为我们提供的思想资源必须经过分析，并给以现代诠释，以揭示其既能对我们当前民族的伟大复兴、建设“和谐社会”提供有积极意义的思想资源，又能对全人类社会合理和全面的发展有普世意义，儒学必须“日日新，又日新”才能成为我们的真正精神财富。

三

对于一种学说作出价值判断，当然我们可以从多种角度来考虑，可以从政治的、经济的、科学技术的等等方面来考虑，但是也许最重要的应是对它的价值作哲学的判断。为此，我们必须了解我们的社会国家、当前全人类面临的重大问题，以此作为我们思考哲学问题的出发点。

当前人类社会存在的重大问题有什么？我想，归纳起来有三大问题：一是，人与自然的关系问题，目前人与自然的矛盾已发展到了十分严重的地步；二是，“人与人”之间关系的问题，这包括人我问题（人与社会）、国与国、民族与民族之间的问题；三是，人自身身心内外关系的问题。也就是说，当前人类遇到的最大问题就是人和自然的矛盾，人与人（人与社会）的矛盾，人自身的矛盾。而这三个问题应和我们建设“和谐社会”和当今人类社会的“和平共处”有着极为重要的关系。我认为，我国儒家的“天人合一”“人我合一”“身心合一”这三个哲学命题，也许可以说为我们解决上述三大矛盾提供了某些宝贵的思路和应该特别重视的思想资源。当然，我没有意思说，这些问题光靠儒家思想都可以解决。

在人类社会进入21世纪时，我们回头看看20世纪的历史，可以发现过去这个世纪是人类社会飞速发展的世纪，取得辉煌成就的世纪，但同时又是充满矛盾斗争的悲惨世纪。在这百年中，发生了两次世界大战，因战争非正常死亡的人何止几千万，大量破坏了人类多少世纪辛勤建造的文化遗产。而我们的国家，在百多年来经历了种种苦难，同时也取得了很大的进步。但在这个过程中由于种种原因，从文化上说在相当长的一个时期，我们对传统几乎全盘否定，而又拒绝吸收西方的某些先进文化，致使我们的社会出现了“信仰危机”“道德真空”“环境污染”“金钱拜物教盛行”等等，这些已经到了相当严重的地步，不能不引起世人高度重视。那么如何办？我想，不仅我这样想，而且许多学者都这样想，我们能不能从我们长达五千年的历史中发掘出解决这些问题的某些思想资源？许多学者在努力寻求。当然，必须注意，我们决不能认为思想文化可以解决一切问题，如果认为思想文化可以解决一切问题，就可能导致“文化决定论”，这就像认为科学技术可以解决人类社会问题一样，而导致“科学主义”的“科学万能”歧途。因此，我们讨论“儒学的现代意义”只是说，它有些什么样的资源和思路，可以对当前人类社会存在的问题给以某种可以思考的路径，给以一种为解决问题的提示方向。

四

关于“人和自然矛盾”的问题，1992年世界1575名科学家发表了一个《世界科学家对人类的警告》，在其开头就说，人类和自然正走上一条相互抵触的道路。我认为，这话深刻地认识到人类社会如果如此发展下去，将会遇到严重的危机。科学技术高度发达，虽然可以给人们造福，但作为自然的一部分的人，在他们征服自然的过程中，不仅掌握了大量破坏自然的工具，而且也掌握了毁灭人自身的武器。对自然界的无量的开发和破坏，资源的浪费，臭氧层变薄，海洋毒化，环境污染，人口暴涨，生态平衡的破坏，不仅造成“自然和谐”的破坏，而且破坏了“人与自然的和谐”，这些已严重地威胁着人类自身生存的条件。这种情况的存在，应该说和西方哲学“主—客”（认识的主体与认识的客体）二分的思维方式有关，正如罗素在《西方哲学史》中说：“笛卡尔的哲学……他完成了或者说几近完成了由柏拉图开端而主要因为宗教上的理由经基督教哲学发展起来的精神、物质二元论，……笛卡尔体系提出来精神界和物质界两个平行而彼此独立的世界，研究其中之一能够不牵涉另外一个。”这就是说，西方哲学长期把精神和物质看成是各自独立的，互不相干的，因此其哲学以“外在关系”（“人”和“自然”是互不相关的二元）立论，或者说其思维模式以“心”“物”为独立的二元，研究一个可以不牵涉另外一个。这就是说欧洲（西方）的思维模式从轴心时代的柏拉图起就是以“主—客”（即“心—物”或“天—人”）二分立论。然而中国哲学在思维模式上与之有着根本的不同，也是在轴心时代就以“天人合一”（即“主客相即不离”）立论。

中国哲学的源头之一可以说是《周易》，在1993年于湖北荆门出土的“楚简”有一段非常重要的记载：

礼，交之行述也。

乐，或生或教者也。

书，□□□□者也。

诗，所以会古今之诗是也，

易，所以会天道、人道也。

春秋，所以会古今之事也。

这些竹简大概是在公元前300 年前写的东西。从这个记载看，“易，所以会天道、人道也，”是说《周易》是研究天道（天的规律）和人道（人类社会的秩序）会通道理的书。这就是说，在中国古代很早就注意到，研究“天”不能不牵涉到“人”，研究“人”也不能不牵涉到“天”，这就是“天人合一”思想。其实在《论语》中也已经透露出这一消息，子贡说：“夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也。”子贡虽然没有听到过孔子讲“性与天道”的言论，但他把这个问题提出来就说明当时人对“人性”（人）与“天道”（天）的关系问题十分关注。从人类社会的发展上看，人们最初遇到的问题就是“人”与“自然界”（天）的关系问题，因为人要生存就离不开“自然界”。所以在中国古代一直都在关注“天人关系”问题。

当然对如何处理和看待“天人关系”自古就有各种不同的看法：有的学者主张应顺应自然；有的学者认为应利用“天”来为人服务，“制天命而用之”；有的主张“天人交相胜”等等。但儒家思想的主流多主张“天人合一”。所谓“天人合一”是说“天”离不开“人”，“人”也离不开“天”。

为什么有这样的思想，可以说其起源很早。我们知道，《周易》本来是一部卜筮的书，它是人用来占卜、问吉凶祸福的。向谁问？是向“天”问，“人”向“天”问吉凶祸福，《易经》记述了这些，所以这就成为“天”“人”关系的书。后来，出现了对这部书的种种解释，这就是《易传》。特别是其中的《系辞》可以说是对《易经》的一种哲学解释。既然《易经》所要解决的是“天人”关系问题，那么“人”和“天”究竟是个什么关系？《系辞》就是要回答这个问题。它认为：《易经》这部书无所不包，既包含“天道”“地道”，也包含“人道”，虽然“天道”表现为阴和阳，“地道”表现为“刚”和“柔”，“人道”表现为“仁”和“义”，但是这三者的道理是统一的，都是乾坤的表现。宋儒张载说：“三才两之（三才指‘天’‘地’‘人’），莫不有乾坤之道也。易一物而合三才，天（地）人一也，阴阳其气，刚柔其形，仁义其性。”⁶《易》把天（地）和人统一起来看，所以天人是一个相互关联的统一体。为什么用“乾”“坤”来表述“天”“地”“人”的统一，这是由于《易传》有个看法，因为“乾”是指“天行健，君子以自强不息”的，“坤”是指“地势坤，君子以厚德载物”的。因此，“人”对“天地”（天）负有特殊的责任。“人”应以“自强不息”“厚德载物”的精神来担当天地所要求的大任。张载说，“天道”和“人道”从“道理”上说是统一的，如果要知道做人的道理不能不知道“天地”的道理，能知道“天地”的道理，也就可以知道“人”（社会）的道理。

所以宋儒对“天人合一”思想发挥得更加深刻了，例如程颐说：“安有知人道而不知天道者乎？道，一也。岂人道自是一道，天道自是一道？”照儒家看，不能把“天”“人”分成两截，更不能把“天”“人”看成是一种外在的对立关系，不能研究其中一个而不牵涉另外一个。朱熹说得更明白：“天即人，人即天。人之始生，得之于天也；既生此人，则天又在人矣。”⁷“天”离不开“人”，“人”也离不开“天”。人初产生时，虽然得之于天（由天产生的），但是一旦有了人，“天”的道理就要由“人”来彰显，即“人”对“天”就有了一个责任。如果没有“人”如何能体现“天”的活泼气象，如何体现“天”的“自强不息”，“地”的“厚德载物”呢？所以人应该知道“为天地立心”就是“为生民立命”，不能分割为二。所以《郭店竹简·语丛一》中说：“知天所为，知人所为，然后知道。知道然后知命。”知道了“天道”（自然运行的规律）和“人道”（人类社会生活的规律），这样才叫作知道“天”和“人”有一个统一的道理，然后才可以知道“天”（天道）和“人”（“人道”，社会）发展的趋向。孔子说：“知天命”。“知天命”就是说“人”应知道“天”的运行发展的趋势。孔子又说：“畏天命”，要对“天”有所敬畏，不能随便破坏“天”的发展规律。因为中国哲学一向不把“天”看成一死物，而把它视为是有机的，连续性发展的，有生意的（生生不息的），与人为一体的。“人”的存在离不开“天”，这是大家都能懂得的道理，但是为什么“人”有时把自己置于与“天”对立的地位，肆意地破坏“天”，把“天”作为征服的对象呢？这是由于他们把“天”和“人”看成只存在着一种外在的关系，而不了解“天”和“人”之间的关系是一种息息相关的内在关系。“内在关系”与“外在关系”不同，“外在关系”是说在“天”与“人”二者之间是各自独立的，各不相干的；而“内在关系”是说在“天”“人”二者之间存在着相即不离的关系。因此，“天人合一”虽是中国哲学中的一个很古老的哲学命题，它是中国儒家思想的基石，它同时也是一常新的人类社会需要不断给以新的诠释的命题。我们在考虑人类自身问题时，必须考虑与“天”（自然界）的关系问题，而且应是接着“天人合一”的观念来不断深入探讨“天”和“人”存在着的相即不离的内在关系。当前人类社会不正是由于长期严重地忽略了“天”与“人”的相即不离的内在关系正在受惩罚吗？不是“人类”和自然正走上一条相互抵触的道路吗？

由《周易》开出的“天人合一”思想（即“易，会天道，人道也”的思想）对解决当今“人与自然”的矛盾作为一种思维模式，或者可以给我们以下三点启发：

第一，“天人合一”作为一种思维模式，它要求人们不能把“人”看成是和“天”对立的，这是由于“人”是“天”的一部分，“人之始生，得之于天”。破坏“天”就是对“人”自身的破坏，“人”就要受到惩罚。因此，“人”不仅应“知天”（认识自然，以便合理地利用自然），而且应该“畏天”（对自然界应该敬畏，要把保护“天”作为一种神圣的责任）。现在人们只强调“知天”，只是一味用“知识”来利用“天”，征服“天”，以至无序地破坏“天”，而不知对“天”应有所敬畏，这无疑是“科学主义”（科技万能）极端发展的表现。“科学主义”否定了“天”的神圣性，从而也就否定了“天”的超越性，这样就使人们的人文精神失去了依托。中国人的“天人合一”学说认为，“知天”和“畏天”是统一的，“知天”而不“畏天”，就会把“天”看成一死物，不了解“天”乃是有机的，生生不息的刚健的大流行。“畏天”而不“知天”，就会把“天”看成是外在于“人”的神秘力量，而使人不能真正得到天的恩惠。“知天”和“畏天”的统一，正是“天人合一”的重要表现，从而表现着“人”对“天”的一种内在责任。“天人合一”这个哲学命题，体现着“天”与“人”的复杂关系，它不仅包含着“人”应该如何认识“天”，同样也包含着“人”应该尊敬“天”，因为“天”有其神圣性。这也许正是由于中国儒家没有成为一般意义上的宗教（如佛教和基督教等），但是它却具有一定的“宗教性”。也许正因为如此，在中国，儒家思想可以起着某种宗教的功能，这就是它认为“人”依“天”所具有的“内在”品德经过自我德行修养而实现其“超凡入圣”的“超越性”。因此，“天人合一”不仅是“人”对“天”的认知，而且是“人”应追求的人生境界。因为“天”不仅仅是自然意义上的天，而且也是神圣意义上的“天”，“人性”就其内在要求上说，以求达到“同于天”的超越境界。就这个意义上说，“人”和“天”不仅不是对立的，而且“人”应与“天地”为一体，如孟子所说：“君子所过者化，所存者神，上下与天地同流，”以实现其自身的超越。这样一种思维路径，不仅对我们走出“天人二分”（天人对立）的困境有十分重要的意义，而且也为人类走向理想人生境界开辟了道路。

第二，我们不能把“天”和“人”的关系看成是一种外在关系，这是因为“天即人，人即天”，“天”和“人”是相即不离的。“人”离不开“天”，离开“天”，则“人”无法生存；“天”离不开“人”，离开“人”，则“天”的道理无法彰显，谁来担当实现“天道”的责任呢？这种对存在于“天”和“人”之间的内在关系的认知正是中国哲学的特点。王夫之对此有一重要的说明。他说：我们考察自古以来学者的学说，从汉朝以来，他们对先秦儒家的学说只抓住其外在的现象，而认为《易经》只是讲“天道”的，而不知《易经》也是“人道”的根本，自从周敦颐首先提出“太极图”的学说，这个学说是研究“天人合一”的根源的，它阐明了人之始生是“天道”变化产生的结果，在“天道”的变化之中把它的精华部分给了“人”，使人具有了不同于其他事物的“人性”，这样就可以发现“人道”（人类社会的规则）的一切日用伦常之理，就是“天道”（宇宙规律）阴阳变化的秩序。“人道”和“天道”是统一的，这点是不能违背的。“人道”本于“天道”（因“人”是“天”的一部分），讨论“人道”不能离开“天道”，同样讨论“天道”也必须考虑“人道”，这是因为“人道”的“日用事物当然之理”，也是“天道”的阴阳变化的秩序。所以张载说：《周易》这部书“得天而未始遗人”。

第三，为什么说儒家哲学认为，在“天”和“人”之间存在着一种相即不离的“内在关系”？盖自古以来，至少由西周以来，在中国的思想中有“天听自我民听，天视自我民视”的思想传统，从孔孟到程朱陆王都是这样认识的。在这个问题上，朱熹有个说法也许反映出孔子“仁学”的一贯思想，他说：“仁者”，“在天则盎然生物之心，在人则温然爱人利物之心，包四德而贯四端者也。”⁸“天道”生生不息，以仁为心，“天”有使万物良好的生长发育的功能，故“人”要效法“天”，要对人慈爱，要使万物得益。这是因为“天人一体”，“人”得“天”之精髓而为“人”，故人生在世当以实现“天”的“盎然生物之心”，而有“温然爱人得物之心”，“天心”“人心”实为一心。“人”有其实现“天道”的责任，人生之意义就在于体证“天道”，人生之价值就在于成就“天命”，故“天”“人”关系实为一内在关系。就以上几点来讨论“天人合一”，我们对之作哲学的理解，这样才能洞见其真精神，真价值。它是作为一种世界观和思想方式，一种思考问题的路径来看“天人关系”的，它的意义在于赋予“人”一种不可推卸的责任。“人”必须在“同于天”的过程中（提高到“天”的境界），实现“人”的自身超越，达到理想的“天人合一”的境界。

当然，儒家的“天人合一”思想不大可能直接具体地解决当前人类社会存在的一个一个“人与自然矛盾”的问题。但是，“天人合一”作为一哲学命题，一种思维模式，认为不能把“天”“人”分成两截，而应把“天”“人”看成相即不离的一体，“天”和“人”存在着内在的相通关系，无疑会从哲学思想上为解决“天”“人”关系，提供一有积极意义的思路。

五

当今人类社会存在的“人与人之间的矛盾”较之于“人与自然的矛盾”更为复杂，它不仅涉及“自己与他人”“人与社会群体”“国家与国家”“民族与民族”“地域与地域”之间的种种矛盾，例如：对物欲和权力的追求，对自然资源的争夺、占有和野心的膨胀，造成国家与国家、民族与民族、地域与地域之间的对立和战争，而且有“帝国霸权”和“恐怖主义”等等。过分注重金钱的追求和物质的享受，特别是统治者的贪污腐化，欺压老百姓，造成人与人之间关系的紧张，社会的冷漠，帮派林立，黑社会的猖狂等等。在人类社会中，现在儿童有儿童的问题，青年有青年的问题，老年有老年的问题，人与人之间在日常生活中的互不理解和仇视，心灵上的隔膜，使社会的和谐全失，这样发展下去终将导致人类社会的瓦解。儒学是否能对现代社会存在的种种弊病提供某些有意义的思想资源呢？我认为，也许孔子儒家的“仁学”能对造就“人与人”，扩而大之国家与国家、民族与民族、地域与地域之间的和谐，即造就“和谐社会”有重要意义。

《郭店竹简·性自命出》中说：“道始于情，情生于性。始者近情，终者近义。”意思是说，人与人的关系开始时是建立在感情基础上，而感情是生于人的本性。因此，人与人的关系开始时更加根据情（如母子之情），到后来则更加根据道义。这里的“道”是指“人道”，即处理人与人之间关系的规律，或者说是处理社会关系的原则，它虽然和“天道”有联系，但也和“天道”不一样，“天道”指自然界的（或指相对于“人”的外界）运行规律。“道始于情”是说人与人的关系的建立是由感情开始的，这正是孔子“仁学”的出发点。孔子的弟子樊迟问“仁”，孔子回答说：“爱人。”这种“爱人”的品德从何而来呢？《中庸》引孔子的话说：“仁者，人也，亲亲为大。”“仁爱”的品德是人本身所具有的，爱自己的亲人是最基本的。但儒家认为“仁”的精神不能仅仅停留在爱自己的亲人上面，《郭店竹简》中说：“亲而笃之，爱也；爱父，其继之爱人，仁也。”对自己亲人爱到极点，那也只能叫“爱”；爱自己的父亲，扩大到爱别人，这才叫作“仁”。又说：“孝之放，爱天下之民。”对父母的孝顺要放大到爱护天下的老百姓。不过爱自己的亲人无论如何是爱别人的基础，“爱亲则方其爱人”。这就是说，孔子儒家的“仁学”要由“亲亲”扩大到“仁民”。也就是说，要“推己及人”，要做到“老吾老以及人之老”“幼吾幼以及人之幼”，才叫作“仁”。做到“推己及人”并不容易，必须把“己所不欲，勿施于人”，“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”的“忠恕之道”作为实现“仁”的准则。（朱熹《四书集注》：“尽己之谓忠；推己之谓恕。”）如果把“仁”推广到社会（全人类社会），这就是孔子说的：“克己复礼为仁。一日克己复礼，天下归仁焉。为仁由己，而由人乎哉？”古来曾把“克己”（克服私欲）和“复礼”（复兴礼制）解释为平行的两个方面，我认为这不是对“克己复礼”的好的解释。所谓有“克己复礼为仁”是说只有在“克己”基础上的“复礼”才叫作“仁”。费孝通先生对此有一解释，他说：“克己才能复礼，复礼是进入社会，成为一个社会人的必要条件。扬己和克己也许正是东西方文化的差别的一个关键。”我认为这话很有道理。一个人要进入社会，必须对自己有个要求，例如说自己应该要求做到“己所不欲，勿施于人”，这样你才可以遵守社会的规范（礼），而成为社会的人；一个国家也一样，你必须对自己有个遵守世界的“公约”和“公理”的要求，这样世界公约、公理才得以维护。费先生认为，中国文化主张“克己”，对于人与人之间相处较好；而西方文化主张“扬己”，把自己抬高到别人、别国之上，这怎么能不发生冲突和战争呢？朱熹对“克己复礼为仁”的解释说：“克，胜也。己，谓身之私欲也。复，反也。礼者，天理之节文也。”这就是说，要克服自己的私欲，以使之做人行事能符合礼仪制度规范。“仁”是人所具有的内在品德（“爱生于性”）；就社会生活说，“礼”是规范人的行为的外在的礼仪制度，它的作用是为了调节人与人之间的关系使之和谐相处，“礼之用，和为贵”。要人遵守礼仪制度必须是出于其内在的“爱人”之心，才符合“仁”的要求，所以孔子说：“为仁由己，而由人乎哉？”对“仁”和“礼”的关系，孔子也有非常明确的说法：“人而不仁如礼何？人而不仁如乐何？”没有仁爱之心的礼乐那是虚伪的，是为了骗人的。所以孔子认为，人们如果有了追求“仁”的自觉要求，并把这种“仁爱之心”按照一定的规范实现于日常社会之中，这样社会就会和谐安宁了，“一日克己复礼，天下归仁焉”。这种把追求“仁”的信念实践于日常实际生活之中，就是《中庸》所说的“极高明而道中庸”。“极高明”要求追求人生上的最高原则，即“仁”的理想；“道中庸”要求人们按照规则把“仁爱”精神实现于日常生活之中（“中庸”，用中的意思）。“极高明”和“道中庸”不能分为两截，这就是儒家的最高理想“内圣外王之道”。我们今天要求建设“和谐社会”，孔子的这些话无疑对我们有重要的价值。《论语》中讲了许多“仁”的道理，但没有出现“仁政”这两字，但是他说“导之以德，齐之以礼”“泛爱众”“举贤才”“博施于民，而能济众”等等都是讲的“仁政”。“仁政”在《孟子》一书中讲得很多，意义也很广泛，其中有些虽已不适合今日人类社会的要求，但其中也许有两点很重要，对我们今天建设和谐社会和实现世界和平仍然有重要意义。一是孟子认为“行仁政”就要使民有恒产，他说：“民之为道也，有恒产者有恒心，无恒产者无恒心。”⁹孟子的意思是说：对民的道理是，要使每个人都有一定的稳固产业，他才能有一定的道德观念和行为准则。没有一定稳固产业的人，便不会有一定的道德观念和行为准则。所以孟子说：“夫仁政，必自经界始。”意思是说：“仁政”首先要使老百姓有自己的土地。我想，我们要真正建立“和谐社会”就必须“使民有恒产”。就全人类社会说，就要使各国、各民族都能自主拥有其应有的财富才行，强国不能掠夺别国的财富和资源以及推行强权政治。二是孟子的“仁政”要求反对非正义战争，他认为“得道多助，失道寡助”，这里的“道”是“道义”的意思，在《公孙丑下》中有一段记载，他认为：天时不如地利，地利不如人和。他说：

域民不以封疆之界，固国不以山谷之险，威天下不以兵革之利，得道者多助，失道者寡助。寡助之至，亲戚畔之，多助之至，天下顺之。以天下之所顺，攻亲戚之所畔，故君子有不战，战必胜矣。¹⁰

这段话的意思是说：限制老百姓不必用国家的疆界，保护国家不一定靠山川的险固，威行天下不必凭兵器的锐利，得道多助，失道寡助。少助到了极点，连亲戚都反对他；多助到了极点，全天下都归顺他。拿天下都归顺的力量来攻打连亲戚都反对的人，那么合乎道义的君子或者不必用战争，若用战争，最后必然是会胜利的。所以儒家往往把战争分为“正义战争”和“非正义战争”，孟子说：“春秋无义战”，“失民心者，失天下”。这个道理对一个国家内的统治者说也一样。汉初的贾谊写过一篇《过秦论》，他总结秦亡之因在于“仁义不施，攻守之势异”。并引用了一句谚语：“前事不忘，后事之师。”这不也是我们今天应该借鉴的吗？孔子儒家这些思想，对一个国家的“治国”者，对于世界上的那些发达国家的统治集团不能说没有意义。“治国、平天下”应该行“仁政”，行“王道”，不应该行“霸道”，不能压迫老百姓。

自1993年亨廷顿提出“文明的冲突论”之后，引起了各国学术界的广泛讨论。在人类历史上看，由于文化（哲学、宗教、价值观念）的不同引起的冲突和战争并不少见，就是进入21世纪虽未发生世界性的大战，但局部地区的战争则不断，其中无疑政治、经济是冲突和战争非常重要的一个原因，但文化确也在相当大的程度上是国家与国家、民族与民族、地域与地域之间冲突和战争的原因，如何化解这种因文化上的原因引起的冲突甚至战争，也许孔子提出的“和而不同”是一条非常有意义的原则。

在中国历史上，一向认为“和”与“同”是不同的两个概念，有所谓有“和同之辨”。《左传·昭公二十年》记载：“公曰：唯据与我和夫？晏子对曰：据亦同也，焉得为和？公曰：和与同异乎？对曰：异。和如羹焉，水火醯醢盐梅以烹鱼肉，燀之以薪。宰夫和之，齐之以味，济其不及，以泄其过。君子食之，以平其心。君臣亦然。……今据不然。君所谓可，据亦曰可。君所谓否，据亦曰否。若以水济水，谁能食之？若琴瑟之专一，谁能听之？同之不可也如是。”¹¹《国语·郑语》：“夫和实生物，同则不继。以他平他谓之和，故能丰长而物归之；若以同裨同，尽乃弃矣。故先王以土与金、木、水、火杂，以成百物。”可见“和”与“同”是两个不同的概念。“以他平他”，是以相异和相关为前提，相异的事物相互协调并进，就能发展；“以同裨同”，则是以相同的事物叠加，其结果只能窒息生机。中国传统文化的最高理想是“万物并育而不相害，道并行而不相悖”。（“万物并育”和“道并行”是“不同”；“不相害”“不相悖”则是“和”。）这种思想为多元文化共处提供了取之不尽的思想源泉。

不同的民族和国家应该可以通过文化的交往与对话，在对话（商谈）和讨论中取得某种“共识”，这是一由“不同”到某种意义上的相互“认同”的过程。这种相互“认同”不是一方消灭一方，也不是一方“同化”一方，而是在两种不同文化中寻找交汇点，并在此基础上推动双方文化的发展，这正是“和”的作用。因此，我们必须努力追求在不同文化之间通过对话，实现和谐相处。现在中西许多学者都认识到，通过对话沟通不同文化之间的相互理解的重要性。例如哈贝马斯提出“正义”和“团结”的观念。我认为，把它们作为处理不同民族文化之间关系的原则，应该是很有意义的。哈贝马斯的“正义原则”可理解为，要保障每一种民族文化的独立自主、按照其民族的意愿发展的权利；“团结原则”可理解为，要求对其他民族文化有同情理解和加以尊重的义务。只有不断通过对话和交往等途径，才可以在不同民族文化之间形成互动中的良性循环。2002年去世的德国哲学家伽达默尔提出，应把“理解”扩展到“广义对话”层面。正因为“理解”被提升到“广义对话”，主体与对象（主观与客观或主与宾）才得以从不平等地位过渡到平等地位；反过来说，只有对话双方处于平等地位，对话才可能真正进行并顺利完成。可以说，伽达默尔所持的主体—对象平等意识和文化对话论，正是我们这个时代所需要的重要理念。这种理念，对我们今天如何正确而深入地理解中外文化关系、民族关系等等，具有重要的启示！¹²。无论哈贝马斯的“正义”和“团结”原则，或者是伽达默尔的“广义对话论”，都要以承认“和而不同”原则为前提。只有承认不同文化传统的民族和国家可以和谐相处，不同的文化传统的民族与国家才能获得平等的权利和义务，“广义对话”才能“真正进行并顺利完成”。因此孔子以“和为贵”为基础的“和而不同”原则应成为处理不同文化之间的一条基本原则。

六

如果我们以儒家的“合天人”（天人合一）的观念来为解决“人和自然”之间的矛盾提供某些思想资源，以“同人我”（人我合一）的观念来解决“人与人”之间的矛盾，那么我们可以用“一内外”（身心合一）来调节自我身心内外的矛盾。现代社会，由于种种内外的压力，特别是人们无止境地追求感官之享受，致使身心失调，人格分裂。由于心理的不平衡引起精神失常、酗酒、杀人、自杀等等，造成了自我身心的扭曲，已经成为一种社会病，而严重影响了社会的安宁，其原因正在于道德沦丧，致使人失去了自我身心内外的和谐。对这样一种情况，许多有见识的学者都为此提出救治的理论和策略。从中国传统文化看，可以说儒家对人的身心道德修养和人格培育给以特别的重视。

在《郭店竹简·性自命出》中说：“闻道反己，修身者也。”意思是说，知道了“道”，就应该反求诸己，这就是“修身”。《大学》这部书更加特别强调人的道德实践对于建设理想的和谐社会的重要意义。它的第一章中说：“大学之道，在明明德，在新民，在止于至善。”朱熹注说：“新者，革其旧之谓也。言既自明其明德，又当推己及人，使之亦有以去其旧染之污也。……言明明德、新民，皆当止于至善之地而不迁。”（明德：真实无妄的道理），明明德、新民的目的在止于至善，达到做人的最高境界。所以《大学》中认为，修身、齐家、治国、平天下，“自天子以至于庶人，壹是皆以修身为本，其本乱而末治者否矣”。这就是说，儒家认为每个人（自天子以至庶人）的道德修养好了，那么“家”可以齐，“国”可以治，“天下”可以太平，如果自己的道德修养这个根本混乱了，“家”“国”“天下”能够治好，那根本是不可能的。所以在《中庸》一书中也说：“为政在人，取人以身，修身以道，修道以仁。”治理社会是要靠人来治理，让什么人来治理就要看他自身的道德修养，道德修养是以合不合“道”为标准，这里的“道”是指“天下之达道”，即“和谐”（和），而做到使社会和谐就要有“仁爱”之心。这里，把个人的道德修养（修身）与“仁”联系起来，正说明儒家思想的一贯性。儒家讲“修身”不是没有目标的，而是为了“齐家”“治国”“平天下”，即为了建设“和谐社会”。《礼记·礼运》中所记载的“大同”社会的理想，就是要求建立一在政治、经济、文化上诸多方面的和谐社会。儒家把和谐社会的理想建立在人的道德修养的提高的基础上，因此，儒家特别重视人的自我身心内外的修养。儒家认为，生死和富贵等等不是人应追求的最终目标，而道德学问才是人所应追求的。孔子说：“德之不修，学之不讲，闻义而不能徙，不善不能改，是吾忧也。”孔子这段话告诉我们的是做人的道理：“修德”（修养道德）并不容易，必须有崇高的理想，有关怀人类社会福祉的胸襟。“讲学”（讲究学问）也不容易，它不但要求自己提高智慧，而且要负起对社会进行人文教化的责任。“改过”，人总是会犯这样那样的错误，但要能勇于改正错误，这样才可以有助于社会的和谐。“向善”，是说人生在世，应日日向着善的方向努力，做到“日日新，又日新”，这样就可以达到“止于至善”的境地。“修德”“讲学”“改过”“向善”是孔子儒家提倡的做人的道理，是使人自我身心内外和谐的有意义的路径。所以孟子说：“存其心，养其性，所以事天也。夭寿不贰，修身以俟之，所以立命也。”如果一个人能保存他的恻隐之心，修养他的善性，以实现天道的要求，寿命的长短都无所谓了，但一定要通过对自身的修养保持和天道的一致，这就是安身立命了。

儒家的“修身”是有目的的，《周易·系辞下》中说：“利用安身，以崇德为。”人们为人行事要益于社会而安身，以达到对道德的推崇。个人通过道德修养，以使其精神境界得以升华，来实现“为天地立心，为生民立命，为往圣继绝学，为万世开太平”的大事业，实践“立大本行达道”的大事业。这对个人自身说，其人生境界自有一内外和谐的“安身立命”处，也就是宋儒所追求的“孔颜乐处”了。朱熹在其《答张敬夫书》中与敬夫讨论“中和义”时说：“而今而后，乃知浩浩大化之中，自家自有个安宅，正是自家安身立命、主宰知觉处，所以立大本行达道之枢要，所谓体用一源，显微无间，乃在于此。”¹³儒家认为，找一“安身立命”处，对自己的身心内外之和谐至关重要，所以朱熹说：“但能致中和于一身，则天下虽乱，而吾身之天地万物，不害而为安泰；其不能者，天下虽治，而吾身之天地万物，不害而为乖错。其间一国一家，莫不然。”如果自我的身心内外能够做到中正和谐，即使天下大乱，在自己和天地万物之间，对自己的身心安宁康泰就不会有什么影响；如果自我的身心内外做不到中正和谐，即使天下治理得很好，自己的身心也将是不安和错乱的。无论治世、乱世，自己都应修德敬业，这样就可以在活着的时候尽伦尽职，在离开人世的时候将是很安宁的，所以张载《西铭》的最后两句话说：“存，吾顺事；没，吾宁也。”

儒家一向都非常看重“安身立命”。所谓“安身立命”就是要对自己有个道德修养上的要求，这样才能使自己身心和谐，内外调适，使自己的言行符合“做人的道理”，这样身才能安，命才能立。至于那些有碍自我身心内外和谐的外在影响，应该排除。曾子说：“吾日三省吾身。为人谋，而不忠乎；与朋友交，而不信乎；传，不习乎。”做个君子人，每天都应时时警惕自己，看看自己为人行事，是否合乎道义。对于那些不合乎道义的事，甚至应该做到“杀身成仁，舍生取义”，所以孔子说：“志士仁人，无求生以害仁，有杀身以成仁。”孟子说：“吾身不能居仁由义，谓之自弃也。”要做到儒家提倡的“做人的道理”，很不容易，但应该是人们努力去追求的，这样自己才可以有个“安身立命”处，其身心内外自然和谐了。而追求自我身心内外的和谐其目的是为了实现社会的和谐。

司马迁说过：“居今之世，志古之道，所以自镜也，未必尽同”，我们今天温习阐发孔子儒家的思想，发掘其中对当今人类社会有意义的资源，无疑是重要的。但古来圣贤的思想、理念并不能全然解决当今社会存在的所有问题，也并不能全都适应现代社会的要求，它只能给我们一些思考的路子，启发我们去用这些思想资源，在给以适应现代社会生活要求的新的诠释的基础上，才有可能为建设和谐的人类社会做出贡献。“周虽旧邦，其命维新。”¹⁴我们中华民族是一个有着长达五千年的历史文化的古老民族，我们的使命是使我们的社会不断革新，从而对全人类作出贡献。

IV．IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN CHINESE CHAN BUDDHISM

From its transmission into China till Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) dynasties, Buddhism had developed into several schools: Tian-tai, Consciousness-only, Vinaya, Pure Land, Hua yan, Chan¹, etc. Since Tang Dynasty, Chan Buddhism has become increasingly influential and even has been particularly thriving to surpass all the other schools that declined early or late. No doubt there are many reasons for its thriving, perhaps one of the reasons is that Chan Buddhism can particularly reflect the characteristic of Chinese philosophy—"immanent transcendence," to which scholars probably should pay more attention.

As a religion, Buddhism has its doctrinal scriptures, its regular rituals, its precepts, its worshiped objects and so on, but Chan Buddhism after Hui Neng (638-713) renounced all things above. So in Chan Buddhism there is no need to chant scriptures, observe precepts, follow any rituals and worship any images, and even leaving home and becoming a monk or nun becomes dispensable, hence to become a Buddha and attain the state of nirvana can only rely on the awareness of one's own mind. It says: "One who can be aware within one thought is a Buddha, but confused within one thought a sentient being." That is to say, to become a Buddha and attain the transcendental state completely depends on the role of the immanent essential mind.

I．Chinese Chan Buddhism neither valued scriptures nor established words, but claimed everything should listen to the essential mind

There is a Chan story called "Buddha twirls a flower and Maha-Kashapa smiles," which is recorded in Zhi Yue Lu (Record of Fingers Pointing to the Moon):

When Buddha was in Grdhrakuta mountain he turned a flower in his fingers and held it before his listeners. Every one was silent. Only Maha-Kashapa smiled at this revelation, although he tried to control the lines of his face. Buddha said: "I have the eye of the true teaching, the heart of Nirvana, the true aspect of non-form, and the ineffable stride of Dharma. It is not expressed by words, but especially transmitted beyond teaching. This teaching I have given to Maha-Kashapa."

Chan Buddhism considered itself as "transmitted beyond teaching," and proclaimed itself as distinguished from the other schools by telling such stories. At the beginning of Buddhism in India, it was quite simple and originally a philosophy of life, in which Shakyamuni Buddha avoided discussing those theories unrelated with real life, say, concerned little about the following problems—"whether the universe is permanent or impermanent," "whether the universe is limited or unlimited," "whether life exists or not after death," "whether life and body are one or not," etc—which were often heatedly discussed at his time in India. Later Indian Buddhism became more and more complicated during its developing, further and further away from real life, and its system became larger and larger, its worshiped images more and more, its technical terms innumerable, which were completely incompatible with Chinese traditional thoughts. After Sui and Tang dynasties, many Chinese Buddhist schools were trying every possible way to get over this complication of Indian Buddhism, such as, "one billion worlds entered into one thought" in Tian Tai School and "principle and matter integrated into one real mind" in Hua Yan School both emphasized the role of the essential mind. This tendency was further intensified in Chan Buddhism after Hui Neng, hence its insistence on establishment in no words and renunciation of all scriptures.

Hui Neng himself did not renounce the scriptures and advocate establishment in no words yet. It is recorded in Platform Sutra that Hui Neng taught his disciples about Diamond Sutra and Lotus Sutra, but he maintained that "all scriptures and books exist and tell something in accordance with people" (Platform Sutra) and are only the tools to conduct people; hence one should not cling to the scriptures because one cannot become a Buddha by chanting the scriptures, and one can be liberated only by relying on one's essential mind. The reasons are: on the one hand, the principles and methods of becoming a Buddha originally exist in one's own essential mind, so "the twelve-part canons of the Buddhas of past, present, and future are originally inherent in one's nature" (Platform Sutra). Thus there is no need seeking outside, no need to search the Buddha out of mind, because to be a Buddha and become enlightened totally depends upon oneself, and the extrinsic words just have nothing to do with it. On the other hand, words are outside things. If one attaches to these outside things, one "attaches to the forms." "One's own essential nature inherently has the insight of Prajñā (wisdom), and if one is continually observant, use one's own insight; therefore one does not depend on words" (Platform Sutra). In order to break the bondage of the scriptures, Chan masters after Hui Neng were simply against chanting the scriptures, and even against all kinds of words. It is recorded in Wu Deng Hui Yuan (The Five Lamps Meet at the Origin): Wei Shan (771-853) asked Yang Shan (814-890), " Nirvana Sutra has forty volumes. How many are said by Buddha? How many by mara (devil)?" (Vol. 9). Yang Shan answered: "All are said by mara (devil)." If one attaches the sutras as Dharma itself, one has already been bewitched and hoodwinked by devils. Gu Zun Su Yu Lu (Recorded Sayings of the Ancient Worthies) records: "As to those things which are considered as Buddhas, interpreted as Buddhas, if one sees something, finds something and attaches something, all of these are called dung of intellectual play, coarse words and dead language" (Vol. 2). Jing De Chuan Deng Lu (Record of the Transmission of the Lamp) records: Lin Ji (787?-867) "went to Huang Bo mountain (where his master lived) in a mid-summer, and saw his master Huang Bo (?-850) reading a sutra. He said, 'I thought there is a man but actually an old monk who puts black soy beans into his mouth'" (Vol. 12). All scriptures are nonsense. By attaching to these nonsense, how can one be liberated and become a Buddha? Since Buddhist scriptures are "dead language" and "said by mara (devil)," not the tools to awaken, naturally they are not to be fallen back on to attain the goal of becoming a Buddha. Gu Zun Su Yu Lu records Nan Quan (748-834) saying: "The Way does not belong to the category of knowing or not knowing, because knowing is false awareness and not knowing is no memory. If one really attains the Way of no-doubt which is like great emptiness, wide, vast and open, how can one tell right or wrong?" (Vol. 13). The Way does not belong to the category of knowledge, which have the difference between subject and object, but the enlightenment to the Way relies on the self-awareness of the mind. If so, the self can't be not self-aware; if the self isn't self-aware, it is "avidya (ignorance)." Therefore "not knowing is no memory."

Chan masters thought that words were unnecessary and language cannot be beneficial to the enlightenment and becoming a Buddha. Only through language one cannot comprehend the Buddhist Dharma. Someone asked Wen Yi (885-958): "What is the first meaning (of Buddhist Dharma)?" Wen Yi replied: "If I tell you, it is already the second meaning" (Wen Yi Chan Shi Yu Lu [ Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Wen Yi]). The Dharma is ineffable, and what has been said is already not the Dharma itself. Therefore, is there any method that may lead people to the enlightenment? As far as Chan Buddhism sees, hardly is there any other method for becoming enlightened but through one's own awareness. However, Chan Buddhism also used very special methods, such as "stick and shout" to instruct disciples. It is recorded in Wu Deng Hui Yuan:

A monk asked: "What is bodhi (awakening)?" Master (De Shan, 782-865) struck him and said: "Get out! Don't shit here!" One asked: "What is Buddha?" Master said: "Buddha is an old bhiksu (monk) in India." Xue Feng (822-908) asked: "By inheriting from patriarchs before, do you still have discriminations?" Master struck him with a stick and asked: "What does this mean?" Xue Feng answered: "I can't understand." On the next day, Xue Feng asked for more teaching. Master said: "There are neither languages nor sentences taught in our school, and I have no Dharma to give." Hence Xue Feng became aware. (Vol. 7)

It is also recorded in Jing De Chuan Deng Lu:

(Lin Ji came to) see Jing Shan. When Jing Shan just raised his head to see who was coming, Master (Lin Ji) shouted. When he just intended to open his mouth to say, Master left with a flick of his sleeve. (Vol. 12)

This is so-called "De Shan's stick and Lin Ji's shout." These special methods are intended to break down people's attachment, and bring them back to the essential mind. As far as Chan Buddhism sees, one loses one's essential nature because one always attaches to something, therefore a sudden shout and an unexpected strike on the head would make one suddenly become enlightened and attain the Buddhahood by oneself. As Yuan Wu (1063-1135) said in Yuan Wu Fo Guo Chan Shi Yu Lu (Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Yuan Wu Fo Guo): "De Shan's stick and Lin Ji's shout are both thorough and complete, and directly cut off the root of the old attachment. They are great knacks and uses, reaching the same end by innumerable means, and could remove bondages from the disciples" (Vol. 14). Lin Ji's master, Huang Bo, said in his Chuan Fa Xin Yao (Essential Teachings on the Transmission of Mind):

This spiritually enlightening nature. . . cannot be looked for or sought, comprehended by wisdom or knowledge, explained in words, contacted materially or reached by meritorious achievement. All the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, together with all wriggling things possessed of life, share in this great Nirvanic nature. This nature is Mind, Mind is the Buddha, and the Buddha is the Dharma.

Since this spiritually enlightening nature everyone has cannot be revealed by knowledge and language, the only way is to use stick and shout to break down the attachment (of course not necessarily to use stick and shout; any other method could make it if only they could break down the attachment), hence the mind has nothing to observe and one attains the transcendental state denying object and mind.

II．Chinese Chan Buddhism broke outmoded conventions and abolished sitting in meditation,⁵ but only valued seeing the nature and accomplishing the Buddhahood

Sitting in meditation is a practicing method used in every Buddhist schools. Shakyamuni Buddha became enlightened under the bodhi (awakening) tree by sitting in meditation for forty-nine days; Bodhidharma came to China and faced the wall by sitting in meditation for three years. After Hui Neng, there has been a great change in Chinese Chan Buddhism. In Platform Sutra, Hui Neng said: "It is only a matter of seeing the nature, not a matter of meditation or liberation." It is clear that Hui Neng insisted on "seeing the nature and accomplishing the Buddhahood," and believed only through meditation one cannot be liberated. Hence he said:

Deluded people stick to the appearances of things: they cling to the idea of absorption in one practice as only meaning constantly sitting unmoving, not letting the mind be aroused at random. They identify this with absorption in one practice, but those who make this interpretation are equivalent to inanimate objects. This is a condition that obstructs the Way. The Way should be fluid, free-flowing. Why then do you stagnate? When the mind does not dwell on things, then the Way is fluid. If the mind dwells on things, that is called self-binding. If you say constant sitting is right, that is contradicted by the fact that Shariputra was scolded by Vimalakirti for sitting quietly in the forest (Platform Sutra).

Those who attach to sitting in meditation and believe deluded thought cannot arise through their sitting actually regard a human being as a dead thing, and know nothing about "the Way should be fluid." The mind should move and not dwell on things, otherwise the mind is bound, and then how could one be liberated? Gu Zun Su Yu Lu records: Ma Zu(709-788) "lived in Nan Yue Chuan Fa Monastery (where his master Huai Rang [677-744] presided) and stayed in a hut alone by practicing sitting in meditation without paying attention to the visitors (even to his master Huai Rang). . . . One day, (in order to instruct Ma Zu) Huai Rang put a tile in front of the hut and began to grind it. Ma Zu didn't pay attention to it at the beginning, but after a long time, Ma Zu got very curious and then asked: 'For what by grinding?' Huai Rang said: 'Grinding into a mirror.' Ma Zu laughed: 'How can a tile become a mirror by grinding?' Huai Rang retorted: 'If a tile cannot become a mirror by grinding, how could one become a Buddha by sitting in meditation?'" (Vol. 1). Ma Zu sat in meditation and was bound by it, hence Huai Rang used "grinding a tile into a mirror," a metaphoric method, to inspire him to be enlightened. This is an example freeing from one's bondage by relying on others. Another example is Hui Leng (854-932) who had worn seven cattail hassocks by sitting in meditation for more than twenty years but still did not see the nature. Until one day when rolling up a curtain by a chance, he suddenly got enlightened, and composed a verse: "It was really a mistake, really a mistake, until I see the world when rolling up a curtain. If one asks me what kind of teaching I know, I shall pick up a whiskbroom and strike right toward his head" (Wu Deng Hui Yuan, Vol. 7). Hui Leng rolled up a curtain accidentally and saw that one billion worlds are just as they are, and then "witnessed the mind and saw the nature." He released the bondage of sitting in meditation, suddenly saw the whole thing in a clear light and became enlightened. It is said in Platform Sutra: "Those who cannot realize it themselves because of the wandering of the conditioned mind need a good knowing advisor to point it out and guide them to perception of essential nature; those who can realize it themselves don't have to turn outward for enlightenment." Ma Zu was inspired by Huai Rang, but Hui Leng became enlightened by himself. In any case, both Ma Zu and Hui Leng have to "realize the good knowing advisor within the essential mind." That is to say, one has to rely on one's immanent essential mind to attain the transcendental state. The saying "until I see the world when rolling up a curtain" in Hui Leng's verse is the crux of his enlightenment, because as far as Chan Buddhism sees, there is no need to deliberately make a certain thing to be enlightened and become a Buddha. One should naturally see the Way in ordinary daily life, just like "clouds floating in the blue sky and water filling in the bottle," and everything goes naturally and ordinarily. There is a verse in Wu Men Guan (Gateless Gate) written by Wu Men (1183-1260):

In spring, hundreds of flowers; in autumn, a harvest moon; in summer, a refreshing breeze; in winter, snow will accompany you. If useless things do not hang in your mind, any season is a good season for you.

This spiritual state of Chan Buddhism is a state going with the nature: one views the blooming of hundreds of flowers in spring, enjoys serenity under a harvest moon in autumn, feels the sudden coming of a refreshing breeze in summer, and watches thickly falling snowflakes swirling in winter. Let everything goes by itself at ease and without any obstruction, then "every daytime is a good day," and "every nighttime is an enjoyable night." If one attaches to sitting in meditation, one is bound by the method itself and cannot be liberated. Lin Ji said: "There is no place in Buddhism for deliberate effort. Just be ordinary and nothing special. Relieve your bowels, pass water, put on your clothes, and eat your food. When you are tired, go and lie down. Ignorant people may laugh at me, but the wise will understand" (Gu Zun Su Yu Lu, Vol. 11). If one wants to become a Buddha and attain the state of nirvana, one should not rely on the extrinsic practice, but be enlightened suddenly as Hui Leng experienced. A monk asked Ma Zu: "How to cultivate the Way?" Ma Zu said: "The Way cannot be cultivated. If one says it can be cultivated, even if it has been cultivated, it will disappear eventually" (Gu Zun Su Yu Lu, Vol. 1). How can the Way be cultivated? By relying on so-called "cultivation," one has to manage it with a contrived effort; certainly "it will disappear eventually." Therefore cultivating the Way cannot be searched deliberately out of ordinary life. A Vinaya Master You Yuan asked Hui Hai: "Do you make efforts in your practice of the Way?" Hui Hai answered: "Yes, I do." The Vinaya Master asked: "How?" Hui Hai answered: "When hungry, I eat; when tired, I sleep." The Vinaya Master asked: "And does not everybody do the same things, master?" Hui Hai answered: "Not in the same way." The Vinaya Master asked: "Why not?" Hui Hai answered: "When they are eating, they think of a hundred kinds of necessities, and when they are going to sleep they ponder over affairs of a thousand different kinds. That is how they differ from me." An ordinary person eats with preference of the fat or the lean in the food, sleeps with going off into wild flights of fancy, and has different preferences and attachments and there is no chance for liberation. Those who truly know Chan should "sleep if need to sleep and sit if need to sit," "enjoy the cool if hot and warm at a fire if cold." A monk told Zhao Zhou (778-897): "I have just entered the monastery. Please teach me." Zhao Zhou asked: "Have you eaten your rice porridge?" The monk replied: "I have." Zhao Zhou said: "Then you had better wash your bowl." At that moment the monk was enlightened (Zhi Yue Lu, Vol. 11). After eating, naturally it is time to wash the bowl. This is so ordinary. Only through this can one meditate when sitting, meditate when sleeping, meditate when resting, and meditate when moving, therefore eating and shitting are both fine Way. If meditation is not necessary, there is no necessity to keep all kinds of precepts. Lu Xisheng asked Yang Shan: "Do you still observe precepts, master?" Yang Shan said: "I don't" (Wu Deng Hui Yuan, Vol. 9). Li Ao (772-841) asked Yao Shan (751-834): "What are sila (precepts), dhyana (meditation) and Prajñā (wisdom)?" Yao Shan said: "We don't have these idle fitments here!" (Jing De Chuan Deng Lu, Vol. 14) Sila (precepts), dhyana(meditation), and Prajñā (wisdom) are the "three practices" of Buddhism, an indispensable gateway for Buddhists, but Chan masters see them as something useless. It seems that this negation means that every practicing method is unnecessary; hence Chan Buddhism negates anything extrinsic and formal. The reason why Chan Buddhism sees like this is based on "the mind of everyday life is the mind of the Way." There is no "mind of the Way" apart from the mind of everyday life, and also no need to live any special life apart from everyday life. With this realization, the immanent mind of everyday life can be the transcendental mind of the Way. It is just as Yin Shun (1906-2005) put in his The History of Chinese Chan Buddhism: "The nature is both transcendental (away from all forms and its body pure and clear) and immanent (all Dharma cannot be different from the nature). Only when one gets enlightened from everything here and now, at the same time not different from everything, and completely realizes that everything is just no other than the magical application of the nature, can one go into the world or renounce the world at one's will, get the substance and its application, integrate the matter with its principles, and have one's feet firmly planted on the ground."¹⁶

III．Chinese Chan Buddhism did not worship images, rather abused the Buddhas and berated the masters, and claimed "one who is enlightened in one thought is a Buddha"

Indian Buddhism cannot keep from the influence of Indian culture which is strongly marked the character of mysticism, especially after Shakyamuni Buddha. For example, there are so-called "twenty-eight heavens" and "eighteen hells," attached to which are adjacent heavens or hells, and there are also innumerous Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who have supernatural powers. Certainly all these are influenced by Indian traditional culture. Even the much simpler Indian Chan which is considered as "transmitted beyond teaching" is still of mystical character. It is said that all twenty-eight masters of Indian Chan have so-called "Six Supernatural Powers": (1) the power of divine audition; (2) the power of divine vision; (3) the power of awareness of the minds of others;(4) the power of the knowledge of previous lifetimes; (5) unimpeded bodily action; (6) the power of the extinction of contamination. Even four meditative states—"The Four Meditation Heavens"—Indian Chan practiced are also very mystical. Chinese Chan Buddhism after Hui Neng is very different. Hui Neng said: "My mind inherently has a Buddha in it; and the inner Buddha is the real Buddha" (Platform Sutra). Based on this, Chan Buddhism was against supernatural powers and worshiping images. Wu Deng Hui Yuan records: Dao Ying (?-902) "built a house near a place called San Feng, and did not go to hall for ten days. Dong Shan (807-869) asked him: 'Why didn't you go to have meals recently?' Dao Ying said: 'A heavenly god served the food everyday.' Dong Shan told him: 'I thought you are a man, but still have this kind of idea. Come to my place at night.' Dao Ying came to Dong Shan's place at night. Dong Shan called his name: 'Dao Ying!' Dao Ying replied. Dong Shan said: 'If you neither think of good nor think of bad, then what leaves?' Dao Ying came back and sat silently. Since then Dao Ying couldn't find the heavenly god any more. After three days, there was completely no such a thing in Dao Ying's idea" (Vol. 13). The point Dong Shan criticized Dao Ying lies in how could a man like Dao Ying believe these mystical supernatural powers. What is the meaning of "neither think of good nor think of bad"? This is the teaching from Hui Neng that one should never attach to those things created by one's imagination. It is recorded in Chan Zong Zhuan (A Biography of Chan Buddhism): "Hui Ming asked the Dharma from Hui Neng. Hui Neng said: 'You should shut out all desires and not conceive a single thought of good or bad.' Hui Ming did what Hui Neng told him to do. Hui Neng told him: 'When you neither think of good nor think of bad, what is your original face?' At these words, Hui Ming was greatly enlightened and said to Hui Neng with his deep gratitude: 'I am like a man who takes a drink of water and knows for himself whether it is cold or warm.'" The so-called "a heavenly god served the food" was just an illusion of Dao Ying; once he became aware, the illusion disappeared and the heavenly god couldn't be found any longer. A man is essentially a man and has his original appearance; therefore everything has to count on the man himself, and does not need any help from the extrinsic transcendental powers at all. In Platform Sutra (Qi Song Edition), there is a verse called Wu Xiang Song (Verse on Freedom from Forms):

When the mind is even, why bother to keep precepts?

When action is straightforward, what's the need to practice meditation?

If you are grateful, you take care of your parents respectfully;

If you are dutiful, above and below are mentally sympathetic.

If you are deferential, high and low harmonize amicably;

If you are tolerant, myriad evils cause no disturbance.

If you can drill wood and produce fire, you will produce red lotuses from the mud.

Harsh words are clearly good medicine;

If it offends the ear, it's surely faithful speech.

Reform your errors, and you will develop wisdom;

Defend your faults, and you betray an unsound mind.

Always practicing altruism in your daily life;

Attaining the Way does not come from donating money.

Enlightenment is only to be sought in the mind;

Why bother seeking mysteries outside?

Hearing my explanation, practice on this basis,

And the Heaven is right before your eyes.

This verse not only denies the existence of the extrinsic mystical powers, but also denies the existence of so-called Heaven and Hell, believing that one should live in the real life ordinarily and responsibly, and by means of one's own Buddha nature (immanent essential nature) in the life here and now can one become a Buddha. It is just as Da Hui(1089-1163) said: "Dharma of secular world is Buddha Dharma and vice versa" (Da Hui Pu Jue Chan Shi Yu Lu, Vol. 27).

It is recorded in Wu Deng Hui Yuan: Tian Ran (739-824) "met a bitter cold weather when visiting Hui Lin Temple, so he burned a wood Buddha statue for warmth. The head of the temple bawled him out: 'Why did you burn my wood Buddha?' Tian Ran prodded the ashes with his staff and said humorously: 'I am looking for sharira (relics) by burning it.' The head retorted: 'How can a wood Buddha statue have sharira (relics)?' Tian Ran laughed: 'Now that it doesn't have sharira (relics), take two more statues and burn them'" (Vol. 5). A wood Buddha statue is an image, how could it have Buddha sharira (relics)? Burning a wood Buddha is only burning a wood-made statue. The denial of the image in his mind is the realization that "my mind inherently has a Buddha in it; and the inner Buddha is the real Buddha." Lin Ji climbed up into the loft of Xiong-er Tower, and the guard of the tower asked him: "Do you prostrate yourself first before the Buddhas or first before the masters?" Lin Ji said: "Neither of them" (Jing De Chuan Deng Lu, Vol. 12). Chan masters paid no respect to the Buddhas and masters at all and even abused the Buddhas and berated the masters. De Shan said: "There are neither Buddhas nor masters down here. Bodhidharma is an old foul foreigner, Shakyamuni Buddha is a pile of dried dung, and Bodhisattva Manjusri and Samantabhadra are men who carry the dung" (Wu Deng Hui Yuan, Vol. 7). As Chan Buddhism sees, everyone is originally a Buddha himself, and elsewhere can a Buddha be found? What are abused and berated are nothing but the images in one's mind, the worship of which would certainly obstruct the development of one's essential nature. It is recorded in Jing De Chuan Deng Lu: "Someone asked Huai Hai (720-814): 'What is Buddha?' Huai Hai retorted: 'Who are you?'" (Vol. 7). In the same book, it is also recorded: "Ling Xun just came to study with Gui Zong, and asked Gui Zong: 'What is Buddha?' . . . Gui Zong said: 'Just you are'" (Vol. 11). Everyone by himself is a Buddha. How can one ask "what is Buddha"? By asking "what is Buddha," one is searching Buddha outside of one's mind. Nevertheless, one should not attach to this idea of becoming a Buddha. Huang Bo said: "If you will conceive of a Buddha, you will be obstructed by that Buddha!" (Wan Ling Lu [ Recorded Sayings in Wan Ling]). If one bears the idea of becoming a Buddha in one's mind constantly, one cannot live naturally and obstructs himself from becoming a Buddha by this searching. A monk asked Dong Shan when he was weighing some flax: "What is Buddha?" Dong Shan said: "This flax weighs three pounds" (Wu Deng Hui Yuan, Vol. 15). A monk asked Ma Zu: "What is the intention of Bodhidharma to come to China?" Ma Zu struck him and said: "If I don't strike you, those who know would laugh at me" (Jing De Chuan Deng Lu, Vol. 6). Dong Shan gave a reply far from the mark in order to break down the attachment of becoming a Buddha, and Ma Zu even tried to prevent the searching of extrinsic Buddhist Dharma, because as Ma Zu saw, "you all should believe that your essential mind is the Buddha, and right this mind is the mind of Buddha" (Ibid.). This is the essential spirit of Chan Buddhism, as it is said in Platform Sutra: "Buddhahood is actualized within your own nature; do not seek it outside the body. If your own nature is confused, a Buddha is an ordinary person; if your own nature is awakened, every ordinary person is a Buddha."

As discussed above, we can see that the central thoughts or fundamental subject of Chinese Chan Buddhism is "witnessing the mind and seeing the nature" and "seeing the nature and becoming a Buddha." The fundamental concepts used in Platform Sutra are "mind" and "nature." "Mind" is also called "one's own mind" (zi-xin), "the essential mind" (ben-xin), "one's own essential mind" (zi-ben-xin), etc.; "nature" is also called "one's own nature" (zi-xing), "the essential nature" (ben-xing), "the Dharma nature" (fa-xing), "one's own Dharma nature" (zi-fa-xing), etc. "Mind" and "nature" have quite similar meaning and both refer to the subjective in everyone's immanent life. They are originally pure and empty, but transcend the phenomenal world. At the same time their activities can appear as all kinds of different things. As Platform Sutra says: "The extent of mind is vast as space. . . the emptiness of physical space contains the colors and forms of myriad things, the sun, the moon, and stars, the mountains, oceans, rivers, and lands, the springs and valley streams, the grasses, trees, and forests, bad people and good people, bad things and good things, Heaven and Hell—all are within space. The emptiness of the essential nature of people in the world is also like this." It also says: "The essential nature of human beings is originally pure. All things come from the essential nature; when you think about all evil things, it produces bad behaviors; when you think about all good things, it produces good behaviors. Thus all things are in your own nature, and your own nature is always clear." Good and bad, Heaven and Hell, the mountains, rivers, and lands, the grasses, trees, insects and fishes, and so on—all are realized from your own nature by means of "thinking" (si-liang) function of "the mind." The appearance of everything cannot deviate from "one's own nature," just as everything is within space. If one's "mind" is confused, one cannot see "one's own nature," hence only an ordinary person; if one's mind is always clear, one "sees the nature" and becomes Buddha or Bodhisattva. It is said in Platform Sutra: "My mind inherently has a Buddha in it; and the inner Buddha is the real Buddha. If there were no Buddha-mind, where would we look for the real Buddha?"

As Chan Buddhism sees, one's own nature (or one's own mind) is originally a vast space without anything, and it is not a deathly stillness but rather it can "think" and everything comes from this "thinking." If this activity of "thinking" goes without any trace, it lays no influence on one's "own nature" and one's own nature can always stay in the clear state. "One's own nature always clear" is just like the sun and the moon always shining, only that sometimes it's covered by clouds and appears dim when seen from the ground, since one cannot see the original face of the sun and the moon. If a sudden wind of wisdom (the instruction and inspiration of a good knowing adviser) blows off the clouds or mists, the always shining sun and moon would appear naturally. It is said in Platform Sutra: "The nature of worldly people is always drifting, like the clouds in the sky. Wisdom is like the sun, insight is like the moon: knowledge and insight are always light, but when you fixate on objects outside, you get your own essential nature covered by the drifting clouds of errant thoughts, so you cannot have light and clarity. If you meet a spiritual benefactor and hear truly authentic teaching, you'll get rid of confusion so that inside and outside are thoroughly clear, and myriad things appear within your own essential nature." A good knowing adviser can only provide some inspirations. Whether one can be enlightened or not counts on oneself. "What is meant by liberating yourself through your own essential nature? That means the beings in false views, afflictions and ignorance are liberated by accurate insight. Once you have accurate insight, you get the Prajñā (wisdom) to break through the beings in folly and delusion, so each one is self-liberated" (Platform Sutra).

The phrase "Buddha nature" appeared only a few times in Dun Huang edition of Platform Sutra, but many times in Zong Bao edition. "Buddha nature" mentioned in two places of Platform Sutra is quite important: one is the verse Hui Neng composed when he studied with his master, "Buddha nature is always clear"; another is when Hui Neng answered the question of Governor Wei, he said "building temples, charity, sustaining, etc. . . haven't any virtue actually," and "virtue lies in dharmakaya (truth body), not in field of merit; one's own Dharma nature is the inside virtue and honesty is the outside virtue. While one sees the Buddha nature inside, one will naturally hold in reverence outside." The first place shows that the essence of "Buddha nature" that has the same quality as "one's own nature" is "always clear," hence "Buddha nature" is "one's own nature," which is the essential nature of human being and the subjective in everyone's immanent life. The second place shows that "Buddha nature" is "one's own Dharma nature" which is also the immanent essence in everyone. Based on the ideas above, Chan Buddhism established its theory of "witnessing the mind and seeing the nature" and "seeing the nature and becoming a Buddha." "Witnessing the mind and seeing the nature" tells that if one can realize one's own essential mind, "one's own nature is always clear"; attaining "one's own nature always clear" means the revelation of the immanent essential nature as the transcendental Buddha nature. Hence it is true that "witnessing the mind and seeing the nature, attaining the Way of Buddhahood by oneself" lie in "the wisdom is accomplished when enlightening."

In that case how can one "witness the mind and see the nature"? Chan Buddhism pointed out a direct and simple practicing method that they established, that is, "freedom from thought as the source, freedom from form as the substance, and freedom from fixation as the basis." It is said in Platform Sutra:

Since time immemorial this school of ours has first established freedom from thought as the source, freedom from form as the substance, and freedom from fixation as the basis. Freedom from form means detachment from forms in the midst of forms. Freedom from thought means having no thought in the midst of thoughts. As for freedom from fixation, while the basic nature of humanity is in the midst of the world, with good and bad, beauty and ugliness, enmity and familiarity, words and speech, offense and attack, deception and contention, one considers it all empty and does not think of retaliation, not thinking about the objects in the surroundings. If thought after thought, previous, present, and subsequent thoughts, go on uninterrupted, this is called bondage. When thought after thought does not dwell on things, then there is no bondage. Thus freedom from fixation is basic.

"Freedom from form" means no attachment to any phenomenon(detachment from form), because ordinary people always attach the phenomena as the substance. For example, one may think that by sitting in meditation one can become a Buddha, which is certainly attached to sitting in meditation; one may think that by worshiping Buddhas one can become a Buddha which is certainly attached to the worshiping of Buddhas; all these are "taking form and attaching to it." "Taking form and attaching to it" can obstruct one's own nature just as the clouds and mists can cover the bright empty sky. When one "detaches from appearances while in the midst of appearances," one can suddenly see the original clearness of the body of nature, just as the clouds and mists are blew off and the bright clean empty space is revealed. Therefore, freedom from form not only means no attachment to any phenomenon, but also means detachment to appearances and revelation of "one's own nature always clear." It is said in Platform Sutra: "If you can be detached from forms and appearances, then the substance of nature is pure. Thus freedom from form is the substance." "Freedom from fixation" means one's own nature originally has no fixation thought by thought, that is, the previous, present, and subsequent thoughts are consecutive, and if once dwelling on one object, it is not going on uninterrupted but fixing on every single thought, hence "the mind" is "bound." "When the mind does not dwell on things, the mind is fluid. If the mind dwells on things, the mind is bound" (Platform Sutra). If the mind is not dwelling on anything, once a thing has gone, it has gone and left no trace. It is like a wild goose flying across the vast sky leaving no trace at all; and also like a white screen on which a movie is projected for viewing, once the movie ends, nothing is left on the screen. Only by this can one not be bound, hence one should regard "freedom from fixation as the basis." "Freedom from thought" does not mean "not thinking of anything at all, and get rid of all thoughts entirely"(Ibid.), but when getting in touch with objects the mind is not affected by the external objects, that is, "the mind does not arouse over objects"(Ibid.). "Thought" is the function of the mind, and what the mind faces is the external objects. Ordinary people's thoughts arouse over the external objects. If the objects are nice, thoughts arouse over them and cling to them; on the contrary, thoughts again arouse and get angry. Therefore, the "thoughts" of ordinary people just arouse along with the objects and move in accordance with the objects, and the "thoughts" of this kind are "erroneous thoughts," always driven by the objects without freedom. "When the mind is not influenced by objects" (Ibid.), one could not be disturbed by the external world. Although one lives in the secular world, one is still not defiled and contaminated but comes and goes at ease, always has one's own clear nature and attains the Buddhahood by oneself. "Freedom from form," "freedom from fixation" and "freedom from thought" discussed above are the functions of "the only mind," and the difference between the ignorant and the awakened just lies in one thought, hence attaining the Buddhahood should rely on the sudden enlightenment.

According to the discussions above, we may conclude as follows:

First, the reason why Chinese Chan Buddhism belongs to Chinese traditional thoughts, distinguishable from Indian Buddhism lies in its "immanent transcendence," which is also the characteristic of Chinese Confucian and Taoist philosophy. The reason why it could deeply influence Neo-Confucianism of Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties (especially Universal Mind School of Lu-Wang) also lies in the "immanent transcendence" of its thought. If it can be said that the quest of Confucian thought with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence" is a morally ideal personality which transcends "the self" and becomes "a saint," and the quest of Taoist philosophy with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence" is the spiritually absolute freedom which transcends "the self" and becomes "an immortal," then the quest of Chinese Chan Buddhism with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence" is a mystical state in momentary eternity which transcends "the self" and becomes "a Buddha." On this point, Chan Buddhism still has some smack of religion.

Second, although Chan Buddhism still has some smack of religion, by virtue of its releasing all extrinsic bondage such as chanting scriptures, sitting in meditation, worshiping Buddha, it is bound to contain the implication of denying itself as a religion. That is to say, the secularization of Chan Buddhism makes it an unreligious religion that has exerted profound influence on China, and it leads people to realize the purpose of transcending the reality in the real life by denying the supernatural concepts of Heaven and Hell, suggesting the secular spirit of "Dharma of secular world is Buddha Dharma and vice versa."

Third, as a religion, Chan Buddhism not only breaks all rules of traditional Buddhism, but also believes that it relies not on extrinsic power but rather the immanent self-awareness of Chan masters themselves to attain the Buddhahood. Therefore, it transforms a religion with the characteristic of "extrinsic transcendence" into an unreligious religion with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence," turns the direction from renouncing the world to going into the world, and hence avoids the inclination of duality. Whether or not this transformation means Chan Buddhism has some inclination to get out of traditional religious mode? If this can be deduced, certainly it would be significant to study the history of Chan Buddhism for investigating the religions in real social life.

Fourth, it is said there was a tradition strongly imprisoning the mind of people in China, and then can we say that there were still some resources to be appealed to for breaking everything imprisoning the mind of people? If there were such resources, Chan Buddhism must be an important one of them. Chan Buddhism denies all extrinsic bondages, breaks all attachments, removes the traditional and realistic authority, and lets everything listen to the essential mind; it is in this sense that one can be the master of oneself. This open-mindedness is very valuable in the feudal despotic society in China and deserves our attention. Of course, Chan Buddhism thereby built the authority centered by the immanent subjective of the "self" and made up the infinite transcendental power of the "self," whereby one could again be bound by the immanent subjective of the "self." This probably is an inextricable paradox to Chan Buddhism.

Fifth, the ideological system of Chan Buddhism with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence" is of obvious subjectivism, and inevitably leads to the denial of any objective criterion and validity, which is a disadvantage to the investigation of the extrinsic world and establishment of objective valid social system and legal order, and has defects in the investigation of ultimate care of the universe and human life. Therefore, we may suggest: is it possible to build a better philosophical system which contains the thought with the characteristic of "immanent transcendence" and the thought with the characteristic of "extrinsic transcendence"? I think this issue deserves due attention in the development of Chinese philosophy.

Sixth, if it is possible to build a Chinese philosophical system which contains the thoughts of both "immanent transcendence" and "extrinsic transcendence," then is it possible to find the resources within Chinese traditional philosophy itself? I think Chinese traditional philosophy has this kind of resources. There are two aspects in the thought of Confucius: on the one hand, he advocated the idea "human-heartedness is something that must have its source in oneself" (Analects, 12.1) and "it is man that can make the Way great, and not the Way that can make man great" (Analects, 15.29) which can be considered as the aspect of "immanent transcendence"; on the other hand, he insisted that one should "fear the will of Heaven, fear great men, and fear the word of the sages" (Analects, 16.8), which can be considered as the aspect of "extrinsic transcendence" or at least a suggestion of it. Later Confucianism has developed the former aspect while leaving the later one undeveloped at all. Is it possible to build a Chinese philosophical system which contains the thoughts of both "immanent transcendence" and "extrinsic transcendence" from the direction of Confucius by developing and combining both aspects of Confucius'thoughts? In my opinion, it is an issue that deserves our study. Born shortly later than Confucius, there was another philosopher Mo Zi, whose philosophy features "extrinsic transcendence." Mo Zi's philosophy includes two interrelated parts: "all-embracing love" being humanistic and "the will of Heaven" being religious. It seems that there is a little bit of contradiction between the two parts, but actually "all-embracing love" is the fundamental principle of "the will of Heaven," therefore "the will of Heaven" is the kernel of Mo Zi's thoughts. Mo Zi's "the will of Heaven" means "Heaven" has wills which are the supreme and ultimate standard to judge everything, can reward the good and punish the bad, and are the transcendental power outside of human or, we may say, are of obvious "extrinsic transcendence." Therefore, the later Mohist School suggested a scientific view and had the thought of logic and epistemology, but it is a pity that these thoughts were left undeveloped after the Warring States (403-221 BC) in China. Is it possible to use Mohist thought as resources to build a Chinese philosophical system which contains the thoughts of both "immanent transcendence" and "extrinsic transcendence"? I think it is also an issue we can study.

肆　论禅宗思想中的内在性与超越性*

佛教传入中国至隋唐分为若干宗派：天台、唯识、律、净土、华严、禅等等。至唐以后，其他宗派均先后衰落，而禅宗的影响越来越大，终至独秀，究其原因或有许多方面，但就禅宗更能体现中国哲学以“内在超越”为特征这点说，似应为研究者所注意。

佛教作为一种宗教自有其宣扬教义的经典、一套固定的仪式、必须遵守的戒律和礼拜的对象等等，但自慧能以后的中国禅宗把上述一切都抛弃了，既不要念经，也不要持戒，没有什么仪式需要遵守，更不要去礼拜什么偶像，甚至连出家也成为没有必要的了，成佛达到涅槃境界只能靠自己一心的觉悟，即所谓“一念觉，即佛；一念迷，即众生。”这就是说，人成佛达到超越的境界完全在其内在本心的作用。

一、中国禅宗不重经典、不立文字，一切自任本心

中国禅宗有一个公案——“释迦拈花，迦叶微笑”的故事，据《指月录》载：

“世尊在灵山会上，拈花示众。是时众皆默然，唯迦叶尊者，破颜微笑。世尊曰：吾有正法眼藏，涅槃妙心，实相无相，微妙法门，不立文字，教外别传，付嘱摩呵迦叶。”

禅宗自称其宗门为“教外别传”，即依此类故事以说明他们和佛教其他宗派的不同。印度佛教开始在释迦牟尼时也是比较简单，本是一种人生哲学，对一些与人生实际无关的理论往往避而不论，如当时印度讨论的“宇宙是常还是无常”“宇宙有边还是无边”“生命死后是有还是无”“生命与身体是一还是异”等等，均少论及。但印度佛教在发展过程中越来越繁琐，越来越远离实际人生，体系越来越庞大，礼拜的对象越来越多，名词概念多如牛毛，这与中国传统思想全然不相合。到隋唐以后，中国的一些佛教宗派都已在想方设法克服印度佛教的这种繁琐，例如天台宗纳三千于一念，华严宗融理事于真心，都强调人的本心的作用，这一趋势到禅宗慧能以后更是变本加厉了，而有不立文字，废除经典之说。

慧能本人还没有简单地否定经典和倡导不立文字，据《坛经》记载，慧能尝为门人说《金刚经》《法华经》，但他认为“一切经书，因人有说”，只是引导人们的工具，不能执着经典，不能靠诵读经典成佛，解脱只能靠自己的本心。这是因为：一方面，成佛得解脱的道理和路径本来就在你自己的本心之中，“三世诸佛，十二部经，亦在人性中本自具有”（《坛经》），不必外求，不必到心外觅佛，成佛的觉悟全在自己，外在的文字是没有用处的。另一方面，文字是一种外在的东西，如果执着了外在的东西就是“着相”，“本性自有般若之智，自用智慧观照，不假文字。”²慧能以后的禅宗大师破除经典的束缚，干脆反对念经，反对一切语言文字。沩山灵佑问仰山慧寂：“《涅槃经》四十卷，多少是佛说？多少是魔说？”仰山回答说：“总是魔说。”³如果把佛经持着为佛法本身，这本身就是着了魔，为魔所蒙蔽，所以《古尊宿语录》中说：“只如今作佛见，作佛解，但有所见所求所著，尽是戏论之类，亦名粗言，亦名死语”（卷二）。《景德传灯录》（卷十二）中记义玄“因半夏上黄檗山，见和尚看经。曰：我将谓是个人，元来是唵黑豆老和尚。”一切经典全是废话，执着这些废话，人如何得以解脱，如何得以成佛？既然佛教经典为“死语”“魔说”，非悟道的工具，那么自然不能靠它来达到成佛的目的。《古尊宿语录》中说：“（南）泉（普愿）云：道不属知不知，知是妄觉，不知是无记，若真达不疑之道，犹如太虚，廓然荡豁，岂可强是非也”（卷十三）。道不属知识，知识有主体和对象即有分别心，悟道在心之自觉；悟道既在自觉，自不能是不自觉的，如为不自觉，即是“无明”，故“不知是无记”。

禅宗的大师们不仅认为文字不必要，就是语言对得道成佛也是无益的。语言并不能使人了解佛法，有问文益禅师：“如何是第一义？”文益回答说：“我向汝道，是第二义。”⁴佛法是不可说的，说出的已非佛法本身。那么用什么方法引导人们觉悟呢？照禅宗看，几乎没有什么方法使人悟道，只能靠自己的觉悟。不过禅宗也常用一些特殊的方法，如棒喝之类。《五灯会元》卷七《德山宣鉴禅师》中载：

“僧问：如何是菩提？师打曰：出去，莫向这里屙。问：如何是佛？师曰：佛是西天老比丘。雪峰问：从上宗来，学人还有分别也无？师打一棒曰：道什么？曰：不会。至明日请益，师曰：我宗无语句，实无一法与人。峰因此有省。”

《景德传灯录》卷十二载：“（临济义玄）见径山，径山方举头，师便喝；径山拟开口，师拂袖便行。”

这就是所谓“德山棒，临济喝”。这种方法是破除执着的特殊方法，目的是要打断人们的执着，一任自心。照禅宗看，人们常因有所执着而迷失本性，必须对之大喝一声，当头一棒，使之幡然觉悟，自证佛道，故佛果禅师说：“德山棒，临济喝，并是透顶透顶，直捷剪断葛藤，大权大用，千差万别，会归一源，可以与人解粘去缚。”⁶义玄的老师在其《传法心要》中说：

“此灵觉性……不可以智识解，不可以语言取，不可以景物会，不可以功用到，诸佛菩萨与一切蠢动众生同大涅槃，性即是心，心即是佛，佛即是法。”⁷

人所具有的这一灵觉性，既然不是能用知识、语言等使之得到发挥，那只能用一棒一喝（当然不一定必须用棒喝，其他任何方法都可以，只要能打断执着即可）打破执着，使心默然无对，而达到心境两忘的超越境界。

二、中国禅宗破去陈规，废去坐禅，唯论见性成佛

坐禅本是原来佛教一切派别所必需的一种修持法门，释迦牟尼在菩提树下证道，一坐四十九天；达摩东来，仍有三年面壁，都是坐禅。但到慧能以后，中国禅宗起了很大变化，《坛经》记载慧能说：“惟论见性，不论禅定解脱。”盖慧能主张“见性成佛”，认为靠禅定并不能得到解脱，所以他说：

“迷人著法相，执一行三昧，直言坐不动，除妄心不起，即是一行三昧。若如是，此法同无情，却是障道因缘，道须通流，何以却滞？心不住法即通流，住即被缚，若坐不动是，维摩诘不合呵舍利弗宴坐林中。”⁸

执着坐禅，以为可以妄心不起，这实是把人看成如同死物，而不知“道须通流”，心不能住而不动，住而不动就是心被束缚住了，那怎么能得到解脱呢？《古尊宿语录》卷一记马祖道一“居南岳传法院，独处一庵，惟习坐禅，凡有来访者都不顾，……（怀让）一日将砖于庵前磨，马祖亦不顾，时既久，乃问曰：作什么？师云：磨作镜。马祖云：磨砖岂能成镜？师云：磨砖既不能成镜，坐禅岂能成佛？”马祖坐禅，被坐禅所束缚，怀让用“磨砖作镜”这种比喻的方法启发他使之觉悟，这叫作依他人为之“解缚”。又有长庆慧稜禅师，二十余年来坐破了七个蒲团，仍然未能见性，直到有一天，偶然卷帘时，才忽然大悟，便作颂说：“也大差，也大差，卷起帘来见天下，有人问我解何宗，拈起拂子劈头打。”⁹慧稜偶然卷帘见得三千大千世界原来如此，而得“识心见性”，解去坐禅的束缚，靠自己豁然贯通，而觉悟了。《坛经》中说：“不能自悟，须得善知识示道见性；若自悟者，不假外善知识。”道一是靠怀让的启发，而慧稜是靠自悟，但无论前者还是后者都必须是“识自心内善知识”，也就是说必须靠自己的内在本心才可以达到超越境界。慧稜颂中“卷起帘来见天下”是他悟道的关键，因照禅宗看，悟道成佛不要去故意作着，要在平常生活中自然见道，就像“云在青天水在瓶”那样，自自然然，平平常常。无门和尚有颂说：

“春有百花秋有月，夏有凉风冬有雪，

若无闲事挂心头，便是人间好时节。”

禅宗的这种精神境界正是一种顺乎自然的境界：春天看百花开放，秋天赏月色美景，夏天享凉风暂至，冬天观大雪纷飞，一切听其自然，自在无碍，便“日日是好日”“夜夜是良宵”。如果执着坐禅，那就是为自己所运用的方法所障，而不得解脱。临济义玄说：“佛法无用功处，只是平常无事，屙屎送尿，着衣吃饭，困来即卧，愚人笑我，智乃知焉。”¹⁰要成佛达到涅槃境界，不是靠那些外在的修行，而是得如慧稜那样忽然顿悟。有僧问马祖：“如何修道？”马祖说：“道不属修，言修得，修成还坏。”¹¹道如何能修得，靠所谓“修”就是要勉强自己，这种不自然的做法，当然会“修成还坏”。所以修道不能在平常生活之外去刻意追求。有源律师问大珠慧海禅师：“和尚修道还用功否？”慧海说：“用功。”源律师问：“如何用功？”慧海回答说：“饥来吃饭，困来即眠。”源律师又问：“一切人总如是，同师用功否？”慧海说：“不同。”源律师问：“如何不同？”慧海说：“他吃饭时，不肯吃饭，百般须索；睡时不肯睡，千般计较，所以不同也。”¹²平常人吃饭，挑肥拣瘦；睡觉胡思乱想，自是有所取舍、执着，不得解脱。真正懂得禅的人“要眠即眠，要坐即坐”“热即取凉，寒即向火”。有僧问赵州从谂：“学人乍入丛林，乞师指示。”从谂说：“吃饭也未？”僧曰：“吃粥了也。”从谂说：“洗钵去。”其僧因此大悟。¹³吃过饭自然应洗碗，这是平平常常的，唯有如此，才能坐亦禅，卧亦禅，静亦禅，动亦禅，吃饭拉屎，莫非妙道。禅定既非必要，一切戒律更不必修持了，陆希声问仰山：“和尚还持戒否？”仰山说：“不持戒。”¹⁴李翱问药山：“如何是戒定慧？”药山说：“这里无此闲家俱。”¹⁵戒定慧本是佛教“三学”，学佛者必须之门径，但照禅宗大师看这些都是无用的东西。禅宗的这一否定，似乎所有的修持方法全无必要，从而把一切外在的形式的东西都否定了。禅宗如是看是基于“平常心是道心”，在平常心外再无什么“道心”，在平常生活外再不须有什么特殊的生活。如有此觉悟，内在的平常心即可成为超越的道心，正如印顺法师的《中国禅宗史》中所说：“性是超越的（离一切相，性体清净），又是内在的（一切法不异于此），从当前一切而悟入超越的，还要不异一切，圆悟一切无非性之妙用。这才能入能出，有体有用，事理如一，脚跟落地。”¹⁷

三、中国禅宗不拜偶像，呵佛骂祖，一念悟即成佛

印度文化中颇多神秘主义色彩，印度佛教也不能不受印度传统文化这种神秘主义影响，特别是释迦牟尼以后更是如此。例如在佛教中有所谓二十八重天，十八层地狱，每个层次又有无数天堂和地狱，以及众多的具有超自然伟力的佛和菩萨，这些当然都是受印度传统文化的影响而有。即使是比较平实的“教外别传”的印度禅也有不少神秘色彩，传说印度禅的二十八祖都有所谓六神通：天耳通、天眼通、他心通、宿命通、神足通、漏尽通等。就是印度禅修行的四种境界“四禅天”也颇具神秘性。而中国禅自慧能以后却不如此。慧能说：“我心自有佛，自佛是真佛。”基于此，禅宗反对神通和偶像崇拜。《五灯会元》卷十三载，有云居道膺禅师“结庐于三峰，经旬不赴堂。洞山（良价）问：子近日何不赴斋？师曰：每日自有天神送食。山曰：我将谓汝是个人，犹作这个见解在。汝晚间来。师晚至。山召：膺庵主。师应诺。山曰：不思善，不思恶，是什么？师回庵，寂然宴坐，天神自此觅寻不见，如是三日乃绝”。良价批评道膺的基本点，就在于道膺是个人怎么会相信那些神秘的神通呢？“不思善，不思恶”是什么意思？这正是慧能叫人不持着那些自己想象出来的莫须有的东西。《禅宗传》载：“明上坐向六祖求法。六祖云：汝暂时敛欲念，善恶都莫思量。明上坐乃禀言。六祖云：不思善，不思恶，正当与时么，还我明上坐父母未生时面目。时上坐于言下，忽然默契，便拜云：如人饮水，冷暖自知。”所谓“天神送食”只是道膺的幻想，当他一旦觉悟，幻想尽除，再无天神可寻觅了。人本来应是人，有人之本来面目，一切全靠自己觉悟，根本不需要外在的超越力量的帮助。契嵩本《坛经》有《无相颂》：

心平何劳持戒，行直何用修禅，

恩则孝养父母，义则上下相怜。

让则尊卑和睦，忍则众恶无喧，

若能钻木出火，淤泥定生红莲。

苦口的是良药，逆耳必是忠言，

改过必生智慧，护短心内非贤。

日用常行饶益，成道非由施钱，

菩提只向心觅，何劳向外求玄。

听说依此修行，天堂只在目前。

这首颂不仅否定了外在的神秘力量的存在，而且否定了所谓的天堂和地狱的存在，认为人们只是要在现实生活中平平常常地尽职尽责地生活，在眼前生活中靠自己所具有的佛性（即内在的本性）即可以成禅。宗杲大慧禅师说：“世间法则佛法，佛法则世间法。”

《五灯会元》卷五载：天然禅师“于慧林寺遇天大寒，取木佛烧火向，院主呵曰：何得烧我木佛。师以杖子拨灰曰：吾烧取舍利。主曰：木佛何有舍利？师曰：既无舍利，更取两尊烧。”木佛本是偶像，哪会有佛舍利，烧木佛无非烧木制之像而已，否定了自己心中的偶像，正是对“我心自有佛，自佛是真佛”的体证。临济义玄到熊耳塔头，塔主问：“先礼佛，先礼祖？”义玄曰：“佛祖俱不礼。”¹⁸禅宗对佛祖不仅全无敬意，还可以呵佛骂祖。德山宣鉴说：“这里无佛无祖，达摩是老臊胡，释迦老子是干屎橛，文殊普贤是担屎汉。”¹⁹照禅宗看，自己本来就是佛，哪里另外还有佛？他们所呵所骂的无非是人们心中的偶像，对偶像的崇拜只能障碍其自性的发挥。《景德传灯录》卷七载：“问：如何是佛？师云：他是阿谁？”卷十一载：“灵训禅师初参归宗，问：如何是佛？……宗曰：即汝便是。”每个人自己就是佛，哪能问“如何是佛”，问“如何是佛”就是向心外求佛了。而且对自身成佛也不能执着不放，黄檗说：“才思作佛，便被佛障。”一个人念念不忘要成佛，那就不能自自然然地生活，而有所求，这样反而成为成佛的障碍。有僧问洞山良价：“如何是佛？”答曰：“麻三斤。”²⁰或问马祖：“如何是西来意？师便打，曰：我若不打汝，诸方笑我。”²¹良价所答非所问，目的是要打破对佛的执着；马祖更是要打断对外在佛法的追求，因为照马祖看：“汝等诸人，各信自心是佛，此心即是佛心。”²²这正是禅宗的基本精神，正如《坛经》中说：“佛是自性作，莫向身外求。自性迷，佛即众生；自性悟，众生即佛。”

据以上所述，可知中国禅宗的中心思想或基本命题是“识心见性”“见性成佛”。在《坛经》中应用的基本概念是“心”和“性”。“心”或叫“自心”“本心”“自本心”等；“性”或叫“自性”“本性”“法性”“自法性”等。“心”和“性”大体是一个意思，都是指每个人的内在生命的主体，它本来清净、空寂，又是超越于现象界的，但它的活动可变现为种种不同的事物，如《坛经》说：“心量广大，犹如虚空，……虚空能含日月星辰，大地山河，一切草木，恶人善人，恶法善法，天堂地狱，尽在空中，世人性空，亦复如是。”又说：“世人性本自净，万法在自性，思量一切恶事，即行于恶；思量一切善事，便修于善行。知如是一切法尽在自性，自性常清净。”善与恶，天堂与地狱，山河大地，草木虫鱼等等都是因“心”之“思量”作用而从自性中变现出来的。一切事物的出现，都不能离开“自性”，就像万物在虚空中一样。如果人的“心”迷误了，就不能见自性，只能是凡夫俗子；如果人的自心常清净，就是“见性”，则是佛菩萨。《坛经》说：“我心自有佛，自佛是真佛；自若无佛心，向何处求佛。”

照禅宗看，人的自性（或本心）本来是广大虚空一无所有，但它并不是死寂的，而是能“思量”的，一切事物皆由“思量”出。如果这些“思量”活动一过不留，那么对自己的“自性”就无任何影响，则自性常处于清净状态。“自性常清净”，就好像日月常明一样，只是有时为云覆盖，在上面的日月虽明，但在下面看到的则是一片昏暗，致使看不到日月的本来面目。如果能遇到惠风（按：指大善知识的指点和启发）把云雾吹散卷尽，那么常明之日月等等自然显现。《坛经》中说：“世人性净，犹如青天，惠如日，智如月，智慧常明。于外著境，妄念浮云盖覆，自性不明，故遇善知识开真法，吹却迷妄，内外明彻，于自性中，万法皆见。”善知识只能对人们有启发作用，觉悟不觉悟还在自己。“自有本觉性，将正见度，般若之智，除却愚痴迷妄，各各自度。”²³

敦煌本《坛经》“佛性”一词很少见，但元宗宝本“佛性”则多见。《坛经》有两处说到“佛性”较重要：一是慧能在黄梅五祖处所作的偈：“佛性常清净”；另一处是答韦使君问，说“造寺、布施、供养”等“实无功德”时说：“功德在法身，非在福田；自法性有功德，平直是德。内见佛性，外行恭敬。”前一条说明“佛性”的本质是“常清净”，这与“自性”一样，所以所谓“佛性”即“自性”，亦即为人之本性，它是每个人的内在生命的主体。后一条说明“佛性”即“自法性”，而为人之内在本质。基于此，禅宗即可立其“识心见性”、“见性成佛”的理论。“识心见性”是说，如对自己的本心有所认识就可见到“自性常清净”；得其“自性常清净”就是使其内在的本性显现为超越的佛性，“识心见性，自成佛道”²⁴，这一切皆在“悟即成智”也。

那么人如何能“识心见性”？禅宗指出了一条直接简单的修行法门，这就是他们所立的“无念为宗，无相为体，无住为本”的法门。《坛经》中说：

“我此法门，从上以来，顿渐皆立无念为宗，无相为体，无住为本。何名无相？无相者，于相而离相。无念者，于念而不念。无住者，为人本性，念念不住，前念、今念、后念，念念相续，无有断绝；若一念断绝，法身即离色身，念念时中，于一切法上无住，一念若住，念念即住，名系缚；于一切法上，念念不住，即无缚也。此是以无住为本。”

“无相”是说，对于一切现象不要去执着（离相），因为一般人往往执着现象以为实体，如以坐禅可以成佛，那就是对于坐禅有所执着；如以拜佛可以成佛，那就是对拜佛有所执着，这都是“取相着相”。“取相着相”障碍自性，如云雾覆盖明净的虚空一样。如能“于相离相”则可顿见性体的本来清净，就像云雾扫除干净而现明净虚空。所以无相不仅仅是不要执着一切现象，而且因离相而显“自性常清净”，《坛经》说：“但能离相，性体清净，是以无相为体。”所谓“无住”是说，人的自性本来是念念不住的，前念、今念、后念是相续不断的，如果一旦停留在某一物上，那么就不能是念念不住而是念念即住了，这样“心”就被“系缚”住了，“心不住法即通流，住即被缚”。如能对一切事物念念不住，过而不留，如雁过长空，不留痕迹，放过电影，一无所有，这样就不会被系缚，“是以无住为本”。“无念”不是“百物不思，念尽除却”，不是对任何事物都不想，而是在接触事物时，心不受外境的任何影响，“不于境上生心”。“念”是心的作用，心所对的是境（外境，即种种事物），一般人在境上起念，如境美好，那么就在境上起念，而有贪；如境不好，那么就在境上起念，而有嗔。因此一般人的“念”是依境而起，随境变迁，这样的“念”是“妄念”，经常为境所役使，而不得自在。如果能“于诸境上心不染”，这样就可以不受外境干扰，虽处尘世，却可无染无杂，来去自由，自性常清净，自成佛道。以上所论“无相”“无住”“无念”实均一心的作用，且迷与悟均在一念之间，故成佛道当靠顿悟。

据以上所说，我们或可得出以下结论：

1．中国禅宗之所以是中国的思想传统而区别于印度佛教，正因其和中国的儒家和道家哲学一样也是以“内在超越”为特征。它之所以深深影响宋明理学（特别是陆王心学），正在于其思想的“内在超越性”。如果说以“内在超越”为特征的儒家学说所追求的是道德上的理想人格超越“自我”而成“圣”，以“内在超越”为特征的道家哲学所追求的则是精神上的绝对自由，超越“自我”而成“仙”，那么，以“内在超越”为特征的中国禅宗则是追求一种瞬间永恒的神秘境界，超越“自我”而成“佛”，就这点说，禅宗仍具有某种宗教的形式。

2．禅宗虽然仍具有某种宗教的形式，但由于它要求破除念经、坐禅、拜佛等一切外在的束缚，这样势必又包含着否定其作为宗教本身的意义。这就是说，禅宗的世俗化使之成为一种非宗教的宗教在中国发生影响，它把人们引向在现实生活中实现超越现实的目的，否定了在现实世界之外与之对立的天堂与地狱，表现出“世间法则佛法，佛法则世间法”的世俗精神。

3．禅宗作为一种宗教，它不仅破除一切传统佛教的规矩，而且认为在日常生活中不靠外力，只靠禅师的内在自觉，就可以成佛，这样就可以把以“外在超越”为特征的宗教变成以“内在超越”为特征的非宗教的宗教，由出世转向入世，从而克服了二元的倾向。这样转变，是否可以说禅宗具有某种摆脱传统的宗教模式的倾向。如果可以这样说，那么研究禅宗的历史，将对研究现实社会生活中的宗教有着重要的意义。

4．如果说在中国有着强大的禁锢人们思想的传统，那么是否也有要求打破一切禁锢人们思想的资源呢？如果确有这样的资源，禅宗应是其中重要的一部分。禅宗否定一切外在的束缚，打破一切执着，破除传统的权威和现实的权威，一任本心，从这个意义上说人自己可以成为自己的主宰，这样的思想解放作用在我国长期封建专制社会中应是难能可贵的，似乎应为我们注意。当然禅宗由此而建立了以“自我”的内在主体性为中心的权威，虚构了“自我”的无限的超越力量，而又可以为以“自我”为中心的内在主体性所束缚，这可能是禅宗无法解决的矛盾。

5．禅宗这种以“内在超越”为特征的思想体系，有着鲜明的主观主义特色，它必然导致否定任何客观标准和客观有效性。这既不利于对外在世界的探讨和建立客观有效的社会制度和法律秩序，同时在对探讨宇宙人生终极关切问题上也不无缺陷。因此，我们是否可以提出一个问题，既能否建立一个包容以“内在超越”为特征的思想，同时也包容以“外在超越”为特征的思想的更完满的哲学体系呢？我认为，这个问题或者是中国哲学发展应受到重视的问题。

6．如果说有可能建立一包容“内在超越”和“外在超越”的中国哲学体系，那么能否在中国传统哲学中找到内在资源？我认为，中国传统哲学中是有这方面内在资源的。本来在孔子思想中就有两个方面：一方面有“为仁由己”“人能弘道，非道弘人”的说法；另一方面也有“畏天命，畏大人，畏圣人之言”的说法。前者是孔子思想中的“内在超越”方面；后者是孔子思想中“外在超越”方面，或者说从后者可以看出孔子思想也有“外在超越”的因素。但后来儒家发展了前一方面，而后一方面没有得到发展。如果能使上述孔子思想中的两个方面同时发展，又有所结合，是否可以沿着孔子思想发展出一包容“内在超越”和“外在超越”的哲学体系呢？我想，这是一个值得我们探讨的问题。比孔子稍后的哲学家墨子，他的哲学可以说是以“外在超越”为特征的哲学体系。墨子哲学可以说由两个相互联系的部分组成：一是具有人文精神的“兼爱”思想；另一是具有宗教性的“天志”思想。这两方面看起来似乎有矛盾，但在墨子思想体系中却认为“兼爱”是“天”的意志最根本的体现，所以“天志”应是墨子思想的核心。墨子的“天志”思想认为“天”是有意志的，它的意志是衡量一切事物最高和最后的标准，它可以赏善罚恶，它是一外在于人的超越力量，或者说它具有明显的“外在超越性”。因此，墨家哲学发展到后期墨家就更具有科学因素和逻辑学和认识论思想。可惜在战国以后墨家思想没有得到发展。墨家思想是否可以成为我们建立一包容“内在超越”和“外在超越”的中国哲学体系的内在资源呢？我想也应是我们可以研究的一个课题。

V．THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DAOISM

Religion is a social phenomenon and studying it with a view to understanding its historical development has special significance today. We can see similar trends in other countries where the rapid developments of science and technology do not in any significant way lessen the people's sense of, or interests in, religion. Even the people of China, for some reason or other, show similar interests in the development of religion. This phenomenon is enough to raise several theoretical questions concerning the need for a better understanding of religion: what is the nature of religion? Does the human psyche require a religious faith? Is religion synonymous with religious belief? Is religious belief beneficial to social life? Is science complementary to, or inconsistent with, religious belief? Can religion be a modernizing agent? and so forth. This paper does not pretend to deal specifically with these questions, but, why do we study the history of religions? Should an ideal history of religions be time-conscious? Can such an history help people think seriously about the problems of religion that exist in the world today? All historians of religions need to address themselves to these kinds of problems.

The religions which had been popular in Chinese history include Buddhism, Daoism (Taoism), Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrianism. However, of all these religious traditions, only Daoism (Taoism) is indigenous to China. To be sure, Daoism (Taoism) is a Chinese religion; it has characteristics peculiar to the Chinese. Besides, it has exercised considerable influence on the development of Chinese culture and psychology, customs and habits, science and technology, philosophy and thought, medicine and hygiene, and even political life. Can our investigation into one of the more influential religions—the origin of Daoism (Taoism), its development and characteristics—help us deepen our understanding of Chinese culture, personality and way of thinking? Can it indirectly help us understand, more intimately, the theoretical and practical problems of religion in the world today? I think it can and toward this end the present discussion is an attempt to analyze and discuss the following issues.

I．General Background

The development of Daoism (Taoism) was an attempt to orientate the Han Chinese to their social, political, economic, moral and psychological lives at the end of the Eastern Han.

Why did Daoism (Taoism) develop only at the end of the Eastern Han period? Historically, such Daoist ideas as "immortality" and "sanctification of the bodies" had already existed during the time of the Warring States (Zhanguo). They became even more popular during the Qin and Han dynasties—why? We know that not just any kind of superstition can be called religion, although religion often embodies a good deal of superstitious elements. Neither can we say that any theistic discourse can become a religion, even if it is capable of extending its influence over a sizeable cross-section of the population. Its growth and development were directly related to the social life of the people, their history, and other objective facts. The development of Daoism (Taoism) during the Eastern Han may be attributed to the following factors.

First, the reality of social life at the end of the Eastern Han had laid fertile grounds for the growth of Daoism (Taoism). The social and political conditions, since Shundi of the Eastern Han, had begun to deteriorate. There was outside interference in the day-to-day administration and the administrative machinery was in the hands of a bureaucracy. Debauchery, unruly behavior and social strife, both from within and without, were the order of the day. Finally there were crop failures due to severe drought, and large numbers of people died in ditches (Zhong Changtong, Changyan). Undue economic exploitations and political pressure at that time had made it impossible for the populace to lead a decent life; bankruptcy and emigration were common. The conflict between the ruling class and the ruled was intense and acute. According to historical records, from Shundi's time, peasant uprisings were rampant. At that time, apart from the common class-interest that united them in social movements, their leaders resorted to magic and superstitions as organizing agents. That is why, in history books, the rebels after Shundi's time were often called yaozei, or "the goblin thieves."

Two conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion. First, a period of economic and political unrest, as well as spiritual and moral decay, provided an objective vantage for the development of religion. Second, as the leaders of the peasantry had used magic and superstitions to rally support in their movements, they knew that these could be used as tools for mobilizing the people, thus paving the way for the widespread development of religion. As is always the case, social turbulence often caused great hardship and suffering to the lower class. Thus, when people became desperate they tended to hinge their hopes upon some kind of spiritual power, or shenling. This was one of the most common avenues through which people, in antiquity, reconciled themselves with their social reality. This also explains why a majority of the early Daoist believers were members of the lower social strata.

Second, the social conditions at the end of the Eastern Han had provided useful material for the founding of Daoism (Taoism). Since the time of Han Wudi, when Dong Zhongshu pointed out that "of the hundred schools, only Confucianism is the most revered," Confucian thought had adapted itself to the needs of building a unified feudal society and serving as an ideology for the ruling class. From then on the development of Confucianism depended primarily on the teaching of a reciprocal relationship between Heaven and man, followed by an increased interest in the development of theology and metaphysics. Though ideally a religion is theistic, not any form of theism is adequate or sufficiently meaningful to become a religion. This is because such a religion (namely, the religion of the masses) must include not only the worship of spiritual beings, but also possess a body of canon together with an endurable form of church organization, doctrines and dogmas, and an historical medium for the dissemination of religious knowledge. Generally, religion must see the world in two forms: the real and the supernatural. Based on this premise, human beings feel that they can only disengage themselves from the problems of social life in a supernatural world—believing that an ideal life can manifest itself only in the yonder shore of the supernatural world.

Despite the fact that Confucianism acknowledged the existence of Shen or God, especially during the Han Dynasty, it had never thought it necessary that its ideals be fulfilled outside the world, but required rather that the ideals of "governing the state and pacifying the world" (zhi-guo ping tianxia) be actualized in the real world, even though this were merely an illusion. Although religion had played a very important role in feudal China, it had never become a force to reckon with. Instead it had, many a time, occupied a secondary position, which state of affairs clearly bespoke as well the dominance of Confucian ideology.

From the developmental point of view, after the Eastern Han Confucianism could very well have become a religion, because its metaphysics together with the conception of the sacred could be easily converted into religion. However, Confucianism did not become a religion during the Han Dynasty for the simple reason that it attempted to materialize the ideals of "governing the state and pacifying the world" in the real world. Thus, following the decay of the Han Dynasty, Confucian ideology not only fell short of becoming a religion but its position as an ideology of the ruling class continued to decline. Because of this decline, Confucian thought had given way to the growth of Daoism (Taoism). History shows that, whenever the dominant ideology of the ruling class lost its power, it often signalled the growth and dominance of a countervailing religion.

Even though Confucianism had declined at the end of the Eastern Han, certain facets of its ideology could still be absorbed and put to good use by an ongoing religion. The fact that Confucian ideas are found in Daoism (Taoism) is clear proof that such assimilation did take place. For example, the idea of "the ultimate peace in the unity of the three (Heaven, earth and man) in one" (tian-di-ren san heyi zhi taiping) shows that the Confucianists were concerned about political reality and the notion of sancai (three endowments) mentioned in Yi Zhuan. The idea that the sky and the universe were formed by breath (qi) could have derived from the knowledge of world creation as well as the yin-yang principles and the five elements mentioned in the apocryphal texts. AlI these ideas were closely connected to Han Confucian thought. That most of the scholars who studied the development of Daoism (Taoism) focused their attention on its relationship with Daoist sources and overlooked the nexus between Daoist and Confucianist ideas is a bias.

Daoism (Taoism) could have another source in its gradual mingling with the tradition of the saints. Although there was a connection between the Daoists and the saints of the early Qin, both seem to belong to quite different schools of thought. Until the beginning of the Western Han, the popular Huang-Lao learning was essentially Daoist. It frequently emphasized the exemplary qualities of the sage and was thus deemed capable of exercising its power over the state and the cosmos. That is why Sima Qian, in his preface, commented that the importance of the Huang-Lao learning lies in the doctrine of "self-actualization through non-action, and self-correction through expiation" (wuwei zihua, qingjing zizheng).

The Huang-Lao Daoist learning underwent a change during the Eastern Han: part of its adherents sought the help of the gods installed in shrines, thus becoming unified with the saints. Huandi, for example, made sacrifices to Laozi (Lao Tzu) at the latter's shrine with the aim to "preserve shen for the uplift of character and the ultimate ascent to Heaven," thus signalling the initial transformation or Huang-Lao's Daoist teaching. Also, as early as the end of the Western Han, there was already in existence what was known as "Huang Lao's Dao" (the Way of Huang-Lao) and later on, the "Fangxian's Dao" (the Way of the Saints), both of which actually belonged to the immortalist sects. Further, the saints' underlying objective was to attain "eternal life" (changsheng busi) and to cause the bodies to be sanctified (routi chengxian). Thus, once it merged with the Daoist ideas of "attaining peace through inaction, and remaining in peace through abstinence" (qingjing wuwei, tiandan guayu), it increasingly began to attract the masses and became a powerful social force. Lastly, the basic tenets of Daoism (Taoism), such as "immortality" and "the sanctification of the bodies," although derived from the Way of the Saints, became part of the Daoist system. Hence, its transformation also represents an important factor contributing to the growth of Daoism(Taoism).

From the above viewpoints, Daoism (Taoism) as a religion may be said to have deviated from the Confucianists' and Daoists' schools of thought. However, its source of ideas was inseparable from both. Hence, from the beginning, it had distinguished itself as a religious system in which Confucian and Daoist ideas supplemented each other. This system represents some of the characteristics typical of Chinese culture, psychology and way of thinking.

Third, the introduction of Buddhism into China had greatly stimulated the development of Chinese religion. From the time Buddhism spread to China during the Western Han till after the middle of the Eastern Han, it maintained a steady level of propagation. Buddhism, acting like a catalyst, escalated the development of Daoism (Taoism). Actually, the school of the saints was already popular during the Western Han, and disciples frequently had given tributes to Huang-Lao. This was evidenced in the existing learnings of "Huang-Lao's Dao" and "Fangxian's Dao." The former sanctified Huangdi and worshipped him in shrines dedicated to him; the latter talked about "non-death and everlasting life" (changsheng busi). Shiji records that the teacher of the river elder, Le Jugong, learned about Huangdi. The Book of Fengshan records that Huangdi became an immortal because of fengshan. Yuji (more appropriately, Ganji), who compiled the Daoist scripture Taiping Jing, suggested that the book was originally by Laozi (Lao Tzu). During Han Mingdi, Ying, King of Chu, had already worshipped Huang-Lao and Futu. Ying recited Huang-Lao's words and honored Futu's shrine. Huandi erected Huang-Lao's and Futu's shrines in his palace. The fact that Huang-Lao and Futu were worshiped manifestly shows that Huangdi was at that time regarded as a deity or a Buddha. Sainthood was in fact a form of sagehood. Living the life of an immortal is but a human discipline. There was no formal, nor endurable form of organization to be used as a base for the interaction of the religious community. But after the spread of Buddhism to China, it became an organized form of religion, possessing not only a set of teaching which differed from that of traditional China, but also an organized church, with a religious canon and a spiritual community, all of which served as a blueprint for the founding of Daoism(Taoism).

It is true that Buddhism had served as a model for the establishment of Daoism (Taoism). Of even greater importance is that Buddhism was alien to Chinese culture, and its propagation in China was greeted with protests by the bearers of Huaxia's cultural tradition. This defensive attitude acted as a stimulus spurring the Chinese to strive even harder towards establishing an indigenous religion. When an ethnic culture encountered an alien culture it often gave rise to mutual absorption or rejection. This situation was particularly marked in the case of the Chinese response to Indian Buddhism. We can provide evidence to show how it was actually reflected in the earliest Daoist scripture, Taiping Jing. In this scripture, we see how some Buddhist ideas, like benqi (the primal beginning) and sanjie (the three worlds), had their origins in the Buddhist canon. On the other hand, there were criticisms about Buddhism, for example, the talks that "the conduct of the four destructions collectively denigrates the spiritual way of Heaven" (Sihui zhi xing, gong wuru huangtian zhi shendao). Moreover, upon the establishment of Daoism(Taoism), its adherents circulated the story about Laozi (Lao Tzu)'s role in bringing about a renaissance among the northern Chinese (Laozi [Lao Tzu] huahu). This was designed not only as a blow to Buddhism but also as an attempt to boost the image of Daoism (Taoism). All this suggests a kind of antagonistic reaction against the entry of the alien culture.

Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the end of the Eastern Han period saw the need for the development of an indigenous religion. The founding of this religion could be traced to the existing tradition of the saints. The fact that it adopted Confucian and Daoist ideas as a basis for the development of Daoism (Taoism) is even less surprising. Once it emerged, it immediately became charged with an intense ethnic fervor and came into direct conflict with the alien Buddhist religion. The outcome is, precisely, a manifestation of an indigenously endowed Chinese culture.

II．The Development of Daoism

The Process through which Daoism (Taoism) developed into an organized religion also a clear manifestation of how a religious community came into being.

What is the nature of religion? It can be defined in a great number of ways. Even in Marxists' writings, religion is conceived differently under different circumstances. Marx said, "religion is the opiate of the people," which is interpreted in terms of the use of religion as a way of hypnotising the masses. This statement came not from Marx but from Feuerbach. It means that the purveyors of religion who claimed that it could bring comfort to humankind were not being honest. Lenin conceived of "religion as the workers' groaning sound," which is interpreted as relating to the agony of the proletariat. Plekhanov said, "Religion has a countless number of definitions. . . . It may be interpreted as a form of relationship that helps to realize the existence of the mystical superhuman power, for humans believe that they can depend on this power." Plekhanov's definition seems to be more relevant and practical, but is there such a mystical power? How do we adjust to the existence of such a power? Why do people find it necessary to believe in such a power? Is belief in a mystical superhuman power superstitious? This raises some philosophical problems, viz., the problems of religion vis-à-vis superstition and belief.

Is religion a superstition? This question can be debated for a long time and no one knows when it will end, but devout believers most certainly will reject the pronouncement that "religion is superstition." Why? It is because believers frequently rely upon certain ideal principles to interpret what often is called the "mystical superhuman power" in the form of ultimate "truth, goodness, and beauty" (zhen, shan, mei), or else they often look upon the ideals of "truth, goodness, and beauty" as a form of "mystical superhuman power." They sincerely believe it to be true and try very hard to apply these ideals in their social life. Probably the belief in, and dependence upon, this ultimate "truth, goodness and beauty" in the guise of a "mystical superhuman power" is a matter of the human psyche's response to specific social conditions. But believers of the "mystical superhuman power" assume superstition and religion to be two different things. To them, "superstition" can only be a trick played upon those who lack scientific knowledge, i.e. a manifestation of spiritual poverty due to a lack of ideals. Devotees who believe that the "mystical superhuman power" is a manifestation of "truth, goodness, and beauty" may perhaps accept the idea that "religion is synonymous with belief" but certainly will not accept that "religion is superstition." According to them, people should have faith: even the agnostics believe in agnosticism.

Religion and belief are undoubtedly related. Religion is based on belief, but whether belief is based on religion, in the classical sense, is a different matter. As a matter of illustration we can say that "we believe in the scientific explanation of atheism" or even accept that "we believe in Confucian philosophy." Nonetheless, there is no doubt that atheism is not a religion, but a scientific doctrine. Even Confucianism may be said to have embodied certain religious elements, although it is not a religion. Therefore, we should distinguish not only between "religion" and "belief," but also between "religion" and "religious thought." Otherwise, almost any kind of philosophical discourse could be regarded as a religion, and if that be the case, it would be as good as abnegating the existence of religion.

Based on our understanding of the human psyche, we may postulate that human beings really need a certain kind of belief. The question is whether there is the need for a religious belief. If we could divide belief into two categories—one a scientific belief and another a non-scientific belief—religion may be said, generally, to belong to the latter category. What follows immediately will be questions like whether human spiritual life requires a certain kind of self-satisfaction obtained from a non-scientific discipline, or whether social life looks upon religious belief itself as a psychological need. This is too gigantic a problem to be discussed here. We can only postulate that for a non-scientific belief to become an organized religion, it must offer some kind of theoretical bases or support. Also, these arguments must be able to reflect the spirit of the time. If there were no religious teachings to be used as a theoretical system, non-scientific beliefs could not become an established religion. Besides, as an established religion, especially one that had colored the history of the social masses, there must be a perduring church organization, a religious canon, a community of devotees, and a history of religion.

In history, there were thousands of the so-called "religious sects," but not all of them could be regarded strictly as "religious organizations." In fact, a number of them could only be looked upon as "superstitious cults." If that be the case, what then may be thought to be an organized religion? We shall analyze the growth of Daoism (Taoism) first before illuminating the really meaningful form of religious organization.

An organized religion must have a canon with a philosophical base of its own. The religious teachings should not be nonsensical, but must contain a well-organized system of ideas for the advancement of humankind. The reason why Indian Buddhism has become an influential world religion is that it provides an impressive system of thought which is capable of enlightening the human mind. If Daoism (Taoism) merely confined itself to a haphazard way of thinking, as is represented in the Taiping Jing, it would have been difficult to become an established religion in China. Thus, from the end of the Han Dynasty, through the Three Kingdoms, till after the Western and Eastern Jin, there emerged Daoists like Ge Hong, Lu Xiujing, Kou Qianzhi, Tao Hongjing and others who, in an attempt to fulfill the requirement of the time, not only integrated some of the Daoist and Confucian ideas but also absorbed some of the Buddhist elements to enrich Daoism (Taoism).

A really meaningful and influential religious community must have a formal or more serious form of church organization. Even though the ideas of "immortality" and "the sanctification of the bodies" were subsequently incorporated into the Daoist religion, the saints relied heavily on personal devotion without developing a distinctive church, and so they failed to develop a religion. It was not until the end of the Han Dynasty that Daoism (Taoism) became an established religion with a permanent membership of disciples, together with a body of clergy and church leaders. However, the regimes of the Three Kingdoms and the Western Jin banned this organization, subjecting it to dissolution until the Eastern Jin when Du Zigong and others revived it and once again set it on course.

An organized religion must also have a more permanent set of religious teaching and canon. Although Daoism (Taoism) had its own precepts and canon when it was first instituted at the end of the Eastern Han, they were rather simple and impermanent in nature. From the Eastern Jin onward, Daoism (Taoism) gradually became more firmly established under the impact of Buddhism and with the tireless efforts of Lu Xiujing, Kou Qianzhi and others.

An organized religion must have its own canon and scriptures for the guidance of its believers. Although there were a number of Daoist books, like the Laozi (Lao Tzu) and the Zhuangzi, before the Wei and the Jin dynasties, these books came to be accepted as scriptures only after being popularized by the devotees. All these books were written by Daoist philosophers of the early Qin, and they had hardly any connection with Daoist religion. It was due to the believers' attempt to look for historical evidences that they decided to upgrade them as scriptures. Taiping Jing, for example, was written before the inception of the Daoist religion. Hence, it served only as a groundwork for the development of Daoism(Taoism). However, by the time of the Eastern Jin and the Northern and Southern dynasties, when Daoism (Taoism) was firmly rooted and a church was organized, a large quantity of scriptures expounding the Daoist canon began to appear (Ge Hong's Pao Pozi). This period saw the appearance of three distinctive categories of scriptures: Sanhuang Jing (The Three Emperors Scripture), Shangqing Jing (The High Pure Scripture), and Lingbao Jing (The Spirit Protected Scripture). All these scriptures subsequently combined to form the "three caves" (sandong) of the Daozang, namely: the cave of the real (dongzhen), the cave of the gods (dongshen), and the cave of the occult (dongxuan).

An established religion must have a spirit being, or shenling, as specific object of worship and a history of its own. When Daoism (Taoism) was first instituted it had inherited part of the saints' tradition. The Daoist disciples claimed that it was imparted to them by the immortals, mostly with Laozi (Lao Tzu)'s assistance. Until the Northern and the Southern dynasties, Daoist disciples created the "rank of the real being" based on the conception of the social hierarchy prevailing at the time. Tao Hongjing' s Zhenling Yeweitu (Real Spirit's Occupational Status Chart) divided the immortals into seven classes, the highest of which was occupied by the first three: the Primal Lord of Heaven (Yuanshi Tianzun), the Daoist Lord on High (Gaoshang Daojun), and the First Divine Daoist Lord (Yuanhuang Daojun). From then on, these three deities became the most honored in the objects of worship in the Daoist temples (daoguan). Since a religion always finds it necessary to undermine the existence of other competing religions, it has to create a history of its own in order to raise its own status. Thus, being an indigenous Chinese religion, Daoism (Taoism) had to tackle the entry of alien Buddhism. Besides emphasizing the differences between "Chinese" and "non-Chinese" (huayi zhi bian) to undermine Buddhism, Daoists also spread the story of "Laozi (Lao Tzu) huahu" and elevated Laozi (Lao Tzu)'s position to that of Buddha Shakyamuni's teacher. Consequently, both Buddhism and Daoism(Taoism) remained in conflict for a long time.

However, it was not until the Eastern Jin and the Northern and Southern dynasties that Daoism (Taoism) finally became an established religion. The various stages of its development may be summarized as follows: First, from the Eastern Jin onward, the Daoists began to revive their religion by reorganizing the Daoist community which had become scattered and unstable. At the same time, in order to overcome the inadequacy of Daoist teaching and theoretical formulations, Ge Hong and others had provided a body of Daoist canon and precepts. Thereafter, as an attempt to consolidate the founding of the Daoist church, a set of religious teaching was formulated; and in order to propagate Daoist teaching the required scriptures were made available. Lastly, so as to set the religion on a proper footing, a compendium of fairy tales and legendary stories was kept alive. The various phases involved in the development of Daoism (Taoism) may thus be said to be characteristic of the circumstances under which a religious body came into existence. One of our aims of studying the history of religion is to use it as a source for illuminating the various phases of its development so as to enable us to assess, more accurately, the role it played in society.

III．Characteristics of Daoism

As a form of religious philosophy Daoism (Taoism) has special characteristic, which can be illuminated only through comparison with other religions.

An established religion has characteristics which are distinctively different from those of other religions. Besides such external forms as church organization, religious doctrines and canon, as well as its conception of the sacred, its characteristics should be reflected in the theoretical system which forms the core of the religion. This theoretical system usually contains a body of basic ideals and conceptual schema. For instance, the ultimate reality of the Buddhist belief, as embodied in the concepts of self-denial, transcendentalism and nirvana, is the insignia which distinguishes it from other religions. The three doctrines of the medieval Christianity—namely, "the existence of God," "the resurrection of the soul" and "free will"—form its religious philosophy and conceptual schema. If that be the case, does Daoist philosophy contain any doctrines and tenets which differ from those of other religions? I think it does, especially in the earlier form of Daoism (Taoism). Whilst almost all religions ask the question "what happens after the demise of a person?", Daoism (Taoism) wanted to know "why humans don't die?". This basic question serves as the key to the theoretical system of Daoism (Taoism). All this shows that it has characteristics different from those of other religions. The early form of Daoism (Taoism) held that its body of belief was made up of the tenet of "the ascent of the three in one," that is, "the unity of Heaven, earth, and man for the attainment of the Great Peace" (tian-di-ren, sanzhe heyi yi zhi taiping); "the blending of the essence, breath, and shen to become a saint" (jing-qi-shen, sanzhe hunyi er cheng shenxian). From this it evolves into "non-death and eternal life" (changsheng busi), "resurrection of the bodies" (routi feisheng), and "transformation of the breath into the three pure ones" (qihua sanqing), thus forming the basis of Daoism (Taoism).

To understand the tenets of the Buddhist philosophy, one must know the meaning of nirvana. Hence, a Russian Buddhist scholar wrote a book analyzing the meaning of nirvana. In Mou Zongsan's book, he analyzed the concept of nirvana from the Chinese Buddhist viewpoint. In studying Christianity, one should analyze the concept of "God." Thus, Aurelius Augustinus (354-430) in his The City of God formulated his thesis regarding the "godliness" of the "Almighty." In his Shenxue Daquan, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) put forward five parameters to prove that "God exists." In Daoist philosophy, the basic concept is breath (qi), the existence of which may be proved by the following:

First, "the unity of the three in one" refers to the unity of Heaven, earth and man (tian-di-ren), and the reason why "Heaven, earth and man" can be unified is due to the fact that the breaths of them are the same. The essence, breath and god (Jing-qi-shen) blend to become one, and the reason why they can be fused in one is due to the fact that the breaths of them are the same.

Second, the so-called "one breath giving birth to the three pure ones" means the three most respected worthies of Daoism (Taoism) were the manifestations of the breath, or the three layers of the most sacred Heaven were manifested by breath, or qi. This also shows how the basic concept of Daoism (Taoism) came to be formed.

Third, although dao (the way) is the highest form of Daoist doctrine, its early period identified three circumstances under which the relationship between dao and qi was highlighted. The first circumstance was that dao is more basic than qi, but dao cannot be isolated from qi. Another circumstance showed that qi is more basic than dao, because Daoism (Taoism) used qi as its prime mover—for example, Liu Xie in his "Miehuo Lun" ("On the Extinction of Illusion"), while citing "Sanpo Lun" ("The Three Breakthroughs"), said " qi is the prime mover of dao." The third circumstance was the synthesis that dao is qi—for example, Tao Hongjing in his Yangsheng Yanming Lu cited Fuqi Jing (Breathtaking Scripture) that " dao is qi." In studying the philosophical basis of the Daoist canon, if one could analyze the meaning of qi and the conceptual base upon which it is built, one would be able to gain further insight into the various salient features of Daoism (Taoism).

Hegel in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy said, "the

difference in cultures is due to the difference in the systems of ideas, even more so is that in philosophy." If we compare Daoism (Taoism) with other religious systems, the doctrines formulated by Daoist ideas, and the school of thought which formed the basis of these doctrines, we would be able to understand more clearly the characteristics of Daoism (Taoism). Although Daoism (Taoism) is indigenous to the Chinese, it actually owes its development to the inspiration of Buddhism when the latter spread to China. Thus, we are able to identify the rival relationship between Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism) as one of its special characteristics.

The earliest Daoist scripture, Taiping Jing, on the one hand, shows that it was influenced by Buddhism. For example, it relates to the question of conformity, a concept which was already in use in traditional Chinese thought. But in Taiping Jing this was discussed in such a detailed and outstanding manner that it became obvious that it was influenced by the Hinayanist Zen Buddhist concept of "mind control" or "control of desire." On the other hand, the scripture also shows that it was antagonistic to Buddhism. For example, Taiping Jing's satirical expression, "the way of the four destructions" (sihui zhi xing), was clearly aimed at Buddhism. It also put forward the argument that "one's burden is one's responsibility" (chengfu) as a direct confrontation to the Buddhist concept of "reincarnation" (laishi baoying). After the Eastern Jin, Daoism (Taoism) gradually developed into a full-fledged religion. It had a theoretical system of its own, and consequently its differentiation from Buddhism became more and more pronounced. At that time, the differences between Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism) might be related to the following problems: (i) life and death and the form of god; (ii) the cause and effect of one's deeds and misdeeds (yinguo baoying); and (iii) this-worldly and other-worldly orientations. By analyzing of all these issues, we would be able to appreciate the special characteristics of Daoism (Taoism) as a religion.

In comparing Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism), we may encounter yet another question: why does not Daoism (Taoism) become a world religion as did Buddhism rather than remaining merely a Chinese religion? From the historical point of view, it is possible that Daoism(Taoism) could have spread to Korea at the end of the Northern and the Southern dynasties. Sanguo Shiji (The History of the Three Kingdoms) recorded how Daoism (Taoism) spread to Korea at the beginning of the Tang Dynasty but, shortly afterwards, Buddhism became popular in Korea and very soon it outran Daoism (Taoism), which thenceforward ceased to retain its foothold there. During the same period, Daoism(Taoism) passed through Korea to Japan, where it might have exercised some influence on Japan's Shinto, though this does not mean that the development of Shinto was due to the Daoist influence. Unlike Buddhism, however, Daoism (Taoism) also failed to spread its wing over Japan. In history Daoism (Taoism) had even less influence on other countries(notwithstanding its continuing impact on Chinese devotees who made their homes outside China).

In my opinion, the main reason why Daoism (Taoism) could not become a world religion is that it not only contains defects in its system of beliefs and practices, but also carries a heavy load of sentiments which are peculiarly Chinese. The goal Daoism (Taoism) seeks to achieve is "non-death and eternal life" and "the sanctification of bodies." All this differs from the monotheistic doctrine that "the soul does not die." On the one hand, its theoretical arguments, such as "the sanctification of bodies" and "non-death and eternal life" are too crude and difficult to be absorbed. Consequently, Daoism (Taoism) had no alternative but to take in some Buddhist ideas, such as "when the form ceases, its spirit remains" (xingjin shen bu mie) and "the three kalpas' wheel of karma" (sanshi lunhui). Thus, the spread of Daoism (Taoism) has been seriously restricted, whereas wherever it goes Buddhism has been able to take the place of Daoism (Taoism) wherever the latter goes. On the other hand, Daoism (Taoism) is too closely related to science. For the sake of preserving life, ensuring "non-death and eternal life" and sanctifying the dead it emphasizes a great deal of physical conditioning for lifting the breath (qi) of material reality to the highest level. Consequently, China's science and technology, especially medicine, came to be developed alongside Daoism (Taoism). Daoism (Taoism)'s use of science was bound to curtail its dynamism as a religion. Thus, the "non-science" and "anti-science" components, in conjunction with the basic qualities of science, began to contradict each other. Religion usually emphasizes "otherworldly orientations," but Daoism (Taoism) seems to insist on "this-worldly orientations" instead. Its adherents believe that they could blend "the three (jing, qi, shen) to become saints" (sanzhe hunyi er chengxian). But as a religious system Daoism (Taoism) also advocates the unity of the three (tian, di, ren) in one to ensure the Great Peace (sanzhe heyi er zhi taiping) and for this reason can be a potent disruptive force in the political process. In thus fabricating the supernatural world of the saints, Daoism (Taoism) hopes to translate the real world into an ideal one—this undeniably is a conflict of ideas.

The study of the characteristics of Daoism (Taoism) is of great importance for it enables us to understand the difference between Daoism (Taoism) and other religions. By analyzing its characteristics we are able to illuminate the salient features of Chinese culture, psychology and philosophy, as well as the direction of developments in science and technology, medicine and hygiene, and the ensuing shortcomings hidden therein. For a people to succeed in development, they must know not only the present and the future, but also the past. They must come to grips not only with the reality of political life and economic exigencies, but also with their traditional culture, religious belief and pattern of thought. Herein lies the reason why serious research must be conducted on Daoism (Taoism) so as to enable us to understand its role as a Chinese religion.

伍　论道教的产生和它的特点*

宗教是一种社会意识形态。把宗教作为意识形态来研究它的发展历史，在今天不仅有其一般性的意义，而且有着某种特殊的意义。我们可以从国外大量的事实看到，科学技术在飞速发展，并没有使宗教意识衰退，反而加强了人们对宗教的追求；就国内情况看，也因种种原因信仰宗教的人有着一种发展的趋势。这样一种现象就向我们提出若干应该认真研究的有关宗教的理论问题，如“宗教的本质是什么”“人类的心理特性是否需要有一种宗教性的信仰”“宗教和宗教性的信仰是否是一回事”“宗教信仰是否有益于社会生活”“宗教与科学是矛盾的还是互补的”“宗教能否现代化”等等。上述这些问题当然不是本文应该研究的范围，本文不可能也不应该直接讨论这些问题。但是，为什么要研究宗教史，一部好的宗教史是不是应有强烈的时代感，它能不能使人们在读了之后而认真考虑当今世界存在的宗教问题，我想写宗教史的人是应该想到这些问题。

在我国历史上曾经流行过的有佛教、道教、回教、天主教、基督教以及袄教等等，但其中只有道教是中国本民族的宗教。说得确切些，道教是中国本民族宗教的一种，因此它具有中国本民族的特色，它对中国的民族文化、民族心理、风俗习惯、科学技术、哲学思想、医药卫生甚至政治经济生活都有相当大的影响。我们研究作为中华民族本民族的一种有较大影响的宗教——道教——的产生和发展的历史以及它的特点，能否加深我们对自己民族文化、民族心理以及思维方式的特征的了解？能否从一个侧面使我们更加认真地考虑当今世界的宗教理论和实际问题呢？我认为应是可能的。为此，本文将对下述三个问题作一些分析和探讨。

一、道教的产生是适应了东汉末期中国本民族（主要是汉族）的社会、政治、经济、道德以及人们的心理的需要。

道教为什么到东汉末年才产生，而道教所崇信的某些思想如“长生不死”“肉体成仙”等等在战国时期已经有了，到秦汉后更为流行，这是为什么呢？我们知道，并非任何迷信思想都可以称为宗教，当然宗教中总是包含着大量的迷信成分；也并不能说任何“有神论”都能成为宗教，虽然一般地说宗教也是“有神论”。宗教，特别是一种有影响的宗教，它的产生和发展必定有其社会生活、历史条件的原因，它的发展总也有着某种客观规律。道教在东汉末年产生是由以下几个条件促成的：

第一，东汉末年的现实社会生活为道教提供了有利于产生的土壤。

东汉自顺帝以后，社会政治日益腐败，外戚专政，宦官当权，“凡贪淫放纵，僭凌横恣，挠乱内外，螫噬民化”，无恶不作，致使“农桑失所，兆民呼嗟于昊天，贫穷转死于沟壑”（仲长统《昌言》）。由于当时政治统治者的残酷经济剥削和政治压迫，使广大人民群众无法生存，破产、逃亡已成为当时普遍现象，所以当时广大人民群众与统治者的矛盾是十分尖锐的。据史书记载，自顺帝以后农民起义此起彼伏，一直不断。当时的起义农民除了阶级利益一致而使他们自发地联合在一起之外，已见农民起义的领导者们利用方术、迷信思想作为组织群众的纽带，故在史书中多称顺帝以后的起义农民为“妖贼”。

从这里我们也许可以得出两点结论：一是在汉末这个经济、政治、精神和道德普遍瓦解的时代里，它为一种宗教的产生提供了客观条件；二是起义农民普遍利用某些方术迷信，这就说明他们已经意识到方术迷信思想可以作为他们组织群众的思想武器，因而为一种宗教的产生创造了广大的群众基础。

社会的危机给下层人民带来的苦难最为深重，在对现实的绝望中走向乞求超现实的神灵，自是古代人民最现实的可能。道教徒最初也是来源于广大下层人民。

第二，东汉末年为道教的产生准备了可以利用的思想材料。自汉武帝以后，董仲舒提出“罢黜百家，独尊儒术”之后，儒家思想适应着封建大一统的需要而成为我国封建社会的统治思想，此后儒家思想的发展沿着天人感应目的论而有神学意味越来越浓厚的谶纬迷信之类。宗教一般说总是有神论，但是是否任何有神论都能成为一种完备意义的宗教呢？那却不一定。因为一种完备意义上的宗教（这里指的是阶级社会里的宗教），它不仅有对神灵的崇拜，而且应有一套教义的理论体系和较为固定的教会组织、教规教仪以及传授历史等等。一般地说，宗教总是要把世界二重化为现实世界和超现实世界，在其教义中认为人们只有在超现实世界里才能永远摆脱现实社会生活中存在的种种苦难，人们的美好的、幸福的生活最后只能在那超现实的彼岸世界中实现。

我国的儒家思想特别是两汉的儒家思想尽管也承认“有神”，但它并不认为必须在现实世界之外实现其理想，而是要求在现实世界之中实现其“治国平天下”的理想，虽然这只能是幻想。在我国长期的封建社会中，宗教虽然有过很大影响，但始终没有能成为独占的统治思想，并且常常居于次要地位，这一情况不能不说和作为正统思想的儒家思想的这一特点有关。

儒家思想到东汉以后从发展上看也很可能成为一种宗教，因为从有神论、谶纬迷信发展成为一种宗教并不是很困难的。但儒家在汉朝始终也没有成为宗教，这和它要求在现实社会中实现其“治国平天下”的理想有着直接联系。因此，随着汉王朝的衰落，儒家思想本身既然不能成为一种宗教，而其统治地位又走了下坡路，由于儒家统治地位的削弱从而为一种宗教的产生提供了条件。历史的进程向我们表明，每当对统治阶级的统治思想发生信仰危机的时候，也往往是宗教意识易于滋生和广泛发生影响的时候。

儒家思想到东汉末虽然衰落了，但它的思想中的某些部分却可以为宗教吸收和利用。这点我们可以从道教思想中找到它吸收某些儒家思想的事实得到证实。例如关于“天地人三合一致太平”的思想，它表现了儒家强烈的关心现实政治的倾向和《易传》中关于“三才”的思想，可以说直接来源于纬书的关于世界创化的模式以及阴阳五行思想等等，这些都和两汉流行的儒家思想有密切关系。我们应该看到，一般研究道教史的学者往往只注意它和道家的渊源关系，而忽视了道教和儒家在思想上的联系，这是一种偏见。

道教的另一思想来源可以说是逐渐与神仙家思想相结合的道家思想。先秦道家与神仙家虽然有着某种联系，但它们毕竟是两种不同的思想体系。到西汉初年，当时流行的黄老之学仍属道家，它所注重的往往是君人南面之术，成为一种治国经世的工具，所以司马迁在他的《自序》中谓，汉初黄老之学的要点在于“无为自化，清净自正”。

降至东汉，黄老道家之学为之一变，其一支走向祠祀求神而与神仙家结合。桓帝祠祀老子，欲“存神养性，意在凌云”，故已见黄老道家之变化。而早在西汉末已有所谓“黄老道”，后又有“方仙道”等，实已是神仙家的流派，而神仙家的思想在于追求“长生不死”“肉体成仙”，它一经与道家思想“清净无为，恬淡寡欲”的思想结合，更加为世人所重视，而在社会上发生影响。后来道教的基本信条“长生不死”“肉体成仙”虽来自神仙家，却和道家某些思想结成不解之缘了，所以道家思想的蜕变也是道教产生的一个重要原因。

从以上两方面看，道教作为一种宗教不同于作为一种学术流派的儒家和道家，但就其思想渊源说它却离不开儒道两家，因此它一开始就是以儒道互补为特征的宗教派别。这一以儒道互补为特征的宗教派别不能不在极大程度上表现着我们这个民族文化、心理和思维方式上的某些特色。

第三，佛教的传入大大地刺激了我国本民族宗教的建立。佛教自西汉末传入中国，到东汉中叶以后它有了一定程度的流传。佛教如同催化剂，加快了道教建立的过程。本来，神仙家在西汉就很流行，而神仙家又往往托言黄老，例如原来就有所谓“黄老道”和“方仙道”等。前者把黄帝老子神化而礼拜祠祀；后者则言“长生不死”。《史记》载，河上丈人的老师乐巨公学黄帝老子，甚至在《封禅书》中记载着有所谓黄帝因封禅而长生不死。道教经典《太平经》的编纂者于吉（或说应作“干吉”）托言此书得之于老君。汉明帝时，楚王英已对黄老和浮屠同样礼拜，“楚王英诵黄老之微言，尚浮屠之仁祠”，桓帝于宫中“立黄老浮屠之祠”。这种把黄老和浮屠同样礼拜，就说明当时把黄帝老子看成和佛一样的“神”。神仙家本来是一种方术，养生求成仙也只是个人修炼的事，并没有什么组织，特别是没有什么固定的组织形式，成为一种宗教团体。但佛教传入以后，佛教作为一种完整形态的宗教，它不仅有一套不同于中国传统思想的教义，而且是一个有教会组织的团体，还有一套教规教仪和礼拜祠祀的对象等等，这就给道教的创立提供了一个可以参考的样板。

佛教的传入对于道教的建立固然有着样板的作用，但更为重要的是，佛教作为一种外来文化进入中国传播和发生影响，必然引起华夏文化系统的反抗，这更是当时要求建立一种民族宗教的动力。一种民族文化在和传入外来文化相遇时，往往同时产生吸收和排斥两种势力，这样一种情况对中华民族来说尤为明显。关于这点，我们可以从最早的道教经典《太平经》的内容所反映的情形得到证实。在《太平经》中，我们可以发现它一方面吸收了某些佛教思想，如“本起”“三界”等即是采自佛教的名辞；另一方面又批评了佛教，有所谓“四毁之行，共污辱皇天之神道”的说法。特别是道教一建立就提出“老子化胡”的故事，用以打击佛教，抬高道教，而表现了一种抗拒外来文化的民族心理。

从以上三方面看，在东汉末年出现一种为中华民族本民族所需要的宗教绝非偶然。而且出现的这种宗教又是来源于中国固有的神仙家，并以儒道互补为其思想基础的道教则更非偶然了。这种宗教一经出现就表现了它的强烈的民族特色，而和外来的宗教——佛教——相抗衡，这也正是中华民族的民族文化特性的一种表现。

二、道教发展成一种完整意义的有重大影响的宗教的过程表明了一种完整意义上的宗教团体发展的一般规律。

宗教的本质是什么？大家都知道它有各种各样的定义，就是在马克思主义的经典著作中，在不同情况下对宗教也有不同的说法。马克思说：“宗教是人民的鸦片”，这是就利用宗教对人民进行欺骗方面说的，而且这样的意思最早不是出自马克思，而是出自费尔巴哈，它的意思是说一些维护宗教的人说宗教可以安慰人是一种欺骗。列宁说：“宗教是劳动者的呻吟”，则是就劳动者对自己命运的哀叹方面说的。普列汉诺夫说：“什么是宗教？宗教有无数定义。……把宗教理解为用以实现其对超人的神秘力量——人认为自己依赖于这种力量——的关系的形式。”普列汉诺夫这个定义也许比较切合实际，但是我们的问题是，有没有一种超人的神秘力量以及对此超人的神秘力量应如何理解？人们为什么要相信一种超人的神秘力量？信仰一种超人的神秘力量是否即是迷信？在这里涉及一些有意义的哲学问题，即宗教与迷信同信仰的关系问题。

宗教是否就是迷信，这个问题可以长期争论下去，到什么时候可以说这个问题已经解决了，我想是不得而知的。但是我们可以相当肯定地说，虔诚的宗教徒都不可能接受“宗教即迷信”的论断。为什么呢？我想，某些虔诚的宗教徒往往是用一种理想主义的观点把所谓“超人的神秘力量”看成是超越性的“真、善、美”的化身，或者说他们往往把他们关于“真、善、美”的理想看成是一种“超人的神秘力量”。他们真诚地相信是如此，并努力致力于把他们这种关于“真、善、美”的理想实现于社会生活中。信仰和依赖这种体现超越性的“真、善、美”的“超人的神秘力量”，大概是人们在一定历史条件下的一种心理特性。然而信仰“超人的神秘力量”的虔诚的宗教徒认为，迷信和宗教不同，“迷信”只能是对缺乏科学知识者的愚弄，没有“理想”的人精神贫乏的表现，虔诚地相信“超人的神秘力量”是“真、善、美”的化身的宗教徒也许可以接受“宗教是一种真诚的信仰”这个观点，而决不愿意接受“宗教即迷信”的论断。照他们看，人们总应该有个信仰，即使是最彻底的怀疑主义者，他们也信仰自己的“怀疑”。

宗教和信仰当然可以说有着必然的联系。宗教总是一种信仰，但是否信仰都是宗教，特别是否是古典意义上的宗教？那却并非如此。例如，我们可以说：“我们信仰科学的无神论”，或者说：“我们信仰儒家哲学”，这大概都是可以的。当然科学的无神论不是宗教，而是一种科学；就是儒家学说也最多只能说是带有某种宗教性的哲学思想体系，但它本身并非宗教。因此，我们不仅应把“信仰”和“宗教”区别开来，而且必须把带有某种宗教性的“学说”和“宗教”区别开来，否则几乎任何哲学学说都可以被说成是宗教，这样也就等于取消了宗教。

我们是否能假设，就人类的心理特性看人们确实要求有某种信仰。但问题在是否要求有一种宗教信仰。如果说可以把信仰分成两大类：一类是理性主义的信仰（或者说是理性的信仰）；一类是非理性主义的信仰（或者说是非理性的信仰）。宗教从总体上说则是属于后一类。紧接着就会有这样的问题：人类的精神生活到底也是否必须从“非理性主义”方面得到某种自我满足，或者说在社会生活中对宗教的信仰也是人们的某种心理需要。这当然是个大问题，在这里我们不可能去讨论它。我们只想说明，非理性主义的信仰要想成为一种完备意义上的宗教信仰，必须用某种理论体系为它作论证，而其理论体系又必须是能反映当时时代精神的。如果没有一套对其宗教教义作论证的理论体系，这种非理性的信仰就不可能是一种完整意义上的宗教。不仅如此，作为一种完整意义上的、特别是对人类社会历史有着长期影响的宗教还必须有固定的教会组织、教规教仪、礼拜的对象和传授的历史等等。

在历史上创立的所谓“宗教教派”何止千百万个，但并不是都可以称得上严格意义上的“宗教团体”，而许多这种组织只能称之为“迷信组织”。那么一种完整意义上的宗教团体应该是怎样的呢？我们这里将通过分析道教的发展来揭示一种完整意义上的宗教团体发展的一般规律。

完整意义的宗教必须有其宗教教义的理论体系，这个体系要有它的哲学基础，因而它的宗教教义的思想体系决不能是纯粹的胡说八道，而总是有某种对人生理解的深刻思想内容，有成系统的哲学理论。印度佛教之所以成为影响很大的世界性宗教，正因为它有一套相当深刻的对人生理解的理论体系。道教的教义如果只是停留在如《太平经》那样一些杂乱无章的内容上，就很难成为在中国较有影响的宗教团体。因此，从汉末经三国西晋到东晋以后，才有一些道教徒如葛洪、陆修静、寇谦之、陶弘景等根据时代的需要把道家老子的思想和儒家的某些学说又吸收了佛教的一些内容，结合在一起创造了道教的理论思想体系。

一种完整意义上的、有影响的宗教团体必然有其较为严密的教会组织。秦汉时的神仙家讲“长生不死”“肉体成仙”的思想尽管为后来的道教所继承，但是神仙家均以个人修炼为目的，而没有建立固定的教会组织，因此也没有成为一种宗教。东汉末年，道教已形成为有教会组织的宗教团体，它有了固定的教徒和神职人员以及教会的领袖，三国和西晋政权对道教采取了取缔的政策，致使道教组织瓦解，到东晋才为杜子恭等所逐渐恢复和发展起来。

一种完整意义的宗教还必须有一套较为固定的教规教仪。在东汉末年，道教初创时虽也有一些教规教仪，但不仅简单，而且也不固定。自东晋以后，在佛教的影响下，经过陆修静、寇谦之等人的炮制，使道教的教规教仪日趋完善。

一种完整意义的宗教必定有阐发其宗教教仪的经典，以便使信奉者的信仰有所依托。在魏晋以前，虽然已经有若干道教经典，但严格地说这些书实是为以后的道教徒所推崇才成为道教的经典的，如《老子》《庄子》等，这些书本来是先秦道家的著作，与道教无关，而道教徒为了从历史上和理论上找他们的根据，而把这类书推尊为经典。又如《太平经》，它本成书于道教正式成立之前，因此也只能说它为道教的建立作了若干思想上的准备。但到东晋南北朝时，由于道教理论体系的建立（葛洪著《抱朴子》）和道教教会组织的发展而出现了大量阐发道教教义的经典。这个时期出现了道教三个系统的经典，即《三皇经》系、《上清经》系、《灵宝经》系。这三个系列的道教经典以后就组成了“道藏”的“洞真”“洞神”“洞玄”的所谓“三洞”三大部。

一种完整意义的宗教必定有其固定的崇奉的神灵和其教派的传授史。道教初创时已继承神仙家的故技，说自己是神仙所传授，且多托言老君。至南北朝时，道教徒更根据当时门阀等级观念而创造了“真灵之阶位”。有陶弘景著《真灵业位图》把“神仙”分为七级，最高一级的三位神仙是，居中的“元始天尊”，其左右为“高上道君”和“元皇道君”，自此以后在道观里大都以这三位尊神为最高崇拜对象。一种宗教必然要对其他宗教进行排斥，因而往往要创造自己的宗教历史，来抬高其地位。道教作为中华民族本民族创造的宗教，面对外来的佛教，除了利用“华夷之辨”等来打击佛教外，还提出了所谓“老子化胡”的故事，把自己的教主老子抬高为佛教教主释迦牟尼的老师的地位，从而引起了佛道二教长期的争论。

道教成为一完整意义上的宗教团体是在东晋南北朝时才最后完成的，它的发展完成过程大体如下：东晋以来，先是在其对已经涣散和不固定的道教组织进行重建和整顿，建立起了较为固定的教会组织；在此同时，为弥补其缺乏系统的宗教教义及其理论体系之不足，葛洪等创造了道教教义的理论体系；接着为巩固道教的教会组织而制定了一套教规教仪，为阐发其宗教教义而构造了相应的经典；最后为把道教建立成一完备的宗教团体而编造了固定的神仙谱系和虚构的传授历史。道教这样一个发展过程或者可以说是一种完备意义上的宗教团体发展的一般情形。我们研究宗教史的目的之一就是要把它作为一种社会意识形态来揭示其发生发展的规律，以便我们更深刻地认识它在社会生活中的作用。

三、道教哲学作为一种宗教哲学有着它明显的特点，其特点只能在和其他宗教对比中加以揭示。

一种完备意义的宗教必定有其不同于其他宗教的特点。它的特点除了表现在某些外在的形式上，如教会的组织形式、教规教仪以及尊崇的神灵等等之外，更深刻地则应表现于其理论体系的层面，这是属于宗教内容的方面。而其理论体系往往是由若干基本命题和一系列的概念范畴所表现的。如佛教的理论体系最终要论证的是“诸法无我”“诸行无常”“涅槃寂静”等“三法印”，说这是佛教和其他教派的根本区别的标志。中世纪的基督教有所谓“上帝存在”“灵魂不死”和“意志自由”等三大命题，围绕着这三大命题而有宗教哲学和它的范畴体系。那么道教哲学有没有某些不同于其他宗教派别的基本命题以及构成其哲学体系的基本范畴呢？我们认为是有的，特别在早期道教中表现得更为明显。几乎所有宗教提出的都是“关于人死后如何”的问题，然而道教所要讨论的是“人如何不死”的问题。道教的理论体系就是围绕着这个问题，从两个方面表现了它与其他宗教派别不同的特点。早期道教说它自己的思想体系是以“三一为宗”，即“天、地、人三者合一以致太平”；“精、气、神三者混一而成神仙”，并从这里演变出“长生不死”“肉体飞升”“气化三清”等观念，而构成了道教的思想体系。

要了解佛教哲学的究极问题，从根本上说必须了解“涅槃”这个概念的涵义，所以俄国的佛教学专家彻尔巴斯基写了一本书专门分析“涅”这个概念的涵义；而牟宗三则写了《般若和涅槃》一书，结合中国佛教的特点解剖了“涅槃”这一概念。研究基督教一般说应从分析“上帝”这一概念着手，奥古斯丁（Aurelius Augustinus，354—430）作《上帝之城》论证所谓“上帝”的“神性”；经院哲学的代表托马斯·阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas，约1225—1274）著《神学大全》对“上帝存在”这个命题作了五大论证，也就是所谓本体论的论证。道教哲学的基本概念可以说是“气”，对此能从下列几个方面得到明证：

第一，所谓“三一为宗”，指的是天、地、人三者合一；而“天”“地”“人”之所以能“合一”，就在于它们同为不同性质的“气”；“精、气、神三者混一”，而“精”“气”“神”之所以能“混一”，也在于它们同为不同性质的“气”。

第二，所谓“一气化三清”，即认为道教的三位最高真神是由“气”变化而成，或者认为三重最高最神圣的“天”是由“气”变化而成，这也是以“气”作为道教的基本概念。

第三，在道教中虽也有以“道”为最高范畴，但在早期道教讲到“道”与“气”的关系大体有三种情况：一种情况是认为“道”比“气”更根本，但“道”不能离“气”；另一种情况是“气”比“道”更根本，因为道教以“气”作为宗主，如刘勰《灭惑论》引《三破论》谓：“道以气为宗”；第三种情况是认为“道”即是“气”，如陶弘景《养生延命录》引《服气经》说：“道者，气也。”研究道教教义的哲学基础，如果能把它关于“气”的概念涵义以及由“气”这一概念演变出来的概念范畴体系作出认真的分析，将会对道教的特殊本质有深入的了解。

黑格尔在《哲学史演讲录》中说：“文化上的区别一般基于思想范畴的区别，哲学上的区别更是基于思想范畴的区别。”如果我们把道教和其他宗教相比较，从道教所使用的概念范畴方面、由概念范畴形成的命题方面以及由一系列命题形成的思想体系方面进行比较，我们就可以比较清楚地看到道教的特点。道教是中华民族本民族的宗教，但它的产生却受到佛教传入的刺激，因此我们可以通过对早期道教的历史发展中佛道之争来看道教作为一种宗教的特点何在。

道教最早的经典《太平经》一方面表现了它所受佛教某些方面的影响，如其中讲到“守一”的问题，“守一”一词虽在中国传统思想里已经有了，但在《太平经》中讲得那么多，那么突出，显然是受到汉时传入的小乘佛教禅法“安般守意”的影响。另一方面也表现了它对佛教的批判和排斥，例如《太平经》中所谓“四毁之行”，显然是针对佛教而发的；又提出“承负”的学说和佛教的“来世报应”相对立。到东晋以后，道教逐渐发展成为完全意义上的宗教，有了它的理论体系，因而和佛教的分歧就越来越明显了。那时佛教和道教的不同大体表现在三个问题上：即生死、神形问题；因果报应问题；出世、入世问题等。对这些问题加以分析，我们就可以认识到道教作为一种宗教的特点。

在我们把道教和佛教作比较中，还会遇到一个问题，即为什么道教没有像佛教那样成为世界性的宗教，而只是中华民族本民族的一种宗教呢？从道教的历史看，道教在南北朝末期或者已经传到朝鲜地区，在《三国史记》中已经记载有唐初道教传入朝鲜的情形。但不久之后，佛教在朝鲜更为流行，战胜了道教，从此道教在朝鲜几乎灭迹。这一时期，道教也经过朝鲜传入日本，它对日本原有的“神道”或者有些影响，但日本的“神道”绝不是因道教传入才有的。道教在日本也没有像象教那样流传开来。道教在历史上对其他国家就更没有什么影响了。

照我看，道教之所以没有能成为世界性的宗教，主要是由于它作为一种宗教其理论和实践都有很大缺陷，且带有过于强烈的民族性。道教作为一种宗教所追求的目标是“长生不死”和“肉体成仙”，这和其他宗教派别讲“灵魂不死”根本不同，而其宗教理论对“肉体成仙”“长生不死”的论证，一方面说太粗糙，很难令人相信，因此后来道教也不得不吸收佛教关于“形尽神不灭”和“三世轮回”等思想，这样道教的流传就大大受到限制，而佛教则可以在道教流传所到之处取而代之；另一方面，它又太接近科学，道教为了养生，要求“长生不死”“肉体成仙”，不得不注重身体的炼养，因而就把实质上是物质性的“气”抬到最高的地位，所以中国的科学技术，特别是医药学的发展和道教结上了不解之缘。道教利用科学就必然限制它作为宗教可能发生的作用，因而在道教中的“非科学”“反科学”的成分和它中间的科学因素，就形成了一个极大的矛盾。宗教本应要求“出世”，而道教作为中华民族的一种民族的宗教却深深打上了“入世”的烙印，从每个道教徒个人说，他们要求“精、气、神”三者混一而成仙；但道教作为一宗教团体学说又提倡“天、地、人”三者合一而“致太平”，所以它有着强烈地干预政治的愿望。道教在虚构了超现实的神仙世界的同时，又希望把现实世界变成为理想世界，这也不能不是一极大的矛盾。

研究道教的特点十分重要，它不仅可以使我们了解它和其他宗教派别的不同所在，而且可以通过对其特点的分析，来了解中华民族的民族文化、民族心理和思维方式的特色，了解我们这个民族科学技术、医药卫生发展的道路及其缺陷所在。一个民族要得到发展，不仅要了解它的今天和明天，而且要了解它的昨天；不仅要了解它现实的政治、经济等方面的状况，还应了解这个民族的传统文化、传统的宗教信仰和思维方式，对中国本民族的宗教道教应该进行认真的研究，其原因也就在于此了。

VI．THE ATTEMPT OF MATTEO RICCI TO LINK CHINESE AND WESTERN CULTURES

When introduced into another country or nation a foreign culture is confronted by the problem of how to treat that cultural tradition. If it wishes to spread easily and exert influence in the country in which it is introduced it must identify with that country's native culture. Hence, as the attitude of Matteo Ricci towards traditional Chinese culture is related to his missionary goals in contacting Chinese and especially Confucianist culture, he developed an intensive knowledge of that culture and recognized its very positive value. Therefore, his missionary work is related to an important issue in the history of culture: how effectively to blend not only into one but to communicate between two cultural traditions with different backgrounds. This is the heart of the problem of cultural transplantation. Most probably, he appreciated well the significance of solving the problem and on the whole took a positive attitude towards Confucianist culture. We may observe this problem in two aspects: one is his own description of the problem; the other is how the literati of the period or a little later looked upon Matteo Ricci.

Matteo Ricci not only had a good command of Chinese, but also knew a great deal about Chinese customs and etiquette. He not only dressed in Confucianist style and called himself a "Western Confucianist" (xiru) with a square piece of cloth on his head, but also followed the etiquette of a Chinese scholar when meeting visitors. He made a careful study of ancient Chinese classics and records and regarded Confucius as a great man of wide knowledge. Of The Four Books (sishu) which he translated he wrote that it "was written by the four great philosophers and is full of reasonable ethical thought."¹ To his mind, "it is no use at all just to know our learning without the knowledge of theirs."²

But how did he treat Chinese culture? In a letter of February 15, 1609, to another missionary he wrote:

As I have gradually illustrated, they (the Chinese) also appreciate very much the principle of filial piety, although one might hold different views. To date from its very beginning, they faithfully followed natural law in ancient times, just like the case in our country. In 1500 years, this nation did not simply worship any idols. Even though they did worship some, these idols were not so detestable as those worshipped by our Egyptians, Greeks and Romans. Some of the gods were even very moral and well-known for their good conduct. As a matter of fact, in the most ancient and authoritative works of the literati, they only worshipped Heaven and Nature and their common master. When making a careful study of all these works, we may find few things contrary to reason, but instead, most of them are corresponding to reason. And their natural philosophers are no worse than anyone else.³

The above quotations make clear the following: (1) Ricci knew very well traditional—especially Confucian—Chinese culture. As in ancient society, China was dominated by the patriarchal clan system and moral importance was attached to filial piety based on the principle of blood relation and "natural law." In China worship of Heaven and Nature is also moral and hence naturally "reasonable." Being quite knowledgeable regarding Chinese culture, Ricci regarded Confucianism not as a kind of religion, but rather as based on "natural law." (2) Ricci highly appreciated China's Confucianist culture. He saw that the idolatry in ancient Chinese culture was not like that of the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans and hence that ancient Chinese philosophy, in speaking of human nature and heavenly principles, transcended Western philosophy. This appears in his answer to Xu Guangqi's question, "China now, when virtue and rite and cultural relics are all prevailing, really flourishes culturally as though it has dispelled clouds and seen the sun again."⁴ This may be due to the fact that as a Catholic he attached great importance to opposing idolatry and advocating morality. Matteo Ricci was strongly against the idolatry of Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism), but he did not regard Confucian worship as a kind of idolatry. Thus we can say, that, on the whole, Matteo Ricci agreed with and appreciated the orthodox Confucianist thought of Chinese culture.

As Xu Guangqi believed in Catholicism through his contact with Ricci, he respected Ricci both for his learning and for his morality. He noted that in Ricci's speech, "you cannot find even a single word which runs counter to the principle of loyalty and piety, nor can you find one harmful to the will of the people and the world."⁵ That Xu Guangqi should attach special importance to "loyalty and piety" was influenced strongly by traditional Chinese ideas and it is on this basis that Matteo Ricci preached the Catholic doctrines and received Chinese culture. One passage in Ten Discourses by a Paradoxical Man describes the statement of Gong Dacan made on Matteo Ricci:

On hearing his wise talk, I feel that the Confucian classics of China and those of his country corroborate each other. Thus those who believe in the real sages, either from the East or from the West, from the North or from the South, are actually all the same.⁶

All the Chinese scholars mentioned above think that what Ricci preached corresponded to traditional Chinese thought, especially to that of Confucianism, the most fundamental linking point of which lies in "the principle of loyalty and piety." As far as we know, although the Chinese intellectuals at the time set store in Ricci's knowledge of astronomy, almanac, science and technology, they valued even more highly his attempt to combine Western with Chinese culture. This probably is one of the earliest manifestations of "regarding Chinese learning as the body and Western learning for use." I shall discuss this problem later on.

I．Modes of Relating Oriental and Occidental Cultures

Judging from the above two aspects we see that, while doing missionary work in China, Matteo Ricci actually was trying to link Oriental and Occidental cultures. On this premise, we would conclude that his attempt adopted the methods of "linking Catholicism with Confucianism" (heru), "using the Catholic doctrines as a complement to Confucianism" (buru), "making in some respects the Catholic doctrines transcend the Confucian ones" (chaoru) "and making some revisions of the Catholic doctrines so that they would concord with the Confucianist ones" (furu). In short, on the above bases Ricci attempted to discover the point at which Oriental and Occidental cultures could be linked.

i．Linking Catholicism with Confucianism (heru)

Matteo Ricci wrote three important books on Catholic doctrines: The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, Ten Discoursed by a Paradoxical Man and Twenty-five Sayings from Epictetus. The original title of the first one is "The True Meaning of the Learning of Heaven." Obviously, he first thought of avoiding the name "the Lord of Heaven" because there is no such thing in China, to facilitate its reception by the Chinese. Feng Yingjing explains in the Preface as follows:

This book is about the questions and answers between Matteo Ricci and his fellow friends and us Chinese. What is the Lord of Heaven? It is God. It does exist.

The edition of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven in the Ming Dynasty often used the titles "God" and "Heaven" for "the Lord of Heaven" or "the Lord of Supremacy," while the present edition often uses instead "the Lord of Heaven" and "the Lord of Supremacy" simply because Ricci used those titles in order to be easily received by the Chinese. Thus in ancient times the Chinese people worshipped Heaven, their state and their forefathers, but not "the Lord of Heaven." He tries to conform to this by quoting the classics to show that in ancient China "the Lord of Heaven" is God himself. The Chinese classics which he quotes include The Book of Songs (Shi), The Book of History (Shu), The Book of Rites (Li), The Book of Changes (Yi) and The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong). These quotes appear more frequently in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven. For instance, in Discourse VI of Vol. II, where he answers the question about "rewarding the good and punishing the evil," he more than once quotes Chinese classics to confirm that the doctrines of Catholicism should be combined with those of Confucianism.(1) Matteo Ricci is quite aware of the existence of a supreme personal "God" in ancient China, regarding which he argues that the "Lord of Heaven" in Western Catholicism and "God" in China are one thing with different names. (2) Criticizing Zhu Xi's explanation, he argues that there is only one "supreme lord," not two (Heaven and earth). In his Introduction to The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven he notes that the ancient sage advised that the subject should be faithful, but that they cannot be faithful to two lords. Of the three Cardinal Guides, ruler guiding subject stands first for since a state has its head, how can Heaven and earth not have their lord? As a state should be unified, how can Heaven and earth have two lords? All these ideas obviously show his interpretations of the Catholic doctrines in relation to Confucianism.(3) Quoting the ancient classics he also states that God wills to impose fortune and misfortune on humanity. (4) So God has his own "sphere" (ting) which is different from the "Heaven" (tian) in nature. From all these we can see that what Matteo Ricci attempts to prove is that Catholicism coincides with Confucianism and the ancient Chinese classics.

ii．Complementing Confucianism (buru)

Lettere dalla China is a note written by Matteo Ricci in Italian in China. Later a British missionary translated it from Italian into Latin and added something concerning the history of missionary work as well as of Matteo Ricci, the missionary. It also has an appendix relating the missionary's posthumous glory and pathos. One passage in the book reads as follows:

In answering what the main content of Christianity is, Dr. Xu Guangqi sums it up very exactly in four Chinese characters: "expelling Buddhism and complementing Confucianism" (qufo buru). That is to say, it wants to expel the idol of Buddhism and add something to the doctrines of Confucianism.⁷

As generally any religion is characterized by excluding others, Ricci criticized Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism), especially the former, since he wanted to bring Catholicism to China; this shows signs in nearly all his works. St. Augustine once pointed out that the main content of a heathen religion should resolutely be given up, but that the ideas put forward by some heathen philosophers should be taken into account, accepted or approved if they were really reasonable. Matteo Ricci took this approach to the doctrines of Confucianism. He declared that Confucianism had nothing to do with religion, but was rather a kind of philosophy. He particularly esteemed Confucius, noting that as Confucius lived five centuries before the birth of Jesus Christ he could not know what was to happen 500 years later. "Ricci just quotes the classics of Confucianism in their own terms, saying nothing of how they should be evaluated after the death of Confucius."⁸ In Ten Discourses by a Paradoxical Man there is a passage about Gong Dacan's discussion with Ricci on the issue "whether good or evil will be rewarded posthumously." Gong first notes that the Chinese classics, because Emperor Qin Shihuang burned books and persecuted scholars after the death of Confucius, lost the records of the paradise, hell and retribution, which are still in a good state of preservation in the West: "Thus the stories about the paradise and hell are well preserved." In China, the story of retribution in later ages "is both vague and strange to scholars, who half believe and half doubt its existence." Gong also tries to prove the probable existence of the paradise by quoting ancient classics, but he still doubts the idea that "bestowing charity is bound to be rewarded a place and stand long." Ricci explains this according to the doctrines of Catholicism in which retribution to those who bestow favor does not consist in "place" or "life span." A man living in the world should work hard for the Lord of Heaven instead of intending to be rewarded in his lifetime; he should be confident that he will finally go to the paradise. Therefore, answering Xu Guangqi he says: "Those who suffer simply for benefit and emolument or fame and official rank or lasciviousness rather than the sacred cause are actually tragic. But those who suffer for the Lord of Heaven are obviously happy and seem to live in the paradise."⁹ It is apparent that he wants to complement the thought of Confucianism with Catholic doctrines, but the approach he adopts is not to negate the Confucian classics but to extend and develop them so as to show that the Confucian ideas do not run counter to those of Western religions but may be complemented by them.

In The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven many passages deal with the "retribution of good and evil." In Discourse VI "On Man's Being Rewarded with Heaven or Punished with Hell after Death," he more or less complements and revises the Confucianist concept that "the family always doing good is bound to be fortunate, whereas the family always doing evil is doomed to misfortune." To him, there is not only retribution in one's lifetime or to one's descendants (he seems not to be in favor of that to one's descendants). What is more important is posthumous retribution: those who do good will go to Heaven instead of going to Hell after death. But as their purpose is not just this, Ricci adds:

All those who do good usually have three intentions: (1) to go to Heaven instead of going to Hell; (2) to reward the kindness bestowed by the Lord of Heaven; and (3) just to follow the imperial edict given by the Lord of Heaven.¹⁰

The first intention serves as a bridge in order for one to reach the third; that is, doing good is after all following the imperial edict. However, the Confucianists did not know this, and even criticized the concepts of Heaven and Hell simply because they could not understand their deep significance: "The Confucianists criticize the concepts of the Heaven and Hell because they do not know truth."¹¹ We can see roughly the difference between Catholicism and China's Confucianist tradition. Since the Confucianists talk about "the retribution of good or evil" just from personal moral cultivation, so everyone should "have self-cultivation" or "stick to morality" only for the purpose of reaching one's inner moral accomplishment. In this sense, it is pursuing a kind of "inner transcendence." But the Catholic doing good is after all for "the Lord of Heaven," which is a kind of power of "outer transcendence." So it pursues or follows a kind of "outer transcendence." I shall discuss this problem later on.

iii．Transcending Confucianism (chaoru)

The aim of China's Confucianist theory is to pursue "inner transcendence," whereas that of Catholicism is to pursue "outer transcendence." In The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven Matteo Ricci points out this shortcoming of Confucianism and criticizes it.¹²

As far as we know, traditional Chinese philosophy, Confucianist philosophy in particular, is strikingly different from Western philosophy and religion. The Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle had already divided the world into two parts: a transcendental noumenon and a real world. Thereafter Christianity was concerned especially with an outer transcendent God, whereas traditional Chinese philosophy was characterized by "inner transcendence." What Confucius means by "nature and the doctrine of Heaven" is a matter of inner transcendence, and what Mencius meant by "thinking hard, knowing nature and Heaven" is also a matter of "inner transcendence." There is a sentence in Xici saying: "A feminine (yin) and a masculine (yang) equal a world, and it is followed by virtue (shan) and will have a nature," which is a matter of "inner transcendence." According to this, one may reach a realm leading to a transcendental "way of Heaven" through one's own inner moral cultivation, without the help of an outer transcendent power. But for Ricci, one can hardly reach the culminating realm just through one's inner moral cultivation; one must be pushed by an outer transcendent power or God; thus it is necessary to believe in God. That is to say, Ricci considers the doctrines of Catholicism to be more perfect than those of Confucianism.

iv．Concordance with Confucianism (furu)

This concept means that it is necessary to make some revisions of the Catholic doctrines or to yield to some of the Confucianist ideas in order to concord or chime in with China's traditional Confucianist thought. The editor's Preface to the French 1978 edition of Lettere dalla China says:

Immediately before Ricci's death, the methods adopted by the Chinese missionary group led by him had already become an issue argued both at home and abroad. It was disputed with two objections. In practice, he was accused of paying too much attention to developing his relation to the Confucianist elite instead of pushing forward the missionary cause. In theory, he was also opposed for his positive evaluation of Confucianism. Some people even pointed out that, if so, it would run a risk of sullying the purity of Christianity. Only by means of a heightened religious emphasis can the missionary preach the Gospel to the broad masses of people and make evident the characteristics of Christianity.¹³

I have already pointed out that Matteo Ricci had some opinions of China's Confucianist tradition and attempted to link Western and Eastern cultures. Naturally, he knew clearly that there were many differences and conflicts between Confucianism and Catholicism and probably would have dealt with these by the methods of "complementing Confucianism" and "transcending Confucianism." If his missionary work were completely according to Catholic doctrines, however, he would have been confronted with more difficulties. Therefore, he had to make some revisions of the Catholic doctrines so as to cater to the Chinese tradition and it is not strange that he was criticized. As to how he adapted Catholicism to Confucianism, the following should be noted.

(1) In order to fit Catholicism to Chinese society, he explained its differences from Chinese society. In the Italian edition of his Lettere dalla China, there is a passage describing how the Confucianist offers sacrifices to gods.

However, according to an old law, there is a grand Confucian temple in every big city where the literati gather, with a figure of Confucius enshrined and his name; every year, the literati offer sacrifices to him four times, with a candle burning and a beast is killed. However, as they do not think of him as godly or want anything of him, such a rite cannot be called a real offering.¹⁴

In Matteo Ricci's books, there are many signs of the Catholic stance against idolatry; the criticism of Buddhist idolatry is particularly strong. However, he never criticizes Confucian offerings to the Sage, nor does he criticize the Chinese offerings to their ancestors. The issue concerning offerings is an important reason why China later forbad the preaching of Catholicism. In 1704, the Vatican gave orders that Chinese Catholics should not follow traditional Chinese rites that did not conform to Catholicism. Obviously, offering sacrifices to Confucius as well as to ancestors is especially counter to Catholicism; this led the Chinese government to limit and even forbid the preaching of Catholicism. Since Matteo Ricci well understood Chinese conditions, he adopted the method of compromising with the Chinese tradition for the sake of adapting to Chinese society as well as his missionary work, although the attempts did not conform to the doctrines of Catholicism.

(2) He makes some Catholic ideas conform to traditional Chinese Confucianist thought so as to enable the Chinese to accept Catholicism. As mentioned previously, the "Lord of Heaven" in Catholicism is, of course, the supreme personified God, but Ricci's The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven does not mean this according to its original title. In that book he often uses such words as "God" and "Heaven" of Chinese origin, instead of the "Lord of Heaven." According to Fang Hao's Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Catholicism, in contrast to the edition of the Ming Dynasty, it is found that the later edition has changed the words "God" or "Heaven" in the Ming to "Lord of Heaven" or "Supreme Lord" in 79 places.¹⁵ In the Chinese language there are already such words as "God" (shangdi) and "Heaven" (tian), but in traditional Chinese thought tian has several meanings. Among these Ricci takes the meanings "God," "Heaven" and the supreme personified God, but for the Chinese people there may be some other meanings. In 1715, after Ricci's death, the Pope gave an edict that the name "Lord of Heaven" was a legal one and such names as "God" and "Heaven" should no longer be used because they could be interpreted in different ways.

Also, according to Professor Luo Guang, "Ricci's Twenty-five Sayings from Epictetus is actually composed of 25 chapters. Every chapter is short and concise. It advises people to live simply and to restrain desire and feeling. Happiness lies in one's secure state of mind without being stirred either by good fortune or misfortune. The purpose of human life lies in one's obedience to the Lord of Heaven. . ." It is apparent then that the book is intended to conform to Chinese conditions.

(3) Ricci made some revisions in the "idea of sin" in order that it should approach more closely the "idea of virtue" in China's Confucianist tradition. As the "idea of sin" in Catholicism implies, human nature cannot be considered "virtuous," which is entirely different from the "idea of human nature being virtuous" in China's traditional Confucianist thought. In accordance with St. Augustine's interpretation, man is born to be "sinful" because of his rational choice. In the final analysis, what causes man to choose evil with reason is his vanity, or an ego-centric desire that puts himself over God. Such a desire usually drives him into following his own intention and holding in contempt God's decree, which is particularly apparent in human desire. Augustine then adds that, since man intentionally chooses evil and commits sins violating God, he can never recover his original state with his own effort. For such a "sin" causes him to degenerate inevitably, being characteristically ego-centric in willing and desiring and able only to choose "committing sin" or tending to "evil."

In this regard in the 7th discourse of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, Ricci thinks that the "human nature" refers to what differentiates man from metal and stone, grass and wood, bird, beast and even spirit, and this is why man "can reason things out." So he says: "What can reason things out is alone called human nature, which is different from other creatures." "Virtue and morality come after reason, which itself is something dependent, and not human nature itself." Thus, "reasoning things out" refers simply to this virtuous "ability," and "human nature is born to be virtuous." This obviously caters to Confucianist ideas. But since Matteo Ricci could not completely violate the doctrines of the Lord of Heaven, he thinks that man is "able to reason things out." How can he get such an ability? Just as farmers plough, weed, remove the stones and irrigate before they sow seeds in order to get good harvests, so "learners should first of all get rid of evil before they could be virtuous. Only by standing aloof from worldly success can they be successful." As this idea is associated with that of "sin" in Catholicism, it could not but conflict with the so-called idea of "good ability." Thus it is quite difficult to reconcile one cultural tradition with another.

From the above four points we can see that Matteo Ricci preached the doctrines of Catholicism for the purpose of linking Oriental and Occidental culture together. Whether his attempt was successful or not will not be evaluated here, but that he was the very first Westerner to make such an attempt is certainly of historical importance.

II． "Body and Use" and the Correlation of Chinese and Western Harmony

In trying to link Western and Chinese culture, often we encounter the problem of the "body and use" (tiyong), of Chinese learning and Western learning. In preaching Catholicism in China, Matteo Ricci could not but consider his relation to traditional Chinese thought and culture. Similarly, in receiving Catholicism, the Chinese had to consider such a relation. Above I have discussed how he dealt with this problem. Now let us consider how the Chinese intellectuals at the time received Catholicism. In my opinion, such receivers of Catholicism at the time as Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao and others in receiving or studying Western learning took the attitude: "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use." We know that although the Protestants were active at that time even at the court in Beijing, yet "the Chinese court made use of them only by employing their techniques." "For example, Ricci once repaired clocks and other machines in the court, and Tang Ruowang (Johann Adam Schall von Bell), Nan Huairen (Ferdinand Verbiest) and others joined in revising the calendar." "What China's enlightened literati were particularly interested in was to learn from them their science and knowledge." "They did not have great success in shaping China's intellectuals,"¹⁶ for few Chinese intellectuals received the doctrines of Catholicism. As these were received chiefly due to his association with traditional Chinese thought, especially the Confucianist morality, his attempt can be regarded as another earlier form of "regarding Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" formulated in the 1860s.

During subsequent centuries there have been various attempts to correlate "Chinese learning" and "Western learning" with that between "body" (ti) and "use" (yong), such as "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use," or "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use" and even "both the learnings as body and for use interchangeably." Those who regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use" are called "all-Westernizers" (quanpan xihua pai); those who regard "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" are called "Chinese culture supremacists" (guocui pai). Such confusions are caused by the attempt to describe the relationship between "Chinese learning" and "Western learning" with that between "body and use." As a matter of fact, none of the above ideas are tenable.

As a pair of important categories in the history of Chinese philosophy, "body" and "use" are not substantial categories, but rather fundamental relations. "Body" (ti) generally refers to the "inner transcendental spirit" or "transcendental noumenon." It corresponds to what Mencius means by "conscience" (liangzhi or liangneng) and Wang Yangming by "mind" (xin), etc.; the latter corresponds to "God's will" (tianming), " taiji," "God's word" (tianli) and "logos" (dao), etc. "Use" (yong) refers to the various functions demonstrated by such an "inner transcendental spirit" or "transcendental noumenon." According to traditional Chinese philosophy, ti and yong are unified, with the former presenting the latter for, as Wang Bi in the Wei-Jin dynasties pointed out, there would be no corresponding yong without ti. The so-called concept of "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" is nothing but an effort to preserve the inner transcendental noumenon in Chinese tradition, so as to reject the Western spirit. For how could we make "Western learning for use" if we should do like that? Similarly, it is impossible to regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use." The former will inevitably result in "Chinese learning both as body and for use" and, the latter, "Western learning both as body and for use."

As for "both the learnings as body and for use interchangeably," it can be interpreted as: if something in Chinese learning is good we should regard "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use"; also, if something in Western learning is good we should in turn regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use." Such an idea is obviously untenable. It will do nothing but include both attitudes in the so-called concept of regarding "both learnings as body and for use interchangeably," which is just eclectic. Professor Fang Keli involves himself in a confused eclectic situation although he criticizes the above two attitudes in his "'Chinese Learning as Body and Western Learning for Use' and 'Western Learning as Body and Chinese Learning for Use.'"¹⁷

It would give rise to "stealthily substituting one culture for another" if we use the relation of tiyong to explain the relationship between Chinese culture and Western culture. If we do not improve the cultural soil and other conditions, but just stealthily substitute one culture for another, the cultural foundation will not be solid. Thus to my mind, our modern society should have its modern spirit and various systems embodying such a spirit. If we use the relation of tiyong to explain this problem, we might probably regard "the modern spirit as body and the systems and their functions embodying such a spirit for use." If so, one might ask: what is the "modern spirit"? And what are the "systems and their functions embodying the spirit"? Here I would refer to the point of view put forward by Mr. Yan Fu, who once criticized the idea of regarding "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use." He also points out that body and use should be unified rather than dual. Particularly, he lays emphasis on the significance of science and puts forward a very meaningful proposition: "liberty as body and democracy for use." I do think that such an idea of his is probably of certain modern significance. So in my opinion, "liberty" is the concentrative embodiment of the modern spirit, or an inner spirit in the modern era and a universal ideal that the people in modern society are pursuing; whereas "democracy" consists of various systems of modern society ensuring everyone "liberty," rather than certain people only. We now live in Chinese society. It is most important to give everyone "liberty" and have a set of democratic systems ensuring its realization if we want to enable our society to become modernized. Only in this way, can people give full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, and our country set foot on the road not only of the "four modernization" but also of all-around modernization.

陆　论利玛窦汇合东西文化的尝试*

从历史上看，一种外来文化在它开始传入另一国家或民族时，必然会遇到如何对待原有文化传统的问题。如果想使外来文化在所传入的国家或民族能比较容易流传和发生影响，就必须与原有文化有所认同。利玛窦对中国传统文化持什么态度，其目的虽与他的传教有关，但是在他与中国文化（主要是儒家思想）接触的过程中，对中国文化有了相当的了解，并对儒家文化的价值有了肯定的正面认识。因此，利玛窦的传教活动就涉及文化史上的一重要问题：即如何调和两种不同背景的文化传统，它们不仅是接触而且是融会贯通成为一体。这就是文化的移植问题。利玛窦很可能了解解决这个问题的重要意义。因此，在总体上利玛窦对儒家文化采取了肯定的态度。这个问题我们可以从两个方面来看：一是看看利玛窦本人对此问题的说法；二是看看当时或稍后的知识分子（士大夫）对利玛窦是如何看的。

利玛窦不仅精通汉语，而且懂得中国的礼仪和风俗，他不仅全身着儒装，头戴方巾，自称“西儒”，而且见客时用秀才礼节。他对中国典籍进行了深入钻研，认为孔子是一位博学的伟大人物；他翻译了《四书》，认为《四书》“是四位很好的哲学家写的，书里有很多合理的伦理思想”，¹因此他认为“仅知道我们的学术，不通晓他们的学术，毫无用处”。²

那么利玛窦如何看待中国文化呢？在1609年2月15日他给另一位传教士的信中说：

“正如我逐步说明的那样，他们（按：指中国人）同样地倾慕着孝道，尽管其他人可以持相反的看法。如果从头说起，他们在古代就像在我们的国家里那样忠诚地遵循自然法则。在1500年中间，这一民族简直没有崇拜过偶像，而他们崇拜的那些偶像也不像我们的埃及人、希腊人和罗马人的偶像那样可憎。某些神灵甚至很有德性，并以他们的善行而享有盛名。事实上，在文人们最古老的、成为权威的著作中也仅仅崇拜天地和这两者的共同主宰。当我们仔细研究一下所有这些著作时，我们就会发现其中很少有什么东西是和理性之光相反的，而大量的倒是与之相一致的，他们的自然哲学家并不比任何人差。”³

从上面引的这段话中，我们可以看出：（1）利玛窦对中国传统文化，主要是儒家思想有比较深入的了解。中国古代社会是以宗法制为纽带的，所以重孝道，以“亲亲”为原则，所以“自然法则”（按：罗光《利玛窦传》译为“天理”）也是带有某种道德性的，而中国对天地和祖先的崇拜也只是某种道德性的，所以是合乎“理性”的。可见利玛窦对中国文化有相当认识，所以他不把儒家看成是一种宗教，而以为它是建立在“自然法则”基础上的哲学。（2）利玛窦对中国的儒家文化的评价是很高的。他认为，中国古代文化在对偶像崇拜上不像埃及人、希腊人和罗马人那样，所以中国古代哲学在讲人性天理的问题上超西方古代。他在回答徐光启时有一段话可以说明他对中国文化的看法，他说：“比至中华，获瞻仁义礼乐声明文物之盛，如复拨云雾见青天焉。”⁴我想，这一点是与天主教也把反对偶像崇拜和伦理道德问题看得很重有关。所以利玛窦极力反对佛教和道教的偶像崇拜，而不把对孔圣人的崇拜和祖先崇拜看成为偶像崇拜。因此，我们可以说，利玛窦对中国文化的正统儒家思想从总体上是肯定的和赞赏的。

徐光启由于结识利玛窦而信奉了天主教，他很敬重利玛窦的学问和道德，说利玛窦的言谈“百千万言中，求一语不合忠孝大旨，求一语无益于人心世道者，竟不可得。”⁵徐光启看重“忠孝”实是深受中国传统思想的影响，谓利玛窦所传天主教义之基本点亦在“忠孝”，利玛窦接受中华文化当是事实。在《畸人十篇》中有一段记录龚大参对利玛窦言论评论的话说：

“窃听精论，即心思吾中国经书与贵邦经典，相应相证，信真圣人者，自东自西，自南自北，其致一耳。”⁶

以上中国学者大都认为利玛窦所宣讲的学说和中国传统思想，特别是儒家思想相合，而最基本的相合点就在“忠孝大旨”。我们知道，当时的中国知识分子对利玛窦的天文、历算、科技等知识虽甚看重，但他们更为重视的实是利玛窦所言与中国文化相合者。这也许正是“中学为体，西学为用”的一种最早表现形式，这个问题我们后面再讨论。

一、天主教与儒家文化汇合的尝试

从以上两个方面看，利玛窦在中国传教时，实际上在作着使东西文化汇合的尝试。有了这个前提，我们就可以进而讨论利玛窦汇合东西文化的尝试了。我以为，利玛窦采用了“合儒”，即以天主教义与儒家学说相合；“补懦”，天主教义可以补充儒家学说；“超儒”，天主教义某些方面超过儒家学说；“附儒”，对天主教义作某些修改，以附会儒家思想。利玛窦大体从这些方面搜东西文化的结合部。

1．合儒

利玛窦有三部讲天主教教义的重要著作：《天主实义》《畸人篇》《二十五言》。《天主实义》这部书原名《天学实义》，看来利玛窦最初考虑避免用中国原来没有的“天主”这一名称，而“天学”本身又无多大宗教性，中国较易接受。冯应京序中对这部书有如下的说明：

“《天主实义》，大西国利子及其乡会友，与吾中国人问答之词也。天主何，上帝也；实云者，不空也。……是书也，历引吾六经之语，以证其实，而深诋谭空之误。”

明版《天主实义》多用“上帝”与“天”之名命名“天主”或“上主”，而今本多改“上帝”与“天”为“天主”或“上主”，可见利玛窦为使中国人便于接受，采用了“上帝”或“天”这样中国原有的名称。对中国人来说，古代有祭天、祭社稷、祭祖先，但没有对“天主”的崇拜，对这个问题利玛窦引经据典论证“天主”就是中国古代的“上帝”。他引用的中国古书包括《诗》《书》《礼》《易》和《中庸》等。这样的情况在《天主实义》中还有多处，如下卷第六篇回答“赏善罚恶”问题，亦多引中国经典以证天主教义与儒家思想相合，不详述。上面引的一段话说明：（l）利玛窦确实觉察到我国古代有一至高无上的人格神“上帝”，他以此论证西方天主教的“天主”和中国的“上帝”不过是名称不同，实际上是一回事。（2）为此他又论证“至高无上者”只能是一个，而不能是两个（天地），并批评了朱熹的解释。在他作的《天主实义引》中说：“平治庸理，惟竟于一，古贤圣劝臣以忠。忠也者无二之谓也；五伦甲乎君，君臣为三纲之首。……邦国有主，天地独无主乎？国统于一，天地有二主乎？”此均为用中国儒家思想来解释天主教义者也。（3）又引经典说明上帝是有意志的，可以降祸福人间；（4）所以上帝有“庭”，和自然界的“天”不是一回事。从这些看，利玛窦无非是要证明天主教和儒家学说、中国古代经典是相合的。

2．补儒

《利玛窦中国札记》是利玛窦用意大利语在中国写的札记，后来一位传教士金民阁把它从意大利文译成拉丁文，并增添了一些有关传教史和利玛窦本人的内容，附有利玛窦死后荣哀的记述。在这部书中有一段话：

在问到基督教法的主要内容是什么的时候，徐光启博士就非常确切地用四个字来概括：‘驱佛补儒’。这就是说：它驱除佛教的偶像，并补足儒生的教法。⁷

任何宗教都有排斥其他宗教的特性，因此利玛窦要想使天主教进入中国，他就必然要批评佛教和道教，特别是佛教，这点在他的各种著作中都表现出来。圣·奥古斯丁曾经提出，对异教徒的信仰主体而言，应该坚决摒弃；而对异教徒他们代表某些异教哲学家的教诲说，则应予以考虑，或接受或赞同，假如它们是合乎理性的。利玛窦实际上是采用了这种方法对待儒家学说。他宣称儒家与宗教无关，而是一种哲学。他特别推崇孔子，并且说孔子是生活在耶稣五百年以前，他不可能知道五百年以后的事情和道理，因此“利玛窦就把儒家经典引为己用，只讲孔夫子以后所应增补的东西。”⁸在《畸人十篇》中有一段龚大参与利玛窦讨论“善恶之报在身后”的问题。龚大参首先提出：由于中国经典在孔子之后经过秦始皇焚书，因而记载天堂地狱报应的文献散失了，而西方经典常存，“故天堂地狱之说，至为详备”。在中国后世报应之说“且不明不谙焉。因而使儒者，疑信半混之，有无之间也”。龚大参虽也引古代经典说明可有天堂，但仍对“大德必得其位，必得其寿”有所疑问。于是利玛窦据天主教义为之解。他认为对有德者的报应并不在于“位”与“寿”，一个人生活在世界上应为天主而劳苦，并不要求得到今生的善报，他应相信终归可以进入天堂。所以在他回答徐光启时说：“为义被窘难者……若为利禄，为功名，为邪淫，又种种非义者，徒芚苦也。若为天主为义，而受窘难，此乃真福也，故谓已得天国矣。”⁹这显然是企图用天主教义补充儒家思想，但利玛窦采用的方法不是否定儒家经典，而是顺着它加以引申发挥，说明中土学说与西方教义并不相悖，只是还可以补充而已。

在《天主实义》中讨论“善恶报应”的地方很多，第六篇“论死后必有天堂地狱之赏罚以报”，其中对儒家的“积善之家，必有余庆；积不善之家，必有余殃”的观念也有所补正。照利玛窦看，不仅可以有现世之报或由子孙受报（利玛窦似不赞成“子孙受报”），但重要的是死后受报。行善事死后可登天堂免地狱，否则要入地狱，但行善事并非仅仅是为了“登天堂免地狱”，故利玛窦说：

“凡行善者有正意三状：下曰，因登天堂免地狱之意；中曰，因报答所重蒙天主恩德之意；上曰，因翕顺天主圣旨之意也。”¹⁰

“下意”是引导人们达到“上意”的桥梁，人们行善最终应是顺应上帝的意旨。但是儒家不了解这一点而对天堂地狱的说法加以批评，那是因为它对其中的深刻道理还不了解，“儒者攻天堂地狱之说，是未察此理耳。”¹¹从这里我们已大体可以看出天主教与中国儒家传统不同。盖儒家讲“善恶报应”是从个人的道德修养上讲的，因此，每个人应该“修身”，或者说应该“明明德”，这仅仅是求得个人内在的道德上的完善，就这一意义说它是追求一种“内在的超越”。但天主教行善终目的应是为了“天主”，而“天主”是一种“外在的超越”力量，所以它所追求的，所崇奉的是一种“外在的超越”。这个问题下面再进一步讨论。

3．超儒

中国儒家学说以追求“内在超越”为目标，天主教则以追求“外在超越”为目标，利玛窦《天文实义》在批评儒家缺点时指出了这一点。¹²

我们知道中国传统哲学（特别是儒家哲学）和西方哲学与宗教很不相同。古希腊哲学，在柏拉图、亚里士多德那里大体上把世界二分为超越性的本体和现实世界，其后基督教更是要有一个外在的超越性的上帝，而中国传统哲学则是以“内在的超越性”为其特征。孔子的“性与天道”问题是一内在超越的问题，孟子的“尽心知性，知天”更是一由内在而超越的“内在超越性”问题；《系辞》中说：“一阴一阳之谓道，继之者善，成之者性”则是一由超越而内在的“内在超越性”问题。这一“内在超越性”问题认为，人们可以通过其内在道德修养（因为人性善）而达到与超越的“天道”汇通的境界，不需要有一外在的超越力量来促使他们如此。但上面所引的利玛窦那段话，显然他认为仅仅靠人自身的内在道德修养是很难达到完满的境界，必须有一外在的超越力量上帝来推动，因此信仰上帝是完全必要的。这就是说，利玛窦以为天主教教义比儒家的学说更圆满。

4．附儒

所谓“附儒”就是说，为了附会中国儒家传统思想，而对天主教义作某些修改或牵就某些儒家思想。1978年利玛窦的《利玛窦中国札记》法文版序言中说：

早在利玛窦的生命临终时，他领导的中国传教团的方式就已经成为中外聚讼纷纭的对象，人们提出两个反对意见。在实践方面，人们指责利玛窦过分关注发展与儒家杰出人物的关系，而不是布教事业的进展；在理论方面，他对儒家的积极评价也受到非议。有人提出，这样做则会冒有损于基督教义纯洁性的危险，而更明确的宗教方法才可以使传教士们直接向人民大众传播福音并突出基督教的特点。¹³

上面我们已经讲过利玛窦对中国儒家传统的某些看法，以及他对汇合东西文化所作的若干尝试。当然，利玛窦也知道儒家学说与天主教也有相当多的冲突处，他或者可以用“补儒”和“超儒”的办法来补救，但是如果他的传教要完全按照天主教义的一套，那肯定会遇到更多的困难。在此，他为了迎合中国传统也不得不对天主教某些方面有所修改，所以上面引用的那段话中对他的批评也不是无的放矢的。利玛窦如何使天主教附会儒家学说，我认为有以下几点可以注意：

（1）为中国传统与天主教不合处开脱，以便使天主教适合中国社会。在《利玛窦中国札记》意大利原文本中有一段说，它对儒家的祭祀作了简明的叙述，他说：

然而，根据一条古老的法则，在文人荟萃的各大城市中，都建有一座庄严的孔庙以供他的塑像，写着他的姓名和尊号；在每次朔望以及一年四次，文人们都要向他奉献一次祭祀，点燃香烛并供一只已宰杀的牲畜，尽管他们不承认他有任何神性，也丝毫无求于他。所以，这种礼节不能称之为真正的祭祀。¹⁴

天主教反对偶像崇拜，在利玛窦书中比比皆是，例如对佛教和道教偶像崇拜的批评十分严厉。但利玛窦从不批评儒家对孔子的祭祀，甚至也不批评中国人对祖先的祭祀。关于祭祀问题是后来中国禁止天主教传教的一个重要原因。1704年，罗马教廷曾有命令要求中国天主教的信徒不得遵照与天主教不合的中国传统的礼仪，其中的主要问题就是祭孔和祭祀祖先的问题，这样就引起了当时中国政府对天主教传教的限制和禁止。看来，利玛窦比较了解中国的国情，为适应中国社会和便于他们传教，他采用了向中国传统妥协的办法，虽然这种做法与天主教义不甚相合，利玛窦也这样做了。

（2）使天主教某些思想附会中国传统的儒家思想，以便中国人能接受。前面我们已经说过，天主教的“天主”当然是至高至尊的人格神，但利玛窦的《天主实义》原名《天学实义》，而书中“天主”常采用“上帝”和“天”这样中国原有的名称，据方豪的《中国天主教史论丛》中说：他取明版与后来的版本相对照，发现后来的版本改明版“上帝”或“天”为“天主”或“上主”共七十九处。¹⁵原中国有“上帝”和“天”之名词，但“天”在中国传统思想中实有多种涵义，利玛窦虽取“上帝”、“天”即至高至尊人格神的涵义，但在中国人看来仍可有其他的涵义。这个问题到利玛窦死后的1715年教皇格来孟第十一世下令规定“天主”二字为法定名称，不准再采用“上帝”与“天”这样的名称，就是因为“上帝”和“天”可以引起不同的解释。

又如利玛窦的《二十五言》，据罗光教授分析，认为：“《二十五言》为二十五章，每篇简短，书中劝人终日乾乾，克制欲情，人生的幸福，在人平生心常安定，不为祸福所动。人生的目的，为事奉天主……”可见《二十五言》是有意适应当时中国人的需要而作如是说。

（3）对天主教的“原罪说”作了某些修改，以便它接近中国儒家传统的“性善说”。照天主教的“原罪”学说，人性不可谓“善”，这和中国传统的儒家思想的“性善说”相径庭。据圣·奥古斯丁说，人类之所以有“原罪”，是人类用理性选择的结果，究其根本，导致人运用理性去选择罪恶的是人的骄傲心，一种把自己置于上帝之上的自我中心的欲望。这种欲望驱使他顺从自己的意向蔑视上帝的旨意。它特别表现在人性的欲望中。奥古斯丁接着论证，自从人有意识地选择了恶，犯下了违抗上帝的罪行，人类便再也没有可能通过自己的努力来恢复他堕落的状态，因为这种“原罪”使他无可挽回地向下堕落，总想以自己为中心，顺从自己的意志和欲望，只能选择“犯罪”或倾向于“罪恶”。

关于这个问题，在《天主实义》第七篇“论人性本善而述天主门士正学”中，利玛窦认为，所谓“人性”是指人区别于金石、草本、鸟兽以至于鬼神的，这就是人“能推理论者”。他说：“能推理论者，立人为本类，而别其体于他物，乃所谓人性也。”而像“仁义礼智，则在推理之后。理也，乃依附之品，不得为人性。”因此，所谓“能推理论者”是说有这样的为善的“良能”，就此意义说“人性本善”。这自然是为了迎合儒家的观点而有的。但利玛窦又不能全然违背天主教义，他又认为人虽有此“能推理论者”（得到理的能力，理即仁义礼智等），但如何才能得到，照他看应如农夫先耕地、除草、除瓦石、灌水，然后再播种，才会有好收获。因此，“学者先去恶，而后能致善，所谓有所不为，方能有为焉。”这一观点又和天主教“原罪说”联系起来，从而不能不与关于所谓“良能”的说法形成矛盾。看来，要把两种不同文化传统全然调和起来是有相当困难的。

由以上四点可以看出，利玛窦的传播天主教义，实想通过汇合东西文化而达到其目的。他的汇合东西文化的尝试是否成功，姑且不论，不过他毕竟是西方人士的一个最早尝试者，总是有其历史意义的。

二、“中学”“西学”与“体”“用”之辨

在探讨中西文化的汇合或沟通时，我们常常会碰到中学和西学的“体用”问题。利玛窦在中国传播天主教不得不考虑它和中国传统思想文化的关系；同样中国人接受天主教也不得不考虑它和中国传统思想文化的关系。上面我们已经讨论过利玛窦如何处理这个问题，下面我们再来看看当时中国知识分子是如何接受天主教的。我以为，那时接受天主教义的如徐光启、李之藻等以及其他知识分子大都实际上也是用“中学为体，西学为用”的态度接受或者了解西学的。我们知道，那时耶稣会士在华活动，尽管也进入北京宫廷，但“中国朝廷利用他们严格限于利用他们的技术”，“如利玛窦之入宫修理钟表机械，汤若望、南怀仁等人之参与历局修订历法等等，正有如中国开明士大夫真正感兴趣的，主要也仅限于向他们学习科学知识”，“他们在归化中国知识分子方面并没有获得多少成功”。¹⁶至于对天主教义，中国极少数知识分子接受它，主要认为它和中国传统思想，特别是儒家伦理相合才被接受下来。因此可以说，它是较之19世纪60年代以后更早的“中学为体，西学为用”的一种形式。

长期以来，有所谓用“体用”关系来论证“中学”与“西学”的关系的种种说法，有“中学为体，西学为用”，有“西学为体，中学为用”，还有“中学西学互为体用”等。所谓“西学为体，中学为用”，一切都应照搬西方，这也许就是“全盘西化”派的主张；“中学为体，西学为用”，一切西方好的东西，中国古已有之，这大概是“国粹”派的观点。为什么在“中学”和“西学”关系上造成种种不同说法和各种混乱，我以为主要就是企图用“体用”关系来说“中学”与“西学”的关系造成的，因此我认为无论上述哪种说法都难以成立。

“体”和“用”在中国哲学史上是一种重要的范畴，但它不是一对实体性的范畴，而是一对带有根本性质的关系性范畴。“体”一般是指“内在性的超越精神”或“超越性的本体”，前者如孟子的“良知”“良能”，王阳明的“心”等等；后者如“天命”“太极”“天理”“道”等等。“用”是指此“内在超越精神”或“超越性本体”所表现的种种功能。照中国传统哲学的看法，“体”和“用”是统一的，“用”是表现“体”的。这一点早在魏晋时王弼已经提出：“虽贵以无为用，不能舍无以为体”，也就是说离开了“体”就无相应的“用”。所谓“中体西用”，无非是想保存中国固有的内在精神或超越本体，以便排斥西方精神，这样如何能以“西学为用”呢？同样，“西学为体，中学为用”也不可能。前者实质上必然导致“中体中用”，后者必然也只能是“西体西用”。

至于“中西互为体用”，据说它的意思是：中国的好东西就以“中学为体，西学为用”；西方的好东西就以“西学为体，中学为用”。这样的说法显然是很难成立的。它无非是要把“中学为体，西学为用”和“西学为体，中学为用”都包容在所谓“互为体用”之中。这不过是一折中主义东西。方克立在他的《“中体西用”和“西体中用”》一文中批评了“中体西用和西体中用”，但他自己却陷入了一种十分混乱的“互为体用说”的折中主义之中。¹⁷

因此，我认为用“体用”关系来解释中西文化的关系只能造成文化上的“移花接木”。如果不改良文化生长的土壤和其他种种条件，用“移花接木”的方法，其根基是不行的，总难以长成参天大树。所以我想，对我们现代社会来说，这个社会应有其现代化的精神和体现这种现代精神的种种制度。如果要用“体用”关系来说明这个问题，那也许可以说以“现代精神为体，保证体现现代精神的制度及其功用为用”。也许有人会问：什么是“现代精神”？什么是体现“现代精神的制度及其功用”？这里我想借用严复的说法，他曾批评“中体西用”，并指出体用不能二元，应是统一的，特别强调了科学的意义，同时他又提出一非常有意义的命题：“自由为体，民主为用”。我认为，严复这个提法或许有现代意义。照我看，“自由”是现代精神的集中体现，或者说它是一种现代内在精神，是现代社会人们所追求的一种普遍理想；而“民主”是现代社会的各种各样的保证人们“自由”的制度，它应是保证每一个人应有的“自由”，而不光保证某一个人或者几个人的“自由”的制度。我们生活在中国今天的社会中，要使我们的社会成为现代的社会，最重要的就是要给每个人应有的“自由”，并以一套民主的制度来保证他的实现。只有这样，人们的积极性和创造性才能得到充分发挥，我们的国家才能不仅走上“四个现代化”的道路，而且是全面现代化的道路。

VII．QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CATEGORICAL SYSTEM OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Aristotle's Categories outlined the philosophical categories of Ancient Greece, putting forward and thoroughly analyzing ten categories. Hegel's Logik outlined contemporary Western philosophical categories in a comparatively complete categorical system. Did China's traditional philosophy (China's ancient philosophy) have a categorical system? Why and how should we study the question of traditional Chinese philosophy's concepts and categories? This essay attempts to contribute to the discussion of these questions.

I．The Significance of Studying the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

The study of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has its general and particular significance. Its general significance can be expounded in at least the following three aspects:

First, while the study of the history of philosophy necessarily requires the study of the historical function of philosophers and philosophical schools, the ultimate value of such a study is to reveal the necessary logic that determined the specific development of certain philosophical thinking in history. For instance, what is the necessary logic of the development of the pre-Qin philosophical thinking from Confucius to Mencius to Xunzi? A scientific history of philosophy with Marxism as its guiding thought should reveal not only the developmental causes of philosophical thought but also the inner logic of the growth of such thought. Since philosophy is a science of the most general laws of nature, society and human thought presented in the form of abstractions, the development of the content of philosophical thought is therefore a history of the continuous advancement of concepts and categories and of their continuous clarification, enrichment and growth. We should study how concepts and categories were advanced in the history of philosophy, how their contents became clearer, richer and more systematic, and how the categorical system became more complicated, more comprehensive and more systematic. We should conduct a concrete analysis of the development of concepts and categories. This will enable us to discover the laws governing the development of philosophical thought and reveal its inner logic.

Second, when we say that the history of philosophy is one of the struggle between materialism and idealism we do not mean to imply that this struggle and the development of man's cognition are two separate processes. It was the one and same process through which man's knowl edge of the world has been developing in the struggle between materialism and idealism which manifests the law of the development of man's knowledge. As the process of knowledge calls for the use of concepts and categories, every stage of development in the history of philosophy is marked by differing explanations of certain basic concepts and catego ries out of which emerged materialism and idealism. In the history of Chinese philosophy, for example, the struggle between materialism and idealism before the Qin Dynasty generally centered around the differing explanations of the Heavenly way and the human way, name and content, knowledge and conduct, and the variable and the constant. During the Wei and Jin dynasties it centered around such pairs of concepts as being and non-being, essence and function, word and idea, ethical code and spontaneity. During the Song and Ming dynasties it focused on principle and force, mind and matter, mind and nature, subject and object. A study of the development of concepts and categories is a key to the exposure of the law governing the struggle between materialism and idealism.

What is more, this study will enable us to understand the necessity of the emergence of certain concepts and categories in the history of cognition and to overcome the shortcomings of maintaining an oversimplified negative attitude toward idealism which can be found in the past studies of the history of philosophy. Wang Bi was an idealist philosopher, but it was he who advanced some categories such as essence and function, the one and the many, word and idea "which help us recognize and master the focal point in the web of natural phenomena." Despite his incorrect presentation of these categories, his advancement of them marked a step forward in man's knowledge, which deserves recognition for its position in the history of philosophy. Only after Wang Bi first posed the concepts of "taking nonbeing as essence" and "forget the words having grasped the concept" did there appear Ouyang Jian's later theory of "The Word Expresses the Concept" (Yan jin yi lun) and Pei Wei's "On the Exaltation of Being" (Chong you lun). Therefore the study of the concepts and categories in the history of philosophy and their development constitutes an indispensable link in correctly appraising materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy.

Third, Engels believed that the study of philosophies of the past was the only way to temper one's theoretical thinking. A scientific history of philosophy can certainly play such a role, and a scientific history of man's knowledge essentially would be the history of the development of concepts and categories. Since concepts and categories in the history of philosophy reflect man's deepening knowledge, when we study its development we are rethinking in our own thought the process of man's coming to know the world. Of course we discard the accidental and secondary factors and grasp the essential, normative content. This process of rethinking inevitably deepens our own thought. In our study of the development of concepts and categories, we not only relive the process of mankind using concepts and categories to understand the world, but invariably use certain methods to revisualize them. That method can only be one of making a theoretical analysis of the contents of the concepts and categories and the relationships between them and the logical relationships in their development. Such a process of analysis itself is a kind of theoretical thinking. In this sense, this study can help us improve our ability for theoretical thinking.

The above-mentioned three points give only the general significance of studying philosophical concepts and categories, for that significance exists in the study of the history of any philosophy (e.g., the Western or Indian). However, the study of the categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and its history of development also has its particular significance; namely, it will enable us to understand the characteristics and level of development of traditional Chinese philosophy. Western philosophy has its own categorical system; its characteristics and the different levels of development of its philosophical thinking at different historical stages are reflected in the development from Aristotle's Categories to Hegel's Logik. The categories used in the primitive Indian Buddhism and the categories of the Kunya and Bhava sects of Mahayana, more or less in succession and each with its striking features, represent the fairly high level Indian Buddhism attained in logical thought and categorical analysis. Traditional Chinese philosophy has its own concepts and categories which gradually formed a fairly comprehensive system. Because of this it will not do just to take them in terms of the concepts and categories of Western philosophy, nor will it do to take them in terms of the Marxist philosophical concepts and categories.

Except for a few concepts taken from Indian Buddhism, the concepts and categories which have taken form in the long history of Chinese philosophy basically developed independently, hence their striking features. For example, the Heavenly way (tian dao) and the human way (ren dao) as a pair of categories were very important in the history of Chinese philosophy. Therefore traditional Chinese philosophy not only paid considerable attention to the study of the relationship between the Heaven and man, but paid special attention to the study of the relationships between man and man (society). Another example is the pair of categories ti and yong which contain the meanings of not only noumenon and phenomenon, but also base and function, whole and part, and abstract and concrete. Such series of pairs of concepts and categories reflect not only the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy, but also the level of theoretical thinking at a certain stage of historical development. To make a not completely apt comparison: traditional Chinese medicine certainly has its own particular tradition with its own particular theoretical system, particular medical terms and concepts. Despite the fact that we have not found clear scientific explanations for some of the theories and achievements, since it does achieve good results in medical treatment it must reflect certain aspects of objective reality and contain fairly profound truths. Since concepts and categories are necessary conditions for the formation of knowledge and play a pivotal role in linking the subjective to the objective, definite concepts and categories reflect definite achievements made by man in recognizing certain aspects of objective reality through his theoretical practice; hence, different concepts and categories mark different depths of man's cognition. Therefore, when we study the concepts and categories at different stages of the development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we can see the level of theoretical thinking at the different stages of development of Chinese history.

In the history of Chinese philosophy, there are three periods during which schools made major contributions to the formation of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely, the various pre-Qin schools, the metaphysical school (Xuanxue) of the Wei and Jin, and the Neo-Confucianism (Lixue) of the Song and Ming dynasties. When we compare the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy in the three stages with those of the Western philosophy, we are impressed by its distinct features and fairly high level. This comparison between the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and those of other countries, nations and regions constitutes an important subject in comparative philosophy.

II． How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

Fundamentally speaking, the study of the concepts and categories of traditional Chinese philosophy requires the scientific analytical method of Marxism. Merely to pose the concepts and categories used in the history of Chinese philosophy is contrary to the goal of our study. For that will not uncover the laws governing the development of philosophical thought, nor will it help us better to understand the laws of the struggle between materialism and idealism, or to improve our theoretical thinking; in particular, we will be unable to recognize the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. To achieve our goal, it is necessary to use the scientific analytical method of Marxism to: 1) analyze the meaning of the concepts and categories, 2) investigate the development of those meanings, 3) analyze the systems of concepts and categories of philosophers or philosophical schools, and 4) study the similarities and differences between the concepts and categories of Chinese and foreign philosophies. It is only on the basis of such an analysis that it is possible to advance the study of the history of Chinese philosophy along a scientific path.

i．Analysis of the Meaning of Concepts and Categories

The advancement of one or of a pair of concepts (categories) marks the level of man's understanding of the world, yet it is up to us to make an analysis of the meaning of such a concept or pair of concepts. When ancient philosophers advanced a new concept they did not have as clear and scientific an understanding of its meaning as we do today; this is particularly true of the concepts they used to explain the origin of the world. For instance, Laozi (Lao Tzu) was the first man to advance the "way" (dao) as the paramount category in his philosophical system. This concept of the "way" he advanced as an antithesis to the contemporary concept of "respecting Heaven." By taking the "way" as the origin of the world, Laozi (Lao Tzu) certainly raised the level of ancient Chinese philosophical thinking. But what was the meaning of the "way"? Laozi(Lao Tzu) himself found it difficult to give a clear definition. He said: "I do not know its name; I call it Dao. If forced to give it a name, I shall call it Great." Therefore he used quite a number of adjectives to describe the "way," such as "soundless and formless," "eluding and vague" and "deep and obscure." Obviously, with the limitations of the objective conditions and their level of knowledge, the ancient philosophers found it difficult to give lucid definitions of the concept of the origin of the world. Thus it is necessary for us to investigate the meaning of the concept of the "way" in the light of the book Laozi (Lao Tzu).¹ The term "spontaneity" (ziran) was widely used by ancient Chinese philosophers but each had his own definition. It was Laozi (Lao Tzu), too, who was the first to use "spontaneity" as a philosophical concept, by which he generally meant non-activity. Wang Chong of the Han Dynasty continued this usage when he wrote: "The Heavenly way is spontaneous non-activity." By the time of the Wei and Jin dynasties, the proponents of non-activity such as Wang Bi and Xiahou Xuan practically took "spontaneity" for the "way"—that is, the primal stuff of the universe. Xiahou Xuan wrote: "Heaven and earth operate with spontaneity and the sage functions following spontaneity. Spontaneity is the way, which originally had no name and Laozi (Lao Tzu) was forced to give it a name."

Even the same philosopher had different definitions for "spontaneity." We can use Guo Xiang's definitions of "spontaneity" as an example for analysis. He identified at least five connotations for "spontaneity." First, the actions of Heaven and man are "spontaneous." In his Annotations of Zhuangzi (the chapter, The Great Teacher) he wrote: "He who knows the deeds of both Heaven and man is a sage,"—knowing the deeds of Heaven and man is spontaneity." Thus, Guo Xiang looked not only at the natural phenomena but also at man's deeds as in a sense spontaneous; in what sense could this be so? Second, "working for oneself" (ziwei) is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang said: "To say that matter is spontaneous means non-activity." He also wrote: "We value this non-activity and matter's working for itself." Then why is "working for itself" a kind of "non-activity"? Third, "being self-willed" is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang held that "working for oneself" is "spontaneity," but "working for oneself" does not mean acting wilfully, but "acting by one's nature," namely, "acting in accordance with one's nature, that is spontaneity, thus called nature (xing)." "According to spontaneity" means "according to one's nature," that is, neither making others succumb to oneself nor allowing oneself to succumb to another. Fourth, "inevitability" is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang wrote: "Knowing the reality of destiny one will not seek what lies beyond it, but just to fulfill one's nature." One who "knows his destiny" will not ask for what cannot be done—this is called "spontaneity." Destiny here means "inevitability." Fifth, "chance is spontaneity." Guo Xiang wrote: "Things are all spontaneous, acting without knowing why or how it should be so." By not knowing the reason of action, "spontaneity" implies "chance." Therefore, when the philosophers were trying to explain "self-generation" they often employed such terms as "suddenly" or "abruptly"—all meaning that things exist without reason, the causality being beyond explanation.

According to Guo Xiang, "spontaneity" has the above-mentioned five inter-connected meanings, of which the last two are most important, that is, "spontaneity" has the meaning of both "inevitability" and "chance."Actually, they are a pair of antagonistic concepts and, from the dialectical point of view, are mutually connected and transform themselves into each other, with inevitability manifesting itself through chance. Guo Xiang used the term "spontaneity" to explain both "inevitability" and "change," precisely because he saw the relationship of mutual dependence between them: that a matter so exists is "inevitable" in one respect because "things emerge by themselves abruptly." In Guo Xiang's philosophical system, things must have these two aspects. From this analysis of Guo Xiang's definition of the concept of "spontaneity" we can see the general characteristics and level of the philosophy of Guo Xiang.

ii．Analysis of the Development of the Meanings of Concepts and Categories

Not only do the meanings of concepts and categories differ from one philosopher to another, at different times they also differ in meaning. Nevertheless, if philosophical thoughts follow one another, it is always possible to discover the relationship of succession between these concepts and categories. The study of their development is extremely important for understanding the laws of the development of man's knowledge. In the following, we will analyze the growth of the concept of qi (often translated as material force, ether, or fluid— tr.) in traditional Chinese philosophy.

Some thinkers as early as the Spring and Autumn Period already discussed the impact of qi on man. For example, the Zuo Zhuan mentioned "the six qi" in the medical theory recorded in the first year of the reign of Duke Zhao of Lu (541 BC). By the Warring States Period, qi became a general concept. People not only believed that the body of man was made of qi, but some believed that the spirit of man also was made of qi. In "White Heart," "Inner Function," and "Mechanism of the Heart" of the book Guanzi, it was said: "As for essence (jing), it is the essence of qi;" "the qi of all things changes and thus becomes life;" "when qi goes to the ground, grains grow; when it goes into the heavens, there emerge the constellations; when it floats in the air, it becomes ghosts and spirits; when it goes into a man's chest, the man becomes a sage" and "therefore when there is qi, there is life; when there is no qi, there is death," etc. According to these thinkers, among the " qi" there is an "essential qi," the life-giver. When such an "essential qi" enters the body of a man, he becomes wise and turns into a sage.

During the Warring States Period this unscientific theory of "essential qi" was used to explain man's spirit. If we considered it materialist, it would be a materialist viewpoint with grave defects which, under certain circumstances, was used by idealists and turned into a component part of their system. It could also be utilized by the supernaturalists who transformed it into a basis for advocating "life without end." We know that Mencius also talked about qi, and posed a sort of qi called the " qi of vastness" (haoran zhi qi). The "White Heart" chapter of the book Guanzi mentions the "essential qi" that can give man wisdom and "this qi should not be checked by strength but should be accommodated by moral power (de)," which is to say, qi itself possesses an intelligence which should be consolidated by moral power. And in the theory of Mencius, his " qi of vastness" is "obtained through accentuating righteousness." Obviously, qi in Mencius' theory has already become spiritual. By the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu went a step further and moralized and mystified qi which became the manifestation of the will and power of God. Dong Zhongshu held that qi had the power of meting out punishment and award, that there were good and vicious qi and that qi had emotions such as happiness, anger, grief and joy. So qi, though still retaining material appearance, already lost its material substance. Later, during the Han period, there were all sorts of superstitious explanations of qi which were indeed the outgrowth of the viewpoint of Dong Zhongshu.

From the historical data of the pre-Qin period and the Han Dynasty, we can see that the concept of qi is closely linked with questions of spirit and form, and thus has much to do with the question of the preservation of health, which often was deemed a means to becoming a deity. In Zhuangzi the "true man" (zhenren), the "spiritual man" (shenren) and others were often described as "with the spirit guarding the form to achieve longevity," "drinking dew and breathing the wind instead of eating grain," "unifying their nature and preserving their qi." They made their spirit integrate with their form so that they could accomplish the goal of "keeping their form perfect and replenishing their spirit to be merged into one with Heaven and earth." The Lü Shi Chun Qiu includes numerous discussions of the "preservation of good health" and considers that to "achieve longevity," qi should be made to flow constantly within the body, and "with essential qi renewed daily, the vicious qi will go and a full life span will be reached; this is called truth." In Huai Nan Zi the preservation of qi, of form and of nature are the same thing; moreover all are linked together with qi. The writers of both of these two books were influenced by the "theory of essential qi" in "White Heart" and other philosophical works. They all thought that "spirit" (jingshen) is also a kind of qi, or "essential qi which can reside or leave the body and that when spirit and body are at one, there will be long life."

Meanwhile, some philosophers of the pre-Qin and Han periods held a materialist view of qi and considered it to be the matter that constitutes the world. Xunzi held that everything in the universe, including man, was made of qi. He wrote: "Water and fire have qi but no life, plants have life but no senses, birds and beasts have senses but know not righteousness and man has qi, life, senses and also righteousness." The chapter "On Spirit" of the book Huai Nan Zi says that the universe was originally a murky body of original qi without any shape and that later the interaction of the positive and negative forces gave birth to everything, so "the dirty qi became worms and the pure essential qi became human beings." Wang Chong put it with even greater clarity. He wrote: "The merging of the qi of Heaven and earth gave birth to everything," and that was the result of the movement of qi. He said: "When Heaven moves, it gives qi. . . qi comes out and it gives birth to things." In order to oppose Dong Zhongshu's idealist view of qi, Wang Chong particularly pointed out that qi has no will, no aim. He said: " Qi is void of ambition, purpose or scheme"; " qi is like smoke and cloud, how can it listen to man's request?" Nevertheless, like the book Huai Nan Zi, Wang Chong took the spirit of man (or the phenomenon of life) as "essential qi." He said: "Man lives because he has essential qi; when man dies, the essential qi vanishes." An analysis of the contents of the concept qi in the history of ancient Chinese philosophy reveals clearly the development of this concept. The three doctrines, or rather definitions, mentioned above, however, were all merged into the thought of Daoism (Taoism) toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, which we will not discuss here.

iii．Analysis of the Systems of Concepts and Categories of Philosophers (or Philosophical Schools)

Historically major philosophers, in establishing their philosophical systems, have invariably used a series of concepts and categories. Thus the study of the relationships between these concepts and categories is necessary for us to make a thorough analysis of their theoretical systems. The level a philosopher's thought reaches often can be judged by how richly and systematically his concepts and categories reflect the essential relationships between the objects they are meant to reflect. Divergent views in the study of a past philosopher (or philosophical school) sometimes arise from the lack of a comprehensive, systematic study of the system of concepts and categories of that philosopher or school. For example, if we merely take into account Guo Xiang's concepts of "being" and "nonbeing" and their relationship, we might conclude that he was a materialist. But the reason why Guo Xiang's philosophy was the zenith of the Wei and Jin metaphysical school was not that he put forth a view different from that of Wang Bi's on the relationship between "being" and "nonbeing," but that he had a fairly complete philosophical system, an analysis of which reveals that it comprises the following four groups of basic concepts. (Though there are other important concepts in Guo's philosophical system, we will not deal with them here.)

"Being" and "nonbeing": The central topic of discussion among the Wei and Jin metaphysicians was the question of "origin and outcome, being and nonbeing." The philosophy of Guo Xiang might be considered to originate from the discussion on this topic. Guo believed that "being"(the "being of everything") is the only thing that exists; it is constantly present; "although being undergoes infinite changes and transformations, it cannot in any instance become nonbeing," and "we say the Heaven and earth constantly exist because there is no time they have not existed." As for "nonbeing," he held that the creator above "being," or "the nonbeing" serving as noumenon, is non-existence, that is, "nothing." Thus he said: "Nonbeing is simply nonbeing, it cannot produce being," and "I venture to ask whether there is a creator or not? If not, how can he create things?" Therefore, from the very beginning, Guo Xiang denied the existence of a "creator" above the being of "everything," or a "nonbeing" which is the antithesis of "being" which as the primal body serves as the basis for the existence of being. However, Guo Xiang's philosophy did not stop here, but went further.

"Nature" and "destiny": Since the existence of things is not based on "nonbeing" as the primal body, then is there an inherent cause for the existence of things? According to Guo Xiang, one cannot say that the being of "everything" is groundless. Since things exist, their very existence is the basis for their existence. Specifically, the basis of their existence is their own "nature": "Everything has its own nature and every nature has its limit." "The nature" Guo Xiang meant is "the reason that things are what they are" which has the sense of "necessity." Thus he said: "Each gets what he deserves by nature; there is no avoiding it nor adding more." He also said: "Things have their own nature, so the wise stays wise till his last day while the dull goes on being dull till his death, neither able to change halfway." As for "destiny" Guo Xiang defined it as "inevitability"; as he put it "destiny means things all act spontaneously without anything acting on them," and "being aware of the impossible." Obviously, his "nature" and "destiny" are two concepts he employed to prove the point that "being" alone exists and that "nonbeing" as creator or primal body is absolutely non-existent.

"Self-generated" and "self-sufficient": The "nature" of things is the basis for their existence, but how does this "nature" originate? Is its emergence with some purpose, or condition? Guo Xiang said: "Things exist by themselves without a source; this is the way of Heaven" and "the emergence of things is just out of their own accord." If the "nature" of a thing is not "self-generated," then it must be given by others or intentionally produced by a creator. Yet this thing becoming this thing and that thing becoming that thing is not something else making this or that thing emerge and exist, nor even making itself emerge and exist; therefore "self-generation" can only be produced "unexpectedly," "abruptly" and "spontaneously" by itself. Were there any reason or purpose for the emergence and existence of a thing, it would inevitably lead to the admission of the existence of an initiator. Then what is the relation between one "self-generated" thing and another "self-generated" thing? Guo Xiang held that everything is "self-generated" and its existence is "entirely in keeping with its own nature" and therefore is "self-sufficient" (wudai). On the one hand, "self-sufficiency" is possible because "things produce themselves"; "things produce themselves without relying on anything else." On the other hand, anything can be "self-sufficient" as long as it "conforms with its own nature," and "is content with its own nature," "for when satisfied with its own nature, a giant roc does not despise the sparrow and the sparrow does not covet the heavenly lake and both are quite satisfied. Thus, big or small, all live in complacence." So, to insist on the premise that the "nature" of things is the only basis for their existence, one must recognize that it is "self-generated" and "self-sufficient."

"Self-transformation" and "mutual indispensability": To support the concepts of "self-generated" and "self-sufficient" requires the solution of another question. Suppose everything exists by itself, this being this and that being that with one differing from another, then are not all the things related? Suppose all the things are relative, then are not they limited? Suppose they are limited, then are not they "insufficient" (you dai)? To answer this question, Guo Xiang advanced the concept of "self-transformation" (duhua). By "self-transformation," he meant that everything emerges and generates independently, hence "self-sufficiency" is absolute. If we try to seek the cause and basis of the emergence and generation of things, ostensibly we can pursue this question infinitely, but ultimately we can come only to the conclusion of "self-sufficiency." Thus he said: "If we try to find out what a thing relies on and what is the cause of its creation, there will be no end and finally we will come to selfsufficiency and the working of self-transformation will be obvious." In his "Annotations on (Zhuangzi's) Qi Wu Lun" Guo Xiang cited an absolute example. He said that the bodily form, the shadow and the penumbra are all beings of absolute independence, for "thus throughout the realm of things, there is nothing, not even the penumbra, which is not 'selftransformed.'"

If one thing does not exist independently, then everything else is not independent, which will inevitably lead to the existence of a primal body(or creator) above "everything," serving as the basis of their existence and inevitably recognized as "a cause of creation and generation." Although things exist independently and self-sufficiently, as long as everything fully realizes its "nature," brings it into full play and "the wise stays wise till his last day and the dull goes on being dull till his death," then the ideal realm will be achieved where "Heaven and earth are not so long-lived but live along with me, and things in the world are not divergent, but the same as me." Relating this way to every other thing has the greatest function; that is, "the greatest function of mutual indispensability is the perfection of self-transformation." Seen from another angle, everything is indispensable as long as it exists. Guo Xiang said: "A man, though only seven feet tall, possesses the five constant virtues; thus this mere body is provided with everything in the universe. Therefore none of the things in the world can be dispensed for one day. With one thing lacking, the living will not have means to live; with one law lacking, the living cannot fulfill their natural life-span." Thus, everything existent is rational, inevitable and not mutually exclusive. This view appears to contradict the doctrine of "self-transformation," but it does not. According to Guo Xiang, everything that exists is rational, inevitable and not mutually exclusive precisely because, as the condition for the existence of everything else, everything fully and absolutely brings its "nature" into full play, creates itself and generates self-sufficiently.

From this analysis of Guo Xiang's system of philosophical categories, we can see that his philosophy finally arrives at the doctrine of "self-transformation," and the concept of "exalted being" (chongyou) is merely a bridge to "self-transformation." What is more, in Guo Xiang's system, only after the establishment of the doctrine on "self-transformation" can one support "sublime being" and a relatively thorough refutation of a "nonbeing" above everything as the basis of the latter's existence.

If we want to know whether a philosopher is a materialist or idealist, or the characteristic of his philosophy, its ideological relations with its predecessors and successors and its place in history, we must first make an analysis of his categorical system.

iv．Analysis of the Similarities and Differences Between the Concepts and Categories of Chinese and Foreign Philosophies

A comparison between the categorical systems of Chinese and foreign philosophies will undoubtedly enable us to have a better understanding of the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. Because of the breadth of this topic and the limited study conducted by this author, we can make only a rather superficial comparison here between Wei and Jin metaphysics and the Buddhist doctrine of Prajñā introduced into China in that period.

The central theme of Wei and Jin metaphysics is the question of "being and nonbeing, origin and outcome." Therefore "being" and "nonbeing" are two basic categories in the Wei and Jin metaphysics. The Buddhist Prajñā doctrine also discussed the question of "being" and "nonbeing" (or the "void," kong), hence Dao-an said: "Of the twelve books, Vaipuliya is most copious and its doctrine on the void of being and non-being is similar to the teachings of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi, thus the doctrine of Mahayana has been easy to spread in China." The concept of the "void" (or "nonbeing") of the Buddhist Prajñā school is actually different from the "nonbeing" advocated by Wang Bi and other Chinese metaphysicians, despite their apparent similarity. The Buddhist concept of original nonbeing, or Tathata in Sanskrit, has the meaning that "all the different dharmas are in their original nature void and empty" and that all things have no original actual forms. Wang Bi and other metaphysicians also talked about "original nonbeing" by which, however, they meant that everything "is based on nonbeing as its origin." Although the two concepts of "original nonbeing" cannot be considered to be entirely different, they do have vast differences in meaning. In Wei and Jin metaphysics, Wang Bi's thought succeeded the doctrines of Laozi(Lao Tzu). In his philosophical system, the category "nonbeing" is one and the same thing as "the way" or "principle"; as he said: "The extreme of greatness is nothing but the way! . . . though it is important that it has nonbeing as its phenomenon, yet it cannot do without nonbeing as its noumenon"; "nothing exists without principle; everything operates according to its own law." Obviously, the "nonbeing" used by Wang Bi is not the "void" or "non-existence," but the "substance" of a thing. The "original nonbeing" of the Buddhist Prajñā doctrine on the void only means that "all the different dharmas are in their original nature void and empty. "They held that everything is void of nature, but created through the association of hetupratyaya. From this one can see that the Buddhist Prajñā School in its discourse on the void refers not to "substance," but to "non-existence." As for the content of "being," the Wei and Jin metaphysicians usually referred to "universal being," namely, all sorts of actually existing things, whereas, on the other hand, in the translation of Buddhist scripts, terms denoting different meanings of "being" (existence) were all translated into the term "being."

After its introduction into China, Buddhism first attached itself to Daoist necromancy during the Eastern Han Dynasty and then to Wei and Jin metaphysics. The various schools of the Prajñā doctrine formed by Chinese monks during the Eastern Jin period generally still used metaphysical thought to explain the teachings of Prajñā until the arrival in China of Kumarajiva whose translations of Madhyamika-sastra, Sata-sastra and Dvadasa-mikaya-sastra of the Maha-prajñāparamita-sastra provided Chinese Buddhist with the material for understanding the true meaning of Buddhist Praj Seng Zhao's On No Real Non-Existenceis more or less close to the original meaning of "neither being nor nonbeing" of the Buddhist Prajñā doctrine.

A comparison and analysis of the Chinese and foreign philosophical concepts and categories can thus show their characteristics and level of development as well as the impact of foreign culture on indigenous traditional culture and the process of a foreign culture being assimilated and becoming a component of the culture of the country (nation, or region) into which the foreign culture was introduced.

III．A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

The term category has myriad definitions in the history of philosophy in the West. Aristotle in his Categories treated it as the basic mode of being and put forward ten categories such as substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, state, action and passion. And Kant described his twelve categories as principles related to cognition or as the precondition for constituting experience. Lenin said: "Categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it."⁴ A Dictionary of Philosophy published in the Soviet Union defines category as "the basic concept that reflects the most general and most essential character, aspect and relationship of the various phenomena and knowledge of reality." "Category" then is generally explained from the two aspects of the existence and knowledge of reality: from the aspect of existence it is defined as "the basic mode of existence" or "the most general and most essential character, aspect and relationship of the phenomena of reality"; from the aspect of knowledge it is defined as the "precondition for constituting experience" or "focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it." The necessary precondition for knowledge is certainly the reflection and manifestation of the "basic mode of existence"while the "basic mode of existence" is meaningful only in the process of man's knowledge. From what we listed above, we can see the relationship between "category" and "concept": a category is a basic concept whereas a concept is not necessarily a category. Thus, what we are discussing here is what are the categories or basic concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy. If, using the basic concepts of classic Chinese philosophers, we can form a system which shows how traditional Chinese philosophy identified and explained "the basic mode of existence" and which reveals the line of development of the traditional Chinese philosophical thinking, then we have proven that traditional Chinese philosophy does have a categorical system. This is presented first in the following diagram and further explained below.

In this diagram, twenty pairs of basic concepts make up the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy. This is certainly a very preliminary proposition. However, despite its many possible defects, it is intended to initiate discussion and study on this question. Here the author would like to explain some points:

i．This diagram is divided into three major parts. Part I is intended to indicate what basic concepts are used in traditional Chinese philosophy on the question of the existence of the world; Part II is meant to show what basic concepts are used to present the form of being; and Part III is meant to show what basic concepts are used to denote the existence and knowledge of man. The relationship between "Heaven" (or the Heavenly way) and "man" (or the way of man) has always been a central theme for discussion in traditional Chinese philosophy and it is around this question that the struggle between materialism and idealism has been waged in the history of Chinese philosophy. Zi Chan was the first Chinese philosopher to make a proposition on the relationship between the two when he wrote: "The way of Heaven is remote, whereas the way of man is near." Confucius attached importance to the "mandate of the Heaven" but he gave even greater attention to the "affairs of man." Although he mentioned that he "began to know the mandate of Heaven at the age of fifty," he seldom discussed this question. "The master was seldom heard discussing the question of nature and the Heavenly way," reports the Analects which, however, extensively records Confucius' sayings on the question of the "way of man." Mencius talked about "obeying nature, and knowing fate and Heaven," and the Doctrine of the Mean says: "Sincerity is the way of Heaven; knowing sincerity is the way of man." Xunzi said: "Grasp the way of Heaven and man." Laozi (Lao Tzu), the founder of Daoism (Taoism) said: "The Heavenly way is spontaneous non-activity," and he played down the importance of "humanness and righteousness"(the way of man). And Zhuangzi "was misguided by Heaven and ignorant of man." Dong Zhongshu, the Confucian master of the Han Dynasty, described his research as a study of "the relationship between Heaven and man." Sima Qian who was much influenced by Daoist thinking said that his Historical Records was a work of "investigations into the relationship between Heaven and man and the changes past and present." The Wei and Jin metaphysicians concentrated on the question of "spontaneity" (the way of Heaven) and "ethics" (the way of man). Hence, He Yan said: "Only with people like Wang Bi, can you discuss the question of the relationship between Heaven and man." The Song Neo-Confucians of both the School of Principle (Lixue) and School of Mind (Xinxue) strongly believed: "The supreme ultimate (the principle of Heaven) is simply an utterly excellent and supremely good normative principle"; the supreme ultimate is an appellation for "all that is good in heaven and on earth, and among men and things." The "principles of Heaven" and the "desires of man" are still a question of the relationship between Heaven and man. Even Wang Fuzhi still made this a focal point in his philosophical discourse. He held that "Rites, no matter how pure they are, are merely expressions of the principles of Heaven inevitably to be found in the desires of man," and that "the desire of man, when reaching superb altruism is the perfection of the principle of Heaven." Thus, traditional Chinese philosophy proceeded from the discussion of the pair of categories: (the way of) Heaven and (the way of) man, an indication of the main attention and particular content of traditional Chinese philosophy.

ii．This diagram shows the development of the categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and their relationships. Proceeding from the study of the relationship between Heaven and man, traditional Chinese philosophy branches out into two parts: Daoism (Taoism) and Confucianism. Laozi (Lao Tzu) advanced the relationship between the "way" and "all things." He said: "The way creates one, one creates two, two create three and three create all things." He also said: "All things in the world are produced by being and being is produced by nonbeing," therefore the relationship between the "way" and the "thing" is also represented by the pair of categories "being" and "nonbeing." The Confucian School however proposed the categories the "way" and the "instrument" in the Commentary on the Book of Changes, which says: "That which shapes and is above is called the way and that which shapes and is below is called the instrument," and adds: "Change contains the supreme ultimate which produces two extremes," and "the alternation of yin and yang is called the way"; thus the relationship between the way and the instrument is reflected in the categories of the supreme ultimate and yin and yang. The Han Dynasty witnessed some development in philosophical thought, but it seems that practically no new and influential philosophical categories were advanced. The Wei and Jin metaphysics upheld three philosophical classes, Laozi (Lao Tzu), Zhuangzi and Zhou Yi, which brought a gradual merging of Daoism(Taoism) with the Confucianism of the Zhou Yi system. This established the theory of a primal body as the origin of the universe, a theory with Laozi (Lao Tzu)'s and Zhuangzi's thought as the framework. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians used categories such as "essence" and "function," "stem and branch," the "one" and the "many" to illustrate "nonbeing" (the primal) and "being" (everything or the various manifestations of this substance). They used "spontaneity" (essence) and "ethics" (function) to present the relationship between the "originality of the universe"(primal body) and "human social relations" (the various social positions and codes), and used the pair of categories "idea" and "word" to explain questions on understanding the substance of the universe. From the Wei and Jin dynasties and the Northern and Southern dynasties onward, traditional Chinese philosophical thought, under the impact of Buddhism introduced from India, evolved into the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty. If the Wei and Jin metaphysical doctrine on substance has the thought of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi as the framework, then Neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming period alternately were based on an objective idealism (represented by Zhu Xi), a subjective idealism(represented by Wang Yangming) and a fairly high level materialism(represented by Wang Fuzhi). The philosophical categories of this period succeeded Wei and Jin metaphysics and also absorbed Tang Buddhist thought in the Sui and Tang periods. Thus, there was a confluence of the thinking of Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism) and Buddhism within a Confucian framework. The most basic philosophical categories of the time became "principle" and qi, "mind" and "matter"; the question of "mind" and "nature" grew into the question of whether "mind is principle" or "nature is principle." Categories such as "subject" and "object," "investigation of things" and "fulfillment of principle" were used in the discussion of the question of knowledge and the categories "Heavenly principle" and "human desire" were used to discuss social issues. Lenin in his On the Question of Dialectics wrote:

"Circles" in philosophy: (is a chronology of persons essential? No!) Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus. . . . Modern: Holbach—Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel—Feuerbach—Marx.⁵

In his "Conspectus of Hegel's Book Lectures on the History of Philosophy," he wrote:

Comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle. . . a circle on the great circle (a spiral) of the development of human thought in general.⁶

Hegel's comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle, as pointed out by Lenin, is a penetrating reflection of the law of development of the philosophical thought. This is of tremendous importance in our study of the development of traditional Chinese philosophic thought.

From the above diagram, we can see that the development of traditional Chinese philosophy is roughly made up of three spiraling circles. The first covers the period prior to the Qin Dynasty: the Confucian School, including Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi (or the Commentary on the Book of Changes); Daoism (Taoism) including Laozi(Lao Tzu), the School of Jixia (i.e., the "White Heart" and other works) and Zhuangzi, with the two Han dynasties forming a transitional period. The second circle was the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties represented by Wang Bi, Xiang Xiu, and Guo Xiang (or Wang Bi, Guo Xiang, and Seng Zhao). Buddhism was in vogue from the Northern and Southern dynasties through the Sui and Tang dynasties and after a period of development, Buddhism in China grew into several sects such as the Huayan (Avatamsaka) Sect and the Chan (Zen) Sect. The third circle covers the Song and Ming dynasties represented by Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, and Wang Fuzhi.

iii．In the second column of the diagram only three pairs of categories are listed, of which the most fundamental is the pair "quiescence" and "movement," whose manifestation is the pair "constant" and "variable," though in fact "positive" and "negative" are also peculiar manifestations of "quiescence" and "movement." Although many philosophers of traditional Chinese philosophy discussed the question of "quiescence" and "movement," little discussion on the question of "time" and "space" was conducted among Chinese philosophers (except for the pre-Qin philosophers of the School of Names and philosophers of the later Mohist School). Philosophical propositions in traditional Chinese philosophy seem not to have been restricted by time or space and they paid little attention to the question whether movement took place in time and space. That is why we have not included the categories "time" and "space" in our diagram.

iv．The question of man (the way of man) was much discussed in traditional Chinese philosophy which was especially characterized by the study of the question of "morals" (ethics). Therefore careful consideration should be given to what should be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy. In this diagram (column III) five pairs of categories (in fact not all of them are related to the way of man) seem to be sufficient as basic concepts. "Spirit" and "form," or the relationship between spirit and body, are used for the study of the phenomena of the human life. This was discussed from pre-Qin days onward, with materialists and idealists holding different views. The question of "nature" and "emotion" might be looked at as the key ethical issue. There have been divergent views on the question of "nature" ever since the pre-Qin days, such as "man is born good by nature"; "man is born evil by nature"; "man is born with a mixed nature both good and evil"; "man is born neither good nor evil by nature" and "man is born good or evil by nature, all depending on the specific man," etc. On the question of nature and emotion, there were views that "nature is good whereas emotion is bad," "nature is quiescent and emotion is active," etc. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians paid considerable attention to this question, but concentrated on a discussion of the difference and similarity between the sage and the ordinary man. The Song and Ming Neo-Confucians divided nature into "the universal nature" and "the humoral nature," with the former stemming from the "principle of Heaven" and the latter from man's inherent emotion and desire or from the qi that makes up the body. Hence, this is still a question of nature and emotion and the importance of ethical education is to "maintain the principle of Heaven and suppress human desire." The question of "knowledge" and "action" also occupies a very important position in traditional Chinese philosophy. Most of the past Chinese philosophers upheld both "acknowledge" and "action" and thought the latter was even more important. The categories "name" and "actuality" were always contained in traditional Chinese philosophy and the categories "subject" and "object" were borrowed from Buddhism, but all four are related to the question of knowledge. Therefore column III of the diagram contains categories involving existence and knowledge.

IV．Discussion

As the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy is a rather broad and complicated issue, it calls for an earnest and extensive discussion. The following are only preliminary views on some of the questions:

i．Should the categories in the categorical system be in pairs?

This question should be discussed in two aspects. On the one hand, in the history of philosophy, the philosophical categories used by a philosopher may not be in pairs. For example, the concept "spontaneity" used by Laozi (Lao Tzu) seems not to have its opposite in the book Laozi (Lao Tzu). The concept qi used as the most general concept in the "White Heart" chapter of Guanzi did not seem to have its opposite either. However, taking the development of traditional Chinese philosophy as a whole, the categories are in pairs. For example, the concept "spontaneity" is paired with "ethics," and "principle" with qi. On the other hand, everything is contradictory, with two contradictory aspects, of which one does not exist without the other. Therefore, the categories which reflect the essential relationships of things must be in pairs of opposites. Some of the philosophical concepts and categories of traditional Chinese philosophy indeed seem to have no pairs of opposites, such as the "mean." We certainly cannot say there is a "counter-mean." Yet an analysis of the meaning of the mean may possibly lead to the solution to this question. Confucius advanced his "doctrine of the mean" to oppose "excess"; he said: "Excess amounts to insufficiency." Thus, the "mean" has the sense of "middle" or "correct." Therefore it would be sufficient to have the concepts of the "positive" and the "negative" in traditional Chinese philosophy since "mean" is included in the meaning of "positive."

Not all the categorical systems used by Western philosophers necessarily reflect the unity of opposites. Among the ten categories used by Aristotle, some can be paired up as opposites such as "quality" and "quantity," but "substance" has no specific opposite, though the other nine categories might be considered to be the opposites of "substance." The twelve categories used by Kant and the categories of the categorical system of Hegel's Logik are mostly pairs of opposites. Though divergent in their views on the categorical system, all Marxist philosophers agree that categories are in pairs, for instance, essence and phenomenon, content and form, necessity and chance, possibility and actuality, etc. Marxist philosophy holds that categories must be pairs of opposites; this is certainly a correct view and reflects the reality of things. Thus when we today study the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and try to make it more systematically and scientifically reflect the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy, we should try to find out the law of unity of opposites in its categorical system.

ii．How many categories should the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy contain in order to be sufficient to indicate "the basic pattern of being" or "the basic concepts that reflect the most fundamental characteristics, aspects and relationships of the phenomena and knowledge of the reality"? The twenty pairs of opposite basic concepts of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy are merely a tentative proposition. They indicate mostly what the "world" and "man" are; for example, the existence of the "world" comprises "principle" and qi and the existence of "man" comprises "spirit" and "form." The categories used by Western philosophers, however, generally show the mode of existence and the "principles of knowledge." The contemporary categories of Marxist philosophy as a whole also show the characteristics and aspects of being and do not include the most basic concepts such as "mind" and "thing" in the categorical system. By this criterion, some of the categories listed above should not be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and some other concepts should be added. However, the way we have indicated the system of traditional Chinese philosophy might be just one approach, for the various categories listed in the diagram do indicate the "basic mode of existence" so far as their contents are concerned, and are also "focal points in the web" of man's knowledge. Would not, then, our way seem to be better suited to reflect the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy? Of course it would be even better if we could use less basic concepts to indicate traditional Chinese philosophy, such as the following diagram.

iii．Can "the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy" reflect its characteristics and level? This is a major question because serious research and thorough discussion are needed to ascertain the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy and its level. Could we venture to say that our diagram of the categorical system more or less reflects the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy? Apparently, traditional Chinese philosophy paid special attention to the study of the basic mode of existence and the existence of man and the relationships between things; that is, the identity of things, hence the multitude of concepts such as the "Heaven and man combine as one," the "knowledge and action combine as one," "essence and function are like one," "nonbeing originates in being," the "spirit and form combine as one," and "mind and matter are not two." Although traditional Chinese philosophy did not devote much discussion to such concepts as time and space, cause and effect which are not included in our diagram, yet as a categorical system, traditional Chinese philosophy already attained a fairly high level as compared with ancient Western and Indian philosophy in that it covered a vast scope, with basic concepts all in pairs and the development of the meaning of its concepts reflecting the world with increasing depth.

The categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has not been widely discussed and is a fairly new topic. Here, the author has ventured to propose some preliminary propositions with the aim of arousing interest in the discussion of this topic in the hope that the study of the history of Chinese philosophy, under the guidance of Marxism, will advance even more scientifically.

柒　论中国传统哲学范畴体系的诸问题*

亚里士多德的《范畴篇》对古希腊哲学的范畴作了总结，提出十个范畴并进行了深入分析。黑格尔的《逻辑学》对西方近代哲学的范畴作了总结，提出了一个较完整的范畴体系。中国传统哲学（即中国古代哲学）有没有一个范畴体系？为什么要研究和如何研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴问题？本文打算对这些问题作一初步的讨论。

一、研究中国传统哲学范畴体系的意义

研究中国传统哲学的范畴体系有它的一般意义和特殊意义两个方面。就其一般意义说至少有以下三点：

1．研究哲学史当然要研究某一哲学家或哲学派别在历史上的作用，但哲学史的研究最终要解决的问题应该是揭示历史上哲学思想如此发展的逻辑必然性。比如说先秦哲学由孔子而孟子而荀子的哲学思想这样发展有什么逻辑必然性。一部以马克思主义为指导的科学的哲学史应当是既能揭示哲学思想发展的动因，又能揭示出哲学思想这样一种理论思维发展的内在逻辑。哲学是关于自然、社会、人类思维最一般规律的科学，它是以抽象思维形式表现出来的，因此可以说哲学思想的发展就其内容说是概念、范畴的提出，概念、范畴涵义的明确、丰富和不断发展的历史。我们研究哲学史上的概念、范畴是如何提出的，它的涵义如何由不明确、不很丰富到比较明确、比较丰富，概念、范畴的体系如何由简单到复杂、由不完整、不系统到比较完整、比较系统，对概念、范畴的发展过程进行具体的分析，就可以掌握哲学思想发展的规律，揭示出其发展的内在逻辑。

2．我们说，哲学史是唯物主义与唯心主义斗争的历史，并不是说唯物主义与唯心主义的斗争和人类认识发展的规律是两个过程，而是同一个过程。人类认识世界的历史是在唯物主义和唯心主义斗争中发展的，也就是说唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争就表现了人类认识发展的规律。而认识必然要使用概念和范畴，所以哲学史上的每一发展阶段都是围绕着对某些基本的概念或范畴的解释而展开，从而形成唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争的。例如，从中国哲学史上看，在先秦唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争，大体上是围绕着天（道）人（道）、名实、知行、变常等等的不同解释而展开的；魏晋时期则是围绕着有无、体用、言意、名教和自然等几对概念而展开的；宋明是围绕着理气、心物、心性、能所等等的不同看法而展开的。研究概念、范畴发展的历史，正是揭示唯物主义和唯心主义斗争规律的关键。

不仅如此，而且可以认识某些概念、范畴在认识史上出现的必然性，有助于克服在以往哲学史的研究中所出现的对唯心主义持简单否定态度的缺陷。王弼是个唯心主义哲学家，但他首先提出了若干“帮助我们认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结”的范畴，如体用、一多、言意等，尽管他的解释是不正确的，而他能提出这些范畴毕竟表现了人类认识的深化，这在哲学史上就应该肯定，给以应有的地位。有王弼“以无为本”“得意忘言”这样的思想的提出，才会有欧阳建的《言尽意论》和裴頠的《崇有论》的出现。所以研究哲学史上的概念、范畴和它的发展历史，也是正确评价哲学史上唯心主义和唯物主义不可缺少的一环。

3．恩格斯说：“迄今为止，学习哲学史是锻炼人们理论思维的唯一方法。”恩格斯这里说的哲学史并没有限定必须是科学的哲学史，倘若学习科学的哲学史当然更能起这样的作用。科学的哲学史必然是能揭示人类认识在唯物主义和唯心主义斗争中发展的规律的，而人类认识发展的历史最基本的内容则是概念、范畴发展的历史。由于概念、范畴在哲学史中的发展反映着人们认识的深入，我们研究它的发展历史就是把人类认识世界的过程在自己的思想中再想一次，当然是排除了种种偶然的、次要的因素，而抓住本质的、带规律性的内容的。这个重新思想的过程，必然使我们自己的思想也深化了。在我们研究概念、范畴发展的历史时，不仅要使人类使用概念、范畴认识世界的过程再现，而且必然要用某种方法使之再现，它只能是对概念、范畴的涵义、诸概念范畴之间的关系以及前后发展的逻辑联系进行理论上分析的方法，这种对概念、范畴的理论分析本身就是一种理论思维活动，就这一方面说，它也会有助于提高我们的理论思维能力。

以上三点都说的是研究概念、范畴的一般意义，因为研究任何哲学发展的历史（如西方的、印度的）都有这样的意义。而研究中国传统哲学的概念范畴和它发展的历史还有其特殊的意义，这就是可以使我们了解中国传统哲学的特点和发展的水平。西方哲学有它自己一套范畴体系，从亚里士多德的《范畴篇》到黑格尔的《逻辑学》表现了西方哲学的特点和不同历史时期哲学思想发展的水平。印度哲学也有它自己的一套范畴体系，就印度佛教说，从原始佛教到大乘空有二宗所使用的范畴大体上是前后相继，有其鲜明的特点，并表现了印度佛教在运用逻辑思维、分析概念涵义上的较高水平。中国传统哲学确有它自己的一套概念、范畴，并且逐渐形成了一个较系统的体系。正因为中国传统哲学有自己一套概念、范畴，对这些概念、范畴就不能简单地用西方哲学的概念、范畴去套，甚至也不能简单地和马克思主义哲学的概念、范畴等同。

在我国哲学史上，长期形成的一套概念、范畴，除少量吸收了印度佛教的概念之外，基本上是独立发展的，所以它的特点也是很鲜明的，例如，在中国哲学史上，“天（道）”和“人（道）”这对范畴就非常重要，因此在中国传统哲学中不仅对天人关系的问题比较重视，而且特别重视人和人（社会）之间关系问题的研究。又如“体”和“用”这对范畴，它不仅包含有“本体”和“现象”的意思，而且有“根据”和“功用”、“全体”和“部分”、“抽象”和“具体”等等的意思，这样一些成对的概念、范畴及其体系自然充分地表现了中国传统哲学的特点，并反映了一定历史发展阶段上的理论思维水平。用一个不十分恰当的比方说，中国医学有其独特的传统，有着特殊的理论体系，使用着特殊的医学名词概念，尽管有些理论和成就我们还不能作出明确的科学解释，但既然在医疗实践上能取得良好的效果，它肯定反映了事物本质的某些侧面，包含着相当深刻的道理。就概念、范畴是知识成立的必要条件，是主观对客观联系的枢纽来说，一定概念、范畴的提出总是人们在思维实践上对客观事物某些侧面的认识获得的一定成果的反映，有什么样的概念、范畴就标志着人们的认识深化到什么程度。因此，我们研究中国传统哲学各个历史发展时期的概念、范畴，就可以看到我国历史上各个时期的理论思维水平。

在中国哲学史上，有三个时期的哲学对中国传统哲学范畴体系的形成有着较大的意义：一是先秦的诸子学；二是魏晋的玄学；三是宋明的理学。如果把这三个时期我国传统哲学的范畴体系和西方同期相比较，应当可以看到它有明显的特点和较高的水平。这样把我国传统哲学和其他国家、民族、地域哲学的范畴体系相比较，是比较哲学应当研究的重要课题。

二、怎样研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴

研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴，从根本上说必须用马克思主义的科学分析方法，我们如果仅仅提出在中国哲学史上曾经使用过哪些概念、范畴，这远不是我们研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴所要达到的目的。因为那样并不能揭示出哲学思想发展的规律、了解唯物主义与唯心主义斗争的规律和使我们的理论思维得到提高，特别是不能认识中国传统哲学的特点和水平。要达到上述目的就必须用马克思主义的科学方法：（l）分析概念、范畴的涵义；（2）分析概念、范畴涵义的发展；（3）分析哲学家（或哲学派别）的概念、范畴体系；（4）分析中外哲学概念、范畴的异同。只有在作了这样一些具体的分析研究的基础上，才有可能使中国哲学史的研究在科学化的道路上前进。

1．分析概念、范畴的涵义

一个或一对哲学概念（范畴）的提出，反映着人们对世界认识的水平，但是这个或这对概念的涵义是什么则要我们去分析。古代哲学家提出一新的概念，其涵义往往不如我们今天科学、明确，特别是在说明世界的本原时所用的概念更是不确定，而且有时含糊不清。例如，老子是第一个把“道”作为他的哲学体系的最高概念提出来的。他提出“道”这个概念，在春秋战国时期具有和“尊天”思想相对立的意义。他把“道”作为世界的本原，这当然是提高了中国古代哲学的思想水平，但“道”的涵义如何？老子自己也感到难以说清，他说：“吾不知其名，字之曰道，强为之名曰大”，所以他用了许多形容词来说明“道”：“寂兮寥兮”“恍兮惚兮”“窈兮冥兮”等等。看来，古代哲学家限于当时的客观条件和认识水平，要给表明世界本原的概念作出明确说明是多么不容易呀！因此，这就要求我们根据《老子》一书对“道”这一概念的涵义进行分析。²“自然”这一概念在中国哲学史上被广泛地使用，但各个哲学家对它的解释却不相同。最早把“自然”作为一哲学概念使用的也是老子，他的“自然”大体上是“无为”的意思，汉朝王充继承了这个意思，说“天道自然无为”。到魏晋，王弼、夏侯玄等“贵无派”，把“自然”看成就是“道”—宇宙本体。夏侯玄说：“天地以自然运，圣人以自然用。自然者道也，道本无名，故老氏强为之名。”

而且同一哲学家对“自然”的解释也并不一致，往往从几个方面去解释。这里我们以郭象的“自然”概念为例作些分析。郭象的“自然”至少有五点相互联系的涵义：第一，天人之所为皆“自然”。郭象注《庄子·大宗师》“知天之所为，知人之所为者，至矣”，说：“知天人之所为皆自然”。这就是说，郭象不仅把“天然”看成是“自然”，而且“人为”从某种意义上说也是“自然”。那么在什么意义上说“人为”也是“自然”呢？第二，“自为”是“自然”。郭象说：“言物自然者，无为之者也”，又说：“贵其无为而物之自为也”，可见他的“自然”有“任物之自为”的意思。那么为什么“自为”是一种“无为”呢？第三，“任性”即“自然”。郭象认为“自为”是“自然”，但“自为”并非任意而为，而是“率性而动”，即“任性而为”，“自然耳，故曰性”。“任自然”就是“任性”，既不使人从己，亦不舍己从人。第四，“必然”即“自然”。郭象说：“达命之情者，不务命之所无奈何也，全其自然而已”，“知命”的不做“无奈何”的事这就叫“自然”，这里所谓“命”即“必然性”的意思。第五，“偶然”即“自然”。郭象说：“物各自然，不知其所以然而然”，就“不知其然”说，“自然”又有偶然性的意思。所以，在说明事物的“自生”时往往用“突然”“掘然”等等，都是说事物的存在是没有道理、说不出原因的。

按郭象“自然”概念的涵义有以上相互联系的五点，而其中最重要的是后面两点，即“自然”既有“必然”又有“偶然”的意思。必然和偶然本是一对相对立的概念，但从辩证的观点看必然和偶然是相互联系的，是能互相转化的，必然性又是通过偶然性表现出来。郭象用“自然”一词既说明“必然”又说明“偶然”，正是因为他认识到“必然”和“偶然”的相互联系：此一事物作为此一事物如此地存在，从一方面说是“必然”的，“物各有性”；从另一方面说又是“偶然”的，“忽尔自生”。在郭象的体系中，事物的存在必须兼有这两方面，缺一方面就无郭象哲学。从对郭象的“自然”概念涵义的分析，我们大体可以看到郭象哲学的特点和水平。

2．分析概念、范畴涵义的发展

不仅每个哲学家的概念、范畴的涵义不同，而且各个时代的概念、范畴的涵义往往也不相同。尽管如此，如果这种哲学思想是前后相承的，那么总可以发现概念、范畴涵义之间的继承关系。研究概念、范畴发展的历史，对于了解人们认识发展的规律是非常重要的。下面就中国传统哲学中“气”概念的涵义的发展作些分析，以便说明分析概念、范畴涵义发展的重要性。

早在春秋时期，就有思想家提出“气”对人的影响问题，如《左传·昭公元年》所记载的医知论“六气”。到战国，“气”成一普遍概念，不仅多以为人的形体由“气”构成，而且有以为人的精神也是由“气”构成。在《管子》书中有《白心》《内业》《心术》等篇，中说：“精也者，气之精者也”“凡物之精，化则为生”“下生五谷，上为列星，流于天地之间谓之鬼神，藏于胸中谓之圣人”“故有气则生，无气则死”等等。这就是说，“气”之中一种叫“精气”，凡是能得到它的似乎就有生命，这种“精气”如果到人的身体中，就会有聪明智慧，可以使人成为圣人。

战国时期，这种对“精神”作不科学解释的“精气说”，如果说仍是一种唯物主义，那么这种唯物主义观点已包含了很大的缺陷，致使在一定条件下可以被唯心主义所利用而成为其体系的组成部分；也可以为神仙家所吸收而改造，使之成为其鼓吹“长生不死”的根据。我们知道，孟轲也讲“气”，提出有一种“气”叫“浩然之气”。在《白心》等篇中说，“精气”能给人以聪明智慧，且“此气也，不可止之以力，而安之以德”，“气”本身就有聪明智慧，要由道德力量巩固它。到孟轲那里，他所说的“浩然之气”，就是“集义所生”的了。显然，孟轲所讲的这种“气”就成为精神性的。到汉朝，董仲舒进一步把“气”道德化、神秘化，致使“气”成为上帝的意志和力量的表现。他认为“气”有刑、赏的能力，有善、恶的分别，有喜、怒、哀、乐的感情，这就使它虽保存了物质的外观，而失去了物质的特性。后来两汉谶纬迷信中关于“气”的种种说法，大体都是沿着董仲舒的观点发展的。

从先秦到两汉的一些史料中我们还可以看到，“气”和神形问题相联系多与“养生”有关，而“养生”则往往又是“成神”的一种手段。在《庄子》书中，所描写的“真人”“神人”等多是“神将守形，守形乃长生”者，他们“吸风饮露，不食五谷”，“一其性，养其气”，神与形合，即可达到“形全精复，与天地为一”的境界。《吕氏春秋》亦多载“养生”之谈，认为要做到“长生久视”则“气”必能在身体中不断流通，而“精气日新，邪气尽去，及其天年，此之谓真。”在《淮南子》中把“养气”“养形”“养性”往往看成是一回事，而且都和“气”的作用联系在一起，无论《吕氏春秋》还是《淮南子》都受到《白心》等篇“精气说”的影响，认为“精神”也是一种“气”（精气），它可以自由出入于身体，神形不离则可长生久视。

与此同时，从先秦到两汉也有继承此前把“气”看成是物质性的、构成天地万物的东西的哲学家。荀子认为天地万物包括人都是由“气”构成，“水火有气而无生，草木有生而无知，禽兽有知而无义，人有气有生有知亦且有义”。《淮南子·精神训》说宇宙最初是没有具体形象的混沌未分的元气，后由阴阳二气的互相作用而产生天地万物，“浊气为虫，精气为人”。王充更明确地说“天地合气，万物生焉”，而且万物的产生正是“气”运动的结果，“天之动行也，施气也；体动气乃出，物乃生矣”。为了反对董仲舒对“气”的唯心主义观点，王充特别提出“气”是无意志、无目的的，“气也，恬澹无欲，无为无事者也”“气若云烟，安能听人辞”。但是，王充和《淮南子》书中的观点一样，仍然把人的精神（或生命现象）看成是“精气”，他说：“人之所以生者，精气也，死而精气灭”。可见在我国古代哲学史上关于“气”的学说，从对这个概念涵义的分析上，就可以明显地发现其间的前后继承关系了。上述三个方面关于“气”的学说，或者说关于“气”的几种涵义，到东汉末都汇合在道教的思想之中，兹不详述。

3．分析哲学家（或哲学派别）的概念、范畴体系

在哲学史上，比较重要的哲学家在建立其哲学体系时，必然要使用一系列的概念、范畴，因此研究其概念、范畴相互之间的关系，是我们深入解剖其思想体系的基本要求。一个哲学家思想体系水平的高低往往和他使用概念、范畴是否丰富、是否成体系，以及其概念、范畴的涵义是否反映事物之间的本质联系有关系。从对哲学史上的哲学家（或哲学派别）的研究方面说，有时看法不同或者也是由于没有对其概念、范畴体系作全面而系统的分析引起的。例如，郭象的哲学如仅从他分析“有”和“无”这对范畴的关系看，或者可以说他的思想是唯物主义的，但是郭象的哲学之所以成为魏晋玄学发展的髙峰，并不是由于他对“有”和“无”的关系提出了和王弼不同的看法，而在于他有一比较完整的思想体系。郭象的哲学思想体系分析起来，大体上可以说是由下述四组基本概念构成的（当然在郭象哲学中还有其他一些重要概念，这里就不说了）。

“有”和“无”：魏晋玄学所讨论的中心是“本末有无”问题，郭象的哲学也可以说是从讨论这个问题开始的。郭象认为，“有”（或“万有”）是唯一的存在，是“常存”的，“夫有之为物，虽千变万化，而不得一为无”，“言天地常存，乃无未有之时”。至于“无”，他则认为在“有”之上的造物主或作为本体的“无”是不存在（non-existence），就是“无物”（nothing），所以他说：“无则无矣，则不能生有”；“请问造物者，有邪无邪？无也则胡能生物？”“无”既然是“无”，怎么能生物？所以郭象哲学一开始就否定在“万有”之上有一个“造物主”，或者说有一个与“有”相对立的本体之“无”作为它存在的根据。但是，郭象哲学并未就此止步，而是继续讨论下去了。

“性”和“命”：事物的存在既然不是以本体的“无”为根据，那么事物的存在有没有什么根据呢？照郭象看，不能说“万有”的存在是没有任何根据，万物既然存在了，其存在本身就是其存在的根据，具体地说，其存在的根据就在于其“自性”，“物各有性，性各有极”。郭象的所谓“性”就是指“此物之所以为此物者”，有“规定性”的意思，所以他说：“天性所受，各有本分，不可逃，亦不可加。”“物各有分（性分），故知者守知以待终，而愚者抱愚以至死，岂有能中易其性？”所谓“命”，郭象则把它解释为“必然性”，如他说：“命也者，言物皆自然而无为之者”，“知不可奈何者命也”。很明显，他的“性”和“命”两概念的涵义都是为了论证“有”是唯一的存在，而作为造物主或本体的“无”是根本不存在的。

“自生”和“无待”：事物的“自性”是其存在的根据，而此“自性”又是如何产生的？它的产生是不是有目的、有条件的？郭象说：“物各自生，无所出焉，此天道也，”“物之生也，莫不颓然而自生。”如果事物的“自性”不是“自生”的，那么就是其他事物所给予的，是造物主有目的创造的。然而此事物之所以成为此事物，彼事物之所以成为彼事物，是没有什么使它这样或那样地产生和存在，甚至也不能认为是它自己使它这样或那样地产生和存在，所以“自生”只能是“欻然自生”“突然自生”“自然而生”。事物的产生和存在如有什么原因和目的，则必然导致承认有主使者。那么“自生”的事物和其他“自生”的事物是个什么关系呢？郭象认为，任何事物都是“自生”的，其存在都是“自足其性”的，所以是“无待”的。一方面“无待”之所以可能是因为“物各自造”，“物各自造，而无所待焉”；另一方面只要“适性”“安性”，则“无待”对于任何事物来说都是可以达到的，“苟足于其性，则虽大鹏无以自贵于小鸟，小鸟无羡于天池，而荣愿有余矣。故小大虽殊，逍遥一也。”所以要坚持事物存在的根据除其自身的“自性”外，再没有其他任何根据和条件，就必须承认它是“自生”的“无待”的。

“独化”和“相因”：要把“自生”和“无待”的观点坚持下去，还有一个重要问题要解决。如果说，每个事物都是一个个的存在，此事物就是此事物，彼事物就是彼事物，互相分别，那么所有的事物岂不都是相对的？如果都是相对的，那么岂不还要受到限制？如果要受到限制，那么岂不仍是“有待”的？为了解决这个问题，郭象提出了“独化”的概念。所谓“独化”是说任何事物的生生化化都是独立自足的，因此“无待”是绝对的。如果要追求事物生生化化的原因和根据，表面上看来可以无穷无尽地追求下去，但追求到最后只能得出“无待”的结论来，所以他说：“若责其所待，而寻其所由，则寻责无极，卒至乎无待，而独化之理明矣”。郭象在《齐物论注》中举了一个极端的例子，他说形、影和罔两（影外之阴）都是独立自足的、绝对的存在，“是以涉有物之域，虽复罔两，未有不独化于玄冥者也”。

如果有一物不是独立自足的存在，那么其他任何事物也都不能独立自足的存在，这样就必然引出在“万有”之上仍有一作为其存在根据的本体（或造物主），而势必承认有“生化之本”了。事物尽管是独立自足的存在，只要每个事物都完满地实现其“自性”，充分地发挥其“自性”，“知者守知以待终，而愚者抱愚以至死”，那么就可以达到“天地未足为寿，而与我并生；万物未足为异，而与我同得”的境界。这样对其他任何事物就有最大的功用，“相因之功，莫若独化之至”。从另一个角度看，任何存在着的事物，只要是存在着的它就是不可少的，就不能不存在，郭象说：“人之生也，形虽七尺，而五常必具，故区区之身，乃举天地以奉之。故天地万物，凡所有者，不可一日相无也。一物不具，则生者无由得生；一理不至，则天年无缘得终。”因此，凡是存在的都是合理的、必然的，而且是不互相排斥的。这个观点似乎与“独化”说有矛盾，其实不然。因为照郭象看，存在着的事物都是合理的、必然的，而不是互相排斥的，正是以每一事物都能充分地、绝对地发挥其“自性”、独立自足地生生化化为条件。

从对郭象哲学范畴体系的分析看，他的哲学最后要建立的是“独化”说，而“崇有”不过是达到“独化”说的阶梯。而且在郭象的体系中唯有建立其“独化”学说，才可以坚持“崇有”，而较为彻底地否定在“万有”之上还有一作为其存在根据的“无”。

我们要了解一个哲学家是唯物主义还是唯心主义、他的哲学的特点以及他的哲学思想的前后继承关系和历史地位，都必须通过对其范畴体系的分析才可以得到。

4．分析中外哲学概念、范畴的异同

在对中外哲学概念范畴的分析比较中，可以更好地认识中国传统哲学的特点和水平，这点是毫无疑义的。由于这个问题比较大，作者又没有作过仔细、深入的研究，这里只就魏晋玄学和当时传入的印度佛教般若学这一个问题作一点粗浅的比较分析。

魏晋玄学所讨论的主要问题是“本末有无”问题，所以“无”和“有”两个概念是玄学的最重要的基本概念。佛教般若学所讨论的问题也是“有”和“无”（或“空”）的问题，所以道安说：“于十二部，毗目罗部最多，以斯邦人老庄教行，与方等经兼忘相似，故因风易行耳。”但佛教般若空宗讲的“空”（或“无”）虽与玄学家王弼等讲的“无”有相似处，实并不相同。汉末灵帝光和二年（179年）支娄迦谶译出《道行般若波罗蜜经》中有“本无品”，“本无”是梵文Tathatā的意译，后来译为“真如”，而在《道行经·本无品》中所说的“本无”是“诸法本无自性”的意思，所有的事物都没有实在的自体。玄学家王弼等也讲“本无”，意思是说万物“以无为本”，所有的事物都以“无”为本体。这两种“本无”思想虽不能说全然不同，但其涵义却有很大差别。从魏晋玄学说，王弼的“本无”思想是继承了老子的学说，在他的哲学体系中“无”这一概念和“道”或“理”是同一的，“夫大之极也，其唯道乎！……虽贵以无为用，不能舍无以为体”；“物无妄然，必由其理”，所以王弼的“无”不是说“虚空”或“不存在”（non-existence），而是指事物的“本体”（substance）。佛教般若空宗的“本无”只是讲的“诸法本无自性”，他们认为任何事物都是因缘和合而成，并无实在的自性。从这里看，般若空宗说的“空”不是指的“本体”（substance）而是说的“虚空”（non-existence）。至于“有”的涵义，魏晋玄学所讲的“有”一般都是说“万有”，即形形色色的具体存在物，但在我们所翻译的佛经中，把佛教中不同涵义的“有”（存在）往往都译为同一个“有”。³

佛教传入中国，在东汉先是依附于中国的道术，到魏晋玄学流行以后又依附于玄学，东晋时所出现的我国僧人的般若学各派大体上也还是用玄学思想了解般若学，一直到鸠摩罗什来华，译出《般若经》的释论《大智度论》和《中论》《百论》《十二门论》等，在中国才对印度佛学的般若学的原意了解了。僧肇的《不真空论》是比较近印度佛教般若学讲“非有非无”的原意的。

我们在对中外哲学概念、范畴的比较分析中，可以看到它们各自的特点和水平，也可以看到一种外来文化思想的传入对原有的传统文化思想发生影响的过程，以及外来文化思想如何被吸收而成为所传入的国家（民族、地域）文化思想的一个组成部分。

三、关于中国传统哲学范畴体系的构想

“范畴”从西方哲学史上看有种种解释，亚里士多德的《范畴篇》把它看作是存在的基本样式（mode），他提出十个范畴：本质（substance）、量（quantity）、质（quality）、关系（relation）、位置（place）、时（time）、占有（state）、作用（action）、遭受（passion）等。康德的12范畴说是与认识有关的原则或说是构成经验的条件。列宁说：“范畴是在区分过程中的一些小阶段，是帮助我们认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结。”苏联《哲学辞典》说：“反映现实世界各种现象和认识的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系的基本概念。”看来，对“范畴”大体上是从现实界的存在和认识两个方面来说明的：说它是“存在的基本样式”或“现实界各种现象的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系”，是就存在方面说的；说它是“构成经验的条件”或“认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结”，是就认识方面说的。而认识的必要条件必然是反映和表现“存在的基本样式”；而“存在的基本样式”又只是在人们的认识过程中才有意义。从上述一些说法中，我们还可以看出“范畴”和“概念”的关系，范畴是基本概念，概念并不都是范畴。因此，在这里我们要讨论的是，中国传统哲学的基本概念即范畴应有哪些。如果我们能根据中国古代哲学家所使用的基本概念构成一个能表现中国传统哲学是如何用以认识和说明“存在的基本样式”的体系，并能从中揭示中国传统哲学思想发展的线索，那就证明中国传统哲学确有其范畴体系。下面先用一图表（见下图）来表明，然后再作一些必要的说明：

在这个图表中共用了20对中国传统哲学的基本概念构成中国传统哲学的范畴体系，这当然是一个很初步的构想，问题一定很多，目的是想引起大家进一步地研究和讨论。对这个中国传统哲学范畴体系的构想图表，我想说明以下几点：

1．这个构想图表分为三大栏，第一栏（Ⅰ）是想说明中国传统哲学中用了哪些基本概念表述世界的存在；第二栏（Ⅱ）是想说明用了哪些基本概念表述存在的形式；第三栏（Ⅲ）是想说明用了哪些基本概念表述人的存在和认识。“天（道）”和“人（道）”的关系问题一直是中国传统哲学讨论的中心，中国哲学史上的唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争大都也是围绕这个问题进行的。子产第一个明确地提出这两者之间关系的命题：“天道远，人道迩”。孔子一方面很重视“天命”，而另一方面更重视“人事”。他“五十而知天命”，却比较少讲这个问题，“夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也”，可是《论语》大量记载他讲“人道”的问题。孟子讲“尽心，知性，知天”，《中庸》说“诚者天之道，诚之者人之道”，荀子讲“制天命而用之”，都是讲的“天人关系”问题。道家的老子讲“天道自然无为”，而压低“仁义”（人道）；庄子“蔽于天而不知人”。汉朝的儒家大师董仲舒说他自己讲的是“天人相与之际”的学问；受道家影响比较深的司马迁也说《史记》是“究天人之际，通古今之变”的著作。魏晋玄学讨论的“本末有无”问题，就其内容说仍是“自然”（天道）与“名教”（人道）的关系问题，所以何晏说：“若王弼者，始可与言天人之际。”宋儒无论理学还是心学，都把“人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允执厥中”称为“十六字心传”。朱熹认为“太极（天理）只是个极好至善底道理”，“是天地人物万善之好底表德”，“天理”和“人欲”问题仍是天人关系问题。直到王夫之仍然把这个问题作为他讨论的重点，他认为“礼虽纯为天理之节文，而必寓于人欲以见”，“人欲之大公即天理之至正矣”。所以，中国传统哲学是从讨论“天（道）”和“人（道）”这对范畴的关系开始而展开的，它反映了中国传统哲学所注重的问题和特殊内容。

2．这个构想图中表述了中国传统哲学范畴的发展及诸范畴之间的关系。中国传统哲学从研究“天（道）”和“人（道）”的关系开始，而分为两支：一支为道家，老子提出“道”和“万物”的关系，他说：“道生一，一生二，二生三，三生万物”，又说：“天下万物生于有，有生于无”，因此“道”和“物”的关系又以“无”和“有”这对概念表现；另一支是儒家，在《易传》中提出“道”和“器”这对范畴，说：“形而上者谓之道，形而下者谓之器”，又说：“易有太极，是生两仪”，“一阴一阳谓之道”，所以“道”和“器”的关系又以“太极”和“阴阳”这对概念表现。两汉时哲学思想虽有发展，但似乎没有提出新的有影响的范畴。魏晋玄学主三玄（《老子》《庄子》《周易》），而使道家系统的思想和儒家《周易》系统的思想渐结合，而实是以老庄思想为骨架而建立了关于宇宙本原问题的本体论。魏晋玄学用“体”“用”、“本”“末”、“一”“多”等概念说明“无”（本体）和“有”（万物，本体的种种表现），用“自然”（体）和“名教”（用）这对概念表述“宇宙本然”（即本体）和“人类社会关系”（即名分教化之类）的关系，用“意”和“言”这对概念说明对宇宙本体的认识问题。自魏晋南北朝以后，中国传统哲学经过印度佛教的冲击，到宋形成理学。理学实是吸收了佛教的思想而形成的新儒学体系。如果说魏晋玄学讲的本体论是以老庄思想为骨架，那么宋明理学确为儒家学说建立了客观唯心主义体系（朱熹）、主观唯心主义体系（王守仁）和较高水平的唯物主义体系（王夫之）。这个时期的哲学概念继承了魏晋玄学的，又吸收了隋唐佛学的，而使儒、道、佛三家在儒家思想基础上汇合了。“理”和“气”、“心”和“物”成为当时哲学的最基本的概念；“心”与“性”展开为“心即理”和“性即理”的问题；“能”和“所”、“格物”和“穷理”等是认识论的问题；“天理”和“人欲”是社会问题。列宁在《谈谈辩证法问题》中说：

“哲学史上的圆圈：古代：从德谟克利特到柏拉图以及赫拉克里特的辩证法。……近代：霍尔巴赫——黑格尔（经过贝克菜、休谟、康德）。黑格尔——费尔巴哈——马克思。”

在《黑格尔<哲学史讲演录>一书摘要》中说：

“把哲学史比做圆圈……”

“每一种哲学思想=整个人类思想发展的大圆圈（螺旋）上的一个圆圈。”

列宁所指出的黑格尔关于“把哲学史比做圆圈”的思想，深刻地反映了哲学思想发展的规律，这对我们研究中国传统哲学思想发展有非常重要的意义。

从这个范畴体系的构想图中，我们可以看到中国传统哲学基本上是由三个螺旋上升的圆圈构成的：第一个是先秦，从儒家说是孔子—孟子—荀子（或《易传》）；从道家说是老子—稷下学派（即《白心》等篇）—庄子，两汉是个过渡阶段。第二个是魏晋，王弼—向秀—郭象（或王弼—郭象—僧肇）。南北朝到隋唐佛教盛行，经过一段时间的发展形成了中国的宗派如华严宗、禅宗等。第三个是宋明，张载—朱熹—王夫之。

3．在构想图中的第二栏（Ⅱ）只列了3对范畴，而最根本的一对范畴是“静”和“动”，“常”和“变”是“静”和“动”的表现，其实“正”和“反”也是“静”和“动”的一种特殊表现形式。中国传统哲学中虽然讨论“静”和“动”的哲学家很多，但“时”“空”问题除先秦名家和后期墨家有较多的讨论外，以后讨论的则不太多，也不普遍。从中国传统哲学看，它的哲学命题似乎不受时、空的限制；运动是否在时空中也不注意。所以，在这里我们没有把“时”“空”这类概念列在这个范畴体系构想图中。

4．在中国传统哲学中，关于“人（道）”方面的问题研究得比较多，特别是“道德”（伦理）问题的讨论更是中国传统哲学的特点，因此到底在范畴体系中应列入哪些，要很好地研究。在这个构想图中（见Ⅲ栏）只列了5对（有些也不全是“人（道）”问题），作为哲学的基本概念是不是大体也够了。“神”和“形”是说“精神”和“身体”的关系问题，是讨论人的生命现象，这个问题从先秦一直讨论下来，有唯物主义的和唯心主义的不同看法。“性”“情”问题可以说是伦理道德的核心问题，对“性”自先秦以来就有种种不同看法，有“性善说”“性恶说”“善恶混说”“无善无不善说”“善恶以人异说”等等；而“性”和“情”的关系又有“性善情恶”“性静情动”等不同说法。到魏晋玄学对这个问题仍很注意，它成为讨论“圣人”与“一般人”的异同的一个重要问题。宋明理学分“性”为“天命之性”和“气质之性”，而所谓“天命之性”是从“天理”来的；“气质之性”是生来固有的感情、欲望等，是从构成身体的“气”得来的，这还是一个“性”“情”问题，而道德教化的重要就在“存天理，灭人欲”。“知”“行”问题在中国传统哲学中占有很重要的地位，就中国传统哲学看，多数哲学家都主张既要“知”又要“行”，而且以为“行”更重要。“名”“实”问题是中国传统哲学原来就有的，而“能”“所”这对概念则是从佛教中吸取的，都是关于人的认识问题。因此，构想图的第三栏（Ⅲ）所列是表明人的存在和认识的概念。

四、问题讨论

关于中国传统哲学的范畴体系是个很复杂、又涉及很多方面的问题，因而需要大家来切实地研究讨论，这里提出几个问题作一点初步的讨论：

1．范畴体系中的范畴是否应成对？

关于这个问题要分成两个问题来讨论，一个问题是从哲学史上说一个哲学家使用的概念、范畴并不一定都成对，例如老子提出“自然”这个概念，在《老子》书中或者还没有另一与之相对的概念；在《管子》书《白心》等篇中“气”作为最一般的概念似乎也没有一相对的概念。但是，从整个中国传统哲学的发展看，范畴都是成对的。如“自然”和“名教”就构成一对范畴；“气”和“理”就构成一对范畴。另一问题是，就任何事物来说都是矛盾的，都有矛盾的双方，决没有只有一方而无另一方，因此反映事物本质联系的范畴也应是成对的。在中国传统哲学中有一些概念、范畴似乎并不成对，例如“中庸”，我们当然不好说“反中庸”和它构成了一对相对的概念。但是，我们从“中庸”的涵义方面来分析，这个问题或者可以解决。孔子提出“中庸之道”是为了反对“过”的，他说：“过犹不及。”所以就“中庸”的涵义说是“中”或“正”的意思，因此中国传统哲学的范畴体系中有“正”和“反”这对范畴就可以了，“正”可以包含“中庸”。

从西方哲学史上看，一些哲学家的范畴体系似乎也并不都是根据对立统一而表现的，在亚里士多德的10个范畴中有的是成对的，例如“质”和“量”，但“本质”（substance）则没有一具体相对的范畴，当然也可以说其他9个范畴都和“本质”构成一对范畴。康德的12范畴和黑格尔的《逻辑学》的范畴体系分析起来，所列范畴大都是成对的，马克思主义哲学家关于范畴体系的看法虽不一致，但都认为范畴应是成对的，例如“本质和现象”“内容和形式”“必然性和偶然性”“可能性和现实性”等等，马克思主义哲学认为范畴必然是成对的，这无疑是正确的，它反映了事物的本来面貌。因此，我们今天研究中国传统哲学的范畴体系，使中国传统哲学的范畴系统化，比较科学地反映中国传统哲学的特点和水平，也应该在它的范畴体系中体现对立统一的规律。

2．中国传统哲学范畴体系中应包含多少对范畴就足够表明“存在的基本样式”或“反映现实界各种现象和认识的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系的基本概念”？这里提出20对基本概念构成中国传统哲学的范畴体系，只是一个尝试，可能不能成立。这20对范畴大都说“世界”和“人”是什么，如说“世界”的存在有“理”有“气”，“人”的存在有“形”有“神”等等。西方哲学家所说的范畴往往是说的“存在的样式”或“认识的原则”。就目前马克思主义哲学的范畴说，一般也是说的存在的特性方面和关系，而并不把“心”和“物”这样的最基本的概念放在范畴体系中。如果用这个标准看，上面所列中国传统哲学范畴体系中有些范畴就不能列入，而应补充另外一些概念。但是，我们这样来表述中国传统哲学的范畴体系是不是也是一种方式，因为图表中所列诸范畴从它们的涵义说是表明“存在的基本样式”的，也是人们认识事物之网的网上纽结。这样表述是不是更适合反映中国传统哲学的特点和水平？当然，如果用更少一些基本概念来表述中国传统哲学的范畴体系应该说是更理想的，比如说也可以如下图只列12对：

3．“中国传统哲学的范畴体系”是否能反映出中国传统哲学的特点和水平？这个问题比较大，因为中国传统哲学的特点有哪些，和怎样看一种哲学水平的高低，都是要进行认真研究和充分讨论的。但我们这个构想图，是不是也可以说多少反映了中国传统哲学的特点和水平呢？看来，中国传统哲学比较重视研究存在的基本样式和人的存在问题，而且注重事物之间的联系，即其同一性的方面，所以在中国传统哲学中讲“天人合一”“知行合一”“体用如一”“无因于有”“神形合一”“理气一元”“心物不二”等等比较多。在这个构想图中虽然没有列“时”“空”、“因”“果”等概念（在中国传统哲学中讨论这方面问题确实比较少），但作为一个范畴体系相对于西方古代或印度古代哲学来说它并不逊色，它包含的范畴很广，基本概念都是成对的，而且从它的发展上看概念的涵义是越来越深刻地反映世界，都表明了中国传统哲学已有较高的水平。

关于中国传统哲学范畴体系问题过去研究讨论得不多，还是一个较新的课题，这里只是提出一些不成熟的看法，希望能引起讨论，使中国哲学史的研究在马克思主义指导下进一步科学化。

VIII．A RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF "THE TRUE, THE GOOD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL" IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

What is the highest ideal in spiritual life human beings quest for? I believe it is "the true, the good and the beautiful" and the unity of the three in one system. Of course, ideas of philosophers are different regarding what constitutes each of these three ideals. As far as how these are unified in one system, opinions differ from each other. There cannot be any final conclusion to this discussion, and actually there is no need for such one. As long as people quest for truth, goodness and beauty, thinkers will undoubtedly want to construct systems unifying the concepts. In my opinion, the quest for spiritual realm of life in Chinese traditional philosophy can be referred to as ancient philosophers' quest for "the true, the good, and the beautiful" in another way. I wrote an article entitled "The Question of the True, the Good and the Beautiful in Traditional Chinese Philosophy"¹ which was largely a historical discussion of the Confucian view about the question. This article is, however, not confined to a discussion of the Confucians and is not historical in its approach because such an approach would entail too unfocussed and lengthy an article. We will therefore analyze and discuss selected representative thinkers.

Influence on the development of Chinese philosophy has always been exerted by China's pre-Qin philosophers, among whom Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi have been the most influential. If we regard these three as typical and through them discuss the question of the different spiritual realm of life (rensheng jingjie) advanced by different traditional Chinese philosophies, we may perhaps be able to derive a unified understanding of spiritual realm of life held by traditional Chinese philosophy.

Forty years ago, Shen Youding, who was engaged in research at Oxford University, wrote to friends in China, saying:

The value theories of Kant and of Hegel have one important difference which we can represent as follows:

Kant: the good ← the beautiful ← the true

Hegel: the true ← the beautiful ← the good

From this we can see that Kant was perhaps closer to the Chinese, while Hegel was closer to the Indian or Greek.²

This conclusion of Mr. Shen is particularly insightful and innovative. From Confucian thought, which formed the mainstream in the development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we can see that this scheme holds, but if we examine the different schools of thought and philosophies which make up traditional Chinese philosophy we find that it does not. As I see it, in traditional Chinese philosophy there were in fact three different systems integrating the true, the good and the beautiful. The systems of Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi are set out below:

Confucius: | the good | ← the beautiful | ← the true
Laozi: | the true | ← the good | ← the beautiful
Zhuangzi: | the beautiful | ← the good | ← the true

Drawing analogies from this diagram we can say in overall terms that in terms of value regarding the question of the true, the good and the beautiful, Confucius approximates Kant, Laozi approximates Hegel, while in a limited way Zhuangzi approximates Schelling or Aristotle. Of course such analogies are limited and we cannot extrapolate them to all other aspects of the ideas of these thinkers, but they do serve to direct the lines along which we can think.

I．Confucius' Demands of the Realm of Life

In the section of The Analects entitled "Wei Zheng" (Practicing Government) the following statement is attributed to Confucius:

At fifteen I set my heart upon learning, at thirty I had established myself, at forty I was not subject to doubt, at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven, at sixty I could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said, and at seventy I followed my heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules.

We know that Confucius and later Confucians believed that life and death or wealth and honor were not attained by mere individual efforts, but that the level of a person's morality or learning could differ because of the amount of individual effort. These words of Confucius are at one and the same time a description of the course of his life, an outline of the process of self-cultivation he pursued, and a summation of his quest for and understanding of the true, the good and the beautiful. The years from fifteen to forty can be seen as the preparatory stage for his assumption of sagehood, and the statements that he was "not subject to doubt" and that he could "follow" his "heart's dictates, and not transgress the rules" reveal that deepening of the process whereby he acquired sagehood. The statement that he had come "to know the commands of Heaven" explains how he acquired knowledge and understanding of "Heaven" (the ultimate questions of life and the universe), which may perhaps be considered to fall within the scope of the quest for the true. Here Confucius sees Heaven as a cognitive object and he has not attained the stage where he is "one with Heaven," having not yet entered that realm of unity. In his "Preface to Zhuangzi," Guo Xiang wrote:

Zhuangzi can be said to have known the origin. . . . although he said he did not have that understanding, he alone responded to it. To respond without understanding is, however, to have no need to apply effort.

To be able to respond to the noumenon of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things can be called knowing "the root," but this entails the cognitive subject being apart from the noumenon of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and to see this noumenon as the object of cognition necessarily means that one has not yet attained oneness with that noumenon. While this noumenon exists on a higher realm, Zhuangzi was not yet able to "follow" his "heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules."

Confucius' statement that at sixty he "could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said" (liushi er ershun) has, in fact, been subject to varying interpretations over the ages. Yang Bojun, whose interpretation presented in Lunyu Yizhu (Analects, Vernacular Translation and Annotation, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1958) is used here, writes that the expression ershun "is extremely difficult to explain. Many have sought to do so, but I feel all their explanations to be forced. . . ." I believe that Yang's interpretation is close to what Confucius intended by the statement. Yang's interpretation is probably based on the explanation of Li Chong of the Jin Dynasty who wrote that ershun means "the heart and the ear follow each other" (xinyu' er xiangcong). Sun Chuo, also of the Jin Dynasty, provided a more metaphysical explanation when he wrote:

Ershun means to discard the logic which governs listening, to intuit the mystery of the meaning, and not to pursue but nevertheless obtain—what can be termed following the principle of the supreme one unconsciously and unknowingly.

This is the intuitive understanding which transcends experience of the entirety of the principles governing the universe, and is in the realm of "inner transcendence." According to the views of modern hermeneutics all explanations of our predecessors' ideas contain within them the ideas of the explicator; by definition, there must be connections between the person doing the explanation and what he is explaining. Most of the explanations of Confucius' thought by thinkers throughout the ages reveal this to be the case. I would like to turn to Zhu Xi's explanation of these words of Confucius. He wrote:

As the sounds enter, the heart communes with them, finding nothing in them to evade or oppose, thereby understanding their ultimate sense, acquired without any thought.

Zhu Xi's "sounds" (sheng) relate to voice (shengyin) and they encompass both the "articulated sounds" (yousheng zhi yin) and the "unarticulated sounds" (wusheng zhi yin). "Understanding their ultimate sense" should transcend the realm in which Confucius knew the commands of Heaven, and so this realm "acquired without any thought" transcends knowledge. I believe that this can be explained as an intuited aesthetic realm, and what is thereby acquired is an intuited image transcending experience. This can also be explained as an artistic realm, the realm of "beauty." This explanation of Confucius' statement may also be "forced," but as Yang Bojun asserts that most explanations of this line have, throughout history, been forced, I see no harm in building on this legacy. But I also believe that such an explanation does have a basis, particularly from the viewpoint of philosophy, in which it may have a new sense. We know that Confucius regarded music as a form of cultivation and that "when in the kingdom of Qi he heard the music of Shao" he was "unable to savor the taste of meat for three months," a detail revealing that he had entered a sublime aesthetic realm "acquired without any thought." Confucius had his own explanation of this realm he had attained: "I had not anticipated that music could transport me to such a state." He thus unintentionally attained a realm in which he enjoyed a form of transcendental beauty.

Zhu Xi commented as follows on Confucius' statement that at seventy he "followed" his "heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules":

Ju, the carpenter's square, is an instrument for measuring patterns, but here it refers generally to pattern or custom. While following his heart's dictates, Confucius did not transgress his pattern, and so he was at ease in his deeds and attained the mean without effort.

The passage from The Analects being commented on here therefore refers to a realm at one with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, where one "knows truth" (zhi zhen), "acquires beauty" (de mei), and later arrives in a perfect realm of "ultimate goodness" (zhi shan). Confucius believed that "perfect beauty" could not compare with "perfect beauty combined with perfect goodness." The Analects contains the following passage in "The Eight Yi":

Discussing the music of Shao, Confucius commented: "It possesses perfect beauty, as well as perfect goodness." Of the music of King Wu, he commented: "It has perfect beauty, but does not possess perfect goodness."

To say that something possesses perfect goodness is, to a certain extent (at least for the Confucians), connected with a judgment concerning ethical value. Mencius said: "Complete truthfulness is called beauty." "Beauty" here contains the idea of ethical evaluation. Zhu Xi annotated this line as follows:

When one has strenuously implemented goodness until it is filled to completion and has accumulated truth, then the beauty will reside within it and will not depend on externals.

"Goodness" here is a form of internalized "beauty," the highest beauty of character. It can be seen that Zhu Xi believed that "goodness" in one respect can encompass "beauty." "Perfect goodness" was held to be superior to "perfect beauty" because "perfect goodness" was in fact both "perfect goodness and perfect beauty." We would now seem to be able to assert that Confucius' realm of life (or his realm of the sage) proceeds from "knowing truth" and "acquiring beauty" to a realm of perfect goodness in which "one can be at ease in one's deeds and attain the mean without effort." In other words, from "truth" we proceed to "beauty" and then we finally attain "goodness."

"The good←the beautiful←the true" was the special characteristic of Kant's philosophy. As Kant saw it, practical reasoning was superior to speculative reasoning. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) the object of research was the phenomenal world and it was subject to the control of the laws of necessity of nature. In his Critique of Practical Reasoning the object of research was the noumenon of rational functioning, which was not subject to laws of necessity, and so was free. The former was nature, the latter morality. The former belonged to the realm of theoretical knowledge, the latter to the realm of ethical belief, and there was no direct channel connecting the two. The question, therefore, was how to build a bridge between theoretical knowledge(epistemology) and ethical belief (ethics); and to resolve the question of how to connect the two, Kant wrote his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment), at the beginning of which he said:

Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the second; and yet the second is to have an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws. Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] the purposes that we are to achieve in nature according to laws of freedom. So there must after all be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically, even though the concept of this basis does not reach cognition of it either theoretically or practically and hence does not have a domain of its own, though it does make possible the transition from our way of thinking in terms of principles of nature to our way of thinking in terms of principles of freedom.³

Kant believes that it was the power of judgment which united reason(pure reason) and rationality (practical reasoning), yet while judgment had something of the nature of each of these forms of reasoning, it was not the same thing as them. Kant divided man's soul into intelligence, feeling and idea. The cognitive ability of intelligence was pure reason, the cognitive ability of idea was rationality or practical reasoning which transcended experience, and the cognitive ability of feeling was what Kant called "judgment." Because feeling was the intermediary between intelligence and idea, it, like intelligence, was moved by external stimuli, and like idea it played its role regarding external things, and thus judgment functioned as an intermediary between reason and rationality.

In one respect, judgment, like reason, confronted incomplete phenomena. In another respect, like rationality, it aimed to reconcile incomplete aspects with a totality. Thus, the understanding of confronted incomplete phenomena and the rationality which addresses itself to a totality meet in judgment. Judgment seeks to include the parts within the whole and then subjects them to reflection, so judgment is able to act as a bridge between reason and rationality.⁴ Thus Kant constructed his philosophical trilogy of "the good ← the beautiful ← the true."

Of course, while there are similarities in value between the philosophies of Confucius and Kant, their aims in constructing their philosophies were dissimilar. Confucius established a philosophy of life, whereas Kant constructed a complete rational philosophical system. This is perhaps one of the differences between Chinese and Western philosophy. If we compare Confucius' process which led him from knowing the commands of Heaven to being able to immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said and then on to "following his heart's dictates without transgression," with the basic theme of the true, the good and the beautiful in traditional Chinese philosophy, then we can say that Confucius' statement that "at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven" represents the stage of seeking "the unity of Heaven and Man" (tian ren heyi). His statement that "at sixty I could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said" represents attaining the stage of "the unity of feeling and scene" (qing jing heyi), and his statement that "at seventy I followed my heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules" represents the stage at which he was able to realize "the unity of knowledge and action" (zhi xing heyi).

The unity of Heaven and Man belongs to the domain of "intelligence"(knowledge). The unity of feeling and scene belongs to the domain of "appreciation" (feeling), and the unity of knowledge and action belongs to "praxis" (idea or intention). According to the Confucians, these three were inseparable. Being human entailed an understanding of the flow of the cosmos and creation, as well as an ability to appreciate the achievements of the cosmos and creation. Moreover, in one's life practice one should re-manifest the perfect beauty and the perfect goodness of the cosmos. The process that Confucius outlined represented the demands made by the human in the realm of life. This was the summation of Confucius' personal quest for the true, the beautiful and the good.

II．Laozi's Quest in the Realm of Life

Laozi seems to have upheld an attitude of denial regarding the demands of most people (including the Confucians) for the true, the good and the beautiful. His call to "deny the sages and discard knowledge" (juesheng qizhi) would seem to be a denial of the quest for ordinary knowledge. His statement that "the five colors blind one's vision" (wuse ling ren mu mang) is an opposition to the general quest for beauty; and his assertion that "when the Great Way declines, compassion and righteousness come into existence" (dadao fei, you ren yi) is an opposition to the general moral concept of goodness. Does Laozi therefore not argue for any quest for the true, the good and the beautiful in the human realm? I disagree with this proposition. He called for a quest after such ideals which would transcend the banal, a quest that for him was within a realm "equal with the Way" (tongyu dao). We can see that Laozi regarded "the Way" as the unity of the true, the good and the beautiful.

The 25th chapter of Dao De Jing (The Classic of the Way and Power) contains the following passage: "The model for man is the earth, the model for earth is Heaven, the model for Heaven is the Way, and the model for the Way is Nature." This is a description of Laozi's views of the quest of the realm of life. He believed that man's highest ideal was imitation of the Way, while the Way itself was natural and spontaneous. What was the Way he discussed? Dao De Jing contains a number of definitions, but the most basic is of a transcendental highest criterion.⁵ Chapter 14 of that classic reads:

Viewing it, it cannot be seen and so it is described as "beyond color;" listening to it, it cannot be heard and so it is described as "beyond sound;" grasping for it, it cannot be grasped and so it is described as "formless." These three are beyond imagination, all being aspects of the one chaotic whole. Upwardly, it emits no light; downwardly, no darkness. It is endless, so that words cannot describe it, and it returns to nothingness. This is formless form, shape without matter, and is called seemingness. Meeting it, it has no front; pursuing it, it has no rear. Cleave to the eternal Way, to govern what exists in the present; if one can understand its ancient origin, one finds the laws governing the Way.

Examining this we find it contains three levels of meaning:

i．"The Way" transcends sensory experience and this transcendence is described as "beyond color," "beyond sound" and "formless." Monk Deqing in the Ming Dynasty wrote in his Dao De Jing Jie (Explanation of The Classic of the Way and the Power): "The one chaotic whole" which cannot be imagined is the Way.

ii．While the Way is transcendental, it is nevertheless based on the existence of real things, i.e. "formless form, shape without matter." Wang Bi comments on this line:

One may want to say that it is nothingness, but from it things can be formed; one wants to say that it exists, but one cannot see its form. . . .

That which is without form and without name is the basic principle of the myriad things.

The seemingness" which is formless form and shape without matter can constitute the basic principle underlying the existence of all forms and shapes. Wang Bi comments that "seemingness" means "one cannot grasp and define it."

In other words, the Way has no specificity. All things which possess specificity fall within the realm of experience and that which lacks specificity transcends experience. In Chapter 21 of Dao De Jing we read:

This Way is seemingness, but within this seemingness forms can be discerned and real things do exist. In this darkness there is essence. This essence is exceptionally real and can be authenticated.

Therefore while the Way lacks specificity, from it all "things" possessing specificity can be formed, and so it constitutes the most real existence, being the noumenon of things.

iii．The Way is the basis of the existence of all things and is the highest criterion of transcendence. "The laws governing the Way" are said to be "principles."⁶ "The laws governing the Way" are then the Way as the highest criterion of the myriad things from ancient times to the present.

The above three points show that Laozi's philosophy was a quest for the origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and for the basis of their existence, from which he created a philosophical system in which the Way was the highest criterion of transcendence. Laozi's discussion of the noumenon of the cosmos in fact falls within the scope of the quest for truth.

Laozi made the Way the highest category in his philosophical system. If man grasped the Way then he grasped the truth, and this was in fact the aim of life. Thus for Laozi "being one with the Way" was the highest aim in life. He said: "Serving the Way is being one with the Way." Wang Bi commented:

The Way relies on non-form and non-action to form the myriad things and so if, in serving the Way, one relies on non-action, then one will be a superior man and teach without words. In the continuity of seeming existence things will follow their reality, and the Way will be one with the body. This is called being one with the Way.

"Being one with the Way" is thus equivalent to being of one body with the Way. It can be seen that Laozi believed that the relationship between man and the Way did not entail man regarding the Way as an ordinary object of cognition (because the Way lacked name and form). Rather it involved man becoming one with the Way. Therefore being one with the Way was merely the highest realm man's life could assume, a realm in which man could transcend the mundane and "acquire the Way" (de Dao). This was the supreme realm after which Laozi sought.

How then did Laozi regard the good and the beautiful? We know that Laozi regarded the basic character of the Way as "nature and nonaction" (ziran wuwei), and this then was his criterion for goodness and beauty. He said: "When the Great Way declines, compassion and righteousness arise." Because moral concepts such as compassion and righteousness are man-made, not only are they incompatible with the principles of "nature and non-action," but also destroy the Way. Only when these man-made things are discarded can man acquire true "goodness." Therefore he said: "Only when compassion is terminated and righteousness discarded can people return to genuine filial piety and kindness." Only when all man-made moral concepts are discarded can people return to their natural relationships. Chapter 8 of Dao De Jing contains the following passage:

Those who possess supreme goodness are like water. Water serves to nourish the myriad things and does not harm them; if one remains in the lowest place that people most loathe, one is closest to the Way.

Ethical persons have the nature of water. Water may benefit the myriad things, but it does not strive for high places. It is content to remain in the lowest place and therefore it approaches the Way. In Chapter 66 we read:

The rivers and oceans are the kings of the waterways, because they choose the lowest places. Because everything flows into them, the oceans and mighty rivers are called the rulers of the valleys.

This is Laozi's explanation of how persons possessing morality are close to the realm of the Way, while not yet being one with the Way. To use Feng Youlan's exposition of "the four realms" in his Xin Yuanren (A New Exposition of Man), those who possess the highest goodness belong only to "the realm of morality," while those who are one with the Way belong to "the realm of Heaven and Earth." Thus, in terms of value, the good is on a lower level than the true.

In Chapter 12 of Dao De Jing we read:

The five colors dazzle and blind the eyes; the five sounds deafen the ears; the five flavors numb the palate; indulgence in hunting them leads to dissipation and craziness.

Wang Bi comments:

The eyes, mouths and hearts all follow their own nature; one acts not to follow their nature, then one harms nature, and blindness, deafness, numbness and madness result.

In other words, the five colors, the five sounds and the five flavors are all "man-made" and have lost the original character of Nature. Laozi regarded plain simplicity as beauty (jian su bao pu).⁷ One should heed what is natural. Artifice results in a loss of the beauty of original nature and a lack of artifice preserves natural beauty. Thus in Chapter 41 of Dao De Jing the following passage occurs:

The supreme note has no sound, the supreme image has no form, the Way loses itself in anonymity, yet it alone excels in starting and completing.

Wang Bi commented:

One listens to the supreme note, but cannot hear it, because it has no sound. A note that has sound will fall, necessarily, into either the second note on the pentatonic scale or the first. When it is thus discriminated, it cannot assemble a crowd. Therefore a note that has sound is not the supreme note.

If an image has form then there will be discrimination, and if there is discrimination then it will either be warm or burning. If not burning, it will be cold. And so an image that has form is not the supreme image.

All these good things are completed by the Way. In terms of image, it is the supreme image among all images, and is image without form. In terms of note, it is the supreme note among notes, and is the note of silence.

The music which is one with the Way is supreme music and the image which is one with the Way is supreme image. The supreme music encompasses all music, while the supreme image encompasses all forms. Music is dependent on sound and painting is dependent on form, but for Laozi the supreme music is without sound and the supreme painting lacks all forms. Because lack of sound or form harmonizes with the principles of "nature and non-action," they constitute true beauty. From this we can see that for Laozi the good and the beautiful derive from the true (the Way) and are specific manifestations of the Way. In the final chapter of Dao De Jing, Chapter 81, the following passage occurs:

Fealty words are not beautiful,

Beautiful words are not about fealty.

Good persons don't argue,

Those who argue are not good.

Men of knowledge are without depth,

Those who have depth do not (seek) knowledge.

I believe that this passage expresses Laozi's hierarchy of the good, the true and the beautiful. "The beautiful" is spoken of in terms of speech(which can stand for literature), "the good" is spoken of in the context of deeds or actions, and "the true" is spoken of in terms of intelligence. "True knowing" is superior to "true goodness," which in turn is superior to "true beauty," thereby creating a hierarchical series of criteria. This is the model of Laozi's quest in the realm of life.

When we say that Laozi's view of "the good, the true and the beautiful" has certain points in common with Hegel's philosophy, we are only saying that there are certain similarities in the arrangement of these three criteria of value orientation. In Hegel's philosophical system, "morality," "art," and "philosophy" all belong to the realm of spiritual philosophy. Spiritual philosophy is the third part of Hegel's philosophical system; it constitutes the third great stage of self-development in the direction of pure spirit—the description of the spiritual stage. The spiritual stage is the unity of the logical and natural stages, and it is self-existing and self-acting. During the transition from self-existing to self-acting, spirit experienced a complicated developing process which consists of three stages: (1) Subjective spirit, (2) Objective spirit, and (3) Absolute spirit. "Morality" belongs to objective spirit. Objective spirit means the spirit that manifested itself in the external objective world, which refers not to the natural world, and only to the spiritual world, say, different spheres of human social life and human history. It consists of (1) Abstract law(property law), (2) Morality, and (3) three ethic (family, citizen society, country) developing stages. Objective spirit is inferior to absolute spirit in the stage of spirit development, thus also inferior to "art" and "philosophy" which belong to absolute spirit. To Hegel, both subjective spirit and objective spirit are partial: Subjective spirit such as soul, sense, consciousness, mind, will, etc. is inner conscious state of individuals, not yet actualized as the reality of existence. Objective spirit such as property, law, morality, politics, family, society, country, etc. is objective though, with no self-consciousness. The essence of spirit is unlimited, absolute, and free, therefore it has to keep on developing to avoid the partiality of subjective spirit and objective spirit and to prevent the incident of their opposition between each other, as a result of which spirit could ascend to the supreme stage. Absolute spirit is the complete and full realization of spirit unto itself. It is both subjective and objective. And apart from taking itself as the object and manifesting its essence self-consciously, it has no other purpose, hence truly unlimited, absolute, and free. "Art," "religion," and "philosophy" as three developing stages of the absolute spirit are identical as far as their contents are concerned, for their differences are only forms. Hegel said: "The element of the universal spirit's existence (Dasein) is characterized by intuition and image in art, feeling and representational thought in religion, and pure and free thought in philosophy."⁸ By listing those three stages of absolute spirit as such, Hegel tries to show that the self-realization of absolute spirit also accords to the process from sensuous intuition, through the representational thought (he also names it as "pictorial thinking"), and to abstract thinking. Therefore, philosophy is the highest, freest, wisest state of absolute spirit. He said, "The most perfect method of knowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought, and here the attitude of man is one of entire freedom."⁹ By saying "pure form of thought," he means pure conception and logical category. The sensuous form of art can not fully embody infiniteness, absoluteness and freeness of absolute spirit (idea), because it was confined by the sensuous form somehow. "This at the same time makes it plain that the manifestation of truth in a sensuous form is not truly adequate to the spirit."¹⁰ Only philosophy is the prefect way to realize "truth." According to Hegel's philosophy of mind, "philosophy" is the most accomplished form of truth, the supreme one; and the quest of "beauty" ("art") being the sensuous manifestation of the idea, only in the developing stage, apparently inferior to "philosophy."Being the inner belief of good or bad, "morality" is even inferior to the developing stage of "art." ¹¹ That is to say, as far as the value theory is concerned, Hegel's idea about the sequence of "the true, the good, and the beautiful" can be referred to as "the true ← the beautiful ← the good." In this sense, his point is not the same as Laozi's philosophy, but they share the same view that "the true" is superior to both "the beautiful" and "the good." As we have said before, Chinese traditional philosophy tends to actually reach a kind of spiritual realm of "the true, the good, and the beautiful," while Western philosophy tries to establish a kind of thought system to rationalize the value of "the true, the good, and the beautiful." Arguably, the former is pursuing a kind of enlightenment, and the latter is only discussing about its quest for "knowledge."

III．Zhuangzi's Quest in the Realm of Life

Like Laozi, Zhuangzi made the Way the highest category in his philosophy, but Zhuangzi's philosophy did not concentrate on proving the limitlessness, absoluteness and eternity of the Way (even though he devoted quite a bit of space in his writings to these questions), but rather on proving the spiritual limitlessness, absoluteness and eternity of those persons, such as perfected men, spirits and sages, who had acquired the Way.

The first chapter of his Zhuangzi is entitled "Roaming Free" (Xiaoyao You) and the theme of this chapter is a discussion of the question of how man can attain absolute spiritual freedom. According to Zhuangzi, while the roc (peng creature) had a wing span of three thousand li and could rise to a height of ninety thousand li and Liezi could ride on the wind over eight hundred li in a day, actions which would seem sufficiently free, they did not in fact constitute true freedom. For the roc to fly ninety thousand li a vast expanse of space was required; to travel those eight hundred li, Liezi had to rely on the force of the wind. These actions were "conditional" (youdai), and only the "unconditional" (wudai) can be described as the attainment of true freedom. Thus he said: "If one is able to follow the laws of nature and grasp the transformations of the six breaths and roam freely in a limitless domain, what does one need to rely on?" Relying on nothing, this "roaming free" was "unconditional." It constituted absolute freedom. But how could one attain this realm? Zhuangzi believed that ordinary mortals could not attain this realm. Only perfected men, deities and sages could do so, because "perfected men have no self, deities exert no effort and sages know no name." To have no self (wu ji) is to "extinguish the self" (sang wo) and in "Discussion of the Equality of Things" (Qiwu Lun) Zhuangzi wrote: "Now I have extinguished myself." In the chapter entitled "Great Master" (Da Zongshi) there is a passage which describes "sitting in forgetfulness" (zuowang), which can be called a description of "having no self" in this realm of absolute freedom:

"I have made progress," Yan Hui said.

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I have forgotten benevolence and righteousness," Yan Hui replied.

"Fine, but that's not enough," Confucius said.

Several days later Yan Hui again saw Confucius, and said, "I have made progress."

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I have forgotten the rites and music," Yan Hui replied.

"Fine, but that's not enough," Confucius said.

Several more days passed, and Yan Hui again saw Confucius and announced, "I have made progress."

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I sat in forgetfulness," Yan Hui replied.

"What do you mean by saying you sat in forgetfulness?" Confucius asked in alarm.

Yan Hui replied, "My limbs fell away, I cast aside my intelligence, I left behind my body, and I forgot all that I know. I merged with the Great Way. That is what I meant by saying that I sat in forgetfulness."

"To be of one body with the myriad things and to have no preferences, and to participate in the transformations of the myriad things and to depend on no things—this means you have become a sage! I wish to follow in your footsteps."

The realm to which Zhuangzi's "sitting in forgetfulness" belongs is the realm in which he describes one as "transcending self" or "having extinguished the self." In the text quoted above, Yan Hui sets out from a denial of mundane morality, then enters a state in which the various fetters imposed on the spirit by the body and knowledge which befuddles the spirit are all eliminated. He then finally attains a mental realm in which "his body is like desiccated timber and his mind is like cold ashes," a realm which transcends material gain, morality, life and death, and in which there are no restrictions from internal and external truths, untruths, likes, hatreds, beauty, and ugliness. That realm was, moreover, typified by "the oneness of Heaven and Earth" and "unity with the Way." The most significant feature of that realm was "the rejection of knowledge," which was the elimination of all discriminatory and conceptual cognitive activities, what Zhuangzi elsewhere called "mental fasting," or "following the inner channels of the ear and eye, yet being beyond the knowledge of the mind."

"The perfected men, deities and sages" Zhuangzi describes had all transcended the mundane world in this way and had achieved an absolute spiritual freedom conferred by "sitting in forgetfulness" and "mental fasting." In the chapter entitled "Tian Zifang" we read:

The perfected man looks down from the blue sky above, conceals himself in the Yellow Springs below, and soars in every direction, his expression remaining unchanged.

The "deities" are described in the chapter entitled "Heaven and Earth":

The supreme deities ride on the light and their form vanishes. This is called abandoning space. To exhaust life and scatter the emotions, to share in the delight of Heaven and Earth and to be unencumbered by the myriad things so that the myriad things return to their true feelings—this is called merging with the dark mystery.

In the chapter "Curbing the Mind" we read:

The sage in life moves with Heaven and in death blends with external matter. . . . he rejects all knowledge and deceit and follows the constant laws of nature. . . . he is empty and indifferent to gain, and is one with the power of Heaven.

The ability of perfected men, deities and sages to transcend time and space and roam freely beyond the coordinates of space was the result of their ability to "leave their bodies and discard knowledge," to rely in everything on nature and non-action, and to make no demands of the real world. Thus they were able to roam freely in "a land of nothingness." Such roaming could, of course, only take place in the spirit. This spiritual realm of absolute freedom could only be an aesthetic realm of art. In the section entitled "Zhi's Journey to the North" (Zhi Bei You) we read:

Heaven and Earth possess great beauty, but speak no language. The seasons move in accordance with clear laws which they do not discuss. The myriad creatures have reasons for their lives but do not speak. The sages can go to the source of the great beauty of Heaven and Earth and commune with the reasons of the myriad creatures, and thus do the perfected men possess non-action. The great sages do not act, and so are said to partake of the reasons of Heaven and Earth.

And in Tian Zifang:

To attain that realm is to gain supreme beauty and supreme joy. The gaining of supreme beauty and roaming in supreme joy define the sage.

The attaining of "truth" in the above passage admits the sage into the realm where "one can wander in the heart to the beginnings of things." This is the realm of nature's inarticulate non-action. The highest form of beauty is "the supreme beauty of Heaven and Earth." "Sages, the perfected and the divines" are waiting to "go to the source of the beauty of Heaven and Earth" (or "prepared for the beauty of Heaven and Earth"). Because of the very existence of Nature and non-action, "the abandonment of form and the rejection of knowledge," one can gain "ultimate beauty and roam in the midst of ultimate pleasure," this realm of "ultimate beauty and ultimate pleasure" also constituting the highest aesthetic realm of art.

In the philosophy of Zhuangzi the relationship between "truth" and "beauty" is also discussed. There is a passage in "Autumn Floodwaters" (qiushui):

Horses and oxen have four hooves, which are from Heaven. Bridle the horse's head, and pierce the bull's nostrils, this is the work of a human being. So we say: do not use human powers to destroy Heaven, do not use reason to destroy a good name, and do not use gain to harm the people. If one diligently keeps this rule and does not lose it, this is to return to the Dao.

Zhuangzi's emphasis on "imitating Heaven and respecting truth" (fatian guizhen) was opposition to all "human actions" (renwei) which ran counter to original nature. The authenticity of the horse is its "chewing the pasture and drinking water, raising its hooves and shaking them,"but if the horse's head is bridled and the bull's nostrils are pierced, then horses and bulls lose their original nature (authenticity), and lose their freedom, thereby losing beauty and their truth. Truth and beauty are one and the same in Zhuangzi's philosophy, but truth must be "follow the way (Dao) of nature." "Truth" is defined in the chapter entitled "The Venerable Fisherman" as "the acme of the spirit, and that which is not spirit is not sincere, and so cannot influence man's feelings." The ability to "influence man's feelings" exists when there are true feelings which cause man to gain an appreciation of beauty. "Accomplished beauty is not uniform in its traces," but the most accomplished beauty is not contrived and is able to freely manifest its authenticity. Therefore Zhuangzi's "quest for truth" was also in order to "seek beauty." If there is no beauty, then there is also no truth to speak of. "The quest for truth" is a quest for a spiritual realm of untrammeled freedom.

Zhuangzi rarely affirmed morality and his thought was characterized by an anti-ethical trend. He believed that all ethical restraints were "man-made" and that they destroyed man's authenticity. Therefore he opposed "using humaneness and righteousness to transform man's nature." Zhuangzi believed that the realization of the freedom of the individual personality was not only "great beauty" (damei) but the highest form of "morality" (de) and supreme goodness (shan). In the chapter entitled "Curbing the Mind" (Ke Yi) we read:

If we do not hone the intellect but are noble, if we do not practice humaneness and righteousness but are self-cultivated, if we have no great achievements but rule, if we have no rivers and oceans to roam among but roam as if we did, if we practice no breath techniques but possess longevity, we forget everything and possess nothing, then we have no limits and all beauty follows us. This is the Way of Heaven and Earth and the complete virtue of the sage.

Cheng Xuanying explains:

When the heart is not impeded by a single obstacle, and the traces of darkness complement the Five Elements, then we have unlimited peace, are empty and expansive and arrive at the Way that cannot be exhausted. The beauty of true virtue follows and resides in the self.

By this he means that when the mind is not trapped, follows nature and practices non-action, then one sits in forgetfulness, and in total freedom. Thus one attains the ultimate whereby every beauty gathers about and follows the self. This is the movement of natural spontaneity of Heaven and Earth, as well as being the path by which the sage perfects his goodness. According to this interpretation, the "good" for Zhuangzi encompasses the highest beauty ("great beauty") within it.

From the above discussion we can see that in Zhuangzi's philosophy, "the true, the good and the beautiful" are a unity and they are unified in an aesthetic realm of spiritual freedom. Zhuangzi, like Laozi, sought "oneness with the Way," but Laozi's unity with the Way entailed understanding and realizing the Way, which were both epistemological concerns, as well as being a form of philosophical enlightenment. For Zhuangzi, however, "unity with the Way" was an appreciation of, and reflection on the Way, which involved direct aesthetic perception. From this we can see that the question of "the true, the good and the beautiful" in the philosophy of Zhuangzi differed from that in the philosophy of Laozi, and for Zhuangzi "the beautiful" was paramount.

The quest for the good, the true and the beautiful in the philosophical axiology of Western philosophy can be seen to have some points in common with the views of Zhuangzi. The philosophy of Aristotle, and more especially that of Schelling, would seem to be similar to that of Zhuangzi regarding this question.

Regarding the quest for the unity of truth, goodness and beauty, Aristotle stated: "Beauty is goodness, and the keen perception it imparts is in fact because it is goodness." But the manifestation of good conduct and beautiful art requires the cognition of things as its basis. From the perspective of values (axiology), Aristotle did not impart the same significance to goodness, truth and beauty. In demarcating human activities, he believed that of the three activities of cognition, practice and creation, cognition was the highest form of activity, because it was only on the basis of this particular activity that man could confront highest truths. But from the perspective of the products resulting from these three activities, Aristotle believed that the fruits of "the quest for truth" were theoretical sciences (such as mathematics, physics and metaphysics), knowledge for the sake of knowledge; the quests for goodness and beauty yielded the practical sciences (including politics and ethics) and the creative sciences (including poetics and rhetoric), all of which have higher external goals. The former directs action, the latter directs creation. Aristotle believed that the basic nature of art was creation. He said: "The arts are a form of creative ability, which encompasses the true process of inference." Here, creative activities become those activities most able to realize man's basic nature, which is logical reasoning (Aristotle once defined the parameters of man's nature as rationality). Accordingly, it would seem that we could say that in Aristotle's philosophy artistic creation which can manifest beauty itself attains the highest value, followed by actions with an external aim (such as moral practice, which belongs to the realm of the "good"), and then followed by knowledge for knowledge's sake which constitutes an activity involving "the quest for truth."¹²

Schelling proposed the philosophical problem of "absolute unity." According to his view, "absolute unity" was neither subject nor object, but "the absolute undifferentiated unity of both subject and object." This "unity" can only be realized within an "intellectual direct perception." "Intellectual direct perception" is the activity producing the directly perceived object. The unity of the two (subject and object) is, in fact, an activity of direct perception. By means of direct perception, the ego unites the self with the cosmic spirit which has unconsciously produced the natural world. Schelling believed that even the activity of "intellectual direct perception," which is possible only with a philosophical genius, but not with just any one, cannot be regarded as achieving an absolute unity of subject and object because a discrepancy still exists between the direct perceiver and the directly perceived object (although this directly perceived object is produced by the free action of the direct perceiver). Thus, Schelling also believed that only within "the direct perception of art" could a truly undifferentiated absolute unity between subject and object be realized.

This "truly undifferentiated absolute unity" is analogous in some aspects to Zhuangzi's concept of the realm entered through "mental fasting" and "sitting in forgetfulness." Schelling believed that "the direct perception of art" is derived from inspiration and from an intense yearning of great internal power within the inner spirit. This can only be described as a mysterious spiritual realm of direct perception. Thus, for Schelling, art constitutes a supreme undifferentiated ideal world. On the basis of the view that "the direct perception of art" is a higher "intellectual direct perception," Schelling regarded "beauty" as the highest value. As he saw it, "truth" was a question of necessity, "goodness" was a question of freedom, and "beauty" was the synthesis of the two. "Beauty" synthesized in art the scientific knowledge of "truth" and the ethical behavior of "goodness." Schelling said: "I believe that the highest ideal activity encompasses all idealized aesthetic activities. Truth and goodness can only be brought into proximity within beauty. Philosophers, like poets, must have aesthetic powers." Thus, from the perspective of the theory of value, "the beautiful" for Schelling constitutes a higher value than "the true" or "the good." ¹³ This schema reveals some similarities with Zhuangzi's view of these values.

IV．Brief Conclusion

i．In the world of man Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi pursued three different quests, and their philosophies manifest three different value orientations. I believe that in philosophical systems embodying any value we find a quest for the unity of truth, goodness and beauty, but philosophers have different views on how to effect and attain this unity. From the perspective of the development of mankind's culture, we cannot demand that philosophies are similar. In China's pre-Qin period, philosophy richly flowered because of this very diversity of value orientation. Philosophers at that time were able to approach the ultimate questions of life from an unusually broad perspective and realm, and this enabled Chinese philosophy to take its place beside that of other great contemporary cultures, such as Indian and Greek. It is right because it is pluralistic, not monistic. It can quest the issue of ultimate concern about universe and life from different approaches. If the development of pre-Qin philosophy could have some value nowadays, I believe one of the important elements is its plurality. Plurality of philosophy could make itself fully developed, and "centralization" would only suffocate the vitality of philosophy eventually. Currently, world culture and philosophy are showing the tendency of pluralistic development under the global consciousness; we can follow with this developing tide to establish the Chinese modernized philosophy.

ii．If the historical philosophies could betray its modern implication, and be practiced in reality in society, we have to give them a modern interpretation. The interpretation of the philosophical thought of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi above is an attempt doing this. The interpretation of their thought can only be "both their philosophy and yet not their philosophy." Because what we said in this article is the interpretation derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, and its foundation is the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, thus we can say it IS "the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi." Also it is "the interpretation derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi," since it is an inferred interpretation, hence it is NOT (or not totally) the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Only by this can we extend the implication of the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Right because it is derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi nowadays, the modern implication has actualized, and philosophy has developed. Making a comparative study of the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi from the point of axiology, and revealing their different orientation in the axiology of their philosophy, can not only show us what "plurality" means to the cultural and philosophical development, but also make an example of distinctive type of philosophical system and respective orientation of life value. Meanwhile it can also show our attention and comprehension to "the true, the good, and the beautiful" today. Undoubtedly, this would be very meaningful for the philosophical studies today.

iii．It is significant to understand (interpret, study) the characteristics of Chinese philosophy with Western philosophy as a frame of reference. In the history of traditional Chinese philosophy, although there had never been a particular philosopher who explicitly elaborated on "the true, the good and the beautiful," it on no accounts means these concepts are nowhere to be found in traditional Chinese philosophy. This article is an endeavor to demonstrate the rich content concerning "the true, the good, and the beautiful" in traditional Chinese philosophy, with Western philosophy as a frame of reference. By so doing, the connotations of traditional Chinese philosophy get extended against the background of Western philosophy; the same can be said of Western philosophy as well. In comparison and juxtaposition with each other, the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy and of Western philosophy can be brought into high relief, despite their own peculiarities. Thus the two can be complementary to each other. If we can say the discussion about "the true, the good, and the beautiful" on the part of Western philosophers belongs to the sphere of knowledge (or belief, say, Christianity), the Chinese philosophers' quest in that regard, generally falls within the spiritual realm. All in all, traditional Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy, though each having its own peculiar characteristics, can also enrich and enlighten each other.

捌　再论中国传统哲学的真善美问题*

人类的精神生活的最高追求是什么？我想应该是追求“真”“善”“美”，并使三者在一系统中统一起来。当然，什么是“真”，什么是“善”，什么是“美”，不同的思想家的看法肯定是不相同的，而“真”“善”“美”如何统一在一个系统中，更可能是仁者见仁，智者见智了。这样的问题没有办法有什么共同的定论，也不需要有什么定论。但是，人们要去追求真、善、美，思想家们要建构真、善、美统一的系统，则是无可怀疑的。中国传统哲学对人生境界的追求也可以说是中国古代哲学家对真、善、美的追求。过去我写过一篇《论中国传统哲学中的真善美问题》，¹主要是讨论儒家对真、善、美问题的看法，而且是一种历史性的论述。现在这篇文章将不仅限于儒家，也不想用历史论述的写法，因为那样不易集中，而且文章将会很长。因此，本文将选有代表性的典型哲学家的思想来进行分析。

我国先秦哲学家们的思想一直影响着中国哲学的发展，其中孔子、老子、庄子的思想影响可以说是最大。如果我们把这三位大哲学家作为典型，并通过他们来讨论中国传统哲学中不同类型哲学家的人生境界问题，也许会对中国传统哲学关于人生境界的问题有一总体的了解。

四十年前，沈有鼎先生在英国牛津大学作研究时，曾给国内朋友写过一封信，他在信中说：

康德的价值论和黑格尔的价值论有一个重要不同点，如下所示：

康德：善←美←真

黑格尔：真←美←善

从这里可以看出康德是中国人，黑格尔是印度人（或希腊人）。²

沈先生的这个论断非常有见地，并富有启发性。从中国传统哲学的主流儒家思想来看确实如此，但如果从中国传统哲学价值论的角度看不同学派或不同哲学家就不全然如此了。照我看，中国传统哲学在真、善、美问题上大体可以分为三大系统，这就是孔子、老子和庄子的思想在真、善、美问题上有如下的不同：

孔子：善←美←真

老子：真←善←美

庄子：美←善←真

照这个图式，如果我们作点比附，大体可以说在真、善、美问题的价值论上，孔子接近于康德，老子接近于黑格尔，庄子从一个有限的方面看则接近于谢林或者亚里士多德。当然比附总是有局限性的，不可能照顾到各个方面，但它或者能给人们提供一个思考的方向。

一、孔子对人生境界的追求

在《论语·为政》篇中记载着孔子的一段话，他说：“吾十有五而志于学，三十而立，四十而不惑，五十而知天命，六十而耳顺，七十而从心所欲不逾矩。”我们知道，孔子和以后的儒家都认为，人们的生死和富贵不是能靠其自身的努力而追求到的，但人们的道德和学问的高低却因其自身努力的不同而有不同。上面引的孔子的那段话可以说是孔子对他一生的生活道路的描述，或者说是他一生修养的过程，也就是孔子本人对真、善、美的追求和了解的过程。从“十有五而志于学”到“四十而不惑”，可以说是他成圣成贤的准备阶段，从“知天命”到“从心所欲不逾矩”可以说是他成圣人的深化过程。“知天命”可以解释为对“天”（宇宙人生的终极关切问题）有了一种认识和了解，这也许可以算是“求真”的范围，因为这一阶段孔子仍然把“天”看成认识的对象，还没有达到“同于天”的阶段，也就是说还没有达到与“天”合一的境界。郭象在《庄子序》中说：“夫庄子者，可谓知本矣……言虽无会而独应者也。夫应而非会，则虽当无用。”盖能与天地万物之本体相应者可谓“知”本。既为“知”本，则仍与天地万物之本体为二，仍把天地万物之本体视为认识的对象，尚未与天地万物之本体会合为一。此境界虽高，但还不能“从心所欲不逾矩”。

“六十而耳顺”，这句话向来有不同解释，杨伯峻先生在《论语译注》中说：“‘耳顺’这两个字很难讲，企图把它讲通的人也有很多，但都觉牵强……”我认为，杨先生的注解大概是符合孔子原意的。晋李充曾说“耳顺”是“心与耳相从”，这也许是杨先生的解释所本。晋孙绰用玄学思想解释这句话说：“耳顺者，废听之理也，朗然自玄悟，不复役而后得，所谓不识不知顺帝之则。”这应是一种超乎经验的直观而得宇宙大全之理的境界，是一种“内在超越”的境界。照现代解释学的看法，凡是对前人思想的解释，都有解释者的意见在内；不过，解释和被解释之间总有某些联系，否则也就无所谓“解释”了。历来的思想家对孔子思想的解释大都如此。这里，我再引用朱熹对这句话的解释，他说：“声入心通，无所违逆，知之之至，不思而得也。”“声入心通”当和“声音”有关（“有声之音”和“无声之音”都可以包括在内）；“知之之至”应是超于“知天命”的境界，这种境界是“不思而得”的，所以是超于认识的。我想，它可以解释为一种直觉的审美境界，它所得到的是一种超乎经验的直觉意象，也可以说是一种艺术的境界、“美”的境界。这种对“六十而耳顺”的解释或许“牵强”，但照杨伯峻的看法，自古以来的“解释”大都牵强，我的这一解释无非是在诸种“牵强”的解释中再增加一种而已。但我自信这种解释不能说全无道理，特别是由哲学的观点看，它或许是有新意的。我们知道，孔子对音乐很有修养，他“在齐闻韶”“三月不知肉味”；“三月不知肉味”自然是“不思而得”的一种极高的审美境界。孔子还对他所达到的这种境界有所说明，他说：“不图为乐之至于斯也。”即想不到听音乐竟能达到如此境界。这种境界是一种超越的美的享受。

“七十而从心所欲不逾矩”，朱熹注说：“矩，法度之器，所以为方者也。随其心之所欲，而自不过于法度，安而行之，不勉而中。”这是一种与天地万物为一体的境界，它是在“知真”“得美”而后达到的一种圆满的“至善”的境界。孔子认为“尽美”比不过“尽善尽美”，《论语·八佾》篇中记载：“子谓韶，‘尽美矣，又尽善也’；谓武，‘尽美矣，未尽善也’。”这里的“尽善”是说“极好”，但说事物“极好”总在一定程度上（至少在儒家那里）是和道德的价值判断联系在一起的。孟子说：“充实之谓美。”此处的“美”实也含有某种道德价值判断的意义。朱熹注说：“力行其善，至于充满而积实，则美在其中，而无待于外矣。”“善”是一种内在的“美”，极高的人格美。看来，朱熹认为“善”从某方面说可以包含“美”。“尽善”之所以高于“尽美”，实因为“尽善”即“尽善尽美”。这里我们似乎可以说，孔子的人生境界（或圣人的境界）是由“知真”“得美”而进于“安而行之，不勉而中”的圆满至善的境界，即由“真”而达于“美”再达于“善”。

“善←美←真”正是康德哲学的特点。照康德看，实践理性优于思辨理性。他的《纯粹理性批判》所研究的是以理智行使职能的现象界为对象，它受自然的必然律支配；《实践理性批判》所研究的是以理性行使职能的本体为对象，它不受必然律支配，它是自由的。前者是自然，后者是道德。前者属于理论认知的范围，后者属于道德信仰的范围，两者之间无法直接沟通。因此就有一个问题，即如何在理论认知（认识论）与道德信仰（伦理学）之间架起一座桥梁，使之得以沟通，这就是康德哲学所必须解决的一个问题，于是他又写了《判断力批判》。在该书的开头处他写道：“在自然概念的领域，作为感觉界，和自由概念的领域，作为超感觉界之间，虽然固定存在着一不可逾越的鸿沟，以致从前者到后者（即以理性的理论运用为媒介）不可能有过渡，好像是那样分开的两个世界，前者对后者绝不能施加影响；但后者却应该对前者具有影响，这就是说，自由概念应该把它的规律所赋予的目的在感性世界里实现出来；因此，自然界必须能够这样地被思考着：它的形式的合规律性至少对于那些按照自由规律在自然界中实现目的的可能性是互相协应的——因此，我们就必须有一个作为自然界的基础的超感觉界和在实践方面包含于自由概念中的那些东西的统一体的根基。虽然我们对于根基的概念既非理论地、也非实践地得到认识的，它自己没有独特的领域，但它仍使按照这一方面原理的思想形式和按照那一方面原理的思想形式过渡成为可能。”³康德认为，正是判断力把理智（纯粹理性）与理性（实践理性）联合起来，而判断力既略带有理智的性质，也略带有理性的性质，又不同于二者。康德把人的心灵分为知、情、意三个部分。有关“知”的部分的认识能力是理智，这是纯粹理性；有关“意”的部分的认识能力是理性，这是超于经验之上的实践理性；有关“情”的部分的认识能力则正是康德所说的“判断力”。由于“情”介于“知”和“意”之间，它像“知”一样地对外物的刺激有所感受，它又像“意”一样地对外物发生一定的作用，所以判断力介于理智与理性之间。

一方面，判断力像理智，它所面对的是个别的局部的现象；另一方面，它又像理性一样，要求个别事物符合于一般的整体的目的。这样，面对局部现象的理解力和面对理念整体的理性，就在判断力上碰头了。判断力要求把个别纳入整体中来思考，所以判断力能够作为桥梁来沟通理智和理性。⁴从而康德建构了他的“善←美←真”哲学的三部曲。

当然，孔子的哲学和康德的哲学从价值论上看虽然确有其相似之处，但是他们建构哲学的目标则是不相同的。孔子建构的是人生哲学的形态，而康德则要建构一个完满的哲学理论体系。这也许可以视为中西哲学的一点不同吧。如果我们把孔子这一由“知天命”到“耳顺”再到“从心所欲不逾矩”的过程和我们所概括的中国传统哲学关于真、善、美的基本命题相对照，也许可以说“五十而知天命”是追求“天人合一”的层次，“六十而耳顺”是达到“情景合一”的层次，“七十而从心所欲不逾矩”则是实践“知行合一”的层次。

“天人合一”属于“智慧”（知）的方面，“情景合一”属于“欣赏”（情）的方面，“知行合一”则属于“实践”（意）的方面。照儒家看，这三者是不可分的。做人既要了解宇宙大化之流行，又要能欣赏天地造化之功，更应在生活实践中再现宇宙的完美和完善。就以上的分析看，孔子的“知天命”、“耳顺”和“从心所欲不逾矩”都是就人生境界的追求说的，这是孔子对自己追求真、美、善的总结。

二、老子对人生境界的追求

对一般人（包括儒家）所追求的真、善、美，老子似乎都持否定态度。如他说“绝圣弃知”，反对追求一般的知识；“五色令人目盲”，反对一般的对美的追求；“大道废，有仁义”，反对一般的道德观念的“善”。是否老子就不主张追求真、善、美的人生境界呢？我想不是的。他追求的是一种超越世俗的真、善、美，这就是所谓“同于道”的境界。看来，老子把“道”视为真、善、美的统一。

《道德经》第二十五章中说：“人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。”这可以说是老子对人生境界追求的叙述。他认为，人最高的理想是效法“道”，而“道”是自然而然的。他所说的“道”是什么？在《道德经》中有多种涵义，但最基本的涵义应是指超越性的最高的准则。⁵《道德经》第十四章中说：“视之不见，名曰夷；听之不闻，名曰希；搏之不得，名曰微。此三者不可致诘，故混而为一。其上不皦，其下不昧，绳绳不可名，复归于无物。是谓无状之状，无物之象，是谓惚恍。迎之不见其首，随之不见其后，执古之道，以御今之有。能知古始，是谓道纪。”这段话分析起来有以下三层意思：

1．“道”是超于感官经验的，“无色”（夷）、“无声”（希）、“无形”（微）都是用以说明“道”的超越性。明释德清《道德经解》：“致诘，犹言思议。”“不可致诘”，即不可思议。此“不可致诘”的“混而为一”者就是“道”。

2．“道”虽是超越性的，但它却是最真实的事物存在的根据，“无状之状，无物之象”。王弼注说：“欲言无耶，而物由以成；欲言有耶，而不见其形”，“无形无名者，万物之宗也”。“宗”者主宰义、根据义。“无状之状，无物之象”的“惚恍”可以作为一切“状”“象”存在之根据。“惚恍”，王弼注谓：“不可得而定也。”这就是说，“道”无规定性。凡有规定性者，均在经验之中；而无规定性者，则超越于经验之外。所以《道德经》第二十一章说：“道之为物，惟恍惟惚。惚兮恍兮，其中有象；恍兮惚兮，其中有物。窈兮冥兮，其中有精；其精甚真，其中有信。”“道”虽无规定性，但可做成一切有规定性之“物”，故为最真实的存在，亦即事物之本体。

3．“道”作为一切事物存在的根据，是就其为超越性的最高准则说的。“纪者，理也。”⁶“道纪”，即“道”作为从古至今天地万物的最高准则。

从以上三点可以说明，老子的哲学是要探求天地万物之本源、存在之根据，从而创造了以“道”为超越性的最高准则的哲学体系。老子的这种对宇宙本体的讨论，实属对终极“真理”探求的范围。

老子把“道”作为他的哲学体系的最高范畴，人掌握了“道”也就是掌握了“真理”，而人生的目的正在于此。因此，老子把“同于道”作为人生的最高追求，他说：“从事于道者同于道。”王弼注说：“道以无形无为成济万物，故从事于道者以无为为君，不言为教，绵绵若存，而物得其真，与道同体，故曰同于道。”“同于道”即是“与道同体”。看来，老子认为人和道的关系不是把“道”作为一般认识的对象（因“道”无名无形），而是应“体道”，即与“道”合一，所以“同于道”只是一种极高的人生境界，一种超越世俗的“得道”的境界。这正是老子所追求的最高境界。

那么老子对“善”和“美”又如何看呢？我们知道，老子的“道”的基本特性是“自然无为”，所以他也把“自然无为”作为“善”和“美”的标准。他说：“大道废，有仁义。”因为“仁义”等等都是“人为”的，不仅不合“自然无为”的原则，而且破坏了“道”，只有把这些“人为”的东西去掉，人们才可以有真正的“善”，所以他说：“绝仁弃义，民复孝慈。”只有抛弃掉“仁义”等一切“人为”的道德观念，人们才可以恢复自然而然的人际关系。《道德经》第八章中说：“上善若水，水善利万物而不争，处众人之所恶，故几于道。”有道德的人其性如水，水对万物都有利，可是并不争说于万物有利，它能处于在下的地位（第六十六章说：“江海所以能为百谷王者，以其善下之，故能为百谷王”），因此近于“道”。这说明有道德的人只是接近于“道”的境界，而不是“同于道”的境界。如果用冯友兰先生《新原人》中的“四种境界”的说法，“上善”的人只是“道德境界”，而“同于道”者才是“天地境界”。所以，从价值论上看，“善”较“真”为低一层次的。

《道德经》第十二章中说：“五色令人目盲，五音令人耳聋，五味令人口爽，驰骋畋猎令人心发狂。”王弼注说：“耳目口心皆顺其性也，不以顺性命，反以伤自然，故曰盲、聋、爽、狂也。”这就是说，“五色”“五音”“五味”等都是“人为”的，是失去“自然”本性的。老子把朴素看成是“美”，“见素抱朴”，⁷一切都应听其自然，按其本然，有做作则失去其本然之“美”，无做作才可存其自然之“美”。因此《道德经》第四十一章中说：“大音希声，大象无形，道隐无名，夫唯道，善贷且成。”王弼注说：“听之不闻曰希，不可得闻之音也，有声则有分，有分则不宫而商矣，分则不能统众，故有声者非大音也。”“有形则有分，有分者不温则炎，不炎则寒，故象而形者非大象。”“凡此诸善，皆是道之所成也。在象则为大象，而大象无形；在音则为大音，而大音希声。”合乎“道”的音是“大音”，合乎“道”的象是“大象”，“大音”可以统括一切“音”，“大象”可以成就一切“形”。就音乐看必有声音，就绘画看必有图形，但老子认为最高超的音乐应是无声的，最绝妙的绘画应是无形的。因为“无声”“无形”合乎“自然无为”的原则，所以是真正的“美”。从这里看，老子的“善”和“美”都是由“真”（“道”）派生的，都是“道”的特性的表现。《道德经》的最后一章即第八十一章中说：

信言不美，美言不信；

善者不辩，辩者不善；

知者不博，博者不知。

我认为，这一由“美”（言词“美”的标准在于平实）而“善”（行为“善”的标准在于诚实）而“真”（智慧“知”的标准在于真实）也许是老子对“真”“善”“美”的一种次第的安排。“美”是就言词（可作文学的代表）说的，“善”是就行为（可作道德的代表）说的，“知”是就智慧（可作知识的代表）说的。“真知”高于“真善”，又高于“真美”，这样就构成了一个层次的序列。这是老子对人生境界追求的一个模式。

我们说老子哲学关于真、善、美的看法和黑格尔哲学有某些相似之处，这仅仅是就他们对真、善、美在价值取向的安排上有某些相似之处而言。在黑格尔哲学体系中，“道德”“艺术”“哲学”都是属于精神哲学的范围。精神哲学是黑格尔哲学体系的第三部分，它是对于绝对精神在其自身发展的第三大阶段——精神阶段的描述。精神阶段是逻辑阶段和自然阶段的统一，它是自在而又自为的。精神从自在到自为也有一个复杂的发展过程，这个过程包括三个阶段：（1）主观精神；（2）客观精神；（3）绝对精神。“道德”属于客观的精神。所谓“客观精神”是指精神把自己体现在外在的客观世界中，但这客观世界不是指自然界，而是指具有精神性的世界，即人类社会生活和人类历史的不同领域，它包括：（1）抽象法（财产法）；（2）道德；（3）伦理（家庭、市民社会、国家）三个发展阶段。客观精神在精神发展的阶段上低于绝对精神，因而低于属于绝对精神的“艺术”和“哲学”。照黑格尔看，主观精神和客观精神都各有其片面性：前者如灵魂、感觉、意识、理智、意志等等都是个人的内在的意识状态，没有实现为现实的存在；后者如财产、法律、道德、政治、家庭、社会、国家等等，虽然是客观的，但没有意识到自己。但是，精神的本性是无限的、绝对的、自由的，因而它就必须继续向前发展，以克服主观精神和客观精神的片面性和两者的对立，从而上升到精神的最高阶段。绝对精神是精神对它自己的完全和充分的认识，它既是主体又是客体，它除去以自身为对象和自觉地表现其本质以外，再没有别的目的，从而它是真正无限的、绝对的、自由的。而“艺术”“宗教”“哲学”是绝对精神发展的三个阶段，这三者在内容上是一致的，它们的不同只是在形式方面。黑格尔说：“在艺术中是直观和形象，在宗教中是感情和表象，在哲学中是纯自由思想。”⁸黑格尔如此排列绝对精神发展的三个阶段，是要表明绝对精神对它自身的认识也要遵循从感性直观经过表象（他又称之为“图像式的思维”）上升到抽象思维的过程。所以“哲学”是绝对精神的最高的、最自由的和最智慧的形态。他说：“认识真理最完善的方式，就是思维的纯粹形式（引者按：指纯粹概念、逻辑范畴而言）。人采取纯思维方式时，就最为自由。”⁹艺术的感性形式不能完全体现绝对精神（理念）的无限、绝对和自由，因为它毕竟要受到感性形式的限制，“用感性形式表现真理，还是不能真正适合心灵的表现方式。”¹⁰只有哲学才是认识“真理”的最完善的形式。从黑格尔的精神哲学看，他把“哲学”作为真理最完善的方式，看成是最高的；而把“美”的追求（“艺术”）作为“理念的感性显现”，视为低于“哲学”的发展阶段；“道德”作为行为主体对善与恶的内在信念，则又低于“艺术”的发展阶段了。¹¹这就是说，如果从价值论上看，黑格尔对“真”“善”“美”的看法就是“真←美←善”。这在层次上虽与老子哲学不完全相同，但把“真”看得高于“美”和“善”，则是与老子相同的。不过，正如我们在前面讨论孔子思想时所说，中国传统哲学所注重的是追求一种达到“真”“善”“美”的境界，而西方哲学所注重的是建立一种论证“真”“善”“美”的价值的思想体系。前者可以说主要是追求一种觉悟，而后者则主要是对“知识”的探讨。

三、庄子对人生境界的追求

和老子一样，庄子也把“道”作为他的哲学的最高范畴，但庄子哲学主要不在于论证“道”的无限性、绝对性和永恒性（虽然他对此也颇花费了不少笔墨），而主要论证的是得道之人（如至人、神人、圣人等）在精神上的无限性、绝对性和永恒性。

《庄子》书的第一篇叫《逍遥游》，这篇的主旨是讨论人如何达到精神上的绝对自由的问题。照庄子看，大鹏击水三千、扶摇九万，列子御风日行八百，看起来是够自由的，但实际上并不是完全自由。大鹏飞行九万里，需要有广大的空间；列子日行八百，也得靠风力。这些都是“有待”的，而只有“无待”才可以说达到真正的自由。所谓“无待”是说不需要任何条件，所以他说：“若夫乘天地之正，而御六气之辩，以游无穷者，彼且恶乎待哉！”这种“逍遥游”是无所待的，从而是绝对和自由的。但是如何才能达到这一无待的绝对自由的境界呢？庄子认为，这不是一般人可以达到的，只有“至人”“神人”“圣人”等才可以达到，因为“至人无己，神人无功，圣人无名”。“无己”就是“丧我”，《齐物论》中说：“今者吾丧我”。在《大宗师》中有一段话讲到“坐忘”，可以说是对“无己”这种精神绝对自由境界的描述：

颜回曰：“回益矣。”仲尼曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘仁义矣。”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日，复见，曰：“回益矣。”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘礼乐矣。”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日，复见，曰：“回益矣。”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回坐忘矣。”仲尼蹴然曰：“何谓坐忘？”颜回曰：“堕肢体，黜聪明，离形去知，同于大通，此谓坐忘。”仲尼曰：“同则无好也，化则无常也，而果其贤乎！丘也请从而后也。”

庄子“坐忘”的境界就是他所说的“无己”或“丧我”的境界。上引文说明，颜回从否定世俗的道德开始，“忘仁义”“忘礼乐”，进而消除身体对精神的种种束缚，消除知识对精神的困扰，达到“形如槁木，心如死灰”的超脱耳目心意，超功利，超道德，超生死，不受任何内在外在的是非、好恶、美丑等等的限制，和天地融合为一、“同于道”的境界。这一境界以“去知”最为重要，“去知”即去掉分解性和概念性的认识活动，也即庄子“心斋”所谓的“徇耳目内通，而外于心知”。这种纯粹的直觉活动，我们说它是一种审美的活动。

《庄子》书中所描述的“至人”“神人”“圣人”等就是这样一些超越世俗，达到“坐忘”或“心斋”的精神上绝对自由的人。如《田子方》篇中说：

夫至人者，上窥青天，下潜黄泉，挥斥八极，神气不变。

而所谓“神人”，如《天地》篇所说：

上神乘光，与形灭亡，此谓照旷。致命尽情，天地乐而万事销亡，万物复情，此之谓混溟。

《刻意》篇中说：

圣人之生也天行，其死也物化……去知与故，循天之理……虚无恬淡，乃合天德。

“至人”“神人”“圣人”之所以能超越时空的限制，逍遥游放于六合之外，正因为他们能“离形去知”，一切任其自然而无为，对现实世界无任何要求，从而能逍遥游于“无何有之乡”。这当然只能是精神上的逍遥游放了。这种精神上的绝对自由的境界只能是一种艺术上的审美的境界。《知北游》篇中说：

天地有大美而不言，四时有明法而不议，万物有成理而不说。圣人者，原天地之美而达万物之理。是故圣人无为，大圣不作，观于天地之谓也。

《田子方》篇中说：

夫得是，至美至乐也。得至美而游乎至乐，谓之至人。

“夫得是”按上文是说“游心于物之初”的境界。此境界为不能言说的自然无为的境界。最高的美为“天地之大美”。“圣人”“至人”“神人”等“原天地之美”（或“备于天地之美”），正是由于自然无为，“离形去知”，所以可得“至美而游乎至乐”，这一“至美至乐”的境界也就是极髙的艺术的审美境界。

在庄子哲学中对“真”和“美”的关系也有所讨论，《秋水》篇中说：“牛马四足，是谓天；落马首，穿牛鼻，是谓人。故曰：无以人灭天，无以故灭命，无以得殉名，谨守而勿失，是谓反其真。”所谓“反其真”就是返回到自然而然的本来状态。庄子主张“法天贵真”，反对一切违反自然本性的“人为”。“龁草饮水，翘足而陆”是马之真性，而“落马首，穿牛鼻”使牛马失去其自然本性（真性），这样牛马就没有自由，从而也失去其“美”，失去其“真”。在庄子哲学中“真”与“美”是一致的，而“真”必须是“顺性命之情”的。《渔父》篇中说：“真者，精诚之至也。不精不诚，不能动人。”“能动人”在于有真情，使人得到美的享受。“成功之美，无一其迹也”，最成功的美不是做作的，而是能自由自在地表现其真性情，所以庄子的“求真”也是为了“求美”，无“美”也就无所谓“真”。“求真”是追求一种自由自在的精神境界。

庄子很少肯定道德，他有反道德的倾向。他认为一切道德规范都是“人为”的，它们破坏人的真性情，所以他反对“以仁义易其性”。庄子认为，个体人格的自由的实现不仅是“大美”，而且是最高的“德”，最髙的“善”。《刻意》篇中说：“若夫不刻意而高，无仁义而修，无功名而治，无江海而闲，不道引而寿，无不忘也，无不有也，澹然无极而众美从之。此天地之道，圣人之德也。”

“澹然无极而众美从之”，成玄英疏说：“心不滞于一方，迹冥符于五行，是以澹然虚旷而其道无穷，万德之美皆从于己也。”此谓心无所执着，自然无为，坐忘无己，自由自在，以达到至极则众美就会聚于己身。这既是天地自然而然的运行，也是圣人成就其善的路径。据此，庄子的“善”是包含在其最高的“美”（大美）之中的。

就上所言，在庄子哲学中“真”“善”“美”是统一的，它们都是统一于精神自由的审美境界上。庄子和老子一样都追求“同于道”，但老子的“同于道”是了解“道”、体会“道”，它仍属于认知的范围，是一种哲理的觉悟；而庄子的“同于道”则是对“道”的欣赏、观照，这就是审美的直觉了。从这里我们可以看出，庄子哲学在“真”“善”“美”问题上和老子不同，他是以“美”为最高。

西方哲学有两个哲学家从价值论上看在“真”“善”“美”问题上和庄子有某些相似之处，一是亚里士多德，一是谢林，也许谢林与庄子更为相近。亚里士多德哲学追求真、善、美的统一，他说：“美即是善，其所以引起快感正因为它是善”，而善的行为与美的艺术表现则需要以对事物的认识为基础。从价值论的角度看，亚里士多德并没有赋予真、善、美同样的意义。在对人类活动进行划分时，他认为在认识、实践和创造这三种活动中，认识是最高的，因为只有借助这种活动，人才能面对最高真理。但就三种活动的产物而言，在亚里士多德看来，“求真”的活动所得是理论性科学（如数学、物理学、形而上学），只是为知识而知识；“求善”与“求美”的活动所得则是实践性科学（包括政治学、伦理学）和创造性科学（包括诗学和修辞学），它们都有更高的外在目的，前者指导行动，后者指导创造。亚里士多德认为，艺术的本质就是创造。他说：“艺术就是创造能力的一种状况，其中包括真正的推理过程。”这里，创造活动成了最能体现人的本质即理性的活动（亚氏曾将人的本质界定为理性）。据此，我们似乎可以说，在亚里士多德哲学中，表现美的艺术创造从而美本身获得了最高价值，其次是有外在目的的行动（即道德实践，这属于“善”），再次才是为知识而知识的“求真”的活动。¹²

谢林的哲学提出“绝对同一”的问题。照他看，“绝对同一”既不是主体，又不是客体，而是“主体和客体的绝对无差别的同一”。要达到这种“同一”只能在一种“理智的直观”中实现。所谓“理智的直观”就是产生直观对象的活动，二者是同一的，这实际上是一种直觉活动。通过这种直觉活动，自我就把自己和无意识地产生自然界的宇宙精神合二而一。谢林认为，这种“理智的直观”不是任何人的意识都可以有的，只有哲学上的天才才能具有。谢林甚至认为，即使“理智的直观”活动也还不算完全地达到了主体和客体的绝对同一，因为在那里还有直观者和被直观者的差别（尽管这个被直观才是直观者的自由活动产生的）。因此，谢林又提出只有在“艺术的直观”中才能真正实现主体与客体的绝对无差别的完全同一。

这种“绝对无差别的完全同一”很接近于庄子的“心斋”和“坐忘”的境界。谢林认为，“艺术的直观”来自灵感，来自内心精神的一种内在力量的强烈追求。这只能说是一种直觉的神秘的精神境界了。这样，在谢林那里艺术就成了没有差别的至高无上的理想世界。基于这种“艺术的直观”高于“理智的直观”的看法，谢林把“美”视为有最高价值。照他看，“真”是必然性的问题，“善”是自由的问题，而“美”是二者的综合，“美”把“真”的科学知识和“善”的道德行为综合实现于艺术之中。他说：“我相信，最高的理性活动是包括一切理念的审美活动。真和善只有在美中才能接近。哲学家必须像诗人一样，具有审美的能力。”因此，从价值论的方面看，在谢林那里，“美”高于“真”和“善”。¹³这与庄子对“真”“善”“美”问题的看法从价值论上看有相似处。

四、简单结论

1．上述孔子、老子、庄子三种不同的人生境界的追求是三种不同的价值哲学，而这三种哲学表现了三种不同的价值取向。我认为，任何有价值的哲学体系总在追求着“真”“善”“美”的三者的统一，但如何统一以及达到统一的过程并不相同。从人类发展看，我们也不必求其相同。在我们的先秦时代，哲学之所以丰富多彩，正是因为它有着多元化的价值取向。当时的哲人能从非常广阔的领域来讨论宇宙人生终极关切的问题，这样就使得我国的哲学放在当时世界范围内，和世界其他地区（希腊、印度等）相比实不逊色，这正是因为它是“多元”的，而不是“一元”的，它是能从不同的路径来探讨宇宙人生的终极关切问题。如果我们说，我国先秦哲学的发展对我们今天有什么意义，我认为其中重要的一条就是它的“多元化”。哲学的多元化才能使哲学得到充分发展，“一元化”最终将窒息哲学的生命力。当今世界文化与哲学正呈现为全球意识下多元化发展的趋势，我们应顺应这一发展趋势来创造中国的现代化哲学。

2．对历史上的哲学，如果要使它具有现代意义，能在现实社会中发生作用，就必须给以现代的解释。上面对孔子、老子、庄子哲学思想的解释，就是一种对他们思想的一种现代解释的尝试。对孔子、老子、庄子思想的解释只能是“既是孔子、老子、庄子的哲学，又不是孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”。因为这篇文章中所讲的是根据孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的解释：它的根据是“孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”，因此它是“孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”；它是根据“孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的解释”，既是一种引发出来的解释，因此它又不是（或不全是）孔子、老子、庄子的哲学。只有这样，我们才扩大了孔子、老子、庄子哲学的意义。也正因为它是我们现时代“根据孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的”，所以它才有现代意义，哲学才有发展。我们从价值论方面来比较孔子、老子、庄子的哲学，说明他们的哲学在价值论上的取向不同，除了说明“多元化”对文化和哲学的发展意义之外，还可以为我们提供不同类型的哲学体系的式样和不同取向的人生价值的追求；又可以表示我们今天的一种对“真”“善”“美”的意义的关注和了解。这无疑对我们今日的哲学研究是有意义的。

3．用西方哲学作为参照，来了解（解释、研究）中国哲学的特点应是有重要意义的。在中国传统哲学史上虽然没有哪个哲学家对“真”“善”“美”问题作过专门的讨论，但在中国传统哲学中却不能说不包含“真”“善”“美”的内容。我们用西方哲学作为参照来揭示中国历史上的哲学家的哲学中同样包含着“真”“善”“美”的丰富内容：这一方面，使中国传统哲学从西方哲学的观点来看，它的意义扩大了；另一方面，使西方哲学从中国哲学的观点来看，它的意义也扩大了。虽然中西哲学都有其自身的意义，但是在它们的差异和比较中使它们各自的特性更加鲜明地呈现出来，因而或者可以互相补充。如果说西方哲学家对“真”“善”“美”的问题的讨论，基本上是属于知识（或信仰，如基督教）的问题；那么中国哲学家对“真”“善”“美”的追求，则基本上是属于境界问题。因此，中西哲学各有各的意义，在互相参照中又可以互相发明。

IX．ON THE CLASH AND COEXISTENCE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATIONS

I．"The Clash of Civilizations" and the "New Empire" Theory

In 1993, an essay entitled "Clash of Civilizations?" was published on the summer issue of Foreign Affairs by Samuel Huntington. In 1994, I criticized the American Hegemonism represented by Huntington in an essay titled as "On Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations?'", published in Philosophical Studies¹. Between the publications of the two essays, Huntington's theory was widely discussed and criticized in all aspects by many scholars at home and abroad. To respond to these challenges as well as to amplify and revise his own theory, Huntington published his chef d'oeuvre, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order, in 1996, which had marked some changes in his arguments. For example, in the Foreword to the Chinese translation, he writes: "The global politics, for the first time in human history, has become multipolar and multicultural."² In the section of "The Commonalities of Civilization," he points out:

Some Americans have promoted multiculturalism at home; some have promoted universalism abroad; and some have done both. Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture. The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not American. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality.³

Though there are still some arguable points in the above-quoted paragraph, the opinion that "the security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality" is undoubtedly prudent enough. Why did this change occur in Huntington's point of view? It was because he had felt the global challenges and threats endangering the Western (or American de facto) hegemony, and the domestic problems of racism and the like, that he proposed the "remaking of world order." In the section of "Renewal of the West?" Huntington claims:

The West obviously differs from all other civilizations that have ever existed in that it has had an overwhelming impact on all other civilizations that have existed since 1500. It also inaugurated the process of modernization and industrialization that have become worldwide, and as a result societies in all other civilizations have been attempting to catch up with the West in wealth and modernity. Do these characters of the West, however, mean that its evolution and dynamics as a civilization are fundamentally different from the patterns that have prevailed in all other civilizations? The evidence of history and the judgments of the scholars of the comparative history of civilizations suggest otherwise. The development of the West to date has not deviated significantly from the evolutionary patterns common to civilizations throughout history. The Islamic Resurgence and the economic dynamism of Asia demonstrate that other civilizations are alive and well and at least potentially threatening to the West. A major war involving the West and the core states of other civilizations is not inevitable, but it could happen. Alternatively the gradual and irregular decline of the West which started in the early 20th century could continue for decades and perhaps centuries to come. Or the West could go through a period of revival, reverse its declining influence in world affairs, and reconfirm its position as the leader whom other civilizations follow and imitate.⁵

We conclude from the above quotation that, on the one hand, Huntington has felt "the gradual and irregular decline" of the Western leadership in the world and the potential threat to the West coming from those countries undergoing or having undergone the process of modernization and industrialization by imitating the West. Surely this is a reality unacceptable for him and some other Western scholars, especially for certain political leaders (Mr. George W. Bush, the current American president, for instance), involved with an unsolvable complex of theirs: why do those resurgent Islamic movements or rising Asian countries which have accepted the western way of modernization and industrialization become a threat to the West instead? According to their reasoning, these countries should and could only play the role of Western adherents or loyal subjects in all spheres, especially in politics and culture. Nevertheless, the reality contradicts their expectations, resulting consequently in an anxiety in the Western mind. On the other hand, the deep-seated dream Huntington really cherishes is the "renewal of the West," to "reconfirm its position as the leader whom other civilizations follow and imitate." The performance of the Bush administration after "9.11" incident can be regarded from this standpoint as an attempt to reconfirm American hegemonic leadership on other civilizations.

After Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, another book, Empire, coauthored by Antonio Negri(Italy) and Michael Hardt (USA), was published in 2000. The basic judgment of this work on current global situation is as follows: "Empire is materializing before our very eyes; it presents its rule as a regime with no territorial or temporal boundaries; this new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire"; "the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world."⁷ Embracing this doctrine, many scholars in the United States propagate the "New Empire" theories. For example, John J. Mearsheimer, professor of politics in the University of Chicago, puts forward in his Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, 2002) the following theory: as every state seeks the maximization of its share of world power, no balancing structure could exist, and the best defense is to offend (which provides a theoretical basis for President Bush's "Preemptive Strike" theory). Another "post-modern state" theorist is Robert Cooper, Foreign Office adviser of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who divides all states into three types: first, post-modern states, e.g. North American and European countries and Japan; second, modern states, i.e. nation-states like China, India, Brazil and Pakistan; third, pre-modern states, e.g. African and Middle East countries and Afghanistan. A concept put forward and reiterated by Cooper is "New Imperialism," which means post-modern states should use their national power (including military power) to control modern states, meanwhile to contain the barbaric acts in pre-modern states such as mass slaughter.⁸ More aggressive still, the American neoconservatists in the 21st century have advocated three core creeds: 1. the extreme adoration of military force; 2. the claim of an American "benign hegemony"; 3. the emphasis on the exportation of American democracy and values. In accordance with this tone, President George W. Bush delivered his speech at the commencement of West Point on June 1, 2002, which could be summarized as three basic principles: first, America should maintain its power of "preemptive strike"; second, American values are universal; third, the United States should maintain an unchallengeable military force.¹¹ This "New Empire" doctrine would inevitably arouse "clashes" among the states and nations of other civilizations, and its central rhetoric has already been echoed by Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations." Two basic proposals are made in the latter's "Clash of Civilizations?": 1. to "limit the expansion of the military strength in Islamic and Confucian states"; to "maintain the military superiority of the West in East and Southwest Asia"; to "exploit the differences and conflicts among Islamic and Confucian states"; 2. to "strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions."¹² From these proposals we conclude that because of the "clashes of civilizations" kindled by the West, headed by the United States, on cultural differences (values, for example), the world has become a pandemonium with the upgrading of regional wars.

Should civilizations survive only in "clashes," in order to materialize the universal "New Empire" doctrine? Why couldn't they "coexist" in peace?

II．"Coexistence of Civilizations" and New Axial Age

Human history has recorded enough cases of clashes caused by cultural (or religious) differences among states, nations or regions. Nevertheless, in view of the general tendency of history, we find that the development of civilizations among different states, nations and regions should be dominated by mutual absorption and convergence. In my opinion, most conflicts among these states, nations and regions were not provoked by cultural differences. As my knowledge about Western culture (both civilization and culture concern with a comprehensive life style of a nation, thus civilization is a magnified culture) is limited, I am not authoritative enough to speak on this issue. Here I would like to quote Bertrand Russell to justify a proposition that the present Western civilization is formed by absorbing and syncretizing several cultural elements. In 1922, after Russell's visit to China, he wrote in an essay titled as "Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted" the following words:

Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines.¹⁴

Though it might be arguable whether Russell was accurate enough on every point of his views, two of which, however, are undoubtedly correct: 1. contacts between different cultures are important dynamics for the progress of human civilizations; 2. the European culture today has absorbed many elements from other national cultures, including some from the Arabian. Another observation based on the progress of Chinese culture would be even more forceful to prove that clashes of civilizations are always temporal, whereas mutual absorption and convergence are far more important.

In Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, different local cultures existed in China, including Central Area (Henan) culture, Qi-Lu (Shandong) culture, Qinlong (Shaanxi) culture, Jingchu (Southern) culture, Wu-Yue (South-east) culture and Ba-Shu (South-west) culture. All of them were amalgamated later into a generally unified Chinese(Huaxia) culture. The possibility of the coexistence of two cultures would be especially illuminated by the importation of Indian Buddhism in the first century AD. Buddhism culture spread in China peacefully; its cultural differences with indigenous Confucianism or Taoism had never brought their disciples into war. Only on three occasions had the Chinese imperial courts suppressed Buddhism, which were caused without exception by political or economic factors. Generally speaking, Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist cultures coexist well in China. A famous French sinologist (Kristofer Schipper) once asked me: "Why is China multicultural?" I pondered for a while and then answered: Perhaps there are two reasons. First, from the ideological point of view, the Chinese always advocate "harmony in diversity," i.e. the harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures. Secondly, in terms of political systems, the Chinese emperor was the highest authority dominating the fates of religious, philosophical and ethical cultures in China. For the sake of social stability, the emperor did not want to see conflicts or wars provoked by cultural differences. Thus he usually sponsored the "debate of three schools," summoning the representatives of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist scholars to debate in imperial court, arbitrating their respective statuses according to the degree of success in debate, instead of allowing any conflicts or even wars.

From the above arguments and historical experiences, I conclude that Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory is, at any rate, ex parte, serving merely for American international politics. He says as follows:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.¹⁵

Huntington's observation is insightful in certain cases, such as Palestinian-Israel conflict in the Middle East, Kosovo conflict, or even the Iraqi War, where some cultural (religious and ethical) elements catalyzed the outbursts of wars. Yet in closer analysis, the basic causes of wars or conflicts are not cultural, but political and economic: Palestinian-Israel conflict was a contest for regional hegemony, Iraqi War was mainly for oil, and Kosovo conflict for the strategies of power politics. But on the other hand, cultural differences have not provoked conflicts between many nations, such as in Sino-Indian, Sino-Russian, or even Sino-European relations. In fact, there have been no serious conflicts or wars(for whatever reason) between them, especially in the last decade. Thus the "clash of civilizations" theory hardly fits the present global situation, nor will it be the future perspective of mankind. Instead, the "coexistence of civilizations" should be the only outlet for human society, and a future goal we should strive for.

Perhaps a clearer picture of our age may help to illuminate this problem. In my opinion, we find ourselves in a New Axial Age.

The idea of Axial Age was proposed by German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). According to his theory, around 500 BC, great thinkers appeared almost simultaneously in Ancient Greece, Israel, India and China, and they contributed their original ideas to the solution to the problems which are of great concern to humankind. Distinctive cultural traditions were then formed respectively by Socrates and Plato in Ancient Greece, Laozi and Confucius in China, Shakyamuni in India, and Jewish prophets in Israel, which, after more than two thousand years of progress, have become the principal part of human intellectual wealth. These regional cultural traditions were independent in their births and developments, without mutual influence. "Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Period, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Even since then it has been the case that recollections and reawakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period—renaissances—afford a spiritual impetus."¹⁶ For example, the Europeans in Renaissance had traced the origin of their culture back to Ancient Greece, which had rekindled the European civilization and left its mark in world history. Similarly, the Song and Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers in China, stimulated by the impacts of Indian Buddhism, rediscovered Confucius and Mencius of the pre-Qin Period, and elevated the indigenous Chinese philosophy to a new height. In a certain sense, the current development of world multiculturalism might become a new leap forward on the basis of the Axial Age 2,000 years ago. Has the contemporary human cultures created, or will create, a New Axial Age? Judging from certain evidences, we may well draw such a conclusion.

First of all, since World War II, with the gradual collapse of colonialism, the once colonized and oppressed nations have taken upon themselves an urgent task to re-affirm their independent identities by all means. Their unique cultures (such as languages, religions and social values) were the most important means for this justification. We know that Malaysia after World War II insisted on using Malay as their national tongue to emphasize the nation's unification; and after the establishment of Israel, the Israeli decided to revive Hebrew as a vernacular, though for a long period of time in the past, Hebrew had only been used in religious ceremonies. "The central elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion."¹⁷ Some political leaders and scholars in Eastern countries also put forward the "Asian values" centered on community to distinguish themselves from the Western "universal values" centered on individual. So on and so forth. Even Huntington began to understand that "non-Western civilizations generally are re-affirming the value of their own cultures."¹⁸

Secondly, the Axial Age around 500 BC was a time when axial civilizations entered the Iron Age, and a time of great leaps forward in productivity, which in consequence produced great thinkers. Now we have entered the Information Age, when another great leap forward in human society is just happening. Because of the economic globalization, the integration of science and technology, and the progress of information network, different regions all over the world are tightly connected, and local cultural progress could no longer be independent as they once were in the "Axial Age" two thousand years ago. Instead, they will be developed in the midst of discords, conflicts, and through mutual influences or mutual absorptions. The self-understanding of each culture is undoubtedly limited, as is described in a famous poem of Su Shi (1037-1101):

They know not Lushan Mountain's real face;

So long as they continue to stay in her embrace.²²

This couplet tells us, a different perspective from another cultural system, i.e. from a cultural "other," might provide us with a more comprehensive view of our own culture. In an essay entitled "Why Is China Necessary for Us Westerners in Studying Philosophy?", FranÇois Jullien, a French scholar, writes: "We have chosen departure, which means a choice for leaving here, in order to create a space for thinking from a distant perspective. This detour in steady steps distinguishes itself from exoticism. We have made our trip traversing China in this manner in order to better understand Greece, which, though curtained off from our knowledge by a lapse of time, is something inborn and inherited by us through birthright. For the purpose of enhancing this perspective, we have to cut off this umbilical cord and constitute an exterior viewpoint."²³ This kind of intercultural study in the spirit of intersubjectivity and inter-reference, together with its methodology of judging one's own culture from the standpoint of a culture "other," is gradually accepted by scholars at home and abroad. Why, then, should we understand our culture from another's perspective? Just because we desire to inherit and develop the cultural tradition of our own. In this case, it undoubtedly becomes a serious problem in how to preserve the proper traits of a culture and pass on its lifeline. As we know, economy can be globalized, science and technology can be integrated, but cultures can never be monoculturalized. In the history of the progress of human society to date, it is neither possible nor wise enough for any culture to reject all external influences; but only when the essence of the target culture is sufficiently digested could it better absorb foreign cultures to nourish its domestic culture. "When we keep in contacts and exchanges with Western world," Mr. Fei Xiaotong said, "we should make our own treasures part of the world cultural heritage. Indigenization first, globalization second."²⁴ That is to say, our own cultural root should be protected when learning from other cultures. Thus, the cultural progress in the 21st century concerning all human societies should be both national and universal.

Thirdly, judging from the status quo of human societies and cultures, a new pattern of cultural diversity with a global consciousness has already been formed or is still being formed. Perhaps the 21st century would be dominated by four principal cultural systems: the Euro-American, the East Asian, the South Asian, and the Islamic (Middle Eastern and North African). Each of the four cultures has a long tradition and a population of over a billion. Of course there are other cultures influencing the future of human society in the 21st century as well, for example, the Latin American and the African; nevertheless, at least in the present, the influence of these cultures are far less than that of the four principal cultures mentioned above. If human society hopes to terminate the present chaos, it should especially criticize the cultural Hegemonism and cultural Tribalism, it should not only face this new cultural Axial Age but also make unremitting efforts to promote the dialogues among states or nations belonging to different cultural traditions, in order to coordinate all the cultures into a project of solving the common problems challenging human society. Undoubtedly, the four principal cultures are burdened with a major responsibility for the current human society. At present, human society is standing on a historic turning point, and every nation or country should seriously reexamine its own culture in the historical perspective. This is especially true for those nations in Euro-American, East Asian, South Asian or Islamic cultural regions, because of the crucial functions they perform in contemporary human civilization. This kind of reexamination is surely quite necessary for the future of human society. The culture tradition is a reality de facto for every nation or state, especially for those nations and states with a long history and having crucial influence on contemporary human society, for it is deeply rooted in the hearts of its people, forming the spiritual prop of this particular nation or state.

Let us return to our own cultural tradition, make it a starting point, and seek in it the source of our power and our spiritual prop, in order to promote the development of our contemporary culture, and to solve the pressing problems existing in human society. In this sense, the Euro-American, East Asian, South Asian and Islamic cultures, with their long historical traditions, might help to promote the human society in the 21st century to the level of a "New Axial Age," comparable to the Axial Age 2,500 years ago. Different cultural traditions would subsist in this New Axial Age, each with a population too large to be eliminated—even with wars, there would be only little or temporary effects. Thus, in the long run, the coexistence of civilizations is predictable.

Ш．Can Chinese Culture Make Contributions to the Coexistence of Civilizations?

If Chinese people want to make contributions to the "coexistence of civilizations" in contemporary human society, they must first know their own culture well, which means they must have a cultural self-consciousness. The so-called "cultural self-consciousness" refers to the fact that people in a certain cultural tradition can give serious consideration or make earnest reexamination of their own culture's origin, history, characteristics (including both merits and weakness) and its tendency of progress. It is fair to say that the Chinese nation is on the eve of a national renewal. To achieve this goal, we must have some self-knowledge about Chinese culture, make a proper estimation of its place in human civilizations, and try to ascertain the genuine spirit of this ancient culture, in order to present its true essence to contemporary human society. On the other hand, we must analyze the weak points of our own culture as well, to better absorb other cultures' essences, and to give a modern reinterpretation of Chinese culture, so that it can adapt to the general tendency in the development of modern society. Only in this way may our country become a vanguard in the development of a global culture, and create a brave new world together with other cultures.

Confucianism and Taoism were two principal schools of thinking in traditional Chinese culture, and generally considered to be complementary to each other. Of course, since Indian Buddhism was introduced into China, Buddhism has also played an important role in Chinese society and culture. Now I would like to discuss whether the Confucian and Taoist thinking can provide meaningful resources to the doctrine of "coexistence of civilizations."

i．The Confucian Doctrine of Ren (仁，benevolence, virtue) Is a Resource of Thinking with a Positive Meaning for the "Coexistence of Civilizations."

"The Way originates in Emotion" (道始于情), as prescribed in "Destiny is the resource of Human nature" (性自命出), a manuscript text in Guodian Bamboo Slips (《郭店竹简》). "The Way" here means "the Way of Humanity" (人道), i.e. the principles in dealing with human(or in other words, social) relationships, which is different from "the Way of Heaven" (天道), i.e. the laws of nature or of universe. Human relationships are established on the basis of emotion, which is the starting point of the Confucian doctrine of Ren. Once a disciple named Fan Chi asked Confucius: "What is Ren?" The answer was: "To love people." Where is the origin of this idea—"to love people"? In The Doctrine of the Mean a saying of Confucius was quoted as: " Ren is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives."²⁷ The spirit of Benevolence and Love (仁爱) is rooted in human nature, and to love one's relative is the most basic exercise of it. But the spirit of Ren goes far beyond this level. To quote Guodian Bamboo Slips: "To love and love deep, that is love; but to enlarge the love for one's father to the love for human being, that is Ren."²⁸ "The enlargement of filial piety is to love all the people below Heaven."²⁹ From these sayings we observe that the Confucian Doctrine of Ren demands to enlarge "the love for relatives" to "the benevolence on people," i.e. to "enlarge one's self-concern to the concern for others" (推己及人), to "treat with the reverence the elders in your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; to treat with the kindness due to youth the young in your own family, so that the young in the families of others shall be similarly treated"³⁰—that is Ren. It is not easy to practice the doctrine of "enlarging one's self-concern to the concern for others," which requires a "practice of Ren" rooted in "the Way of Loyalty and Forgiveness" (忠恕之道), i.e. "never do to others as you do not wish done on yourself,"³¹ "wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."³² ("Loyalty is the complete devotion of oneself; forgiveness is the deduction of one's self-concern"朱熹：《四书集注》).

If Ren is to be extended to the whole society, it would be as what Confucius once said: "To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a junzi (君子: gentleman, nobleman) can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under Heaven will return to Ren (after his example). Is the practice of Ren from a man himself, or is it from others?"³³ "To subdue one's self" and "to return to propriety" are usually interpreted as two parallel teachings, but I do not consider this the best explanation of this doctrine. "To subdue one's self and return to propriety is perfect virtue" actually means the behavior of "returning to propriety" based on the "subduing of one's self" can be regarded as Ren. Mr. Fei Xiaotong had his own interpretation about this doctrine: "Only after one has subdued one's self could one return to propriety. The return to propriety is the prerequisite for one to enter the society and become a social man. Perhaps it is just on this point Western and Eastern civilizations have parted, that is, whether to expand or to subdue one's self."³⁴ I think Mr. Fei's remark makes a lot of sense. Zhu Xi also had an exegesis on this doctrine. "To subdue means to conquer," he said, "and the self means one's personal desires. To return means to restore, and the propriety means the laws and patterns of the Principle of Heaven." According to this exegesis, one should subdue one's personal desires to abide by proprieties and social criteria. Ren is one's natural virtues ( "Love is born in nature."³⁵); and propriety is exterior conventions to rule one's behavior, the function of which is to adjust social relationships so that people could live in harmony, as is summed up in one of Confucius' old saying: "The most valuable function of propriety is harmony."³⁶ Only if one abides by proprieties and social criteria willingly, i.e. by an innate will to love people, can one fulfill the demands of Ren. Thus Confucius asked: "Is the practice of Ren from a man himself, or is it from others?" He made a distinction between Ren and propriety: "If a man be without Ren, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without Ren, what has he to do with music?"³⁷ He who performs the rites or music without a heart of Benevolence and Love is a hypocrite, and is serving a purpose of cheating. It is in this sense that Confucius thought, if people would pursue Ren self-consciously and practice what a heart of Benevolence and Love demands according to the proprieties in everyday life, then harmony and peace would be achieved in a society,— "If a junzi can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under Heaven will return to Ren." In my opinion, this teaching of Confucius is not totally meaningless for the political leaders of a state or the ruling class in developed countries (United States in particular). "The politics of Ren" (仁政), or "the Way of a virtuous emperor" (王道) instead of "the Way of hegemony" (霸道), is indispensable to "rule the state" (治国) and to "harmonize all under Heaven" (平天下). If "the politics of Ren" or "the Way of a virtuous emperor" is practiced, different cultures would be able to coexist and develop in peace; while "the Way of hegemony" will bring forth the "clash of civilizations," resulting in monoculturalism and cultural Hegemonism. If Confucian doctrine of Ren is applied to the regulating of intercultural relationships, clash or war of civilizations will be avoided, and the coexistence of civilizations, achieved.

Of course, even the Confucian doctrine of Ren is no miracle drug to solve all the problems about the existence of civilizations in contemporary society. Nevertheless, as a set of moral self-regulations based on Benevolence and Love, it would undoubtedly be of some practical significance to harmonize the coexistence of civilizations if practiced as a principle to regulate intercultural and cultural relationships.

It is not easy to make different cultures get along in harmony and thus to make states and nations in different cultural traditions coexist in peace. Probably the Confucian doctrine of "Harmony in Diversity" (和而不同)³⁹ could provide us with an illuminating resource of thinking. According to Confucius, "The virtuous (junzi) get on in harmony without agreeing to each other; the base (xiaoren) agree with others without harmony."⁴⁰ Junzi, as intellectuals with moral discipline practicing the Way of Loyalty and Forgiveness, should try to get on with others in harmony in spite of their different opinions; but those with no morality or discipline always force others to accept their opinions, thus could not maintain a harmonious relationship with others. If this doctrine of "Harmony in Diversity" could be applied as a principle in dealing with intercultural and cultural relationships, it can play a very positive role in resolving the conflicts among states or nations. It would be especially true in dealing with those discords and conflicts provoked by cultural differences (e.g. the differences in religious beliefs or social values) among states or nations, if we practice the teaching of "Harmony in Diversity" as principle to resolve these conflicts.

"Harmony" and "Sameness" are generally regarded as two different concepts in traditional Chinese thinking. There was even "a debate on the differences between Harmony and Sameness" in China's history. As a passage in Zuo Zhuan relates, once the Duke of Qi asked Yan-zi: "Is there only Ju who can get along with me in harmony?" The reply of Yanzi was: "Ju merely expresses the same opinion with Your Highness,—how can it be called harmony?" "Is there any difference between Harmony and Sameness?" asked the Duke. "They are quite different," replied Yan-zi. "Harmony is like well-cooked dish, you must concoct fish and meat with water, fire, vinegar, sauce, salt and plum, and then cook the dish with firewood. The cook harmonizes these flavors to make it moderate. If it is too light, then salt should be added; if too salty, then water. When junzi dines with such a dish, his heart would be pacified. This is analogous to the relationship between the King and his magistrates. . . . But Ju is different from it. When Your Highness say that something is right, he agrees; when Your Highness say the opposite, he agrees as well. It is as if to moderate water with water,—who could tolerate to eat such a dish? Or as if a zither always plays the same tune,—who could tolerate to enjoy such music? This is why Sameness differs from Harmony" (《左传·昭公二十年》). Another saying of Shibo (史伯) was recorded as follows: "In fact, only Harmony can activate the growth of lives, and Sameness would stop it on the contrary. Harmony is to moderate something with heterogeneous things—only in this way, the lives would flourish and find their belongings. If something is supplemented by homogeneous things, it can only be abandoned after its exhaustion. Thus the ancient virtuous emperors had concocted Earth with Metal, Wood, Water and Fire⁴¹, to transform it into miscellaneous lives."⁴² (《国语·郑语》) From the above quotations, we understand that Harmony and Sameness are totally different concepts. Only under the presupposition of difference and correlation could things "be moderated with heterogeneity," and the diverse things progress together in harmony with one another. "To supplement something with homogeneity" is to aggregate the sameness, which would only suffocate the lives. The supreme ideal of traditional Chinese culture is that "miscellaneous lives are nourished together without harming each other; miscellaneous ways are practiced together without counteracting each other."⁴³ The "miscellaneous lives" and "miscellaneous ways" refer to Diversity; and the "without harming each other" and "without counteracting each other" refer to Harmony. This doctrine would provide us with inexhaustible resources of thinking for the coexistence of diverse cultures.

Now in Western countries, people of insight have already admitted the possibility of coexistence of civilizations, that the clash or war provoked by mere cultural differences should be avoided. They believe that different nations and states should be able to achieve common understanding through cultural exchanges, dialogues, and discussions. This would be a process moving from "Diversity" to mutual understanding. This mutual understanding is neither to extinct nor to assimilate the individual cultures, but to find a cross point in two different cultures and to use it as the basis to promote the progress of both cultures,—such is the function of "Harmony." It is just because of the differences of diverse cultures that human civilizations have become so colorful, and that the complementary and interactive setup is formed gradually in the ever-flowing river of human history. Cultural differences might lead to clashes or even wars, but not all differences are destined to cause clashes or wars. Especially in an era when science and technology are rapidly developing, a massive war, if it really happens, would easily destroy humankind itself. Thus we must endeavor to maintain a harmonious coexistence through intercultural dialogues. Many scholars at home and abroad have recognized the importance of mutual understanding achieved through dialogues between different cultures. Habermas, for instance, begins to emphasize the concepts of justice and solidarity. In my opinion, they are significant principles in dealing with international cultural relationships. Habermas' "Principle of Justice" can be understood as follows: every national culture has a right to protect its independence and autonomy and to develop freely according to the will of its people. His "Principle of Solidarity," on the other hand, can be interpreted as an obligation to sympathize, understand and respect other national cultures. By uninterrupted dialogues and communication between different national cultures, there will be a time, sooner or later, when a positive cycle of interactions can be formed.⁴⁴ Another advocator of this principle is Gadamer, the German philosopher who passed away only recently. He proposed that "understanding" should be extended to the level of "universal dialogue." Because of this extension, the relationship between subject and object (as cognitive or grammatical concepts) is possible to be transformed from inequality to equality; in other words, only when the dialogues are conducted on equal basis, can there be any meaningful dialogue and fruitful result. Gadarmer's consciousness of equality between subject and object and his theory of "cultural dialogue" are important ideas urgently needed in our time,⁴⁵ illuminating enough for us to understand properly and thoroughly the cultural or national relationships between China and other nations. Nevertheless, whether it is Habermas' principles of justice and solidarity or Gadamer's theory of universal dialogue, their common presupposition should be the principle of "Diversity in Harmony," since only when nations and states in different cultural traditions coexist in harmony through dialogues, can they acquire equal rights and obligations and only then the "universal dialogue" between them may become meaningful and fruitful. Thus, the Confucian principle of "Harmony in Diversity" based on the belief that "harmony is the most valuable"⁴⁶ should be practiced as one of the basic principles in dealing with intercultural relationships. This principle, if adopted by all states and nations, would become a positive factor not only in eliminating the discords, conflicts and even wars, but also as a dynamics in promoting the development of all states and nations through exchange and communication. It is just in this sense that Bertrand Russell said: "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress."⁴⁹ The contemporary human society needs different cultures to develop their traditional characters through mutual absorption and convergence, in order to bring about the coexistence of civilizations on a new basis.

ii．The Taoist Doctrine of the Way (tao) Can Provide Significant Resources of Thinking to Prevent "the Clash of Civilizations."

If Confucius is a "man of virtue" (仁者), then Lao-zi is a "man of wisdom" (智者). The Way is the fundamental concept in Lao-zi's Tao Te Ching, while "the spontaneity and doing-nothing" (自然无为: to obey natural laws without offences) are the basic features of the Way. "The spontaneity and doing-nothing are the Way of Heaven," said Wang Chong in his Lun Heng.⁵⁰ All kinds of conflicts in contemporary human society are undoubtedly caused by the greedy desires for power and wealth. Those great powers, in their pursuit of selfish gains and expansion of power, exploit the resources of underdeveloped countries and practice power politics, which is the fundamental cause of global chaos. Lao-zi's doctrine of "spontaneity and doing-nothing" could be interpreted as to do nothing against people's will, which will render the society and the world peacefulness. Lao-zi once quoted the saying of an ancient sage: "As I do nothing, the people will reform by themselves; since I like quiet, they will keep order by themselves; when I seek no trouble, the people will prosper by themselves; when I have no desire, they will live in austerity by themselves."⁵¹ It means: the ruler with political powers should neither interfere with his people (doing-nothing), nor disturb their everyday life (liking quiet), nor act against their will (seeking no trouble), nor exploit them insatiably (having no desire); thus, the people will reform by themselves, keep order by themselves, prosper by themselves, and live in austerity by themselves. If we give a modern interpretation of this teaching and apply it to the administration of contemporary society, it will not only bring peace to a country but also function significantly in eliminating the clash of civilizations. We can interpret the above-quoted teaching as follows: in international politics, the more a country interferes with the affairs of other countries, the more chaotic the world will become; the more those great powers threaten others with military force, the more turbulent and disorderly the world will become; the more those great powers exploit the underdeveloped countries under the pretext of international aids, the poorer those underdeveloped countries will become; the more those developed countries desire and fight for the world dominance of wealth and power, the more immoral and terrorized the world will become. Therefore, in my opinion, the doctrine of "doing-nothing" may be an effective prescription for the leaders of the so-called "new empire." If they would accept this prescription, the world will enjoy peace. Nevertheless, the "new empire" always bully other states and nations by means of "willful acts" (有为), such as interference, exploitation or military threat, which are undoubtedly determined by its greedy nature as an empire. According to Lao-zi, "No calamity is worse than to be discontented. Nor is there a sin more dreadful than coveting. He who knows how to be content, truly he will always be so."⁵² Isn't the "new empire" discontented and coveting? Lao-zi said again: "Isn't the Way of Heaven much like a bow bent? The upper part has been disturbed, pressed down; the lower part is raised up from its place; the slack is taken up; the slender width is broader drawn. For thus the Way of Heaven cuts people down when they have had too much, and fills the bowls of those who are in want. But the way of man will not work like this: the people who have not enough are spoiled, for tribute to the rich and the surfeited."⁵³ Why is the human society in this world today in a state of turbulence and disorder? Isn't it totally caused by human beings themselves, especially those leaders of the "new empire" acting against the "Way of Heaven" and losing the "hearts of men," practicing a policy of spoiling those who have not enough, in order to pay tribute to the rich and the surfeited? Isn't it the root of discords, conflicts and wars in contemporary world? Thus we find that the "clash of civilizations" theory is closely related to the theory of "new empire" hidden behind its back.

Lao-zi strongly opposed wars for the sake of preserving peace in the world. In Chapter 31, Tao Te Ching, he said: "Weapons at best are tools of bad omen, loathed by all. Thus those of the Way avoid them."⁵⁴ In wars there are always people killed, production interrupted and social orders broken, thus Lao-zi thinks that war is evil, because people hate it, and virtuous statesmen would not push the country into war to solve their problems. Again Lao-zi said: "To those who would help the ruler of men by means of the Way: let him not with his militant might try to conquer the world; this tactic will be revenged by Heaven. For where armies have marched, there do briers spring up; where great hosts are impressed, years of hunger and evil ensue."⁵⁵ This is generally true in the history of all nations. In China, after every major war, the population would be reduced dramatically, farmland disserted, production interrupted, and robbers and thieves infesting. The two world wars both ended in this way, and the current war in the Middle East is no exception. Whenever the leaders of the "new empire" provoke a war anywhere, they will surely be bogged down there, since the people in the conquered countries will not surrender, they will fight without the fear of death, as Lao-zi said: "The people do not fear at all to die; what's gained therefore by threatening them with death?"⁵⁶ And: "As for those who delight to do murder, it is certain they can never get from the world what they sought."⁵⁷ We see from history that those who had initiated wars, though momentary successes they might get, would finally fail and be dishonored. Hitler was such an example, and Japanese Militarism, another. As a "man of wisdom," Lao-zi could observe the latent converse side with his wisdom, as he said: "On bad fortune the good fortune always leans; in good fortune the bad fortune always hides."⁵⁸ Now people in some countries are suffering, but it would be a necessary precondition prepared for their nation's renewal in future. Take the past hundred years of China's history, for example, it is just after being beaten repeatedly that the Chinese people had finally waken up. Today we may say that the Chinese nation is on the eve of a great renewal. In my opinion, leaders of every country, especially those of the "new empire," should learn some wise teachings from Tao Te Ching, and realize that, in the long run, the politics of great powers and Hegemonism will have no future. Therefore, I consider the thinking of Lao-zi valuable in refuting the theories of "clash of civilizations" and of the "new empire." We advocate the theory of "coexistence of civilizations" and are in agreement with Lao-zi's idea of "doing-nothing," in the expectation of a world of Great Harmony, with peace and security, general progress and common wealth for humankind. Of course, as Lao-zi was born two thousand years ago, his philosophy cannot be used to solve all the problems that contemporary human society is confronted with (including the discords and conflicts among nations), but his wisdom should be of important value to illuminate our way. Our task is to rediscover and develop the essence of his thinking, to give it a modern interpretation, so that the general public can benefit from the edifications in the treasury of ancient Chinese philosophy.

Differences in religious beliefs, values and ways of thinking may lead to conflicts among nations and states; and conflicts can breed wars. However, we may ask: Are these conflicts inevitable? Would it be possible that these conflicts be resolved peacefully, without a war for cultural differences? We have to find a common resource of thinking in all national cultures advocating the coexistence of civilizations, in order to prevent any possible conflict or war. As argued above, the Confucianism and Taoism in Chinese culture could provide significant resources of thinking to bring about the peaceful coexistence of civilizations. I believe that the same kind of resources can be found in cultures of other nations and states as well. At the turn of the 21st century, we must make a careful choice whether to practice the theory of "clash of civilizations" in dealing with the problems among nations and states, or the theory advocating the "coexistence of civilizations" to bring peace to human society. It would be a blessing to humankind if we choose not the clash but the coexistence of civilizations. The Book of History teaches us: "All the states under Heaven should be harmonized."⁵⁹ Like many other nations, the Chinese nation is a great one with a long and brilliant tradition of history and culture. Chinese culture is undoubtedly one of the most valuable treasures for mankind. With this cultural heritage, we should be able to make contributions to the peaceful coexistence of human civilizations, promote cultural exchanges, so that harmony might befall on this world of diverse cultures.

玖　“文明的冲突”与“文明的共存”*

一、“文明的冲突”论与“新帝国”理论

1993年夏季号美国《外交事务》发表了塞缪尔·亨廷顿的《文明的冲突？》一文，我于1994年撰写了《评亨廷顿〈文明的冲突？〉》（刊于《哲学研究》，1994年第3期），批评了以亨廷顿为代表的美国“霸权主义”，在此期间中外许多学者都对亨廷顿的理论从各个角度进行了讨论或提出了批评。1996年，亨廷顿为了回答对他的批评，并补充和修正他的某些观点出版了《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》。可以看出他的某些观点有所改变，例如在他为中文版写的《序言》中说：“在人类历史上，全球政治首次成了多极的和多文化的。”在《文明的共性》一节中，他说：

一些美国人在国内推行多元文化主义，一些美国人在国外推行普世主义，另一些美国人则两者都推行。美国国内的多元文化主义对美国和西方构成了威胁，在国外推行普世主义则对西方和世界构成了威胁。它们都否认西方文化的独特性。全球单一文化论者想把世界变成像美国一样。美国国内的多元文化论者则想把美国变成像世界一样。一个多元文化的美国是不可能的，因为非西方的美国便不成其为美国。多元化的世界则是不可避免的，因为建立全球帝国是不可能的。维护美国和西方需要重建西方认同，维护世界安全则需要接受全球的多元文化性。⁴

虽然这段话也还有一些可商榷处，但他提出“维护世界安全则需要接受全球的多元文化性”，应该说是比较明智的考虑。亨廷顿的观点有这样的变化，正是由于他感到在世界范围内西方（实际上是美国）的“霸权”地位受到挑战和威胁，在国内又受到“种族”等问题的困扰，因此提出了“世界秩序的重建”问题。在该书“西方的复兴”一节中亨廷顿说：

西方与所有已经存在过的文明显然是不同的，因为它已经对公元1500年以来存在着的所有文明都产生了势不可挡的影响。它开创了在世界范围内展开的现代化和工业化的进程，其结果是，所有其他文明都一直试图在财富和现代化方面赶上西方。然而，西方的这些特点是否意味着，它作为一种文明的演进和变动根本不同于所有其他文明中普遍存在的模式？历史的证据和比较文明史学者的判断却表明并非如此。迄今为止，西方的发展与历史上诸文明共同的演进模式和动力并无重大不同。伊斯兰复兴运动和亚洲经济发展的势头表明，其他文明是生机勃勃的，而且至少潜在地对西方构成了威胁。一场涉及西方和其他文明核心国家的大战并不是不可避免的，但有可能发生。而西方始于20世纪初的逐渐而且无规律的衰落，可能持续几十年，甚至几百年。或者，西方可能经历一个复兴阶段，扭转它对世界事务影响力下降的局面，再次确立它作为其他文明追随和仿效的领袖的地位。⁶

这段话一方面反映了亨廷顿感到西方领导世界的地位正在“逐渐而且无规律”地“衰落”，而那些向西方学习走上或正在走上“现代化”和“工业化”的国家已经“潜在地对西方构成了威胁”，这当然是他和西方某些学者、特别是政治领袖（如现任美国总统小布什）不愿接受的。这里包含着亨廷顿和某些西方学者、政治家的一个不可解的情结：为什么那些伊斯兰复兴运动和亚洲兴起的国家走上了他们创造的“现代化”和“工业化”的道路，反而对他们构成了威胁？照他们看，这些兴起的国家在一切方面（政治的、文化的）本应跟着他们走，听命于他们才是“合理”的。但是现实的情况并非如此，因而表现出西方世界的忧心忡忡。另一方面，在亨廷顿内心真正希望的是西方文明的“复兴”，“再次确立它作为其他文明追随和仿效的领袖地位”。“9·11”以后美国布什政府的所作所为，可以说正在试图确立其作为其他文明的霸主的领导地位。

继亨廷顿的《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》之后，2000年出版了意大利安东尼奥·奈格里与美国迈克尔·哈特合著的《帝国—全球化的政治秩序》一书，该书对当前世界形势的基本看法是：“就在我们眼前，帝国主义正在成长、形成。无边无垠，永无止境，这就是全球政治新秩序——一种新的主权形式：帝国。”“新的主权形式正在出现。帝国是一个政治对象，它有效控制着这些全球交流，它是统治世界的最高权力。”⁹基于这一理论，在美国有众多学者在大力宣扬这种“新帝国”论。例如2002年美国芝加哥大学的米尔斯海默教授在《大国政治的悲剧》中指出：任何一个国家都要寻求权力的最大化，因此不可能有权利均衡的机制，最好的防御就是进攻（这就是布什的“先发制人”的理论基础）。另外还有一位“后现代国家理论”者英国首相布莱尔的顾问罗伯特·库珀，他把世界上的国家分为三类：第一类是后现代国家，即北美、欧洲国家和日本；第二类是现代国家，即他们还是民族国家，如中国、印度、巴西、巴基斯坦等；还有一类是前现代国家，如非洲国家、阿富汗、中东国家。库珀提出并一再讲的一个概念就是“新帝国主义”，其意思是，后现代国家首先要动用它们的国家力量（包括军事力量）来控制现代国家，同时也制止前现代国家那些诸如屠杀之类的行为。¹⁰更有甚者21世纪的美国新保守主义提出三项核心内容：（1）极度崇尚军力；（2）主张建立美国“仁慈霸权”；（3）强调输出美国式的民主与价值观。据此，布什总统2002年6月1日在西点军校毕业典礼上提出三大原则：第一，美国要保持“先发制人”的权力；第二，美国价值观是普适全球的；第三，保持不可挑战的军事力量。¹³依据这种“新帝国”论，在不同文化传统的国家和民族中不可能不引起“冲突”。而亨廷顿的“文明冲突”论实际上早就为这种“新帝国”论提供了最基本的策略。在他的《文明的冲突？》中，有两条基本的主张：（1）“抑制伊斯兰与儒家国家的军事扩张”，“保持西方在东亚、西南亚国家的军事优势”，“制造儒家与伊斯兰国家之间的差异与冲突”；（2）“巩固能够反映西方利益与价值并使之合法化的国际组织，并且推动非西方国家参与这些组织。”依据这些理论，我们可以看到，由于西方，主要是美国，利用着文化上的差异（例如在价值观上的差异），挑起文明之间的冲突，已使当前的世界陷入一片混乱之中，局部战争越演越烈。

那么“文明”难道只能在“冲突”中，以实现一统天下的“新帝国”的理论吗？在不同“文明”之间难道不可以“共存”吗？

二、“文明的共存”与新轴心时代

在人类以往的历史上并不缺乏由于文明（例如宗教）的原因引起国家与国家、民族与民族、地域与地域之间的冲突。但是，我们从历史发展的总体上看，在不同国家、民族和地域之间的文明发展更应该是以相互吸收与融合为主导。照我看，国家与国家、民族与民族、地域与地域之间的冲突主要并不是由文明的原因引起的。我对西方文化（文明与文化都涉及一个民族全面的生活方式，文明是放大了的文化）了解很有限，没有多少发言权，这里只引用罗素的一段话来说明今日西方文明是在吸收与融合多种文化成分而形成的。1922年，在罗素访问中国之后，写过一篇题为《中西文明之比较》的文章，其中有这样一段：

不同文明之间的交流过去已经多次证明是人类文明发展的里程碑。希腊学习埃及，罗马借鉴希腊，阿拉伯参照罗马帝国，中世纪的欧洲又模仿阿拉伯，而文艺复兴时期的欧洲则仿效拜占庭帝国。

罗素的这段话是否十分准确，可能有不同看法，但他说：（1）不同文明之间的交流是促进人类文明发展的重要因素；（2）今日欧洲文化是吸收了许多其他民族文化的因素，而且包含了阿拉伯文化的某些成分，这两点无疑是正确的。如果看中国文化的发展，就更可以看到在不同文化之间由于文化原因引起冲突总是暂时的，而不同文化之间的相互吸收与融合则是主要的。

中国在春秋战国时代本来存在着多种不同的地域文化，有中原文化、齐鲁文化、秦陇文化、荆楚文化、吴越文化、巴蜀文化等等，但后来才合成一个大体统一的华夏文化。特别是到公元1世纪初印度佛教文化的传入，更加说明两种不同文化可以共存。印度佛教文化是以和平的方式传入中国的，外来的印度佛教与本土的儒、道两家从来没有因文化的原因发生过战争，只有三次因政治经济的原因有着冲突，当时的朝廷曾对佛教加以打击，但在大多数的时间里，在中国儒、道、释三种文化是同时并存的。一位法国的著名汉学家（施舟人）曾问我：“为什么中国文化是多元性的”。我考虑了一下，我说，我认为也许有两个原因：一是思想观念上的原因，这就是中国一向主张“合而不同”，文化虽可以不同，但能和谐相处，这个问题下面我会较多地说明；二是制度上的原因，中国以皇帝为最高权威，一切文化（宗教、哲学、伦理），都以皇帝的意志为中心，而皇帝往往为了社会的稳定，不希望因不同文化而引起冲突，甚至战争。因此，皇帝常采用“三教论衡”的办法，把儒、道、释召到朝庭上来辩论，哪一派辩论赢了就排在前面，然后是第二、第三。不允许他们之间互相残杀，发动战争。

从以上情况看，根据历史经验，我认为亨廷顿的“文明的冲突”理论无论如何是片面的，而且是为美国战略服务的。他说：“我认为新世界的冲突根源，将不再侧重意识形态或经济，而文化将是截然分隔人类和引起冲突的主要根源。在世界事务中，民族国家仍然举足轻重，但全球政治的主要冲突将发生在不同文化的族群之间，文明的冲突将左右全球政治，文明之间的断层线将成为未来的战斗线。”

虽然亨廷顿的“文明的冲突”论可以说，他敏锐地观察到某一些由于“文明”引起冲突的现象，例如中东地区的巴以冲突、科索沃地区的冲突，甚至伊拉克战争等等，都包含着某些文化（宗教的和价值观的）的原因，但是分析起来，最基本的发生冲突和发生战争的原因不是由文化引起的，而是由“政治和经济”引起的，巴以冲突是为了争夺地区的控制权，伊拉克战争主要是为了石油，科索沃地区冲突主要是为了大国的战略地位。但是，我们应看到另一方，在不少不同文化之间现在并没有因为文明（文化）的不同而引起冲突，例如中印之间、中俄之间，甚至中欧之间，都在相当长的一个阶段，特别是近十余年里，并没有什么严重冲突，更没有发生过战争。所以“文明的冲突”论并不能正确说明当前世界现存的形势，更不是人类社会发展的前景，而“文明的共存”才应是人类社会的出路，是人类社会必须争取的目标。

为了弄清这个问题，我想也许，我们先了解一下当前是一个什么样的时代。照我看，也许我们正处在一个新的轴心时代。

德国哲学家雅斯贝尔斯曾经提出“轴心时代”的观念。他认为，在公元前500年前后，在古希腊、以色列、印度和中国几乎同时出现了伟大的思想家，他们都对人类关切的问题提出了独到的看法。古希腊有苏格拉底、柏拉图，中国有老子、孔子，印度有释迦牟尼，以色列有犹太教的先知们，形成了不同的文化传统。这些文化传统经过两千多年的发展已经成为人类文化的主要精神财富，而且这些地域的不同文化，原来都是独立发展出来的，并没有互相影响。“人类一直靠轴心时代所产生、思考和创造的一切而生存，每一次新的飞跃都回顾这一时期，并被它重新燃起火焰。自那以后，情况就是这样。轴心期潜力的苏醒和对轴心期潜力的回忆或曰复兴，总是提供了精神动力。”¹⁹例如，欧洲的文艺复兴就是把目光投向其文化的源头古希腊，使欧洲文明重新燃起火焰，而对世界产生重大影响。中国的宋明理学（新儒学）在受到印度佛教文化冲击后，再次回到先秦的孔孟，而把中国本土哲学提高到一个新水平。在某种意义上说，当今世界多种文化的发展很可能是对两千多年前的轴心时代的又一次新的飞跃。那么，我们是否能说当今人类社会的文化正在或即将进入一个新的“轴心时代”呢？我认为，从种种迹象看也许可以这样说。

首先，自二次世界大战以后，由于殖民体系的逐渐瓦解，原来的殖民地国家和受压迫民族有一个很迫切的任务，就是要从各方面确认自己的独立身份，而民族的独特文化（语言、宗教、价值观等等），正是确认其独立身份的重要支柱。我们知道，二战后马来西亚为了强调民族的统一性，坚持以马来语为国语。以色列建国后决定将长期以来仅仅用于宗教仪式的希伯来语重新恢复为常用语。“任何文化和文明的主要因素都是语言和宗教”。²⁰一些东方国家的领导人和学者为了强调自身文化的特性提出以群体为中心的“亚洲价值”以区别西方的以个体（个人）为中心的所谓“世界价值”。等等，等等。甚至亨廷顿也认识到“非西方文明一般正在重新肯定自己的文化价值”。²¹

其次，公元前500年前后那个轴心时代，正是上述各轴心国进入铁器时代的时候，生产有了大发展，从而产生了一批重要的思想家。而当今进入了信息时代，人类社会又将会有一个大飞跃。我们可以看到，由于经济全球化、科技一体化、信息网络的发展，把世界联成一片，各国、各民族文化的发展将不可能像公元前五六百年那个“轴心时代”是各自独立发展的，而是在矛盾、冲突和互相影响、互相吸收中发展。每种文化对自身文化的了解都会有局限性，“不识庐山真面目，只缘身在此山中”，如果从另外一个文化系统看，也就是说从“他者”看，也许会更全面地认识此种文化的特点。法国学者法朗索瓦·于连《为什么我们西方人研究哲学不能绕过中国》一文中说：“我们选择出发，也就是选择离开，以创造远景思维的空间。在一切异国情调远处，这样的迂回有条不紊。人们这样穿越中国也是为了更好地阅读希腊；尽管有认识上的断层，但由于遗传，我们与希腊有某种与生俱来的熟悉，所以了解它，也是为了发展它，我们不得不割断这种熟悉，构成一种外在观点。”²⁵这种以“互为主观”“互相参照”为核心，重视从“他者”反观自身文化的跨文化研究逐渐为广大中外学者所接受。从另外一种文化来了解自身文化，正是为了继承自己的传统文化，发展自己的传统文化。在这样的情况下，如何保存其文化的特性，传承其文化的命脉，无疑是必须认真考虑的问题。我们知道，经济可以全球化，科技可以一体化，但文化是不可能单一化的。从人类社会发展到今天看，任何文化不受外来文化的影响是不可能的，也是不可取的；但是只有充分发挥其原有文化的内在精神，才可以更好地吸收外来文化以滋养本土文化。正如费孝通先生所说：“在和西方世界保持接触、积极交流的过程中，把我们的好东西变成世界性的好东西。

首先是本土化，然后是全球化。”²⁶这就是说，在吸收外来文化的时候，必须维护我们自身文化的根基。因此，21世纪影响人类社会文化的发展必将既是民族的，又是世界的。

第三，就当前人类社会文化存在的现实情况看，已经形成了或正在形成全球意识观照下的文化多元化发展的新格局。我们可以看到，也许21世纪将由四种大的文化系统来主导，即欧美文化、东亚文化、南亚文化、中东北非文化（伊斯兰文化），这四种文化不仅都有着很长的历史文化传统，而且每种文化所影响的人口都在十亿以上。当然还有其他文化也会影响21世纪人类社会发展的前途，例如拉丁美洲文化，非洲文化等。但就目前看，这些文化的影响远不及上述四种文化大。人类社会如果希望走出当前混乱纷争的局面，特别要批判文化霸权主义和文化部落主义，在文化上不仅要面对这个新的轴心时代，而且必须不断推动在不同文化传统的国家与民族之间的对话，使每种文化都能自觉地参与解决当前人类社会所面临的共同问题。无疑上述四种文化对当今人类社会负有特别重大的责任。当前人类社会正处在一个重大的历史转折关头，每个民族、每个国家对自身文化，特别是对当前人类文明有重大影响的欧美文化、东亚文化、南亚文化和伊斯兰文化，都应作一历史的严肃、认真的反思，对今后人类社会发展的前途无疑是十分必要的。对任何一个民族和国家来说，特别是对有较长历史而对当今人类社会有着重大影响的民族和国家来说，它的文化传统是已成的事实，是无法割断的，因为其文化传统已深入到这个民族和国家的千百万的人民心中，是这个民族或国家的精神支柱。

我们回到“传统”，以“传统”为起点，并从“传统”中找寻力量、找寻支点，以推进我们文化的发展，来解决当前人类社会存在的问题，就这个意义上说，21世纪也许将由有着很长历史文化传统的欧美文化、东亚文化、南亚文化、伊斯兰文化等推动人类社会进入再次回顾公元两千五百年前那个轴心时代的一个“新的轴心时代”。在这新的轴心时代，存在着不同的文化传统，而且这些文化传统仍然有着雄厚的人口资源基础，是绝不可能被消灭，即使用战争的办法，也只能暂时起一点作用，从长远看，文化仍然必须共存。

三、中国文化能否为“文明的共存”作出贡献？

中国文化要希望对当今人类社会的“文明的共存”作出贡献，必须对自身文化有所了解，这就是要对自身文化有一个“自觉”。所谓“文化自觉”是指在一定文化传统的人群对其自身的文化来历、形成过程的历史以及其特点（包括优点和缺点）和发展的趋势等等能作出认真的思考和反省。应该说，中华民族正处在民族复兴的前夜，因此我们必须对中国文化有个自觉的认识，必须给中国传统文化一个恰当的定位，认真发掘我们古老文化的真精神所在，以便把我们优秀的文化贡献给当今人类社会；认真反省我们自身文化所存在的缺陷，以便我们更好地吸取其他国家和民族的文化精华，并在适应现代化社会发展的总趋势下给中国文化以现代的诠释，这样我们的国家才能真正地走在世界文化发展的前列，与其他各种文化共同创造美好的新世界。

中国传统文化中主要是儒、道两家，而且我们常说中国文化是儒、道互补的，当然印度佛教传入中国后，它对中国社会和中国文化也发生着重要影响。现在我想讨论一下儒、道两家的思想理论是否能对“文明的共存”提供有意义的资源。

1．儒家的“仁学”为“文明的共存”提供了有积极意义的资源

《郭店竹简·性自命出》中说：“道始于情”。这里的“道”说的是“人道”，即人与人的关系的原则，或者说社会关系的原则，它和“天道”不同，“天道”是指自然界的运行规律或宇宙的运行法则。人与人的关系是从感情开始建立的，这正是孔子“仁学”的基本出发点。孔子的弟子樊迟问“仁”，孔子回答说：“爱人”。这种“爱人”的思想从何而有呢？《中庸》引孔子的话说：“仁者，人也，亲亲为大。”“仁爱”的精神是人自身所具有的，而爱自己的亲人最根本。但是“仁”的精神不能只停止于此，《郭店竹简》中说：“亲而笃之，爱也；爱父，其继之爱人，仁也。”非常爱自己的亲人，这只是爱，爱自己的父亲，再扩大到爱别人，这才叫作“仁”。“孝之放，爱天下之民”。对父母的孝顺要放大到爱天下的老百姓。这就是说，孔子的“仁学”是要由“亲亲”扩大到“仁民”，也就是说要“推己及人”，要做到“老吾老以及人之老，幼吾幼以及人之幼”，才叫作“仁”。做到“推己及人”并不容易，必须把“己所不欲，勿施于人”“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”的“忠恕之道”作为“为仁”的准则。（朱熹《四书集注》：“尽己之谓忠，推己之谓恕。”）

如果要把“仁”推广到整个社会，这就是孔子说的：“克己复礼为仁，一日克己复礼，天下归仁焉。为仁由己，而由人乎哉？”自古以来把“克己”和“复礼”解释为两个平行的方面，我认为这不是对“克己复礼”的好的解释。所谓“克己复礼为仁”是说，只有在“克己”的基础上的“复礼”才叫作“仁”。费孝通先生对此也有一解释，他说：“克己才能复礼，复礼是取得进入社会、成为一个社会人的必要条件。扬己和克己也许正是东西方文化的差别的一个关键。”³⁸我认为这话是很有道理的。朱熹对“克己复礼为仁”的解释说：“克，胜也。己，谓身之私欲也。复，反也。礼者，天理之节文也”云云。这就是说，要克服自己的私欲，以便使之合乎礼仪制度规范。“仁”是人自身内在的品德（“爱生于性”）；“礼”是规范人的行为的外在的礼仪制度，它的作用是为了调节人与人之间的关系使之和谐相处，“礼之用，和为贵”。要人们遵守礼仪制度必须是自觉的，出乎内在的“爱人”之心，才符合“仁”的要求，所以孔子说：“为仁由己，而由人乎哉？”对“仁”和“礼”的关系，孔子有非常明确的说法：“人而不仁如礼何？人而不仁如乐何？”没有仁爱之心的礼乐那是虚伪的，是为了骗人的。所以孔子认为，有了追求“仁”的自觉要求，并把这种“仁爱之心”按照一定的规范实现于日常社会之中，这样社会就会和谐安宁了，“一日克己复礼，天下归仁焉。”我认为，孔子和儒家的这套思想，对于一个国家的“治国”者，对于现在世界上的那些发达国家（特别是美国）的统治集团不能说是没有意义的。“治国、平天下”应该行“仁政”，行“王道”，不应该行“霸道”。行“仁政”“王道”可以使不同文化得以共同存在和发展；行“霸道”将引起文明的冲突，而使文化走向单一化，形成文化霸权主义。如果把孔子的“仁学”理论用于处理不同文明之间的关系，那么在不同文明之间就不会引起冲突，以至于战争，而实现“文明的共存”。

当然，孔子的这套“仁学”理论虽然不能解决当今人类社会存在的“文化的共存”的全部问题，但它作为一种建立在以“仁”为本之上的“律己”的道德要求，作为调节不同文化之间关系的一条准则，使不同文化得以和谐相处无疑仍有一定的现实意义。

要使“不同文化之间”和谐相处，从而使不同文化传统的国家、民族能和平共存，并不是一件容易的事，也许孔子提倡的“和而不同”可以为我们提供极有意义的资源，他说：“君子和而不同，小人同而不和”。他认为：以“和为贵”而行“忠恕之道”的有道德有学问的君子应该做到能在不同中求得和谐相处；而不讲道德没有学问的人往往强迫别人接受他的主张而不能与他人和谐相处。如果我们把“和而不同”用作处理不同文化之间关系的原则，它对于解决当今不同国家与民族之间的纷争，特别是在不同国家与民族之间，因文化上的不同（例如宗教信仰不同，价值观念上的不同）而引起的矛盾、冲突，应有非常积极的意义。

在中国历史上一向认为“和”与“同”是不同的两个概念，有所谓“和同之辨”。《左传·昭公二十年》记载：“公曰：唯据与我和夫！晏子对曰：据亦同也，焉得为和？公曰：和与同异乎？对曰：异。和如羹焉，水火醯醢盐梅以烹鱼肉，燀之以薪。宰夫和之，齐之以味，济其不及，以泄其过。君子食之，以平其心。君臣亦然。……今据不然。君所谓可，据亦曰可。君所谓否，据亦曰否。若以水济水，谁能食之？若琴瑟之专一，谁能听之？同之不可也如是。”（齐侯说：只有据跟我很和谐啊！晏子回答说：据也只不过和你相同而已，哪里说得上和谐呢！齐侯说：和（谐）和（相）同不一样吗？晏子回答说：不一样。和谐好像做羹汤一样，用水、火、醋、酱、盐、梅，来烹调鱼和肉，再用柴烧煮，厨子加工以调和，使味道适中，味道太浓就加水冲淡。君子食用这样的羹汤，内心平静。君臣之间也是这样。……现在据不是这样。国君认为对的，他也认为对；国君认为不对的，他也认为不对。这就像用水去调剂水，谁能吃它呢？如同琴瑟老弹一个声音，谁能听它呢？不应该同的道理就像这样。）《国语·郑语》：“（史伯曰：）夫和实生物，同则不继。以他平他谓之和，故能丰长而物归之；若以同裨同，尽乃弃矣。故先王以土与金、木、水、火杂，以成百物。”（实际上和谐才能生长万物，同一就不能发展。把不同的东西加以协调平衡叫作和谐，才能使万物丰盛发展而有所归属；如果把相同的东西相加，用尽之后就只能被抛弃。所以先王把土和金、木、水、火配合起来，做成千百种东西。）可见“和”与“同”是两个不同的概念。“以他平他”，是以相异和相关为前提，相异的事物相互协调并进，就能发展；“以同裨同”，则是以相同的事物叠加，其结果只能窒息生机。中国传统文化的最高理想是“万物并育而不相害，道并行而不相悖。”“万物并育”和“道并行”是“不同”；“不相害”“不相悖”则是“和”。这种思想为多元文化共处提供了取之不尽的思想源泉。

现在西方国家的有识之士都认识到不同文明之间应能共存，而不应因文化上的不同而引起冲突，以至于战争。他们认为，不同的民族和国家应该可以通过文化的交往与对话，在对话（商谈）和讨论中取得某种“共识”，这是一个由“不同”到某种意义上的相互“认同”的过程。这种相互“认同”不是一方消灭一方，也不是一方“同化”一方，而是在两种不同文化中寻找交汇点，并在此基础上推动双方文化的发展，这正是“和”的作用。不同民族和不同国家之间由于地理的、历史的和某些偶然的原因，而形成了不同的文化传统，正因为有文化上的不同，人类文化才是丰富多彩的，而且才在人类历史的长河中形成了互补和互动的格局。文化上的不同可能引起冲突，甚至战争，但并不能认为“不同”就一定会引起冲突和战争。特别是在今天科学技术高度发展的情况下，如果发生大规模的战争，也许人类将毁灭人类自身。因此，我们必须努力追求在不同文化之间通过对话，实现和谐相处。现在中西许多学者都认识到，通过对话沟通不同文化之间的相互理解的重要性。例如哈贝马斯提出“正义”和“团结”的观念。我认为，把它们作为处理不同民族文化之间关系的原则，是有意义的。哈贝马斯的“正义”原则可理解为，要保障每一种民族文化的独立自主，按照其民族的意愿发展的权利；“团结”原则可理解为，要求对其他民族文化有同情理解和加以尊重的义务。只要不断通过对话和交往等途径，总可以在不同民族文化之间形成互动中的良性循环。⁴⁷不久前去世的德国哲学家伽达默尔提出，应把“理解”扩展到“广义对话”层面。正因为“理解”被提升为“广义对话”，主体与对象（主观与客观或主与宾）才得以从不平等地位过渡到平等地位；反过来说，只有对话双方处于平等地位，对话才可能真正进行并顺利完成。可以说，伽达默尔所持的主体—对象平等意识和文化对话论，正是我们这个时代所需要的重要理念。⁴⁸这种理念，对我们今天如何正确而深入地理解中外文化关系、民族关系等等，具有重要的启示。但是，无论哈贝马斯的“正义”和“团结”原则，或者是伽达默尔的“广义对话论”都要以承认“和而不同”原则为前提，只有承认不同文化传统的民族和国家通过对话可以和谐相处，不同的文化传统的民族与国家才能获得平等的权利和义务，“广义对话”才能“真正进行并顺利完成”。因此儒家以“和为贵”为基础的“和而不同”原则应成为处理不同文化之间的一条基本原则。用“和而不同”原则处理不同文化传统国家与民族之间的关系，不仅对消除矛盾、冲突甚至战争有着正面的积极意义，而且也是推动各国家、各民族文化在交流中促使其发展的动力，所以罗素说：“不同文明之间的交流过去已经多次证明是人类文明发展的里程碑。”当今人类社会需要的是不同文化能在相互吸收和融合中发展不同的文化传统的特色，以期达到在新的基础上的“文化的共存”。

2．道家的“道论”能为防止“文明的冲突”提供有意义的资源

如果说孔子是一位“仁者”，那么老子则是一位“智者”。老子《道德经》一书中，“道”是其基本概念，而“自然无为”（顺应自然的规律，不做违背自然规律的事）是“道”的基本特性，王充《论衡·初禀》：“自然无为，天之道也。”今日人类社会之所以存在着种种纷争，无疑是由于贪婪地追求权力和金钱引起的。那些强国为了私利，扩张自己的势力，掠夺弱国的资源，实行强权政治，正是世界混乱无序的根源。也就是说帝国霸权正是“文明冲突”的根源。老子提倡“自然无为”。我们可以理解为：不要做（无为）违背人们愿望的事，这样社会才会安宁，天下才会太平。老子说，古代圣人曾经说过：“我无为而民自化，我好静而民自正，我无事而民自富，我无欲而民自朴。”这段话的意思是说：掌握权力的统治者不应该对老百姓作过多的干涉（无为），不要扰乱老百姓的正常生活（好静），不要做违背老百姓意愿的事（无事），不要贪得无厌地盘剥老百姓（无欲），这样老百姓就会自己教化自己（自化），自己走上正轨（自正），自己富足起来（自富），自己生活朴素。如果我们对这一段话给以现代诠释，那就不仅可以使一个国家内部安宁，而且对消除不同文明之间的冲突无疑有着重要意义。对这段话我们可以作如下诠释：在国与国之间对别国干涉越多，世界必然越加混乱。大国强国动不动用武力或武力相威胁，世界越是动荡不安和无序。大国强国以帮助弱国小国为名而行掠夺之实，弱国小国越加贫穷。发达国家以越来越大的欲望争夺世界财富和统治权，世界就会成为一个无道德的恐怖世界。据此，我认为“无为”也许对新帝国的领导者是一副治病良方，如果他们能接受，将会使世界得以和平和安宁。然而“新帝国”往往以干涉、掠夺、武力等等“有为”（为所欲为）手段来对待其他国家与民族，这无疑都是由其帝国贪欲本性造成的。老子认为：“祸莫大于不知足，咎莫大于欲得，故知足之足，常足矣。”（祸害没有比过于不知道满足的了，罪过没有比过于贪得无厌的了，知道满足的人，永远是满足的。）“新帝国”不正是“不知道满足的”“贪得无厌的”吗？老子还说：“天之道，其犹张弓欤？高者抑之，下者举之；有余者损之，不足者补之。天之道，损有余而补不足，人道则不然，损不足以奉有余。”（“天道”不就像张弓射箭吗？高了就把它压低一点，低了就把它升高一点，有余的加以减少，不足的加以补充。“天道”的规律是减少有余的，用来补充不足的。“人道”则不一样啊，往往要剥夺不足的，而用来供奉有余的）。为什么今日世界人类社会处在一种十分混乱不安定的状态？这完全是由人自身造成的，特别是那些“新帝国”的领导者造成的，他们违背了“天道”，他们失去了“人心”，他们奉行的是“损不足以奉有余”，这不正是今日世界不断发生矛盾、冲突、战争的根源吗？从这里我们可以看到，“文明冲突”论与其背后所隐蔽的“新帝国”论是有着密切联系的。

为了社会的和平和安宁，老子强烈地反对战争。《道德经》第三十一章中说：“夫兵者，不祥之器，物或恶之，故有道者不处。”（打仗用兵是不吉祥的东西，大家都厌恶它，所以有道德的人不使用它。）战争总要死人，总要破坏生产，总要使社会秩序被破坏，所以老子认为它不是什么好东西，老百姓都讨厌它，有道德的国家领导人是不使用战争的办法解决问题的。老子又说：“以道佐人主者，不以兵强天下，其事好还。师之所处，荆棘生焉。大军之后，必有凶年。”（我们应该用道德来告诫领导者，不要用兵力逞强于天下。用兵这件事一定会得到报应。军队所到的地方，就会破坏一切，使荆棘丛生。大战之后，一定会是荒年。）我们反观各国历史，无不如此，在我国每次大战之后往往出现：人口大量减少，土地荒芜，生产破坏，盗贼多有。两次世界大战的结果是如此，当前的中东地区的战争也是如此。哪个新帝国的领导者到处发动战争，其结果处处陷入被动，这是因为被征服的国家的老百姓不服，他们会用不怕死来抗争，所以老子说：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之。”（老百姓不怕死，用死来威胁他们又有什么用呢？）所以老子说：“夫乐杀人者，则不可得志于天下矣。”（喜欢杀人的人，就不能在天下成功）。我们从历史上看到，发动战争的人，虽然一时可以得逞，但最终总要失败，而落得身败名裂，希特勒是一个例子，日本军国主义也是一个例子。老子是一个“智者”，他用他的智慧能看到事物的相反方面，他说：“祸兮，福之所倚；福兮，祸之所伏。”（灾难，好运常常紧靠在它旁边；好事，灾祸往往会潜伏在它里面。）现在有些国家的人民正在受着苦难，这也就正是为他们将来的民族复兴准备了条件。从我们国家的百年历史来看，正是我们在处处挨打之后，我国的人民才有了觉醒，今天我们才可以说，中华民族正处在民族复兴的前夜。我想，世界各国、特别新帝国的领导者应从《道德经》中吸取智慧，认识强权政治、霸权主义从长期的世界历史发展看是没有前途的。因此，我认为老子思想对消解“文明的冲突”论、新“帝国论”是十分有价值的理论。我们拥护“文明的共存”论、赞成老子的“无为”思想，以期待今日人类社会能处在一和平、安宁、共同发展、共同富裕的大同世界之中。当然，两千多年前的老子思想不可能全然解决当今人类社会的问题（包括各民族之间的矛盾、冲突等等问题），但是他的智慧之光对我们应有重要启示。我们应该做的事，是如何把他的思想中的精华加以发掘和发挥，并给以现代的诠释，使之有利于人们从古代的思想文化的宝库中得到某些宝贵启示。

在不同民族和国家之间，由于宗教信仰的不同、价值观念的不同、思维方式的不同可以引起冲突，甚至可以由冲突导致战争。但是，是否必然要引起冲突，能不能化解冲突、使之不因文化的不同而导致战争，这就需要我们从各个不同民族的文化中找出可以使文明共存的资源，用以消解不同文明之间可以引起冲突的文化因素。如上所述，中国文化中的儒道两家可以为化解“文明的冲突”，并能为“文明的共存”提供有意义的资源。我相信，各民族、各国家的文化同样可以为化解“文明的冲突”，并能为“文明的共存”提供有价值的资源。在人类文明进入到21世纪之时，是用“文明冲突”的理论来处理各民族、各国家之间的问题，还是用“文明共存”的理论来引导人类社会走向和平共处，这是我们当前必须认真考虑和慎重选择的问题。反对“文明冲突”论，倡导“文明共存”论，这无疑是人类社会的福祉。《尚书·尧典》中说：“协和万邦。”中华民族和其他许多民族一样是一伟大的民族，有着悠久的灿烂光辉的历史文化传统，它的文化对人类社会无疑是极为宝贵的财富。我们对这笔财富应善于利用，使之对当前人类社会争取“和平共处”，实现不同文化之间的协调共存，推进世界各种文化之间的交流，作出应有的贡献。

X．THE COEXISTENCE OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY: SOURCES OF THE VALUE OF HARMONY IN DIVERSITY

I．Introduction

Though one cannot say that present world conflicts are mainly the result of cultural clashes, they certainly are related to clashes between cultures. A debate taking place in the world over cultural clashes and cultural coexistence might lead to greater mutual understanding, tolerance, and peace or, as a result of cultural isolation and hegemony, to political clashes. In either case, this debate will affect the destiny of humankind in the 21st century. Owing to the collapse of colonialism after the end of World War II, Western cultural imperialism gradually faded, and greater cultural diversity emerged in the world. In the past half century, developments in world trade and communication have led to ever more frequent cultural interactions between different peoples, nations, and regions, and have made the world an increasingly indivisible whole. In the present stage of world culture, two different tendencies have arisen: some Western theoreticians, seeking to protect their traditional interests and customs, continue to maintain a Western-centric perspective; others, adopting an indigenous romantic feeling toward an independent or revitalized people, create a nationalism that seeks to return to roots and preserve native culture, and a conservativism that seeks to return to past traditions. Some East Asian scholars, looking at the suffering wrought by Western culture throughout the world and the oppression that they personally suffered, even suggest a cultural perspective focused on East Asia. A great problem that we presently face is how we can prevent these two conflicting tendencies from developing into a large-scale confrontation and how we can dispel confrontations that do arise. At the same time, we must be careful about conflicts that may arise between the West and East Asia owing to differences in cultures and traditions.

II．Harmony in Diversity

How do we enable peoples, nations, and regions of different cultural traditions to develop together while remaining different, and in this way create a globally conscious environment for the development of cultural diversity? I think that the Chinese principle of harmony in diversity (he er butong) provides us with a source of positive value for doing precisely this.

The Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals for the 20th year of Duke Zhao of Lu (522 BC), records the following conversation between Jing, marquis of Qi, and Yan Ying: The marquis of Qi said to Yan Ying, "Does only Liangqiu Ju (an official close to the marquis) act in harmony with me?" Yan Ying replied, "Ju conforms. How do you get harmony (he) from conformity (tong)?" The marquis said, "Is harmony different from conformity?" Yan Ying replied, "Yes. Harmony is like the blending of ingredients of a good soup. The chef uses various condiments to cook a thick meat soup over a blazing fire, blending them together, adjusting the flavor, adding to make up for deficiencies, and draining off excesses. The gentleman eats the soup to calm his mind. The relation between ruler and minister is similar. . . . Now Ju does not operate like this. Whatever you approve, Ju also approves, and whatever you reject, Ju also rejects. This is like adding water to water. Who can eat such 'soup'? Again, this is like a zither that can produce only one note. Who can listen to such 'music'? In all such cases, sameness/conformity (tong) is unacceptable." Also, Discourses of the States (Guoyu), in the chapter "Discourses of Zheng," has Shi Bo's reply to Duke Huan of Zheng (771 BC): "Now blending (he) various substances can in fact produce many things, whereas things of the same (tong) substance do not maintain well. Balancing one substance with another is called blending. Things so produced are rich and long-lasting, and substances naturally come together in this fashion. Supplementing one substance with the same substance produces nothing but rubbish. Thus the kings of the past had clay mixed with metal, wood, water, and fire to produce ceramics of all kinds." These two passages make clear that he and tong are completely different in meaning. Confucius said this even more clearly: "The man of virtue harmonizes without conforming (he er butong). The narrow-minded man conforms without harmonizing (tong er buhe)" (Analects, "Zilu"). From the passages above, one can see that the significance of "harmony in diversity" (he er butong) is that when two different cultural traditions achieve a common understanding through cultural intercourse and dialog, they are in some sense attaining a commonality from their diverse perspectives. This commonality consists not of one side vanquishing the other side, nor of one side converting the other side, but of finding points in common in the two different traditions and on this foundation advancing both traditions. Precisely herein lies the power of harmony. We can see this effect in the development of Chinese culture. Confucians sought to establish propriety and create music to actively maintain (you wei) the harmony of society. Daoists, in contrast, sought to follow nature to passively maintain (wu wei) peace in society. These two originally very different cultural traditions, over the course of nearly two thousand years of development, achieved a certain common understanding through continuous dialog. In the Western Jin period (265-316), Guo Xiang, in an effort to harmonize the Confucian and Daoist traditions, proposed that active administration of government (you wei) is a form of passive administration of government (wu wei). In a comment on "Autumn Floods" in the Zhuangzi, he wrote, "Can men, in eking out a living, forego plowing with oxen or riding horses? In plowing with an ox and riding a horse, can one avoid ringing the ox in the nose or bridling the horse? The ox does not resist being ringed in the nose, and the horse does not resist being bridled, because Heaven wills it. If this is mandated by Heaven, then though these beasts of burden are placed in the service of man, this circumstance is rooted in the will of Heaven." The point of this passage is that though the ox is ringed in the nose, and the horse is bridled, through the active efforts (you wei) of man, these relations conform to what is natural (wu wei). Both Confucians and Daoists could accept this perspective of Guo Xiang even though this view does not fit squarely within either the original Confucian or original Daoist tradition. Active engagement (you wei) and passive following (wu wei) are quite different concepts. If both perspectives are to be accepted to some extent, both sides must find, through a process of negotiation, points of commonality (points of harmony). These points of commonality can serve as universal principles that both sides can accept. These universal principles are principles that both sides can accept without their negating the distinguishing features of either side. This state of affairs would indeed be a case of harmony in diversity.

We can also illustrate the significance of harmony in diversity with developments resulting from the encounter of traditional Chinese culture and a foreign cultural tradition. Originally, Indian Buddhist culture and traditional Chinese culture (Confucianism, Daoism, etc.) were quite distinct, but from the Han (202 BC-220 AD) to Tang (618-907) dynasties, Chinese culture continuously strove to accept and adapt the quite alien culture of Buddhism, and Indian Buddhism, for its part, continuously strove to change aspects of itself ill-suited to the demands of Chinese society. As a result, during the nearly one thousand years in which Indian Buddhism was transmitted to China, Chinese culture highly benefited from Indian Buddhism. Indian Buddhism profoundly influenced Chinese philosophy, literature, art, architecture, and popular customs. At the same time, Indian Buddhism was able to promote and perfect itself throughout the immense Chinese empire. During the Sui(581-618) and Tang dynasties, for example, there formed several more Sinitic sects of Buddhism (the Tiantai sect, Huayan sect, and Chan sect). Yet Chinese culture remained Chinese culture and did not lose its distinctive features because it adopted Indian Buddhism. Such cultural exchange and mutual influence serve as an excellent illustration of the principle of harmony in diversity. As a matter of fact, the development of European culture also exemplifies this principle. Bertrand Russell, in The Problem of China (1922), wrote, "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines." The reason that one culture could adopt another culture was often because the notion of harmony in diversity was embedded in the interactions and negotiations of the two cultures.

III．Commonalities across Cultural Traditions

There are various circumstances under which the principle of harmony in diversity appears in the interactions of two different cultural traditions. One is that in the negotiations between cultures, the two cultures discover that they have similar concepts. For example, Christianity has the concept of love for humanity, Buddhism has the concept of compassion, and Confucianism has the concept of concern for the masses. In an abstract sense, all of these concepts signify love. Love can thus serve as a universal principle that all these different cultural traditions can accept. At the same time, love for humanity, compassion, and concern for the masses are concepts that preserve the distinct features of their respective traditions. Another circumstance is that one culture, in its intercourse with another culture, discovers that it lacks important ideas present in the latter culture, and that these ideas can be accepted into the former culture. By accepting the new ideas through cultural interaction, transforming them, and fitting them into its culture, the receiving culture can enrich itself. For example, China originally lacked a clear notion of sudden enlightenment, but by the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi had adopted the notion of sudden enlightenment into their Rational School of Neo-Confucianism, as did Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren (Yangming) in their School-of-Mind Neo-Confucianism. A third circumstance is that one culture, in its intercourse with another culture, discovers that it lacks significant ideas present in the latter culture, and that though these new ideas are incompatible with some ideas of the receiving culture, interactions with the other culture force it to forsake the old ideas and accept the new foreign ideas in order to develop. For example, after the idea of democracy penetrated China, it had to give up such traditional notions as the "three guides" (san'gang: the ruler guides the minister, the father guides the son, and the husband guides the wife). A fourth circumstance is that in the interaction of two or more cultures, these cultures discover, through repeated discussions, significant new ideas previously missing in their cultures—ideas such as peaceful coexistence and the coexistence of cultural diversity—that, when incorporated into a system of diverse cultures, are undoubtedly significant for the individual cultures. There may, of course, be other circumstances leading one culture to adopt ideas from another, but here I will say no more. When, as described above, different cultures create commonalities by harmonizing their differences, when they find common principles in their differences, when they find common understanding in their different circumstances, such indeed is realizing harmony in diversity through cultural interaction and negotiation.

IV．Regional Diversity and the Bidirectional Nature of Cultural Selection

In this discussion of harmony in diversity as a principle of intercourse between different cultures, there are two other points worth noting. One is the issue of regional differences in cultural development. The other is the bidirectional nature of culture selection. Having persisted for a long period or having encountered some special cause, a culture may decline or even die out in one particular region or among a particular people and continue to develop in another region or among another people. For example, Buddhism, having been transmitted in India down to the fifth and sixth centuries, stagnated, but in China, having absorbed aspects of Chinese culture and having been developed at the hands of eminent monks during the Sui and Tang dynasties, it became more Sinified. Then from China it was transmitted to the Korean peninsula and Japan, where it blended in with the local cultures. In Japan especially, there developed some distinctly local sects of Buddhism. This is why I say that Chinese culture benefited from Indian Buddhism, and that Indian Buddhism was promoted and perfected in China. Such regional differences in development occurred not only in China but also in Europe. As Russell said in the passage quoted above, present-day European culture arose in Egypt, was transmitted to Greece, passed through Rome and Arabia, and reentered Europe. Such regional development of culture thus laid down the "landmarks in human progress." The reason for such development is that when culture a is transplanted within culture b, it may acquire aspects of culture b. These acquired aspects may be originally lacking in culture a or may have not received much development. After being added to culture a, these aspects then lead culture a to be developed within culture b. Such cultural development is perfectly consistent with the principle of harmony in diversity and is a good example of the idea that "blending various substances can in fact produce many things, whereas things of the same substance do not maintain well" ("Discourses of Zheng").

As for the bidirectional nature of culture selection, as we know, it is not the case that any alien culture transmitted to a region or a people at any time and under any circumstances will always be accepted and developed. For example, during the Sui and Tang dynasties, not only did Buddhism have a tremendous influence on Chinese society; "Buddhist sutras were over ten times more common among the populace than Confucian classics" (Sui Shu [ Book of Sui], "Jingji Zhi" [Treatise on Classics and Books]). At this time Nestorianism (a type of Christianity) was transmitted to China and had a degree of influence, yet it could not establish itself. This failure was due to the bidirectional nature of culture selection. Even different sects of Indian Buddhism fared differently in China. For instance, Esoteric (Tantric) Buddhism flourished for a while in the area of Han society after the mid-Tang—a fact verified by the relics excavated from the underground palace at Famen Temple. But later, Esoteric Buddhism fell into decline and had little lasting influence on Han society. Yet in Tibet, Indian Esoteric Buddhism blended in with the local religion to produce Tibetan Buddhism, which has persisted down to the present as the religion of Tibetans. What brought about this difference? The first type of Buddhism to enter the area of Han society consisted of the Theravada meditation techniques associated with An Shigao (birth date unknown). Later, Lokaksema (b. c. 147 AD) brought Prajñā Buddhism to China. From the Jin Dynasty (265-420) on, the form of Buddhism that spread in China was Prajñā Buddhism, not the Theravada meditation techniques. The reason was that PrajñāBuddhism was similar to Neo-Daoism (whose core teachings were those of Laozi and Zhuangzi); that Chan Buddhism (which developed during the Tang Dynasty after Prajñā Buddhism was adopted during the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420) and the Southern Dynasties (420-589) was different from Indian meditation techniques, its philosophical foundation arising from Prajñā Buddhism; and that Chan Buddhism adopted not only some elements of Daoism but also some elements of Confucianism in order to adapt to the needs of Chinese society. Here we see mutual selection between cultures. Moreover, such mutual selection between cultures is another typical manifestation of the principle of harmony in diversity.

V．Conclusion

In the early Tang period, Xuanzang (602-664) propagated the Consciousness-Only School of Thought, but this school of thought lasted only some thirty years. The reason that it was not respected by the Chinese is that this mode of thought was thoroughly Indian in style, and thus quite different from the Chinese manner of thinking. In contrast, Chan Buddhism spread quickly from the mid-Tang on because Chan thought was similar to Chinese thought and jelled into a Sinified sect of Buddhism. It then went on to influence the Rational School of Neo-Confucianism during the Song and Ming dynasties. This shows that in the intercourse between two different cultures, there is often mutual selection, and this mutual selection is to some extent a manifestation of the principle of harmony in diversity. For only if there is diversity between cultures can there be selection among diverse elements. If the thought of two cultures is entirely the same, there is nothing to select, and thought that is completely alike cannot add to preexisting thought any new ideas, and so cannot stimulate or promote the development of the preexisting culture. We can thus see that the principle of harmony in diversity has great significance for the mutual selectivity of interacting cultures.

We have seen that the principle of harmony in diversity can spur healthy cultural exchange and promote rational development of culture, in accord with the present world trend toward cultural diversity. If we want Chinese culture to develop for the better, if we want it to make a contribution to future world civilization, then we must approach the culture of other peoples, nations, and regions with an attitude of harmony in diversity, sufficiently absorb the achievements of other cultures, and renew our own traditional culture so that we can create a new culture suited to modern social life.

拾　文化的多元共处——“和而不同”的价值资源*

今日世界的纷争虽然不能说主要是由文化之冲突引起的，但也决非与文化冲突无关。因此，关于文化冲突与文化共处的讨论正在世界范围内展开，是增强不同文化间相互理解和宽容而引向和平，还是因文化隔离和霸权而导致政治冲突，将影响着21世纪人类的命运。自从第二次世界大战结束之后，由于殖民体系的瓦解，文化上的“西方中心论”也逐渐随之消退，世界文化呈现出多元发展的趋势。近半个世纪以来，世界经济贸易、信息传递的发展，使民族与民族、国家与国家、地域与地域之间文化上的交往越来越频繁，世界日益成为一个不可分割的整体。目前，在世界文化发展中，出现了两股不同方向的文化潮流：某些西方国家的理论家从维护自身传统利益或传统习惯出发，仍然坚持“西方中心论”。与此同时，某些取得独立或复兴的民族，抱着珍视自身文化的情怀，形成一种返本寻根、固守本土文化的民族主义和回归传统的保守主义。甚至某些东方学者鉴于两个世纪以来西方文化对世界造成的灾难和自身所曾受到的欺压，而提出文化上的“东方中心论”。如何使这两股相悖的潮流不致发展成大规模的对抗，并得以消解，实是当前一大问题。同时，我们还须注意，在西方国家与民族、东方国家与民族之间由于文化传统的不同也会引起纷争和冲突。

如何使不同文化传统的民族、国家和地域能够在差别中得到共同发展，以便造成在全球意识下文化多元化发展的新形势呢？我认为中国的“和而不同”原则可能为我们提供有正面价值的资源。

《左传·昭公二十年》记载有齐侯与晏婴的一段对话，齐侯对晏婴说：“唯据与我和夫！”（按：“据”指梁丘据，齐侯侍臣）晏子对曰：“据亦同也，焉得为和？”公曰：“和与同异乎？”对曰：“异。和如羹焉，水火醯醢盐梅以烹鱼肉，燀之以薪。宰夫和之，齐之以味，济其不及，以泄其过。君子食之，以平其心。君臣亦然。……今据不然。君所谓可，据亦曰可。君所谓否，据亦曰否。若以水济水，谁能食之？若琴瑟之专一，谁能听之？同之不可也如是。”又据《国语·郑语》，有史伯回答桓公的一段话说：“夫和实生物，同则不继。以他平他谓之和，故能丰长而物归之；若以同裨同，尽乃弃矣。故先王以土与金、木、水、火杂，以成百物。”这都说明，“和”与“同”的意义全不相同。孔子说得更为明确，他说：“君子和而不同，小人同而不和。”（《论语·子路》）从以上的几段话看，“和而不同”的意思是说，要承认“不同”，在“不同”基础上形成的“和”（“和谐”或“融合”）才能使事物得到发展。这种“同”不是一方消灭一方，也不是一方“同化”另一方，而是在两种不同文化中寻找交汇点，并在此基础上推动双方文化的发展，这正是“和”的作用。我们可以用中国文化自身发展为例：儒家要求“制礼作乐”，即要求“有为”以维护社会的和谐；道家追求“顺应自然”，即要求“无为”以保持社会安宁。它们本是两种很不相同的思潮，但经过近千年的发展，在不断对话中，取得了某种共识。到西晋，有郭象为调和孔老，提出了“有为”也是一种“无为”。在《庄子注·秋水》中有一段郭象的注说：“人之生也，可不服牛乘马乎？服牛乘马，可不穿落之乎？牛马不辞穿落者，天命之固当也。苟当乎天命，则虽寄之人事，而本在乎天也。”这里的意思是说，虽然“穿牛鼻”“落马首”是通过“人为”（人事）来实现，但它本来就是合乎“顺自然”的。郭象的这一观点，既是儒家可以接受，也是道家可以接受，但它又不全然是原来儒家和原来道家的思想了。“有为”（人为）和“无为”（天然）本不相同，但要使两者的意义都在某种程度上被容纳，就必须在商讨中找到交汇点（和），所找到的交汇点就可以成为双方能接受的普遍性原则，它并不要抹煞任何一方特点，而使双方能接受，这无疑是体现了“和而不同”的思想的。

我们还可以用中国历史上中国传统文化与外来文化相遇后发生的情况为例，说明“和而不同”的意义。本来印度佛教文化与中国传统文化（如儒家、道家等）是两种很不相同的文化，但从汉到唐的几百年中，从中国文化自身方面说，一直在努力吸收和融化佛教这种异质文化；从印度佛教方面说，则一直在致力于改变着不适应中国社会要求的方面。因此，在印度佛教传入中国的近千年的历史中，中国文化在许多方面受惠于印度佛教。印度佛教深刻地影响着中国哲学、文学、艺术、建筑以及民间风俗习惯诸多方面。同时，印度佛教又在中国这块大地上得到了发扬光大，在隋唐形成了若干中国化的佛教宗派（如天台、华严、禅宗等）。然而中国文化仍然是中国文化，并未因吸收了印度佛教文化而失去其特色。这种文化上的交流和互相影响，可以说是很好地体现了“和而不同”的原则。其实欧洲文化的发展也可以说明这一点。在罗素1922年写的《中西文明之比较》中有这样一段话：“不同文明之间的交流过去已经多次证明是人类文明发展的里程碑。希腊学习埃及，罗马借鉴希腊，阿拉伯参照罗马帝国，中世纪的欧洲又模仿阿拉伯，而文艺复兴时期的欧洲则仿效拜占庭帝国。”一种文化之所以能吸收他种文化，往往是在两种文化交往和商谈中体现“和而不同”思想的结果。

在不同文化传统的交往中体现“和而不同”的原则可能会有多种情况：一种情况是，在商谈中发现不同文化原来有相近或相似的观念，如在基督教中有“博爱”，在佛教中有“慈悲”，在儒家中有“泛爱众”，从抽象的意义上讲都是“爱”，“爱”就可以成为不同文化传统都可以接受的普遍原则。同时“博爱”“慈悲”“泛爱众”仍然保留其各自不同的特点。另一种情况是，在文化交往中发现此种文化不具有另一种文化某些重要观念，但另外那种文化中的这些观念和此种文化并非不能相容，这样就可以在交往中接受这些新的观念，并经过改造而逐渐使之融化在此种文化之中，从而丰富此种文化的内容。例如，在中国原来并没有明确的“顿悟”的观念，但到宋明时代，程朱理学和陆王心学都在某种程度上接受了“顿悟”的观念，使之融化在他们的体系之中。第三种情况是，在文化的交往中会发现，此种文化不具有彼种文化中的某些有意义的观念，而且这些有意义的观念和此种文化的某些观念不相容，从而在交往中不得不放弃此种文化中的某些旧观念，而接受外来的新观念，致使此种文化得到发展。例如在西方“民主”思想输入中国之后，中国人不得不放弃过去传统中的“三纲”等旧观念。第四种情况是，在两种或多种文化的交往中，经过反复的交谈会发现，双方或多方都未曾有过的，然而十分有意义的新观念，例如“和平共处”“文化多元共处”等观念，把这些观念引入不同文化体系中，无疑对各种文化都是有意义的。当然还会有其他种种不同情况，兹不赘述。上述不同传统文化之间因其“不同”通过“和”（调和；协调）的作用而达到某种“同”，在“不同”中找到可以共同接受的原则。

在讨论“和而不同”作为不同文化之间交往的原则时，似乎还有两点可以注意：一是文化的异地发展问题；另一是文化的双向选择问题。一种文化在一地（或一民族）发展日久或者遇到某种特殊的原因，会出现某种衰退甚至断绝的现象，而往往会在其传到另一地区（或民族）得到发展，例如佛教在印度传到五、六世纪，以后似乎没有什么重大发展，但佛教在中国隋唐时期（七、八、九世纪），由于吸收了中国文化的某些方面而为中国的高僧大德发展了，形成了中国化的佛教宗派，并通过中国传到朝鲜半岛和日本，于是又和当地文化相结合，特别是在日本又创造了日本独特的佛教派别。所以我常说：“中国文化曾受惠于印度佛教，印度佛教又在中国得到发扬光大。”这种文化的异地发展的现象不仅发生在亚洲，而且也发生在欧洲。如前引罗素所说，今日欧洲的文化是由埃及而到希腊，中经罗马、阿拉伯再回到欧洲，正是这种文化的异地发展，形成了“人类文明发展的里程碑”。究其原因，甲种文化移植到乙种文化中往往会给甲种文化增加某些新因素，这些新因素或者是甲种文化原来没有的，或者是在甲种文化中没有得到充分发展的，它们加入甲种文化，从而使甲种文化在乙种文化中得到发展。这种情况正符合文化发展的“和而不同”原则，这正是“和实生物，同则不济”的体现。

关于“文化的双向选择”问题，我们知道，并不是任何异质文化传到某一地区（或民族）在任何时候和任何情况下都会被接受和得到发展。例如在隋唐时期不仅佛教对中国社会有着重大影响，《隋书·经籍志》中说：“佛经在民间数十百倍于儒经”。这一时期景教（基督教的一种）也曾传入中国，并产生过一定影响，但最终并未在中国站住脚，这就有个文化的双向选择问题。不仅如此，就是印度佛教的宗派在中国的命运也不相同。例如密教（密宗）在唐中期以后在中国汉地曾盛极一时，这点我们可以从扶风法门寺地宫出土文物得到证实，但以后密宗衰落了，在汉地几乎没有什么影响，可是印度密教在中国西藏地区与当地苯教结合而形成藏地佛教，它一直到现在仍是藏族人民信仰的宗教。这是为什么呢？就汉地佛教说，最初传入的是小乘禅法安世高系，其后支娄迦谶把般若学随之传入中国。自晋以后在中国流行的是般若学，而非小乘禅法。究其原因，盖因般若学与以老庄学说为骨架的玄学相近，而在东晋南朝选择了般若学，在唐朝发展起来的禅宗也并非印度禅法，而其思想基础仍可说是般若一支，且禅宗无疑不仅吸收了某些老庄思想，而且为适应中国社会的需要也吸收了某些儒家思想。这就看出，在文化间确存在着一种“双向选择”问题，而这种“双向选择”也是“和而不同”原则的另一种体现。

我们还可以看到，在唐初虽有玄奘大师宣扬佛教唯识学，但此学在中国唐朝仅流行了三十余年，就不为中国人所重视，这是因为唯识学的思维模式完全是印度式的，与中国的思维模式大不相同。然而禅宗在唐中叶以后却很快流行了，这正因为禅宗的思维模式较接近于中国，成为中国化的佛教宗派，并影响着宋明理学。这说明，在不同文化交流中，文化之间常常存在着“双向选择”的问题，而这种“双向选择”也是在一定程度上表现着“和而不同”的原则。盖因文化之间总有“不同”，才有“选择”问题，如果是完全相同的思想，那就无所谓“选择”了，而且完全相同的思想的传入，对原有思想文化不会增加什么新的因素，因而也就不能刺激和推动原有文化的发展，可见“和而不同”原则对文化的“双向选择”有着非常重要的意义。

我们把“和而不同”看作是推动文化健康的交流，促进文化合理的发展的一条原则，这正符合当前世界文化多元化发展的趋势。如果我们希望中国文化得到更好的发展，如果我们希望中国文化今后能对人类文明有所贡献，就必须以“和而不同”的态度对待其他民族、国家、地域的文化，充分吸收它们的文化成果，更新自己的传统文化，以创造适应现代社会生活的新文化。

NOTEs　注释

壹　关于儒家思想第三期发展可能性的探讨

*　英文稿原发表于Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 51-54。中文稿1983年8月写于美国哈佛大学，并于是年8月25日在加拿大蒙特利尔大学举办的第17届世界哲学大会上以此稿为基础作了发言。后载于《瞩望新轴心时代——在新世纪的哲学思考》，中央编译出版社，2014年1月，第198—203页。——编者注

贰　儒学与建构性后现代主义

*　中文稿写于2011年12月23日；后载于《瞩望新轴心时代——在新世纪的哲学思考》，中央编译出版社，2014年1月，第150—152页。英文稿苑爱玲译。——编者注

1　Paul Kennedy, "The Form of Capitalism Will Change to Some Extent," Cankaoxiaoxi, March 16, 2009.

1　保罗·肯尼迪：《资本主义形成会有所改变》，见《参考消息》，2009年3月16日。

2　Universalism: Some Western scholars and politicians believe that only the values preached by Western empires have "universal value" and that the ideas and cultures of all other nations have no "universal value" to present-day human society except as museum exhibits. Therefore, we must distinguish the issue of "universalism" from that of "universal value." On this, please refer to the "General Preface" written by Tang Yijie for History of Chinese Confucianism, Peking University Press, October 2011.

2　“普遍主义”（universalism）：某些西方学者和政客认为，只有西方帝国鼓吹的价值观才具有“普遍价值”的意义，其他民族的思想文化中对当今人类社会没有“普遍价值”的意义，只有作为博物馆陈列品的价值。因此，我们必须将“普遍主义”与“普遍价值”问题区分开来。关于这个问题可以参见汤一介《中国儒学史·总序》，北京大学出版社，2011年10月。

3　According to the paper "Whitehead's Process Philosophy," "Process philosophy takes environment, resources and human beings as a closely related living community" (Social Sciences Weekly, Shanghai, August 15, 2002). Even the Stoics of Ancient Greece believed "man is part of nature." (Translator's back translation due to lack of the original English version of the relevant quotation—Translator's note)

3　《怀德海的〈过程哲学〉》中说：“（怀德海）的过程哲学把环境、资源、人类视为密切相连的生命共同体。”见上海《社会科学报》，2002年8月15日。甚至早期斯多葛学派也有“人是自然的一部分”的论述。

4　Karl Theodor Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Wei Chuxiong et al., Huaxia Publishing House, June 1989, p. 14.

4　卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯：《历史的起源与目标》，魏楚雄等译，华夏出版社，1989年6月，第14页。

5　Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, trans. Ma Yuande, The Commercial Press, August 1988. On page 91 of the final volume of this translation, it is written: "Descartes' philosophy. . . completed or nearly completed the dualism of spirit and material that began from Plato and was developed by Christian philosophy for religion-related reason. . . According to Descartes' system, the spiritual world and the material world are two parallel and independent worlds and the study of one may not involve the other."

5　罗素：《西方哲学史》，马元德译，商务印书馆，1988年8月，下册第91页中说：“笛卡尔的哲学……它完成了，或者说极近乎完成了自柏拉图开端而主要因为宗教上的理由经由基督教哲学发展起来的精神、物质二元论。……笛卡尔体系提出来精神界和物质界两个平行而彼此独立的世界，研究其中之一能够不牵涉另外一个。”

6　Léon Vandermeersch, "The Significance of Ruzang (Confucian Collection) in the World," Guangming Daily, August 31, 2009.

6　汪德迈：《〈儒藏〉的世界意义》，《光明日报》，2009年8月31日。

7　Wang Zhihe, "Postmodernism Calls for a Second Enlightenment," World Culture Forum, February 2007.

7　参见王治河：《后现代化呼唤第二次启蒙》，《世界文化论坛》，2007年2月号。

8　"For the Common Welfare: an Interview with John B. Cobber" (interviewed by Wang Xiaohua), Social Sciences Weekly, Shanghai, June 13, 2002.

8　《为了共同的福祉——小约翰·柯布访谈》（王晓华访问记），上海《社会科学报》，2002年6月13日。

9　According to the section "Supreme Harmony" of Correcting Ignorance by Zhang Zai, "Everything has its opposite and the opposite must move against the thing. When the opposite moves against the thing, there must be a fight between them. As long as there is a fight, the end must be harmony."

9　张载《正蒙·太和》中说：“有象斯有对，对必反其为；有反斯有仇，仇必和而解。”

10　"Chinese and Western Civilizations Contrasted," in Russell's A Free Man's Worship, Time Literature and Art Press, April 1988. The Chinese translation is slightly changed.

10　见《中西文明之比较》，此文收入罗素：《一个自由人的崇拜》，时代文艺出版社，1988年4月版，译文稍有改动。

11　Thinking Through Confucius, Peking University Press, August 2005.

11　《通过孔子而思》，北京大学出版社，2005年8月。

12　Complete Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vol. 3, p. 5.

12　《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷，第5页。

13　"For the Common Welfare: an Interview with John B. Cobber" (interviewed by Wang Xiaohua), Social Sciences Weekly, Shanghai, June 13, 2002.

13　《为了共同的福祉——小约翰·柯布访谈》（王晓华访问记），上海《社会科学报》，2002年6月13日。

叁　儒学的现代意义

*　英文稿原载Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2008, 3(4): 477-501。Translated by Yan Xin from Jianghan Luntan 江汉论坛 (Jianghan Tribune), 2007 (1): 5-14。中文稿原载《江汉论坛》2007年第1期。——编者注

1　卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯：《历史的起源与目标》，魏楚雄、俞新天译，华夏出版社，1989年，第14页。

2　蒋庆：《关于重建中国儒教的构想》，《中国儒教研究通讯》，2005年第1期。

3　参见《儒学“第四次浪潮”：激辩儒教》，载上海《社会科学报》，2006年2月23日。

4　同上。

5　孟子：《梁惠王》下。

6　张载：《横渠易说》。

7　朱熹：《朱子语类》第17卷。

8　朱熹：《朱子语类》第67卷。

9　孟子：《滕文公》上。

10　孟子：《公孙丑》下。

11　《左传·昭公二十年》。

12　参见潘德荣：《伽达默尔的哲学遗产》，香港《二十一世纪》，2002年4月号；于奇智：《哲人的人文化成》，香港《二十一世纪》，2002年8月号。

13　《朱子文集》第10卷。

14　《诗经·大雅·文王》。

肆　论禅宗思想中的内在性与超越性

*　英文稿原载Journal of Sino-Western Communications, 2010, 2(2): 51-68，杨浩译。中文稿原载《北京社会科学》，1990年第4期。——编者注

1　Chan is more famous for its Japanese name—Zen, and itself derived from the Sanskrit dhyana. In English, Chan is usually rendered as "meditation." —editor

2　《坛经》。

3　《五灯会元》第9卷《沩山灵佑禅师》。

4　《文益禅师语录》。

5　Sitting in meditation (zuo-chan) literally means sitting Chan, and is more famous for its Japanese name zazen. —editor

6　《佛果禅师语录》第14卷。

7　《佛果禅师语录》第9卷。

8　《坛经》。

9　《五灯会元》第7卷。

10　《古尊宿语录》第11卷。

11　《古尊宿语录》第1卷。

12　《景德传灯录》第6卷。

13　《指月录》第11卷。

14　《五灯会元》第9卷。

15　《景德传灯录》第14卷。

16　Yin-shun, The History of Chinese Chan Buddhism (in Chinese), Taipei: Zheng-wen Press, 1987, p. 375.

17　台湾正闻出版社1987年版，第375页。

18　《文益禅师语录》。

19　《五灯会元》第15卷。

20　《景德传灯录》第6卷。

21　《佛果禅师语录》第9卷。

22　同上。

23　《坛经》。

24　同上。

伍　论道教的产生和它的特点

*　英文稿原载Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 67-79。中文原载《中国文化与中国哲学》1986年第1期。——编者注

陆　论利玛窦汇合东西文化的尝试

*　英文稿原载Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 147-157。中文原刊于台湾《中国论坛》1989年3月25日。——编者注

1　Quoted from Luo Guang, Matteo Ricci (in Chinese).

1　罗光：《利玛窦传》，第71页。

2　Ibid., pp. 208-209.

2　同上，第208—209页。

3　Matteo Ricci, Lettere dalla China, trans. He Gaoji et al., Beijing: China Press, 1983, p. 687.

3　转引自《利玛窦中国札记》，何高济、王遵仲、李申译，中华书局，1983年3月第1版，第687页。

4　See the "Epilogue" to Twenty-five Sayings from Epictetus, in Xu Zongmian, ed. Extracts of the Translated Works by the Protestants in Ming and Qing Dynasties, Beijing: China Press, 1949, p. 329.

4　《跋二十五言》，载《明清间耶稣会士译著提要》，徐宗勉编著，中华书局，1949年2月初版，第32页和28页。

5　Ibid., p. 328.

5　同上。

6　See Ten Discourses by a Paradoxical Man, Yanzhoufu: Catholic Press, 1930, Vol. II, p. 76.

6　《畸人十篇》卷下，兖州府天主堂印书局，1930年，第4版，第76页。

7　Lettere dalla China, p. 663.

7　《利玛窦中国札记》，第663页。

8　Ibid., p. 664; also cf. p. 693.

8　同上，第664页，并参见第693页。

9　All the quotations are from Vol. II of Ten Discourses by a Para doxical Man, pp. 57-79.

9　以上引文均见《畸人十篇》卷下，“善恶之报应在身后”，第57—79页。

10　See The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (T'ien-chu Shih-i), p. 52.

10　《天主实义》，第52页。

11　Ibid., p. 55.

11　 同上，第55页。

12　Ibid., p. 71.

12　同上，第71页。

13　See Lettere dalla China, p. 660.

13　同上，第660页。

14　Ibid., p. 659.

14　同上，第659页。

15　See Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Catholicism, pp. 4-8.

15　《中国天主教史论丛），商务印书馆，1947年3月上海初版，第4—8页。

16　See the Preface to the Chinese version of Lettere dalla China, p. 23.

16　参见《利玛窦中国札记》，中译者序言，第23页。

17　See Studies of Philosophy, 9 (1987), pp. 29-35.

17　《哲学研究》，1987年第9期，第29—35页。

柒　论中国传统哲学范畴体系的诸问题英文稿原载 Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture, 1991: 17-37。中文原载《中国社会科学》1981年第5期。——编者注

*　The tables on pp. 206-207 are taken from Social Sciences in China, a quarterly journal(Beijing: The Social Sciences Publishing House, no. 4, 1982), III, pp. 204 and 210 respectively.

1　See "Early Daoist Theories of Life and Death, and Spirit and Form," Zhexue Yanjiu, No. 1, 1981.

2　参见《略论早期道教关于生死、形神问题的理论》，《哲学研究》，1981年第1期。

3　参见金克木：《试论梵语中的“有—存在”》，《哲学研究》，1980年第7期。

4　V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, XXXVIII, p. 92.

5　Ibid., p. 362.

6　Ibid., p. 247.

捌　再论中国传统哲学的真善美问题

*　中文原载台湾《哲学与文化》月刊1989年185期，同时又载《中国社会科学》1990年第3期。现我对内容作了少量补充，特此说明。——作者注
英文稿Translated by Bruce Doar from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (Social Sciences in China), 1990, No. 3, with some added passages translated by Yang Hao。——编者注
增译的内容是按照汤先生的要求在Bruce Doar翻译稿的基础上增译了第二节末段以及第四节后面一部分，另外还调整了前面一小部分的翻译以及部分术语，修订了原译稿中的部分拼写错误。——杨浩附注

1　In Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1984, No. 4.

1　载于《中国社会科学》，1984年第4期。

2　Zhexue Pinglun, Vol. 10, No. 6.

2　见《哲学评论》，第10卷第6期。

3　Kant, Panduanli Pipan (Critique of Pure Reason, Chinese edition), Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1964, p. 13. [Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 15-16. —editor]

3　《判断力批判》，商务印书馆，1964年版，第13页。

4　Li Zehou, Pipan Zhexue de Pipan (A Critique of Critical Philosophy), Renmin Chubanshe, 1984, pp. 368-370; Jiang Kongyang, Deguo Gudian Meixue (Classical German Aesthetics), Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1981, pp. 67-68.参见李泽厚《批判哲学的批判》，人民出版社，1984年版，第368—370页；蒋孔阳

4　《德国古典美学》，商务印书馆，1981年版，第67—68页。

5　Tang Yijie, Weijin Nanbeichao Shiqi de Daojiao (Taoism in the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties Period), Shaanxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1988, pp. 56-57.

5　参见拙著《魏晋南北朝时期的道教》，陕西师范大学出版社，1988年版，第56—57页。

6　"Sangang Wuji," in Baihu Tongyi.

6　《白虎通义·三纲五纪》。

7　"Tiandao," in Zhuangzi, contains the following passage: "With pure simplicity, the world cannot compete in beauty." This passage serves to explain the expression jiansu baopu.

7　《庄子·天道》：“素朴而天下莫能与之争美。”此可以为“见素抱朴”之注脚。

8　Hegel, Fa Zhexue Yuanli, Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1961, p. 351. [G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 341, p. 372. —editor]

8　黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，商务印书馆，1961年版，第351页。

9　Hegel, Xiao Luoji, Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1980, p. 87. [G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Logic, Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 24, remark. —editor]

9　黑格尔：《小逻辑》，商务印书馆，1980年版，第87页。

10　Hegel, Mei Xue, Vol. I, Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1979, p. 133. [G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. I, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 104-105.—editor]

10　黑格尔：《美学》第1卷，商务印书馆，1979年版，第133页。

11　The discussion about the philosophy of Hegel refers to Chen Xiuzhai & Yang Zutao, Ouzhou Zhexue Shigao (History of European Philosophy), Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 1983, pp. 553-558; Jiang Kongyang, op. cit., pp. 219-220; Xue Hua, Heigeer Yu Yishu Nanti (Hegel and Artistic Problem), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1986, pp. 25-27.

11　以上关于黑格尔哲学的论述参见陈修斋、杨祖陶：《欧洲哲学史稿》，湖北人民出版社，1983年版，第553—558页；蒋孔阳：《德国古典美学》，商务印书馆，1981年版，第219—220页；薛华：《黑格尔与艺术难题》，中国社会科学出版社，1986年版，第25—27页。

12　Zhu Guangqian, Xifang Meixue Shi (History of Western Aesthetics), Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe, 1963, pp. 55-56.

12　参见朱光潜：《西方美学史》上卷，人民文学出版社，1963年版，第55—56页。

13　See Chen Xiuzhai & Yang Zutao, op. cit., pp. 481, 488; Jiang Kongyang, op. cit., pp. 140-142.

13　参见陈修斋、杨祖陶：《欧洲哲学史稿》，第481、488页；蒋孔阳：《德国古典美学》，第140—142页。

玖　“文明的冲突”与“文明的共存”

*　英文稿原载Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2010, No. 3: 7381-7391, trans. Yang Zhiyi, rev. Shen Hong。中文原载《中国文化》，2004年6月；澳门《中西文化研究》，2004年6月。——编者注

1　《评亨廷顿〈文明的冲突？〉》，载《哲学研究》，1994年第3期。—Translator's note

2　亨廷顿：《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》，周琪、刘绯、张立平、王圆译，中文版序言，新华出版社，1999年。—Translator's note

3　Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1996, p. 318. —Translator's note

4　亨廷顿：《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》，周琪、刘绯、张立平、王圆译，新华出版社，1999年，第368页。

5　Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1996, p. 302. —Translator's note

6　亨廷顿：《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》，周琪、刘绯、张立平、王圆译，新华出版社，1999年，第348页。

7　Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire, "Preface," Harvard University Press, 2000.—Translator's note

8　Cf. 佩里·安德森（Perry Anderson）等：《三种新的全球化国际关系理论》(“Three Recent Theories on International Relationships in Globalization Era”)，《读书》，2002年第10期。—Translator's note

9　麦克尔·哈特、安东尼奥·奈格里：《帝国——全球化的政治秩序》，杨建国、范一亭译，封面及序言，江苏人民出版社，2000年。

10　参见佩里·安德森等：《三种新的全球化国际关系理论》，《读书》，2002年第10期。

11　Cf. 陈光兴: 《〈帝国〉与去帝国化问题》 (“Empire and the Problem of De-empirization”),《读书》，2002年第7期；崔之元：《布什原则、西方人文传统、新保守主义》(“Principles of Bush, Western Humanity Tradition and Neoconservatism”),《读书》，2003年第8期。《布莱尔的自由帝国主义理论奏效吗？》(“Would Blair's Liberal Imperialism Work?”), originally Tony Blair's speech: "The Best Defense of Our Security Lies in the Spread of Our Values" (Sunday Telegraph, May 30, 2004). —Translator's note

12　Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations?" p. 49, in Foreign Affairs, summer, 1993.—Translator's note

13　参见陈光兴：《〈帝国〉与去帝国化问题》，载《读书》，2002年第7期；崔之元：《布什原则、西方人文传统、新保守主义》，载《读书》，2003年第8期。布莱尔曾说：“防御安全的最佳办法就是传播我们的价值观。”（《布莱尔的自由帝国主义理论奏效吗？》，载英国《星期日电讯报》，2004年5月30日，转引自《英报认为布莱尔主义走向穷途末路》，载《参考消息》，2004年6月2日，第3版）

14　Bertrand Russell, "Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted," in The Problem of China, London, 1922. —Translator's note

15　"Clash of civilizations?" p. 22, op. cit. —Translator's note

16　Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, p. 7. —Translator's note

17　The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 59, op. cit. —Translator's note

18　Ibid., p. 20, op. cit. —Translator's note

19　雅斯贝尔斯：《历史的起源与目标》，第14页。

20　亨廷顿：《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》，周琪、刘绯、张立平、王圆译，第49页。

21　同上书，第5页。

22　苏轼：《题西林壁》：“不识庐山真面目，只缘身在此山中。”—Translator's note

23　As the translator fails to find the French version of this essay, this translation is based on the Chinese translation 《为什么我们西方人研究哲学不能绕开中国？》, published on《跨文化对话》, Issue 5, p. 146, 上海文化出版社, Jan. 2001. —Translator's note.

24　Fei Xiaotong, Collected Works of Fei Xiaotong, Vol. 14, Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe, 1999.—Translator's note

25　《跨文化对话》，第5辑，第146页，上海文化出版社，2001年。

26　费孝通：《中国文化与新世纪的社会学人类学——费孝通、李亦园对话录》，见《费孝通文集》，第14卷，第395页，群言出版社，1999年。

27　《中庸》：“仁者，人也，亲亲为大。”Cf. The Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 20.—T ranslator's note

28　《郭店竹简·五行》：“亲而笃之，爱也。爱父，其攸爱人，仁也。”—Translator's note

29　《郭店竹简·唐虞之道》：“孝之放，爱天下之民。”—Translator's note

30　《孟子·梁惠王上》：“老吾老以及人之老，幼吾幼以及人之幼。”C.f. Mencius, Chapter 2. —Translator's note

31　《论语·颜渊》：“己所不欲，勿施于人。”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 12. —Translator's note

32　《论语·雍也》：“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人。”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 6.—Translator's note

33　《论语·颜渊》：“克己复礼为仁。……”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 12. —Translator's note

34　Fei Xiaotong, "A Reconsideration of the Relationship Between Man and Nature in Culturalism," Working Paper of the Center for Sociological Research and Development Studies of China (CSRDSC), Department of Sociology, Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, PKU, Feb. 2002. —Translator's note

35　《郭店竹简·语丛二》：“爱生于性。”—Translator's note

36　《论语·学而》：“礼之用，和为贵。”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 1. —Translator's note

37　《论语·八佾》：“人而不仁如礼何？人而不仁如乐何？”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 3.—Translator's note

38　费孝通：《文化论中人与自然关系的再认识》，见北京大学中国社会与发展中心、北京大学社会学系、北京大学社会学人类学研究所ISA工作论文，2002年2月。

39　In this context, I translate this saying as "Harmony in Diversity," instead of "Unity in Diversity" —the latter is another popular translation of this term. Tong (同) means Agreement when applied on human relationships, or Sameness/Homogeneity on material objects. Thus the translator would use different translations according to the contexts, and translate "不同" as diversity, disagreement, or heterogeneity, etc. —Translator's note

40　《论语·子路》：“君子和而不同，小人同而不和。" Cf. The Analects, Chapter 12.—Translator's note

41　 In ancient Chinese philosophy, Metal, Wood, Water, Fire and Earth are Five Processes(五行), i.e. five basic elements, to make up the world. —Translator's note

42　《国语·郑语》：“（史伯曰：）夫和实生物，同则不继。以他平他谓之和，故能丰长而物归之；若以同裨同，尽乃弃之。故先王以土与金、木、水、火杂，以成百物。”—Translator's note

43　《中庸》：“万物并育而不相害，道并行而不相悖。”Cf. The Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 30. —Translator's note

44　Yue Daiyun, "Cultural Relativism and Comparative Literature," A Bridge Across Cultures, Peking University Press, 2002. —Translator's note

45　Pan Derong, "The Philosophical Heritage of Gadamer," Twenty-First Century, HK, Apr. Issue, 2002; Yu Qizhi, "Humanisitic Cultivation of the Philosophers," Twenty-First Century, HK, Aug. Issue, 2002. —Translator's note

46　《论语·学而》：“和为贵。”Cf. The Analects, Chapter 1. (Also: note 31) —Translator's note.

47　参见乐黛云：《文化相对主义与比较文学》，见《跨文化之桥》，北京：北京大学出版社，2002。

48　参见潘德荣：《伽达默尔的哲学遗产》，载香港《二十一世纪》，2002年4月；于奇智：《哲人的人文化成》，载香港《二十一世纪》，2002年8月。

49　Bertrand Russell, "Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted," in The Problem of China, London, 1922. —Translator's note

50　王充：《论衡·初禀》。—Translator's note

51　《道德经》第57章：“我无为而民自化，我好静而民自正，我无事而民自富，我无欲而民自朴。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 57. —Translator's note

52　《道德经》第46章：“祸莫大于不知足，咎莫大于欲得，故知足之足，常足矣。" Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 46. —Translator's note

53　《道德经》第77章：“天之道，其犹张弓欤？高者抑之，下者举之；有余者损之，不足者补之。天之道，损有余而补不足，人道则不然，损不足以奉有余。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 77. —Translator's note

54　《道德经》第31章：“夫兵者，不祥之器，物或恶之，故有道者不处。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 31. —Translator's note

55　《道德经》第30章：“以道佐人主者，不以兵强天下，其事好还。师之所处，荆棘生焉，大军之后，必有凶年。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 30. —Translator's note

56　《道德经》第74章：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 74.—Translator's note

57　 《道德经》第31章：“夫乐杀人者，则不可得志于天下矣。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 31.—Translator's note

58　《道德经》第58章：“祸兮，福之所倚；福兮，祸之所伏。”Cf. Tao Te Ching, Chapter 58.—Translator's note

59　《尚书·尧典》：“协和万邦”。—Translator's note

拾　文化的多元共处——“和而不同”的价值资源

*　英文稿原载Cultural Interaction Studies in East Asia: New Methods and Perspectives, March 31, 2012: 229-234。中文原载《跨文化对话》集刊第一辑，1998年。——编者注